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A Linguistic Frame of Mind: 
ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī and what it meant to be ambiguous 
Abstract 
The mediaeval Islamicate world was dominated by a language-obsessed culture that placed great 
value on words and their meanings. These words and meanings could, for those who used them, make the 
difference between both earthly success or failure, and salvation or damnation in the hereafter. Scholars 
were also conscious of the contingency of the links between words and their meanings, and the potential 
this created for ambiguity. This dissertation is about the mechanisms, models, and assumptions those 
scholars used to manage linguistic ambiguity. My investigation focuses on ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī (fl. ≤ 
409/1018), one such language-obsessed scholar. I provide a comprehensive review of his life, works, and 
times. He put together a portfolio of intellectual positions in exegesis, theology, ethics, and poetics that 
was guided by a philosophy of language which accepted and negotiated linguistic ambiguity. 
Underpinning that philosophy was a theory of meaning that used the pairing of expression and idea (lafẓ 
and maʿnā) to deal with polysemy, the intent of the speaker, and the function of the lexicon. Ar-Rāġib’s 
philosophy was emblematic of what I call the Arabic Language Tradition, the shared assumptions of 
which constituted an indigenous philosophy of language that was able to supply its own answers to the 
central questions of linguistics and then use those answers across all of the genres encompassed by its 
scholarship, from grammar to poetics, law, and theology. It was an Arabic Language Tradition that is best 
understood through comparison to an alternative Classical Language Tradition that had its roots in the 
Organon and a theory of meaning with little space for ambiguity. Re-telling Islamic intellectual history 
through the lens of language in this way shows us that in addition to the well-known and oft-studied 
Islamic engagement with Hellenistic philosophy there was another, indigenous, tradition with its own 
answers to the problems of mediaeval scholarship. This Arabic Language Tradition saw in language a 
solution to these problems, rather than seeing language as just another hurdle to be overcome. 
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Linguistic ambiguities, and the obsession with language from which they spring, have long 
been recognised as a prominent characteristic of mediaeval Islamicate intellectual culture. 
Richard M. Frank wrote that in “no culture, perhaps, has speech and the eloquent use of language 
been so praised and admired or the language itself more cherished and studied”.1 This 
observation was updated by James Montgomery with a list of eighteen intellectual disciplines 
ranging from law to poetry that show a “fascination (or: fixation) with speech”.2  
The obsession with language
3 
was accompanied by an awareness that language was 
inescapably imprecise. European scholars were aware of this back in 1954, when in the first 
                                                 
1 Richard M. Frank, Beings and their attributes: the teaching of the Basrian school of the Muʿta ila in the classical 
period  (Albany State University of New York Press, 1978). 9. 
2 The full list: 
At the very heart of the manifold, complex and shifting responses to the Qurʾān which we identify (and 
frequently distort) as characteristic of the Islam of the first two ʿAbbāsid centuries, beats a fascination (or: 
fixation) with speech: speech as divine (the Qurʾān); speech as revealed law (the Sharīʿa); speech as 
prophetic exemplar (the Ḥadīth); speech as God’s special gift to the Arabs and their Prophet (‛arabiyya); 
speech as creedal declaration (shahāda); speech as deontology (al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf); speech codified as 
grammar (naḥw); and lexicography (lugha); speech as reasoned (nuṭq); and logical (manṭiq); speech as 
dialectic, eristics and speculative science (kalām); speech as doctrine (maqāla); and oration (khuṭba); speech 
as utterances threaded together as a poem (qawl manẓūm); or scattered untrammelled by rhyme or rhythm as 
prose (qawl manthūr); speech as the cooing of doves [rhymed] (sajʿ); speech as translation (naql, 
occasionally tafsīr); speech as rhetoric (khaṭāba). 
James E. Montgomery, "Speech and Nature: al-Jāhiẓ, Kitāb al-Bayān wa-l-Tabyīn, 2.175-207, Part 1," Middle 
Eastern Literatures 11, no. 2 (2008): 170. It is a moot point whether the intellectual culture cared so much about 
language as a result of the Quran, or whether the Quran became intellectually central because the culture cared so 
much about language. 
3 It was a culture obsessed with language, but perhaps not quite “logocentric” (pace Montgomery, ibid.). The 
intellectual culture was obsessed with all words from a plurality of speakers more than it was obsessed with a single 
logos, even if that single logos were to be the Quran. Islamic scripture is also not quite what Jacques Derrida had in 
mind when he coined the word logocentrisme for the single shared logos, inevitably and naturally expressed in 
sounds, that he accused everyone “from the pre-Socratics to Heidegger” of being fixated with: “ce logocentrisme qui 
est aussi un phonocentrisme” (that logocentrism that is also a phonocentrism). NB: the link between Derrida’s 
logocentrisme and Islamicate intellectual culture was perhaps first made by Mohammed Arkoun. Jacques Derrida, 
 
 2 
edition of the journal Arabica Louis Massignon observed that Arabic was more the “langue des 
Aḍdād” than it was the “langue du Ḍād”, a pithy remark that played on the indigenous tradition 
that the phoneme ḍād was unique to the Arabic language, and on the apparent prevalence in 
Arabic of words with two opposite meanings (aḍdād).4 The article on linguistic structures in 
which he made this observation about ambiguity was a catalyst for a 1967 collection edited by 
Jean-Paul Charnay entitled L’Ambivalence dans la culture arabe. In its introduction Charnay 
wrote that it appeared paradoxical to base one of the great cultures of humanity on a notion that 
appeared to negate the great Hellenic principles of identity and causality, which had enabled 
modern civilisation to reason on the basis of evidence from reality.
5
 Although the contributions 
to Charnay’s collection demonstrated that words with two opposite meanings are no more 
common in Arabic than in French,
6
 and broadened the analysis of ambiguity to include the 
genres of legal disputes (i tilāf), dialectics, and mysticism, Charnay had nevertheless highlighted 
                                                                                                                                                             
De la grammatologie  (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1967). 11, 23. ———, Of Grammatology, trans. Gaytari 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 3, 11, cf. lxviii; Carool Kersten, "From 
Braudel to Derrida: Mohammed Arkoun’s Rethinking of Islam and Religion," Middle East Journal of Culture and 
Communication 4(2011): 7. 
4 Louis Massignon, "R flexions sur la structure primitive de l'analyse grammaticale en arabe," Arabica 1, no. 1 
(1954): 13 [11]. The letter ḍād is thought to have been “a lateral or lateralized velarized voiced interdental fricative”, 
which would indeed have made it “a unique sound among the world's languages”. Kees Versteegh, "Ḍād," in 
Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics Online Edition, ed. Kees Versteegh, Lutz Edzard, and Rudolf de 
Jong (Brill Online: Brill, 2010). 
5 Charnay’s argument reads: 
Il peut sembler paradoxal d’axer l’une des grandes cultures de l’humanit  sur une notion – l’ambivalence – 
apparemment n gatrice des grands principes d’identit  et de causalit  issus de l’hell nisme, repris sous des 
angles diff rents par Descartes, les rationalistes du XVIIIe siècle et les dialecticiens du XIXe siècle, et qui ont 
fond  l’essor de la civilisation moderne par ad quation entre les modes de raisonnement et la nature physique 
ou sociale.  
Jean Paul Charnay, ed. L'Ambivalence dans la culture arabe (Paris: Éditions Anthropos, 1967), 9. 
6 An analysis supported by G. Weil, "Aḍdād," in Encyclopaedia of Islam  Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. 
Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs (Brill Online: Brill, 2010). Cf. Lidia Bettini, "Ḍidd," in 
Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics Online Edition, ed. Kees Versteegh, Lutz Edzard, and Rudolf de 
Jong (Brill Online: Brill, 2010). 
 3 
a key aspect of the foreignness of mediaeval Islamicate intellectual culture from a European 
perspective: it appears to be particularly tolerant of ambiguity. 
In Die Kultur der Ambiguit t: Eine andere Geschichte des Islams, Thomas Bauer notes that 
mediaeval Islamicate scholarship often still offers the best theoretical presentation of verbal 
ambiguity available, before going on to address language as just one of a number of types of 
cultural agency that can be evaluated against an ideal of Ambiguit tstoleran  that he hopes can 
be useful for Europeans, Muslims, and European Muslims today.
7
 It is likely that the difference 
between Charnay’s discomfort with ambiguity and Bauer’s celebration of it reflects 
philosophical developments in European scholarship in the later decades of the twentieth 
century. We have, thanks to Michel Foucault, Richard Rorty, and many others, as well as 
substantial recourse to the ironies laid out by Friedrich Nietzsche, become more comfortable 
with ambiguity and commensurately less comfortable with certainty. Revealingly, Bauer 
bookends Die Kultur der Ambiguit t with a quotation from the Nobel Prize winning physicist 
Max Born (1882-1970) that says absolute certainty and the belief in a single attainable reality are 
at the root of the world’s evils.8 In this dissertation, however, I am dealing with a different time 
and a different place. There was no mediaeval Islamicate discussion of whether absolute 
certainty existed, comparable to the debates that informed Born, Charnay, and Bauer. Instead, 
there were a series of methodological disagreements about how best to attain certainty. This 
dissertation focuses on disagreements about the role language played in that process. 
                                                 
7 Thomas Bauer, Die Kultur der Ambiguit t: Eine andere Geschichte des Islams  (Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligion, 
2011). 13, 16-17, 405. (The Culture of Ambiguity: an alternative history of Islam). Ambiguit tstoleran  (tolerance of 
ambiguity) is a concept from psychology that Bauer says has not yet found its place in the social sciences. Ibid., 13. 
8 “Ich glaube, daβ Ideen wie absolute Richtigkeit, absolute Genauigkeit, endgültige Wahrheit usw. Hirngespinste 
sind … Ist doch der Glaube an eine einzige Wahrheit und deren Besitzer zu sein, die tiefste Wurzel allen Übels auf 
der Welt.” Max Born. Von der Verantwortung des Naturwissenschaftlers (translated into English as My Life and My 
Views), Munich, 1965, p.183. Quoted in ibid., 15, 405. 
 4 
Linguistic Structures 
I argue that the various instances of linguistic ambiguity, such as the aḍdād, are all 
products of the relationship between expression (lafẓ) and idea (maʿnā), and that it is only by 
starting one’s investigation with this basic pairing that one can come to understand the different 
ways in which mediaeval Arabic-language scholars engaged with and negotiated ambiguity. I 
also argue that just as Charnay and Bauer differentiated between the European and Islamicate 
traditions’ attitudes to ambiguity, there are two separate traditions within mediaeval Islamicate 
scholarship that accepted the framework of expression and idea while disagreeing on its 
relevance to their goals. The Arabic Language Tradition exemplified by ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī 
(henceforth anglicized as “Ragib”) chose to focus on language and manipulate the relationships 
between expressions and ideas in order to solve many of the problems of divine revelation, 
human speech, and reality. The Classical Language Tradition rejected such obsession with 
language in favour of the pursuit of a reality made up of supra-linguistic ideas. These contrasting 
philosophical approaches to language resulted in two very different attitudes to its potential for 
ambiguity; the Arabic Language Tradition was comfortable with the prospect, and the Classical 
Language Tradition was not. 
The Arabic and Classical Language Traditions may have disagreed about ambiguity but 
they tended to share the assumption that expression and idea constituted the primary conceptual 
vocabulary for the interaction of language, mind, and reality. The pairing of expression and idea 
(lafẓ and maʿnā) therefore stands at the very center of this dissertation, which in fact began life 
as an enquiry into the functions performed by these two terms in the work of Ragib, his 
contemporaries, and the preceding generations. Now if we step away from the Arabic-speaking 
world for a moment to ask what “expression” and “idea” mean, the answer is that they are simply 
 5 
two levels of linguistic structure. Expression (lafẓ) and idea (maʿnā) are the names used in 
Arabic for the two core elements of linguistics:  
linguists over the years have made a strong case for distinguishing at least two levels of 
structure: one that will interface with the morphology and the phonology of the language to 
yield the surface form of sentences [i.e. lafẓ], and another that will interface with other 
conceptual components of the mind to yield the meaning of sentences [i.e. maʿnā].9 
The pairing of expression and idea was ubiquitous in Arabic-language mediaeval scholarship. 
All the authors I am dealing with simply assumed that these two concepts were part of the fabric 
of language and reality. Terminological alternatives were very rarely countenanced.
10
  
The ubiquity of the pairing of expression and idea means that it has attracted substantial 
attention from scholars of mediaeval Arabic, and their works have given us a clear and 
informative picture of the range of ways in which these two words were used. Frank’s article 
investigating the concept of maʿnā, which he usually translates as “meaning”, reflects a 
paradigmatic philological approach. It is a detailed enquiry into the word’s meaning in the 
specific genre and context of pre-eleventh-century Arabic grammar.
11
 The first important 
                                                 
9 Cedric Boeckx, Linguistic Minimalism: origins  concepts  methods  and aims  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006). 40. 
10 That this was not an inevitable assumption can be seen by turning back to twenty-first century linguistics, where 
Noam Chomsky and others have to argue for their “big facts” about language, the “essential, unavoidable features of 
human language” that exist by “conceptual necessity”. One such fact is that “sentences are pairings of sound and 
meanings”, and Chomsky would argue that this binary was all that mattered against a proliferation of earlier 
theories, some of which were his own. In Chomsky’s words: “(a.) A linguistic expression (SD) [structural 
description] is a pair (π, λ) [phonetic form, logical form] generated by an optimal derivation satisfying interface 
conditions. (b.) The interface levels are the only levels of linguistic representation”. Boeckx’s analysis of Chomsky’s 
1993 article adds that Chomsky would add the word “virtual” in brackets to “conceptual necessity” to show that “in 
science we must always be ready to be proven wrong”. Such quibbles could only have been alien and irrelevant to 
Ragib. Ibid., 73. (Norbert Hornstein, Jairo Nunes, and Kleanthes K. Grohmann, Understanding Minimalism  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 7f.) Noam Chomsky, "A Minimalist Program for Linguistic 
Theory," in The View from Building 20: essays in linguistics in honor of Sylvain Bromberger, ed. K. Hale and S. J. 
Keyser (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 1, 2, 3, 5, 43.   
11 Richard M. Frank, "Meanings are Spoken of in Many Ways: the Earlier Arab Grammarians," Le Museon 94, no. 3-
4 (1981). See also the index to his collected articles: Texts and Studies on the Development and History of Kalām. 
 
 6 
observation Frank makes is that the “grammarians of the period … elaborated no formal theory 
of meaning”.12 This is true of Ragib, who never laid out all the components of his language 
model in one place, nor labelled them as his methodology or theory. However, I will show that 
across his portfolio of works Ragib provided a number of compatible presentations of “what 
speech is” or “what language is”. 
Frank’s conclusion is that maʿnā means enough different things for it to be almost 
impossible to translate with a single English word, and he groups these alternatives under four 
main headings: maʿnā as intent; maʿnā as referent; maʿnā as “semiotic equivalent” or 
paraphrase; and maʿnā as “conceptual significate” and “an ideal or abstract entity”.13 However, 
had Frank broadened the scope of his enquiry beyond the grammarians he would have 
confronted the fact that although manageable limits on the number of English words needed to 
translate maʿnā are elusive, there is no evidence that mediaeval Islamicate scholars had an 
equivalent problem. Polyvalency and homonymy were familiar issues for them but while many 
words and concepts were known for being multivalent, maʿnā was not one of them. It appears to 
have been a fixed part of the architecture that enabled them to deal with the polyvalency of other 
words. Frank writes:  
The problem [of different uses of maʿnā] seems not to have posed itself and it is hardly 
required for us to attempt to formulate a theory for them, forcing the texts to answer a 
question they do not raise and, more pertinently, the answer to which is not needed for our 
understanding of their responses to the questions they do raise.14  
                                                                                                                                                             
Edited by Dimitri Gutas. 3 vols. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005-c2008). 
12 Ibid., 260. 
13 Ibid., 314-315. 
14 Ibid., 314. 
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The question did not pose itself because it was irrelevant but rather because it was commonplace, 
widely shared, and generally assumed. I consequently understand the concept of maʿnā an 
“assumption” and translate it with the single word “idea”.15 It is true that mediaeval scholars did 
not need to interrogate their own assumptions in order to use them, but if we wish to understand 
their methodologies then we must. Methodologies have the inevitable character of affecting the 
subject matter of the genres in which they are used.  
Whereas Frank was unsure “whether all … or which, if specifically one or some and not 
another, of the several meanings [of maʿnā] we have found and distinguished in the texts should 
be understood when” the word maʿnā is used,16 I would argue that there is in fact a single 
meaning. I disagree with Djamel Eddine Kouloughli that this breadth of signification is one of 
the factors that “proved harmful to a meticulous and methodical study of the relationship 
between” lafẓ and maʿnā.17 On the contrary, I believe that the absence of such a study by a 
mediaeval scholar can be evidence of the widely shared nature of the assumptions about 
language, mind and reality that I am investigating. When assumptions are so obvious and well-
known, and at the same time so fundamental to the way one thinks, they tend not to be addressed 
specifically or explained explicitly. Equally, it is because maʿnā is such a broad concept that it 
proved to be so useful, and together with lafẓ remains such an aesthetically pleasing theory.18 
                                                 
15 Cf. my brief discussion of the problem of translation on page 30. 
16 Frank, "Meanings " 315. 
17 Djamel Eddine Kouloughli, "Lafḏ,̣" in Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics Online Edition, ed. Kees 
Versteegh, Lutz Edzard, and Rudolf de Jong (Brill Online: Brill, 2010). 
18 Cf. recent judgements on the aesthetic quality of Muḥammad b. Idrīs aš-Šāfiʿī’s legal theory. David R. Vishanoff, 
The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law, vol. 93, American 
Oriental Series (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2011). 41. Joseph E. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory: 
the Risāla of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (Leiden: Brill, 2007). 59. For discussion of “the convergence of 
beautiful design and empirical pay-offs” see: Boeckx, Linguistic Minimalism, 82, 116f. 
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The aesthetic impact of using the single pairing of expression and idea to deal with all 
problems of meaning and signification, singularly defines Ragib’s work and is found throughout 
the analyses of scholars writing in Arabic throughout the mediaeval period. This should not be 
taken to mean that it dominates everywhere to a equal extent, an observation particularly true 
after Ragib’s death, when spectacularly successful programmes such as that of Abū Yaʿqūb 
Yūsuf as-Sakkākī (555/1160-626/1229)19 had found favour in the madrasa. As-Sakkākī used the 
terms expression and idea, but their pairing did not structure his thought about language in the 
way it did Ragib’s.20 His commentator al- a īb al-Qazwīnī ( alāl ad-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh 
Muḥammad, 666-739/1268-1338) on the other hand, did use the pairing: “in the Qazwīnian 
tradition the [poetics] figures are divided into two kinds, as they are anchored either in the 
meaning [the idea] (maʿnawī) or in the wording [the expression] (lafẓī)”.21  
Both as-Sakkākī and al-Qazwīnī fall outside the chronological scope of this dissertation, 
but when their work is reflected in secondary studies such as that of Ahmed Moutaouakil it can 
provide useful further information about the meaning of these two terms. In his R flexions sur la 
th orie de la signification dans la pens e linguistique arabe, Moutaouakil is sensitive to the 
                                                 
19 Dates will be given in this format, A.H./A.D., and the A.D. date should be regarded as approximate ± one year, 
although I have calculated it correctly when the requisite information was available. The Hiǧrī calendar (A.H.) is 
lunar, the Gregorian calendar (A.D.) solar, and the extra notation required to represent the ambiguity in every 
instance would be cumbersome to little effect. Centuries (for example “the eleventh century”) will be given in A.D. 
only. 
20 As-Sakkākī brought the linguistic disciplines in Arabic (excluding lexicograpy) together under a single umbrella, a 
programme and achievement that falls outside the chronological scope of this dissertation. He called this new 
discipline ʿilm al-adab and wrote that it contained all those aspects of adab, apart from lexicography, that were 
indispensable. Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf as-Sakkākī, Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Hindāwī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub 
al-ʿIlmīyah, 2000). 37. Cf. Kees Versteegh, "The Arabic Tradition," in The Emergence of Semantics in Four 
Linguistic Traditions: Hebrew  Sanskrit  Greek  Arabic, ed. Wout Jac van Bekkum (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 
1997), 262.   
21 Al-Qazwīnī called the subject in question ʿilm al-balāġah. The quotation is from: Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Rhetorical 
Figures," in Encyclopedia of Arabic literature, ed. Julie Scott Meisami and Paul Starkey (London / New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 657. 
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breadth of signification of key Arabic terms, writing that maʿnā can signify lexical meaning 
[from a dictionary], semantic meaning [from a sign], pragmatic meaning [from an intent], a 
representation of a principle (aṣl) [derived meaning], syntactic meanings [from relationships to 
other words], and propositional content as a speech act.
22
 However, he only deals with the 
combination of maʿnā and lafẓ when he ascribes these two levels of analysis to the grammarians, 
for whom lafẓ is something analogous to the modern concept of surface form while maʿnā is 
more profound and a representation of both syntactic sense and pragmatic signification.
23
 
Kees Versteegh writes that from “the point of view of the historiographer the most 
fascinating aspect of the development of the science of language in the Arabic world is the 
perseverance of the dichotomy of lafẓ/maʿnā”.24 I agree. However, Versteegh continues this 
sentence:  
…in spite of a constantly changing perspective in the use of maʿnā. … Apparently, they 
were not bothered by the variety of meanings in which the term maʿnā was used and made 
no effort to clarify and demarcate these various usages…25  
He provides a list of sixteen meanings of maʿnā in five groups: aspects of maʿnā “linked with the 
speaker” (intent); “linked with the message” (intent, paraphrase, communicative purpose…); 
“linked with the extra-linguistic world” (referent…); “linked with thought” (“the conceptual 
                                                 
22 Ahmed Moutaouakil, R flexions sur la th orie de la signification dans la pens e linguistique arabe  (Rabat: 
Facult  des lettres et des sciences humaines de Rabat, 1982). 53-54, 87-88. 
23 Ibid., 108-110. Moutaouakil’s study reinterprets mediaeval ideas about language in order to make them contribute 
to modern linguistics and semiotics. He synthesises Arabic ideas into a “th orie du discours” that he says, with some 
justification, is pragmatics-based (i.e. centred upon language in use, deixis, and context). Moutaouakil’s work is 
effective in demonstrating the scope, scale, and variety of mediaeval Arabic work on language, and of the relevance 
of these ideas to twentieth-century Western linguistics and semiotics.  
24 Versteegh, "The Arabic Tradition," 275. 
25 Ibid. 
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correlate of a word”, Aristotelian form, Platonic idea”); and “linked with the linguistic sign” 
(lexical meaning, underlying grammatical structure or function…).26 
Versteegh is consciously broadening his field of enquiry beyond grammar, hence the 
inclusion of results of the translation process from Greek and Syriac such as the Platonic ideas.
27
 
Nevertheless, what we have here is a list of the ways mediaeval scholars used a single concept, 
rather than evidence of the internal subdivision of that concept. If there was, as I argue, a broad 
ontological assumption that the interface between language and reality was made up of just the 
two spaces of idea and expression, then it is hardly surprising that a mediaeval scholar would 
translate Aristotle’s “form” with the same word that he would use for “thought” or “intent”. This 
is, of course, not to say that mediaeval scholars did not have the tools to distinguish between 
alternatives when required. The translators and Hellenistic philosophers were comfortable with 
creating neologisms, and everyone else had plenty of resources in the lexicon to establish the 
difference between a contemplative idea (fikrah…) and a specific conversational intention 
(qaṣd…).28  
                                                 
26 Ibid., 230-231. 
27 Kouloughli agrees with Versteegh about the limitations of the grammarians’ horizons. In his article “A propos de 
lafẓ et maʿnā”, which starts with the statement that “[t]he pairing of lafẓ and maʿnā occupies a central position in all 
disciplines that are particularly concerned with language and texts…” (le couple lafẓ/maʿnā a occup  une position 
centrale dans toutes les disciplines qui sont int ress es de près à la langue et aux texts…), he writes that the 
grammarians had little interest in the semantic aspects of the language, by which he means those aspects connected 
to the meaning of words, and consequently to the mind. He suggests that this lack of interest contributed to the 
poverty of their contributions to the semantic dimensions of grammatical problems. Djamel Eddine Kouloughli, "A 
propos de lafẓ et maʾnā," Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales 35(1983): 43. 
28 It is only when Versteegh addresses a further subdivision of maʿnā into divergent grammatical meanings, by 
Georges Bohas working on Muwaffaq ad-Dīn Abū al-Baqāʾ Ibn Yaʿīš (553/1158-643-1245), that he is prepared to 
admit that subdivisions can be a problem:  
the distinction of two different maʿnās by Bohas is a distinction set up by a modern historiographer. Within 
the Arabic tradition the two senses of the term maʿnā are used indiscriminately, and maʿnā denotes at the 
same time the lexical and the morphological/syntactic meaning. 
 Versteegh, "The Arabic Tradition," 248-249. As part of a close reading of Ibn Yaʿīš’ commentary on Abū al-Qāsim 
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Twentieth-century Arabic-language scholarship has also paid attention to expression and 
idea (lafẓ and maʿnā). Iḥsān ʿAbbās wrote that the binary ( unāʾīyah) of lafẓ and maʿnā was set 
up by the earliest scholars, crystallised with Ibn Qutaybah al-Dīnawarī’s (213/828 - 276/889) 
division of poetry according to the quality of its lafẓ, maʿnā, or both, and was then felt to be 
restrictive by the great literary theorist from the generation after Ragib, ʿAbd al-Qāhir al- urǧānī 
(d. 471/1078).
29
 Sulaymān Ḥasīkī’s article on the relationship between lafẓ and maʿnā gives a 
well-chosen review of mediaeval and modern works that deal with this binary, showing that 
scholars such as Ibrāhīm ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Māzinī (d. 1949) were still able to make profitable use 
of the pairing to talk about language and mind in the twentieth century.
30
 
Al- urǧānī had been perhaps the first mediaeval scholar to develop a meta-discourse about 
expressions and ideas in Arabic.
31
 Unlike Ragib, he not only used these two terms, but was also 
interested in the way that other scholars had used them. He was aware that the genre of poetic 
criticism (naqd aš-šiʿr) had enabled opposing schools of thought to see themselves as partisans 
of either one or the other, and he felt that such focus on the poetic quality of either specific 
expressions or specific ideas obscured the importance of combinations of expressions (naẓm) and 
                                                                                                                                                             
az-Zamaḫšarī’s (467/1075-538/1144) compendium of Arabic grammar Kitāb al-Mufaṣṣal fī an-Naḥw, Bohas had 
distinguished between the maʿnā that connects “hitting” and “hitter” to “hit” (the root ḍ-r-b), and the maʿnā that 
connects “hitter” to “eater” and “drinker” (the pattern fāʿil). Georges Bohas, "Contribution à l' tude de la m thode 
des grammairiens arabes en morphologie et en phonologie d'après des grammairiens arabes 'tardifs'," in Etude des 
th ories des grammairiens arabes I: morphologie et phonologie, ed. George Bohas and Jean-Patrick Guillaume 
(Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1984), 27.   
29 Iḥsān ʿAbbās, Tārī  an-Naqd al-Adabī ʿinda al-ʿArab  (Beirut: Dār al-Amānah, 1971). 422. 
30 Sulaymān Ḥasīkī, "Al-ʿAlāqah Bayn al-Lafẓ wa-l-Maʿnā. Dirāsah fī Abniyat al-Kalimah aṣ-Ṣawtīyah wa-ṣ-
Ṣarfīyah," al-Fikr al-ʿArabī 21, no. 24 (2000). For al-Māzinī see: ʻUmar Riḍā Kaḥḥālah, Muʿ am al-Mu’allifīn: 
Tarā im Muṣannifī al-Kutub al-ʿArabīyah, 4 vols. (Beirut: Mu’assasat ar-Risālah, 1993). 1:65.  Kamal Abu Deeb 
thinks that al-Māzinī’s analytical toolbox was taken from al- urǧānī without attribution. Kamal Abu Deeb, Al-
Jurjānī's Theory of Poetic Imagery  (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1979). 1-2. 
31 Kouloughli wrote that it was only with la r volution Ǧur anienne (“The al- urǧānian revolution”) that lafẓ and 
maʿnā became the part of a semantic theory. Kouloughli, "A propos de lafẓ et maʾnā," 55-56. The problem with this 
chronology from my point of view is that Ragib is “pr - urǧanienne” and yet is using what appears to be an 
established methodology that addresses language, mind and reality with the binary of expression and idea. 
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their consequent combinations of ideas (maʿnā al-maʿnā). This was the first time that there had 
been a critical assessment of the role the pairing of expression and idea had been playing in 
poetics, and al- urǧānī’s work has unsurprisingly been the focus of sustained attention.32  
Margaret Larkin’s monograph on al- urǧānī refers to the pairing as “the overused terms, 
lafẓ and maʿnā”,33 which reflects her recognition of the tremendous range of conceptual 
functions performed by these two terms. She is explaining how the Muʿtazilī theologian al-Qāḍī 
ʿAbd al- abbār (d. 415/1024) simply defined eloquence with parallel adjectives for each term: 
eloquence is elegance of expression and superiority of idea.
34
 The two words in question were 
indeed often used in such an indeterminate manner, but contrary to Larkin, my feeling is that 
they are used so often and in so many ways not because they are vague or ill-defined, but 
because they represent core assumptions with a clear semantic range.
35
 Kamal Abu Deeb is more 
sympathetic to the breadth of signification behind the word “expression” than Larkin; writing 
that before al- urǧānī the word lafẓ had indicated “the sound-aspect of poetry, with no reference 
                                                 
32 Salim Kemal’s engaging review of Arabic poetics is notable for its lack of dependence on al- urǧanī. However, 
Kemal’s assertion that “it is not clear that the distinction of form from content is useful in any explanation” runs 
contrary to my  argument throughout this dissertation. Salim Kemal, The Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna  (Leiden: 
Brill, 1991). 1-40, 34. Cf. Charles E. Butterworth, "Review: The Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna. Islamic 
Philosophy, Theology, and Science, Texts and Studies. Vol. 9 by Salim Kemal," College Literature 23, no. 2 (1993); 
Anne Druart, "Review: The Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna by Salim Kemal," The Review of Metaphysics 46, no. 3 
(1993); Julie Scott Meisami, "Review: The Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna by Salim Kemal," Journal of the 
American Oriental Society 113, no. 2 (1993). 
33 Margaret Larkin, The Theology of Meaning: ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī's Theory of Discourse (New Haven: 
American Oriental Society, 1995). 40. 
34 Larkin translates  a ālat al-lafẓ wa-ḥusn al-maʿnā as “elegance of diction and superiority of content”. Ibid. 
35 In her discussion of the debate in poetic criticism between partisans of expression and partisans of idea, Larkin 
writes that “there exists a considerable amount of confusion in the sources regarding this issue due to the varying 
uses of the terms of the debate”. Ibid., 10. 
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to its meaning”, as well as the “form or construction, as opposed to the content or raw material”, 
and finally “the single word as an independent unit”.36 
The basic constituent parts of the mechanisms that I am investigating in this dissertation, 
expression and idea, have therefore not gone unnoticed by scholarship. In fact, modern Arabic 
scholarship continues to use them confidently and productively, which may well reflect the fact 
that ʿAbbās, Ḥasīkī, and al-Māzinī did not have to translate these two words in order to use them. 
Abu Deeb, Frank, Kouloughli, Larkin, Moutaouakil, and Versteegh provide compelling evidence 
of the semantic breadth of the concepts involved, their commonplace nature, and their 
importance to mediaeval scholarship.  
Secondary scholarship has shown how the word maʿnā can mean everything from 
grammatical paraphrase (the maʿnā of the conjunction “and” (wa) is connectivity) to poetic motif 
(the maʿnā of this line of poetry is that the cheeks of the beloved are like a rose).37 The argument 
that I want to make, and that Ragib’s works will allow me to make, is that the conceptual 
relationship between wa and the idea of connectivity behind it is analagous to the conceptual 
relationship between a line of poetry and the motif behind it. One is a physical representation 
whether written or spoken, and the other is that which the physical representation conveys. The 
expression, and the idea behind it.  
                                                 
36 Abu Deeb is criticised by Larkin for integrating al- urǧānī into Western literary criticism rather than into his own 
context,but nevertheless remains well aware throughout his Al-Jurjānī’s Theory of Poetic Imagery that the mediaeval 
scholar was trying very hard to repudiate the idea that poetic quality, or its absence, was always to be evaluated in 
terms of expressions rather than ideas. Abu Deeb, Al-Jurjānī's Theory, 48, 50. 
37 Ragib was happy to use maʿnā for poetic motif. In his discussion of literary plagiarism (as-sariqāt) he talks of 
“the maʿānī that have become controversial among poets…” due to accusations of uncritical copying. Abū al-Qāsim 
al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib. [Ragib on Innovative Figures of Speech] Ms  of Kitāb min Kalām ar-
Rāġib fī-l-Badīʿ (Afānīn al-Balāġah). MSS 165 (dated estimate ca. 14th C.), in Landberg Collection, Yale University 
Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, New Haven. ff.38b-39b. See also Wolfhart Heinrichs, "An Evaluation 
of Sariqa," Quaderni di Studi Arabi 5-6(1987-1988). 
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Or as Ludwig Wittgenstein would have it: “Hier das Wort, hier die Bedeutung”. Expression 
and idea are, as I noted above, simply two levels of linguistic structure when one is outside the 
Arabic-speaking world. Sadly, rather than providing us with an appropriate German translation 
of the pairing of expression and idea, Wittgenstein was satirising the pairing for its failure to take 
into account how language was used. In the next sentence he substitutes Wort and Bedeutung for 
two physical things: “Das Geld und die Kuh  die man daf r kaufen kann”. His point is that a 
philosophy of language should be looking for something other than two simple entities; it should 
be looking for what people do with them: “Anderseits aber: das Geld, und sein Nutzen”.38 This is 
where the mediaeval Arabic Language Tradition as exemplified by Ragib stands out from 
treatments of the same subject in pre-Wittgenstein European-language intellectual history. 
Ragib’s philosophy of language used the pairing of expression and idea to deal with the 
dynamics of language use, intent, truth, and ambiguity. The pairing was more than a sterile 
analytical division, it was a creative hermeneutic. 
Finally, I must note one usage of maʿnā in the mediaeval Arabic sources that is not part of 
the pairing of expression and idea. It is an extra-linguistic meaning: maʿnā as the attribute, 
quality, accident, or form of a substance. Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī (d. 324/935-6) wrote that: 
“people disagree about whether the maʿānī (plural of maʿnā) that subsist in bodies, such as 
movement, stillness, etc., are accidents or attributes”.39 Al-Ašʿarī is using maʿnā to describe a 
non-physical, non-sensible entity that is connected to a substance, and it is clear from the 
                                                 
38 My emphasis. “Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast: 
money, and its use.)” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: the German text with a revised English 
translation, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). #120. 
39 Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl al-Ašʿarī, Kitāb Maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn wa-I tilāf al-Muṣallīn, ed. Hellmut Ritter 
(Istanbul: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft / F.A. Brockhaus, 1929-1933; repr., Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 
1980). 369. 
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subsequent discussion about the nature of these things and what they should be called that he was 
not the first to do so.
40
 The word maʿnā is, in effect, acting as a placeholder to show that we are 
dealing with an idea and not a thing, and maʿnā is sufficiently broad and vague a term to allow it 
to function throughout the debate on what these maʿānī really are, and what they should be 
called. The term maʿnā in this usage is, however, still to an extent analogous to the linguistic 
maʿnā discussed above. Al-Ašʿarī’s maʿnā is the intangible idea of movement or knowledge 
inside or behind an actual sensible substance, just as a linguistic maʿnā is the idea behind or 
within the substance of a written or spoken expression.  
Language and Logic 
The mediaeval Islamicate intellectual world was well aware that it had access to a rich 
heritage of Mediterranean thought, which had already confronted many of the problems with 
which it was dealing. The vast land mass east of Baghdad, which had transformed Islamicate 
intellectual culture through the transfer of paper-making technology from China in the eighth 
century,
41
 was also a source of knowledge but scholars such as Ragib tended to look to, for 
example, ancient Persia as a source of ideas about politics rather than about knowledge. The 
major source for epistemology was ancient Greece, whose traditions were transmitted and 
commented upon by scholars throughout late antiquity right up to the eleventh century. By 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 369f. See: Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam, Structure and growth of philosophic 
systems from Plato to Spinoza (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976). 115, 147-167. Also 
see: Richard M. Frank, "Al-maʿnà: Some Reflections on the Technical Meanings of the Term in the Kalām and Its 
Use in the Physics of Muʿammar " Journal of the American Oriental Society 87, no. 3 (1967). Frank later expressed 
concerns about his conclusions in this 1967 article: ———, "Meanings " 259 note 1. Also: Hans Daiber, Das 
theologisch-philosophische System des Muʿammar ibn ʿAbbād as-Sulamī (gest  830 n  Chr )  (Wiesbaden: Orient-
Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1975). 
41 Adam Gacek, Arabic Manuscripts: a vademecum for readers, Handbuch der Orientalistik (Leiden: Brill, 2009). 
186. 
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Ragib’s time, scholars had been writing in Arabic for centuries about Aristotle, Plato, and the 
Neoplatonic corpus of late antiquity.  
The challenge these Arabic-speaking scholars encountered was the same problem of cross-
cultural (and cross-historical) epistemology that Frank faced when trying to translate maʿnā into 
English: the assumptions about the interface between language and reality are different even 
while many of the same concepts are being discussed. If the translation of the Arabic word 
maʿnā into European languages is an example of how this problem plays out in the modern 
Western academy, then an example of the same problem in the mediaeval Islamicate world is the 
struggle to understand how Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics might be dealing with the same 
concepts as the indigenous Arabic disciplines of literary analysis and criticism (naqd aš-šiʿr  
badīʿ  balāġah  faṣāḥah  et al.).   
This struggle has been extremely well documented in a number of key works, notably those 
of Fritz Zimmermann and Shukri Abed on Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī’s (d. 339/950) efforts to integrate 
the Hellenistic philosophical traditions into Arabic, and the work of Deborah L. Black on both 
al-Fārābī and Avicenna (Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn Ibn Sīnā, 370/980-428/1037).42 Al-Fārābī was one 
of the great polymaths in the Greek-derived tradition, concerned with everything from music 
theory to politics and prophecy. After his death, three centuries elapse before we know of 
another Arabic language literary theorist making a concerted attempt to use Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
                                                 
42 F. W. Zimmermann, Al-Farabi's Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle's De Interpretatione  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1981). ———, "Some Observations on al-Fārābī and the Logical 
Tradition," in Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition, ed. R. Walzer (Oxford: Cassirer, 1972). Shukri B. 
Abed, Aristotelian Logic and the Arabic Language in Alfārābī  (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991). 
Deborah L. Black, "Aristotle's 'Peri hermeneias' in Medieval Latin and Arabic Philosophy: Logic and the Linguistic 
Arts," Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Supplementary Volume 17(1991); ———, Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric 
and Poetics in medieval Arabic philosophy  (Leiden: Brill, 1990). 
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and Poetics, Ḥāzim b. Muḥammad al-Qar aǧannī (608/1211-684/1285).43 That three hundred 
year gap, and the fact that in the middle of it al- urǧānī did not feel a need to use the Rhetoric or 
Poetics, points to the existence of sufficient conceptual resources within the indigenous Arabic 
tradition. These resources are the subject matter of this dissertation. They are also the unheard 
weight of cultural assumption that sits in the background when one reads, for example, Black on 
Avicennna.
44
 Avicenna was living in an intellectual context dominated by the assumptions about 
Arabic, language, and literature that dominate Ragib’s work, and that of a vast swathe of his 
contemporaries and predecessors. 
While the mediaeval scholars themselves, in the disciplines I have addressed up to this 
point, do not appear to have made as much use of Hellenistic ideas about language and literature 
as might have been expected, a piece of recent modern European-language scholarship has 
intriguingly used Hellenistic logic to assess mediaeval Arabic scholarship. Cornelia Sch ck’s 
Koranexegese, Grammatik und Logik uses the lens of Organon logic to assess the theology and 




                                                 
43 Whose synthesis has been studied by Wolfhart Heinrichs, Arabische Dichtung und griechische Poetik  Hā im al-
Qarṭa annīs Grundlegung d  Poetik mit Hilfe aristotel  Begriffe  (Beirut / Wiesbaden: Deutsche Morgenländische 
Gesellschaft / F. Steiner in Komm., 1969). Scholars writing in Arabic in the philhellenic Organon tradition (most 
notably Avicenna) had also of course contended with Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics on their own terms. See: 
Black, Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics. And for al-Fārābī’s attitude to non-Aristotelian rhetoric, see: 
Maroun Aouad, "Al-Fārābī critique des traditions non aristot liciennes de la rh torique," in Literary and 
Philosophical Rhetoric in the Greek  Roman  Syriac and Arabic Worlds, ed. Fr d rique Woerther (Hildesheim: 
Georg Olms, 2009). 
44 Black argues in her excellent article that Arabic scholars working on Aristotle’s Organon did not equate logic and 
grammar in the way that the Latin European tradition did. Rather than seeing grammar as a tool for language in the 
same way as logic was a tool for thought, al-Fārābī and Avicenna relegated grammar to the study of idiom, and 
accepted Aristotle’s inclusion of some linguistic questions at the start of On Interpretation. Black, "Aristotle's 'Peri 
hermeneias'," 77 (and passim). 
45 Cornelia Sch ck, Koranexegese  Grammatik und Logik  (Leiden: Brill, 2006). ———, "Discussions on 
Conditional Sentences from the Year AH17/AD 638 to Avicenna (d. AH 428/AD 1037)," in Classical Arabic 
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Sch ck’s central insight is that the discussions in early Arabic logical works are dealing 
with the same subject as discussions in early legal and theological works. In both Ibn al-
Muqaffaʿ’s (Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdullāh, d. ca. 137/755) analysis in al-Manṭiq (Logic) of how a 
syllogism is affected by its terms’ potential to mean more than one thing at once,46, and Abū 
Ḥanīfah’s (Nuʿmān b.  ābit, d. 80/699-150/767) analysis of whether the “pig” prohibited in the 
Quran is a specific pig, or all pigs,
47
 the argument is about the relationship between language, 
mind and reality and in particular whether an expression always stands for a specific indivisible 
idea, or can refer to multiple ideas.  
Sch ck leads her readers through the centuries of these debates, focusing on, for example, 
whether the definite article means that an expression signifies all members of its class, or 
whether it requires the addition of a quantifier to clarify the instances when it only refers to some 
of them.
48
 She reads all these debates through the prism of Aristotle’s logical works, an exercise 
that is productive because Aristotle does indeed, in Prior Analytics, warn of the logical problems 
caused by confusing expressions that signify the whole of things with identical expressions that 
signify parts of things.
49 Sch ck shows that these discussions led to recognition of the problem 
that logical and grammatical subjects and predicates are not the same.
50
 From the perspective of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Philosophy: Sources and Reception, ed. Peter Adamson, Warburg Institute Colloquia (London: Warburg Institute, 
2007). 
46 Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, "al-Man iq," in al-Manṭiq li-Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ wa- udūd al-Manṭiq li-Ibn al-Bihrī , ed. 
Muḥammad Taqī Dānešpažūh (Tehran: Anǧumān-e Šāhanšāhī-ye Falsafah-ye Īrān, 1978), 50. Sch ck, 
Koranexegese, 149.  
47 al-Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, 138-139. Sch ck, Koranexegese, 114-115. 
48 For example ———, Koranexegese, 430-434. 
49 Ibid., 438. Aristotle, "Prior Analytics," in Loeb Classical Library: Aristotle I (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1938; reprint, 2002), 47b.15f, 49b.14f. 
50 Sch ck, Koranexegese, 436. 
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the logician, logical predication claims to determine things in reality whereas grammatical 
predications tell us nothing other than that words have been used.  
Sch ck contrasts Avicenna’s consequent position that logical and grammatical predication 
are different with Sībawayh’s (Abū Bišr ʿAmr b. ʿUṯmān d. ca. 796) identification of “expression 
with thing, and grammatical structure with logical relation, and therefore grammatical necessity 
with logical necessity”.51 The problem with this comparison is that it assumes that Sībawayh was 
taking part in the same conversation as Avicenna. If he was not, then reading grammar as logic 
results in a fallacy; grammar is not logic so grammar is bad logic. Even when conversations can 
be objectively recognised as having the same subject matter, such as a specific Quranic verse, 
and even though the broad issue of language’s relationship to reality is the same, Abū Ḥanīfah 
and Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ are still not a fortiori taking part in the same conversation. The problem 
with Sch ck’s methodology is that while she is sensitive to the dynamics of the logical Organon 
tradition, by applying its concepts to the works of scholars outside that tradition she risks doing 
violence to their ideas.
52
 My aim in this dissertation is to complement the work of scholars such 
                                                 
51 ———, "Discussions on Conditional Sentences," 70, 72. 
52 Sch ck’s analysis of Abū Ḥanīfah’s position on the value of the singular noun is based on two passages. In one, 
Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī (d. 324/935-6) is enumerating those historical figures with Murǧiʾī tendencies (a movement  
holding that judgements on the status of believers in the hereafter should be postponed (mur aʾ), recounting an 
anecdote in which Abū Ḥanīfah is happy to call someone a “believer” when that person is saying that he is not sure 
whether the word “Muḥammad” means the Prophet or just a particular black man. Abū Ḥanīfah and his interlocutor 
are certainly playing with word meanings, but the thrust of the argument is that even people who play with words to 
the extent of heresy remain believers. Sch ck’s observation is that this is an understanding of synonymy in the sense 
of Aristotle’s Categories I: “both a man and an ox are animals”. ———, Koranexegese, 114-115. al-Ašʿarī, 
Maqālāt, 138-139. Aristotle and J. L. Ackrill, Categories and De interpretatione  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). 
1a.6. In the second passage, Abū Ḥanīfah is responding by letter to the Basran jurist ʿUṯmān al-Battī (d. 143/760) 
who had accused him of being a Murǧiʿī and treating grave sinners as just deviant believers. Abū Ḥanīfah starts by 
using Quranic verses containing both words to show that God considered belief separate from acts. Furthermore, 
acts can be done to a greater or lesser extent whereas belief, or assent (taṣdīq), can only be given or not given. He 
engages with al-Battī’s historical arguments about whether the community were believers before the Quran revealed 
all the prescribed acts, and goes on to say that “belief” has to be a broad category or the participants in the civil war 
would cease to be believers because of their acts of killing each other. He notes that ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, the fourth 
caliph, called both parties to the civil war “believers”. Wordplay is less prominent than in the passage above, and it 
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as Sch ck by providing an analysis of ideas that do not originate in the Classical Language 
Tradition with which she is familiar. My analytical toolbox therefore has to be autochthonous in 
the Arabic Language Tradition, and its two heaviest tools are not major and minor premise, but 
expression and idea. 
Language and Law 
The opening line of Aron Zysow’s oft-cited Harvard Ph.D. dissertation reads: “[t]he great 
dividing line in Islamic legal tradition is between those legal systems that require certainty in 
                                                                                                                                                             
is again clear that Abū Ḥanīfah was not in any way taking part in a conversation about the logical force of nouns. 
Sch ck, Koranexegese, 104-106. Nuʿmān b.  ābit Abū Ḥanīfah, "Risālat Abī Ḥanīfah ilā ʿUṯmān al-Battī," in al-
ʿ lim wa-l-Mutaʿallim Riwāyat Abī Muqātil     wa-yalīhi Risālat Abī  anīfah ilā ʿU mān al-Battī  umma al-Fiqh al-
Absaṭ, ed. M. Zāhid al-Kawṯarī (Cairo: al- ānǧī, 1949), 34-38. These concerns are shared by David Vishanoff, who 
writes that Sch ck projects “onto the earliest theologians a greater concern with formal logic than is warranted by 
the [ ] sources”. Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 30.  
A final example is her use of a passage in the Amālī of aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍā (355/967-436/1044) to address the role of 
the definite object. In this passage the early Muʿtazilī theologian Wāṣil b. ʿA āʾ (d. 131/748-9) self-consciously uses 
the syllogistic form in an argument with ʿAmr b. Ubayd (d. ca. 699–761) about what to call those who pray yet 
commit grave sins (ahl al-kabāʾir min ahl aṣ-ṣalāh). ʿAmr maintains that they are hypocrites (munāfiqūn) because 
the presence of the definite article makes the combination of Quran 9:67 (at-Tawbah) and Quran 24:4 (an-Nūr) 
makes a syllogism: the hypocrites are the transgressors (al-fāsiqūn); the false accusers of virtuous women (i.e. the 
grave sinners) are the transgressors; therefore the grave sinners are the hypocrites (AaB, CaB, therefore, AaC). (This 
deviates from Aristotle’s third figure in Prior Analytics where the conclusion is AiC (Darapti)). Wāṣil’s response is 
to substitute different Quranic verses into the same form: those who do not use the revelation in their decisions (i.e. 
the grave sinners) are the unjust (aẓ-ẓālimūn) (Quran 5:45 (al-Māʾidah); the unbelievers (al-kāfirūn) are the unjust 
(Quran 9:67 (at-Tawbah); therefore the grave sinners are the unbelievers. Having shown that that ʿAmr’s argument 
from the force of the definite article proves that grave sinners are unbelievers just as much as it shows they are 
hypocrites, Wāṣil then goes on to get ʿAmr to agree on the principle that one should use the terminology on which 
the majority of Muslim sectarian groups agree, rather than using terminology on which they disagree. When ʿAmr 
accepts this principle, Wāṣil concludes that grave sinners should be called transgressors because that is the minimum 
upon which all the sects agree, and ʿAmr concurs. Aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍā, who is reporting this debate, then gives his 
own response: the fact of sectarian disagreement is never by itself sufficient proof that a doctrine is incorrect (wa-
baṭala ʿalā kulli ḥālin an yakūna –l-i tilāfu fī-l-qawli dalīlan ʿalā wu ūbi –l-imtināʿi minhu). 
Sch ck is correct that the question of the definite article is part of the discussion. However, it is clear from the text 
that the interlocutors were in no way engaging with the syllogism as anything other than a dialectic tool. The winner 
of the argument uses the force of the definite article in the syllogism merely as a reductio ad absurdum. Josef van 
Ess, whose translation of and commentary on this passage Sch ck cites, agrees: “Seine reductio ad absurdum hat 
rein dialektische Funktion” (His reductio ad absurdum has a purely dialectic function). The core issue, and the 
question with which aš-Šarīf engages, is what role sectarian consensus or the lack of it can play in the politics and 
theology of naming. Sch ck, Koranexegese, 43f. ʿAlī b. a -Ṭāhir aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍā, Amālī as-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, 
ed. Muḥammad Badr ad-Dīn an-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī, 4 vols. (Cairo: Aḥmad Nāǧī al- amālī & Muḥammad Amīn al-
 ānǧī, 1907). 115-116. Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2  und 3  Jahrhundert Hidschra, 6 vols. 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991-1995). 5:143. 
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every detail of the law and those that will admit probability”.53 He then goes on to engage with a 
tradition of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) that is replete with discussions of language, theories of 
meaning, and the problem of linguistic ambiguity. In twentieth-century Baghdad the Shia scholar 
Muḥammad Bāqir aṣ-Ṣadr, working in that very same tradition, gave the following summary of 
how the law understood language in a manual for eighteen-year old students:  
There exist in every language connections between a group of expressions and a group of 
ideas. Each expression is associated with a particular idea in a way that causes us, 
whenever we form a mental image of the expression, to transfer our minds immediately to 
a mental image of the idea. This conjunction between conceptualizing the expression and 
conceptualizing the idea and transfer of the mind from the one to the other is what we name 
signification.54  
In 2000 Mohamed M. Yunis Ali wrote a comprehensive study of Sunni legal theory from the 
ninth to the nineteenth century using pragmatics, H. P. Grice’s twentieth-century theory of 
communication that centers on language in use, deixis, and context.
55
 Among his insights is the 
recognition that Taqī ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyah (661/1269-728/1328) had a theory of meaning 
                                                 
53 Aron Zysow, "The Economy of Certainty: an Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory" (Ph.D. 
Thesis, Harvard University, 1984), iii. 
54 In this quotations I have replaced Roy Mottahedeh’s “utterance” with my “expression” and his “meaning” with 
my “idea”. Muḥammad Bāqir aṣ-Ṣadr, Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence, trans. Roy Mottahedeh (Oxford: 
Oneworld, 2003; repr., 2005). 65. 
55 Mohamed M. Yunis Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics  Sunni Legal Theorists' Models of Textual Communication  
(London: Routledge, 2000). See also the references in the encyclopaedic article by Gregor Schwarb, "Capturing the 
Meanings of God's Speech: the relevance of uṣūl al-fiqh to an understanding of uṣūl al-tafsīr in Jewish and Muslim 
kalām," in Davar davur ʿal ofanaṿ: meḥḳarim be-farshanut ha-Miḳra ṿeha-Ḳorʾan bi-yeme ha-benayim mugashim 
le- agai Ben Shamai / A word fitly spoken: studies in mediavel exegesis of the Hebrew Bible and the Quran 
presented to Haggai Ben-Shammai, ed. Meʾir Mikhaʾel Bar-Asher, Simon Hopkins, Sarah Stroumsa, and Bruno 
Chiesa (Jerusalem: Mekhon Ben-Tsevi, 2007), 136 n.100. Despite this, specialists still feel that not enough attention 
has yet been paid to language: “modern scholarship … has thus far largely ignored theories of language embodied in 
Islamic law”. Ahmed El Shamsy, "From Tradition to Law: the Origins and Early Development of the Shāfiʿī School 
of Law in Ninth-Century Egypt" (Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 2009), 71 n.57.  
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closely analogous to “the Gricean programme for reducing meaning to the contents of intentions 
of speakers”.56  
Legal theory therefore contains a discourse about certainty and ambiguity, has a well-
developed and self-conscious theory of meaning, and clear and instructive parallels with modern 
Western linguistic thought can be made. Ragib, however, was not writing legal theory, just as he 
was not writing grammatical theory. He was perfectly aware of both traditions, and equally 
certain that he was not a direct part of either. Ragib was also writing before the madrasa 
transformed intellectual culture and placed the law at its centre.
57
 A few madrasas did exist in 
Iran and Iraq during Ragib’s lifetime but he had passed away when the great Saljuk vizier Niẓām 
al-Mulk founded the famous Niẓāmīyah madrasa in Baghdad, consecrated on 10  ū al-Qaʿdah 
459 / 22 September 1067.
58
 Ragib therefore represents a chance to study a set of ideas that must 
have been influential in the madrasa (his Quranic Glossary would after all become hugely 
popular) and that must at the same time represent the culmination of centuries of thought and 
speculation in Arabic about the interface between language, mind and reality. If one considers 
the madrasa age with its great synthesising figures as a new consensus, then Ragib is one of the 
last language-obsessed scholars of an Arabic Language Tradition that would disappear when the 
madrasa started to produce new syntheses. The third point of separation between Ragib’s work 
                                                 
56 “Intentions of speakers” are what make a cry to a skater of “the ice is very thin!” into a warning rather than a 
statement of fact. Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics  Volume 1: regarding method  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 133-135. See also Michael Carter, "Pragmatics and Contractual Language in Early Arabic 
Grammar and Legal Theory," in Approaches to Arabic linguistics: presented to Kees Versteegh on the occasion of 
his sixtieth birthday, ed. C. H. M. Versteegh, Everhard Ditters, and Harald Motzki (Leiden: Brill, 2007), esp. 27f. 
Jeff Speaks, "Theories of Meaning," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/meaning/Summer 2011 Edition). 
57 Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 252, 271. 
58 J. Pedersen and G. Makdisi, "Madrasa," in Encyclopaedia of Islam  Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, 
C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs (Brill Online: Brill, 2011). 
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and legal theory is that legal theory is a hermeneutic that analyses language in order to explain 
and interpret it, whether the object of study be a person’s contractual utterance or God’s divine 
word. Ragib, on the other hand, had a understanding of how language worked that applied 
equally well to both language production and language interpretation. He did both poetics and 
exegesis. 
Ragib was not writing legal theory, but he was aware of it as a discipline well-established 
in his pre-madrasa age. There has been substantial recent scholarship on early legal theory, and 
David Vishanoff’s important study has addressed the core issues of ambiguity and language 
therein.
59
 Vishanoff tells how legal theory, inspired in large part by the work of Muḥammad b. 
Idrīs aš-Šāfiʿī (d. 204/820) chose to both exploit the ambiguity it claimed was inherent in the 
Arabic language, and react against that ambiguity. Vishanoff’s focus on the law makes him ask 
whether the hermeneutical theories he is analysing actually changed rulings by judges in court, 
leading him to ask “[w]hy … did legal theory come to be dominated by such a powerful and 
flexible hermeneutic, if most of the interpretative possibilities it offered were never to be 
pursued?”.60 The answer can be found in the assumptions and debates about language, mind, and 
reality that, rather than being created by legal theory, were merely reflected in it. Vishanoff is of 
course aware of the array of non-legal disciplines and usefully reviews exegesis, theology and 
grammar in his introduction, but approaching ambiguity solely through hermeneutics is 
inherently limiting.
61
 As I have noted above, Ragib and many like him were concerned with the 
ontology of language, mind, and reality; truth and cosmology were at stake rather than just rules 
                                                 
59 Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics. 
60 Ibid., 8, 7-9. 
61 Ibid., 15-34. 
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for syntax and morphology (grammar) or rules for human behaviour (law). These broader 
concerns of his can easily be called “philosophy”. 
An indication of this difference of scope and scale can be found in a comparison of the 
language mechanisms that Vishanoff and I are investigating. One major focus of Vishanoff’s 
linguistic analysis is the general or specific force of an expression (ʿāmm versus  āṣṣ). This 
binary is inevitably about the relationship between a spoken or written text and reality; how 
many of the pigs existing in real life are indicated by the word “pig”? However, if one focuses on 
the binary of expression and idea (lafẓ and maʿnā), the issue comes to be about the relationship 
between words and mind. General and specific are then just two ways that expression and idea 
can interact.
62
 For example, Ragib describes the signification of “those who were brought” in 
Quran 3:23 as follows: “even though the expression is general, the idea behind it is specific”.63  
Language and Ragib 
Ragib is at the centre of this dissertation about language, and yet he is part of neither of the 
disciplinary traditions discussed above: grammar and the law. In the following chapter I will 
discuss the difficulties of situating him in any particular discipline. It will suffice to say here that 
despite his protestations, he was at times engaged in theology (kalām).64 He made use of the 
                                                 
62 For a comprehensive review of the different ways that the ʿāmm –  āṣṣ binary was used by the first major legal 
theorist see: Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 72-87. In what follows, I will also argue that another well-known 
pairing, ḥaqīqah and ma ā , is equally dependent on the core linguistic structure of expression and idea. See note 
415f below. 
63 The “those” in question (allaḏīna ūtū…) are the Jews to whom God gave revelation through prophets prior to 
Muḥammad. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib, [Exegesis of Quran 3:1 to 4:113] Tafsīr ar-
Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī, ed. ʿĀdil b. ʿAlī aš-Šidī, 2 vols. (Riyad: Madār al-Wa an li-n-Našr, 2003). 481f.  
64 The translation of kalām as “theology” is an oversimplification, but the alternative is prolixity. “Speculative 
theology?” “Scriptual philosophy?” “Dialectic, eristics and speculative science?”. One’s choice of translation often 
depends on whether one wishes to preserve a distinction made in the educational institutions of thirteenth and 
fourteenth-century Europe between a “theology” that made use of scripture and a “philosophy” or “science” that did 
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resources of the Arabic Language Tradition to analyse and propose solutions for problems that 
scholars had been debating for centuries: is the Quran eternal? Does God really have the “hands” 
that he is described as having in the Quran? Versteegh remarked that the Greek and Arabic 
grammatical traditions shared a concern with interpreting a text (the Homeric poems and the 
Quran) that led them to restrict their focus to linguistic matters, faced as they both were with 
vigorous philosophical traditions that were making claims about language and its relationship to 
mind and reality.
65
 This may well be true, but Ragib’s career is a reminder that it cannot be the 
whole truth. Ragib was a scholar who cared about ontology and was comfortable with 
philosophical ideas. By putting the focus in this investigation of linguistic methodologies onto 
Ragib we will inevitably engage with ideas about language, mind and reality, as opposed to just 
language on its own. 
When we move outside law and logic, there is much less recent scholarship on language 
and ambiguity. Gregor Schwarb concluded that a “comprehensive monography on kalāmic 
                                                                                                                                                             
not. Richard Rorty, "The Historiography of Philosophy: four genres," in Philosophy in history: essays on the 
historiography of philosophy, ed. Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 66. The range of subjects that kalām involved, a list that could scarcely serve as a 
translation, was laid out by Abū Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī (d. 324/935) in his Risālah fī Iḥstiḥsān al-Ḫūḍ fī ʿIlm al-Kalām (A 
Vindication of the Science of Kalām): al-kalāma fī –l-ḥarakti wa-s-sukūni wa-l- ismi wa-l-ʿaraḍi wa-l-alwāni wa-l-
awkāni wa-l- u ʾi wa-ṭ-ṭafrati wa-ṣifāti –l-bārī… (kalām about motion and rest, body and accident, accidental 
modes and states, the atom and the leap, and the attributes of the Creator). Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl al-Ašʿarī, 
The theology of al-Ashʿarī: the Arabic texts of al-Ashʿarī's Kitāb al-lumaʿ and Risālat istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-
kalām: with briefly annotated translations  and appendices containing material pertinent to the study of al-Ashʿarī, 
ed. Richard Joseph McCarthy (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953). 88, 120. Confirming the authorship of this 
Risālah, see: Richard M. Frank, "Elements in the Development of the Teaching of Al-Ash'ari," Le Mus on 104, no. 
1-2 (1991): 141f. Ragib defines ʿilm al-kalām as: “knowledge of rational indicators, real demonstrative proofs, 
division and definition, the difference between reason and supposition, etc.” (maʿrifatu –l-adillati –l-ʿaqlīyati wa-l-
barāhīna –l-ḥaqīqīyati wa-t-taqsīmi wa-t-taḥdīdi wa-l-farqi bayna –l-maʿqūlāti wa-l-maẓnūnāti wa-ġayri ḏālik). 
Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib, [Methodological Introduction] Muqaddimat Jāmiʿ at-
Tafāsīr maʿ Tafsīr al-Fātiḥah wa Maṭāliʿ al-Baqarah, ed. Aḥmad Ḥasan Farḥāt (Kuwait: Dār ad-Daʿwah, 1984). 95. 
———, "[Methodological Introduction] Muqaddimah fī-t-Tafsīr," in al-Ḫawālid min  rāʾ ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī fī 
Falsafat al-A lāq wa-t-Tašrīʿ wa-t-Taṣawwuf, ed. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn ʿAbd al-La īf an-Nāhī (Amman / Beirut: Dār 
ʿAmmār / Dār al- īl, 1987), 121-122. 
65 Kees Versteegh, "The Notion of 'Underlying Levels' in the Arabic Grammatical Tradition," Historiographia 
Linguistica 21, no. 3 (1994): 288-290. 
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theories of meaning and signification remains a desideratum”, and the references he 
subsequently provided were to the works of Sch ck, Frank, Versteegh and Vishanoff discussed 
above.
66
 This may well reflect the dynamics of Western scholarship. Rorty observed that it tends 
to focus on, for example, mediaeval logic and language rather than mediaeval theology. This is 
because it is easier to connect mediaeval logic and language to modern scholarship and modern 
debates.
67
 The same is self-evidently true of law. Theology is no longer of any use to us; few 
careers or livelihoods are bound up with the ontological status of God’s attributes. 
Ragib was more than just a theologian (mutakallim). He was an exegete and, importantly, a 
litt rateur and theorist of poetics. Such combinations of language-centred disciplines have been 
identified and studied by Wolfhart Heinrichs, who started with the dichotomy between literal and 
non-literal language (ḥaqīqah and ma ā ) and traced it through mediaeval discussions about 
poetry, exegesis, and legal hermeneutics.
68
 The literal/non-literal binary is an important one, but 
it is not the mechanism that drives Ragib’s methodology. Instead, it is the binary of expression 
and idea that is most important. Literal language and non-literal language are, like general and 
specific, just two more ways that expression and idea interact.
69
 
Scholars writing in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish are well-aware of the importance of 
language in Ragib’s work.  mer Kara writes in the second edition of the İslâm Ansiklopedisi that 
Ragib moves forward from the simple idea that lafẓ is limited and maʿnā is unlimited to dwell on 
                                                 
66 Schwarb, "Capturing the Meanings," 131 n.86. 
67 Rorty, "The Historiography of Philosophy," 86-87. 
68 Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Contacts Between Scriptural Hermeneutics and Literary Theory in Islam: The Case of Majāz 
" Zeitschrift f r Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften 7(1991/1992); ———, "On the Genesis of the 
ḥaqīqa-majā  Dichotomy," Studia Islamica, no. 59 (1984).  ———, The Hand of the Northwind: opinions on 
metaphor and the early meaning of istiʿāra in Arabic poetics  (Wiesbaden: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, 
1977). 
69 See note 415 below. 
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homonymy and semantic extension.
70
 The leading writers on Ragib in their respective languages, 
ʿUmar ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān as-Sārīsī and Sayyed ʿAlī Mīr Lawḥī, both credit Ragib with a particular 
skill in and attention to language.
71
 However, no-one has tried to work out the mechanisms that 
underpin his thinking, nor has anyone given the most important binary, expression and idea, its 
methodological due. 
Methodological Issues 
Ragib never elaborated a theory of meaning 
“Real historians wait for the evidence to suggest questions by itself”72 is a principle that I 
have tried hard to adhere to, but risks remain as I attempt to describe a methodology that Ragib 
never explicitly elaborated or claimed to follow. There is a “constant temptation to find a 
‘message’ which can be abstracted and more readily communicated”.73 The exegetical process of 
finding ideas that are “rarely worked out systematically” and then trying to “present these ideas 
in some coherent form  ...  gives the thoughts of the major philosophers a coherence, and an air 
generally of a closed system, which they may never have attained or even aspired to attain”.74 I 
am hopeful that if Ragib were to be presented with my account of his methodology in some 
hypothetical time-travel situation he would recognise it and approve, thereby confirming my 
                                                 
70  mer Kara and Anar Gafarov, "Râgib el-İsfahânî," in T rkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi, ed. Kemal Güran 
(Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2007), 398. I am grateful to Dimitris Kastritsis for his assistance with the 
translation of this entry, 
71 ʿUmar ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān as-Sārīsī, ar-Rāġib al-Isfahānī wa-Ǧuhūdahu fī-l-Luġah wa-l-Adab  (Amman: Maktabat 
al-Aqṣā, 1987). Sayyed ʿAlī Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb-e Eṣfahānī:  endegī va ās̱ār-e ū  (Isfahan: Sāzmān-e Farhangī-ye 
Tafrīḥī-ye Šahrdārī-ye Iṣfahān, 2008). See also Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 253. 
72 Skinner, Visions of Politics, 15. Skinner is paraphrasing G. R. Elton’s 1969 The Practice of History.  
73 Ibid., 67. 
74 Ibid., 68. Skinner is criticising J. W. N. Watkins’ 1965 Hobbes’s System of Ideas.  
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adherence to Quentin Skinner’s principle that: “no agent can be said to have meant or achieved 
something which they could never be brought to accept as a correct description of what they had 
meant or achieved”.75  
Nevertheless, my exegesis is creating something new. Heinrichs has usefully described 
such a process as the creation of “a finely tuned tool which is not exactly theirs and not exactly 
ours”.76 The value of Skinner’s principle is that it reminds us of the risk of slipping from “not 
exactly theirs” to “not theirs at all”. Although Sch ck was aware that she was analysing an 
implicit logic rather than explicit textual evidence, she can hardly have imagined that her 




Perhaps one reason that I am forced to attribute to Ragib a theory of meaning that he never 
explicitly described is that it is in the very nature of language to both govern our minds’ 
interactions with reality and yet at the same time always remain in the background as an 
unquestioned assumption. This is the problem that Wittgenstein was talking about when he 
wrote: 
Wir wollen in unserm Wissen vom Gebrauch der Sprache eine Ordnung herstellen: eine 
Ordnung zu einem bestimmten Zweck … Wir werden zu diesem Zweck immer wieder 
Unterscheidungen hervorheben, die unsre gew hnlichen Sprachformen leicht übersehen 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 77. 
76 Heinrichs was discussing his own reconstruction of a theory of Arabic literary plagiarism from mediaeval 
scholars’ works. Heinrichs, "Evaluation of Sariqa," 358. 
77 Sch ck wrote that while “there is no indication of a logical reflection on the opposing doctrinal standpoints” she 
would “rather label the early discussions about the understanding of sentences as implicit logic.” My emphasis. 
Sch ck, "Discussions on Conditional Sentences," 63. See also note 52. 
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lassen … Die Verwirrungen, die uns beschäftigen, enstehen gleichsam, wenn die Sprache 
leerläft, nicht wenn sie arbeitet.78 
Ragib never had to explain his assumptions about language to his readers because in their 
mediaeval Arabic-language scholarly context these assumptions were the “ordinary forms of 
language” that Wittgenstein mentions. As well as watching them run, we have to put Ragib’s 
language mechanisms into neutral so that their engine idles and we can look at them. After all, 
Ragib was prepared to take this same step himself. He would stop at a problem, pause, and then 
deconstruct its language. This happens much more often in his works, and indeed in the works of 
other mediaeval Arabic scholars, than we find in the works of European-language scholars, 
whether mediaeval or modern. The difference reflects the extent to which Ragib and others like 
him were obsessed with language. 
Another of Wittgenstein’s metaphors is equally useful for examining mediaeval Islamicate 
intellectual culture. He described how children interact with language and reality through 
language games based around naming. Adults play language games too and can deviate from 
existing rules of the game to make up new rules.
79
 Scholars such as Ragib had complicated 
language games based around mechanisms like metaphor and the manipulation of polysemy. 
Some of these language-games, such as homonymy, were well known and did not need to have 
their rules explained, whereas others such as Ragib’s ideas about metaphor and metonymy 
needed to be laid out in the hope that others would start playing them. 
                                                 
78 Emphasis in original. (“We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a 
particular end in view … To this end we shall be constantly giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary 
forms of language easily make us overlook … The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an 
engine idling, not when it is doing work.”) Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #132. 
79 Ibid., #7, #83. 
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Translation 
This dissertation is an attempt to follow Rorty’s exhortation to “get into the swing of 
whatever exotic language-games are being played by the people whose beliefs we are trying to 
describe and explain”.80 The problem is that once in the swing of the game one has to describe it 
to people who are not playing. Wittgenstein again: Wenn ich  ber Sprache … rede  muss ich die 
Sprache des Alltags reden.
81
 The most faithful rendering of a term in an academic work will 
always be transliteration, which would mean that this dissertation would be written in a 
language, perfectly intelligible to specialists, of English and Arabic alfāẓ combined! 
The problem is that an alien term, once translated, ceases to be alien. Once it becomes 
familiar it is coloured by the associations of the familiar term in the target language. This is the 
process of cross-cultural epistemology. As Skinner says, the idea that we have to “pair the terms 
used by alien peoples with counterparts in our own languages” in order to understand them is too 
optimistic. “Often there will be no prospect of translating terms in an alien language by means of 
anything approaching counterparts in our own”.82 I believe that this does not hold for the 
rendering of lafẓ and maʿnā with “expression” and “idea”, but I accept that it is the case with 
many other Arabic words, particularly those that denote a discipline or type of knowledge unlike 
anything that exists in our own context. Examples of this latter category that will be encountered 
below are adab, istiʿārah, and badīʿ. 
                                                 
80 Skinner, Visions of Politics, 43. Skinner is paraphrasing and criticising Rorty for not providing enough detail of 
the intended interpretative strategy. 
81 My emphasis. (“When I talk about language … I must speak the language of every day”). Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, #120. 
82 Skinner, Visions of Politics, 46. I have removed the quotation marks that constitute Skinner’s criticism of Martin 
Hollis’ article “The Limits of Irrationality” in Rationality, edited by Bryan R. Wilson (Oxford: 1970).  
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Cross-cultural epistemology extends into the names and boundaries of disciplines. Ragib 
did not see himself as a philosopher of language like Wittgenstein, and would not have 
understood modern philosophy departments that focus on language, mind, and epistemology. He 
saw himself as, among other things, a lexicographer and an exegete. He also kept his exegesis 
and his poetics largely separate. If I were to do the same thing, and stay within his terminological 
and disciplinary boundaries, then I would struggle to deal with the very underlying 




The Arabic, Persian, and European-language biographical traditions have not done justice to 
Ragib. Confusions and contradictions abound in their archives about the most basic facts of his 






We now know for certain that Ragib was alive in or before the year 409/1018. The 
manuscript of his Quranic Glossary that proves this was brought to light by Muḥammad ʿAdnān 
al- awharǧī in a 1986 article, and I have been able to consult it at the home of its owner, 
Muḥammad Lu fī al- a īb, in London.84 Its colophon is dated Muḥarram 409 (May-June 1018) 
and it has a titlepiece in New Abbasid Style script beneath which is a purchase note from 7 
Šawwāl 420 (18 October 1029). The purchase note is significant because it contains names and 
handwriting that I have been able to verify: 
ʿAlī b. ʿUbaydallāh aš-Šīrāzī bought this book from the city of Isfahan on the seventh of 
the month of Šawwāl in the year 420 for the library of al-Ustāḏ al- alīl Abū al-Muẓaffar 
                                                 
83 Recent biographical studies include: as-Sārīsī, ar-Rāġib. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb. Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī, Kunū  al-
A dād  (Damascus: Ma baʿat at-Taraqqī, 1950). 268-271. Kara and Gafarov, İslâm Ansiklopedisi. Geert Jan van 
Gelder, "Rāḡeb Eṣfahāni," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New York: Iranicaonline Website, 2010). 
Everett Rowson, "al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, Abū 'l-Ḳāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. al-Mufaḍḍal," in Encyclopaedia 
of Islam  Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs (Brill 
Online: Brill, 2009). 
84 Muḥammad ʿAdnān al- awharǧī, "Ra’y fī Taḥdīd ʿAṣr ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī," Ma allat Ma maʿ al-Luġah al-
ʿArabīyah bi-Dimašq 61, no. 1 (1986). Al- awharǧī’s article is reprinted in ʿUmar ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān as-Sārīsī, Fī-d-
Difāʾ ʿan ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī: ʿaṣruhū wa-muʿtaqaduhū wa-ā āruhū  (Amman: Printed with the assistance of the 
Ministry of Culture, 2008). 49-56. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib. Ms  of Mufradāt 
Ġarīb al-Qur’ān al-Karīm [Quranic Glossary] (dated 409/1018), in Library of Muḥammad Lu fī al- a īb, Private 
Collection, London. See Appendix for a description of the manuscript and a discussion of al- awharǧī’s plates. 
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Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad b. al-Layṯ, may God prolong his life in nobility and wealth and preserve 
his high rank.85 
Abū al-Muẓaffar Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad b. al-Layṯ al-Azdī (fl. 432/1041) was a litt rateur (adīb) and 




From an Istanbul manuscript we learn that Abū al-Muẓaffar Ibrāhīm’s employee ʿAlī b. 
ʿUbaydallāh aš-Šīrāzī was in Tabriz four years after he was in Isfahan.87 In Ramaḍān 424 / July-
August 1033 he copied out the Diwān of Abū ʿUbādah al-Walīd al-Buḥturī (206/821-284/897) 
and wrote on the title page: 
Copied by ʿAlī b ʿUbaydallāh aš-Šīrāzī in the city of Tabriz in the year 424 in the month of 
Ramaḍān, in the service of the library of al-Ustāḏ al- alīl Abū al-Muẓaffar Ibrāhīm b. 
Aḥmad b. al-Layṯ, may God prolong his life in nobility and wealth and preserve his high 
rank.88 
ʿAlī b. ʿUbaydallāh aš-Šīrāzī’s handwriting is identical in the London and Istanbul manuscripts. 
                                                 
85 ———. Mufradāt al-Ḫaṭīb Collection. f.1a. 
86 Originally from Azerbaijan, Abū al-Muẓaffar’s travels in Isfahan, Tabriz, and Astarābāḏ (now Gorgan, Iran) before 
arriving in Damascus in 432/1041 are detailed in: Abū al-Qāsim ʿAlī Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārī  Madīnat Dimašq, ed. ʿAmr 
b. Ġarāmah al-ʿUmrawī, 80 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1995). 6:264-268. See also: Ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥamawī Yāqūt, 
Muʿ am al-Udabāʾ: Iršād al-Arīb ilā Maʿrifat al-Adīb, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār al-Ġarb al-Islāmī, 1993). 1:40-
41.  alāl ad-Dīn as-Suyū ī, Buġyat al-Wuʿāh fī  abaqāt al-Luġawīyīn wa-n-Nuhāh, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl 
Ibrāhīm, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1979). 1:406.  alīl b. Aybak aṣ-Ṣafadī, Kitāb al-Wāfī bi-l-Wafāyāt, ed. Ridwān 
as-Sayyid, 30 vols. (Leipzig: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft / F.A. Brockhaus, 1962-2007). 5:310. 
Kaḥḥālah, Muʿ am al-Mu’allifīn, 1:11. Wahsūdān ar-Rawwādī was the most successful leader of the ar-Rawwādī 
dynasty that ruled in Azerbaijan in the eleventh century. C. E. Bosworth suggests that their ethnic origin was Arab, 
from the Yemeni tribe of Azd, which would explain Abū al-Muẓāffar’s nisbah of al-Azdī. C.E. Bosworth, The New 
Islamic Dynasties  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 150. 
87 It appears that aš-Šīrāzī was accompanying Abū al-Muẓaffar on his travels. See note 86. 
88 Abū ʿUbādah al-Walīd b. ʿUbayd al-Buḥturī. Ms  of Diwān. Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 1252 (dated 425/1033-4), 
Süleymaniye, Istanbul. f.1a. He finished the copyfive months later in Ṣāfar 425 (December 1033-January 1034). 
Ibid., f.198b. See also Ramazan Şeşen, Fihris Ma ṭūṭāt Maktabat Kūprīlū, 3 vols. (Istanbul: Markaz al-Abḥāṯ li-t-
Tārīḫ wa-l-Funūn aṯ- aqāfīyah al-Islāmīyah, 1986). 2:36, cf. 2:12. 
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Beneath aš-Šīrāzī’s purchase note on the Quranic Glossary there is also a reading note and 
again it can be verified: 
Aš-Šayḫ al-Fāḍil al-Adīb Abū  aʿfar Muḥammad b. Abū Bakr b. an-Naqīb aš-Šahrastānī, 
may God embellish his success, read this book to me from beginning to end. This was in 
the year 510. [This note was] written by Mawhūb b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al- aḍir al-
 awālīqī in praise of God for his blessings, and in prayer and salutation to his messenger 
Muḥammad and his family.89 
Mawhūb b. Aḥmad al- awālīqī (466/1073-539/ 1144) is the famous author of al-Muʿarrab min 
al-Kalām al-A amī ʿalā  urūf al-Muʿ am, an explanatory lexicon of foreign words in Arabic.90 
Abū  aʿfar aš-Šahrastānī is known to have studied lexicography with him in Baghdad.91 These 
two men appear in an almost identical reading note dated 514/1120, again written by al-
 awālīqī, on the cover of a copy of Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. ʿUmar al-ʿUzayrī as-Siǧistānī’s (d. 
300/941) dictionary of rare Quranic words in Dublin.
92 Al- awālīqī’s handwriting is identical in 
the London and Dublin manuscripts.
93
 
                                                 
89 Ragib. Mufradāt al-Ḫaṭīb Collection. f.1a. 
90 Yāqūt, Muʿ am al-Udabāʾ, 2735-2737. Abū Barakāt ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Ibn al-Anbārī, Nu hat al-Alibbāʾ fī 
 abaqāt al-Udabāʾ, ed. Ibrāhīm as-Sāmarrāʾī (Baghdad: Maktabat al-Andalus, 1970). 293-295. 
91 as-Suyū ī, Buġyat al-Wuʿāh, 1:388. Kaḥḥālah, Muʿ am al-Mu’allifīn, 1:301. 
92 “Aš-Šayȟ al-Fāḍil al-Adīb Abū  aʿfar Muḥammad b. Abū Bakr b. an-Naqīb aš-Šahrastānī, may God embellish … 
read this book to me from beginning to end. This was in the year 514. [This note] written by Mawhūb b. Aḥmad b. 
Muḥammad al- aḍir al- awālīqī in praise of God, and in prayer and salutation to his messenger Muḥammad …” 
Abū Bakr Muḥammad as-Siǧistānī. Tafsīr Ġarīb al-Qurʾān. AR 3009 (dated 499/1106), Chester Beatty, Dublin. f.1a. 
A. J. Arberry and Ursula Lyons, The Chester Beatty Library  A handlist of the Arabic manuscripts, 8 vols. (Dublin: 
E. Walker, 1955). 1:3 (inc. plate).  
9393 It should be noted that while al- awālīqī’s handwriting in the two reading notes is identical, the Dublin 
manuscript (of which he is the copyist) provides evidence that he could also write in a more careful script when 
required. That more formal script is the one reproduced by:  ayr ad-Dīn az-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 8 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-
ʿIlm li-l-Malāyīn, 2002). 7:335.  
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There is a further note on the title page of the London Quranic Glossary manuscript but it 
is anonymous and cannot be corroborated in the way that we could corroborate the notes by aš-
Šīrāzī and al- awālīqī. It comes in between the aš-Šīrāzī and al- awālīqī notes, and reads: 
The author of this book was born at the beginning of the month of Raǧab in the year 343 in 
the citadel of Isfahan (qaṣbat Iṣfahān), and died on the ninth of Rabīʿ al-Āḫar in the year 
422, may God exalted have mercy on him, Amen.94  
The London Quranic Glossary manuscript is the only physical evidence that exists from Ragib’s 
lifetime, if indeed he was still alive when it was written. It proves that he was alive in or before 
409/1018. The combination of the manuscript’s colophon dated 409/1018 and its verifiable 
purchase note dated 420/1029 is enough to establish this beyond reasonable doubt. To fix Ragib 
in a still more defined time and place requires us to look at the references he makes to other 
people. 
In a persuasive confirmation of the evidence that as-Sārīsī had already been putting 
together on Ragib’s dates and lifetime,95 Iḥsān ʿAbbās picked up references to two figures of the 
late tenth and early eleventh centuries.
96
 The first is Abū al-Qāsim Ġānim b. Abī al-ʿAlāʾ, a 
member of the retinue of that famous patron and politician the vizier aṣ-Ṣāḥib Ibn ʿAbbād (938-
                                                 
94 Ragib. Mufradāt al-Ḫaṭīb Collection. f.1a. The note appears to be in the same hand as an ownership note on the 
title page: “from the books of Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Anṣārī, may God benefit him with knowledge”. I have not 
been able to trace Al-Anṣārī. The dates would mean that Ragib died age 78, a number that does not tally with 
another anonymous note on an Istanbul manuscript. ———. Ms  of Kitāb aḏ-Ḏarīʿah ilá Makārim aš-Šarīʿah. 
Damad Ibrahim 768 (dated ?), Süleymaniye, Istanbul. title page. Cf. as-Sārīsī, ar-Rāġib, 32. See also Appendix. 
95 ———, Fī-d-Difāʾ. ———, ar-Rāġib, 27-48. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib, [The 
Letters of ar-Rāġib] Rasā’il ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī, ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān as-Sārīsī (Irbid: ʿĀlam al-Kutub al-
Ḥadīṯ, 2005). 4-8, 13-15. ʿUmar ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān as-Sārīsī, "Ra’y fī Taḥdīd ʿAṣr ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī," Ma allat 
Ma maʿ al-Luġah al-ʿArabīyah al-Urdunī, no. 11/12 (1981). ———, "Ḥawla Taḥqīq Muḥāḍarāt al-Udabāʾ wa 
Muḥāwarāt aš-Šuʿarāʾ wa-l-Bulaġāʾ li-r-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī," Ma allat Ma maʿ al-Luġah al-ʿArabīyah bi-Dimašq 80, 
no. 1 (2005): 204-208. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 28-31, 73-87. 




 In his literary anthology Litt rateurs’ Ripostes and Poets’ and Eloquent Men’s 
Rejoinders, Ragib writes: “Abū al-Qāsim b. Abī al-ʿAlāʾ wrote to me with some lines of 
poetry…”,98 and elsewhere:  
Abū al-Qāsim b. Abī al-ʿAlāʾ recited poetry one day that he had addressed to a leader, but 
we had already heard it from him before. When he was criticised for this he replied ‘I 
composed it and I can repeat it to whomever I want’.99  
The second connection Ragib makes is to ʿAbd as-Samad b. Bābak (d. 1019):100 “Abū Saʿīd b. 
Mirdās told me that he sat drinking beneath a trellis of grapes with a group of people among 
whom was Ibn Bābak…”101 
It seems clear that Ragib was a contemporary of known literary figures at the end of the 
tenth and beginning of the eleventh centuries. He talks of having spent time with a member of aṣ-
Ṣāḥib’s court, and this chronological connection to aṣ-Ṣāḥib is confirmed by a third reference: 
“some of the people of our age who are with aṣ-Ṣāḥib talk about…”102 These three references to 
contemporary figures in Ragib’s literary anthology, together with the manuscript evidence from 
London, are the sum total of proofs that originate in Ragib’s lifetime. They are enough to 
establish that he was alive at the end of the tenth and beginning of the eleventh centuries, and the 
                                                 
97 Abū al-Qāsim’s poems praising aṣ-Ṣāḥib’s new palace in Isfahan and then, later, eulogising aṣ-Ṣāḥib after his 
death are recorded by court chronologers. Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Malik aṯ- aʿālibī, Yatīmat ad-Dahr fī Maḥāsin Ahl 
al-Aṣr, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī ad-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, 4 vols. (Cairo: Ma baʿat as-Saʿādah, 1956). 3:213, 3:284. 
98 My emphasis. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib, [Litt rateurs’ Ripostes and Poets’ and 
Eloquent Men’s Rejoinders] Muḥāḍarāt al-Udabāʾ wa-Muḥāwarāt aš-Šuʿarāʾ wa-l-Bulaġāʾ, ed. Riyāḍ ʿAbd al-
Ḥamīd Murād, 5 vols. (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 2006). 1:241. 
99 My emphasis. Ibid., 1:179.  
100 Kaḥḥālah, Muʿ am al-Mu’allifīn, 2:154. 
101 My emphasis. Ragib, Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, 2:686. Neither Iḥsān Abbās nor Sayyid ʿAlī Mīr Lawḥī nor I have 
been able to identify Abū Saʿīd b. Mirdās. 
102 My emphasis. Ibid., 1:141. 
 37 
anonymous birth and death dates on the front of the London Quranic Glossary are as good an 
unproven estimate as any. It is tempting to speculate as to the reasons for this lack of evidence 
from a time and place when biographical dictionaries, court records, and writings by scholars 
about scholars abound.
103
 However, in the absence of textual or other evidence the temptation to 
speculate must be resisted. 
It is in this light that further tentative connections to Ragib must be viewed. As-Sārīsī 
argues that the patron to whom Ragib addresses a number of his books was Abū al-ʿAbbās aḍ-
Ḍabbī (Kāfī al-Awḥad, d. 399/1008),104 the successor to aṣ-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād in the vizierate of 
Faḫr ad-Dawlah (Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Rukn ad-Dawlah b. Būyah, reg. 366/977-387/997, d. 
387/997).
105
 As-Sārīsī’s argument rests on the fact that aḍ-Ḍabbī has been referred to with the 
honorific al-ustāḏ ar-raʾīs (“the scholar and leader”) while Ragib says he wrote his Analysis of 
the Two Creations and Attainment of the Two Happinesses for al-ustāḏ al-karīm (“the noble 
scholar”),106 his On Human Virtue Arising from the Disciplines of Knowledge for al-ustāḏ (“the 
                                                 
103 This dilemma is eloquently addressed by Kurd ʿAlī, who suggests that Ragib may not have been close enough to 
powerful people to have been remembered by their chroniclers. Kurd ʿAlī, Kunū , 34. 
104 Yāqūt, Muʿ am al-Udabāʾ, 1:175-181. Aḍ-Ḍabbī “belonged to one of the great Shiʿi families of Iṣfahān”. David 
Durand-Gu dy, Iranian Elites and Turkish Rulers: a history of Iṣfahān in the Saljūk period (Oxford: Routledge, 
2010). 40. He established a library at the old Friday mosque of Isfahan. al-Mufaḍḍal b. Saʿd al-Māfarrūḫī, Kitāb 
Maḥāsin Iṣfahān, ed. as-Sayyid  alāl ad-Dīn a -Ṭihrānī (Tehran: Ma baʿat Maǧlis al-Millī, 1933). 85. Jürgen Paul, 
"The Histories of Isfahan: Mafarrukhi's Kitāb Maḥāsin Iṣfahān," Iranian Studies 33, no. 1/2 (2000): 130. For 
archaeological details of the mosque (“small fragments of constructions from this period [i.e. Ragib’s period] 
remain…”) see: Oleg Grabar, The Great Mosque of Isfahan  (New York: New York University Press, 1990). 47.  
105 Bosworth, Islamic Dynasties, 154, #75. 
106 Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib, [Analysis of the Two Creations and Attainment of the 
Two Happinesses] Tafṣīl an-Naš’atayn wa Taḥṣīl as-Saʿādatayn, ed. Asʿad as-Saḥmarānī (Beirut: Dār an-Nafāʿis, 
1988). 26. Mīr Lawḥī highlights a marginal correction to this phrase in a British Museum manuscript (dated 
776/1374) of Analysis of the Two Creations that responds to the omission of al-karīm with an insertion that Mīr 
Lawḥī reads as ar-raʾīs. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 34, 100-103. However, the reading an-nafīs is also possible from the 
plate provided by Mīr Lawḥī and this is confirmed by the older manuscript at Princeton, which reads al-ustāḏ an-
nafīs. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib. Ms  of Kitāb aḏ-Ḏarīʿah ilá Makārim aš-Šarīʿah 
and Tafṣīl an-Naš’atayn wa Taḥṣīl as-Saʿādatayn. Yahuda 3555 (dated 584/1188), in Garrett Collection (Yahuda 
Section), Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton. f.142b. 
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scholar”),107 and in his On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions he 
refers to his love for al-ustāḏ at the beginning of the epistle and ends it with a prayer for the 
same.
108
 Ragib also uses the title al-ustāḏ ar-raʾīs when quoting aḍ-Ḍabbī’s poetry in 
Litt rateurs’ Ripostes and The Confluence of Eloquence.109 Nevertheless, all we have here is a 
title (ustāḏ) that Ragib used anonymously, a historical figure quoted by Ragib who was referred 
to by the same title, and no proof.
110
 
The same must be said for claims about where Ragib lived, in light of his absence from the 
extant histories. ʿAbbās suggests that the frequency and nature of Ragib’s references to Isfahan 
in Litt rateurs’ Ripostes means that he probably lived there.111 As-Sārīsī’s report of an 
anonymous note on the cover of an Istanbul manuscript stating Ragib was from Isfahan and 
travelled to Baghdad is incorrect. The manuscript in question has instead only two notes about 
Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Fūrak al-Iṣfahānī (d. 406/1015) on its title page, notes which include 
some of the text thought by as-Sārīsī to describe Ragib, including a trip to India and a death in 
                                                 
107 ———, Letters, 159. 
108 Ibid., 213, 236. 
109 al-ustāḏ ar-ra’īs at ———, Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, 2:247, 3:122.  al-wa īr Aḥmad b  Ibrāhīm at ibid., 3:154. al-
wa īr ar-ra’īs Aḥmad b  Ibrāhīm at ibid., 4:560. al-wa īr ar-ra’īs al-kāfī al-awḥad at ibid., 5:135. al-ustāḏ ar-ra’īs 
at ———, [The Confluence of Eloquence] Ma maʿ al-Balāġah, ed. ʻUmar ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān as-Sārīsī, 2 vols. 
(Amman: Maktabat al-Aqṣā, 1986). 681. See as-Sārīsī, ar-Rāġib, 34-37. ———, "Ra’y." ʿAbbās agreed with as-
Sārīsī: ʿAbbās, "Taʿlīqāt," 200.  
110 ʿAbbās’ conjecture (admitted as such) is worth a footnote here: Ragib could be the aš-šay  al-ʿālim who admits 
to a secret rage at aṣ-Ṣāḥib in Abū Ḥayyān court reportage. Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī, A lāq al-Wa īrayn: ma ālib al-
wa īrayn aṣ- āḥib b  ʿAbbād wa-Ibn al-ʿAmīd, ed. Muḥammad b. Tāwīt a -Ṭanǧī (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1992). 316-
317. ʿAbbās, "Taʿlīqāt," 202-203. It is also worth mentioning the Abū Rāġib who appears elsewhere in the same 
work with a virulent written attack on aṣ-Ṣāḥib. at-Tawḥīdī, A lāq al-Wa īrayn, 151-159.  Joel L. Kraemer, 
Humanism in the renaissance of Islam : the cultural revival during the Buyid Age, Studies in Islamic culture and 
history series (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986). 264f. 
111 ʿAbbās, "Taʿlīqāt," 198-199. 
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Nishapur in 406/1015. There is no mention of Baghdad, reference to which is made by both as-
Sārīsī and Mīr Lawḥī, the latter on the authority of Ismāʿīl Pāša (d. 1920).112 
Finally, mention must be made of the mass of bibliographic material that erroneously 
places Ragib’s death a century or more too late. It includes Šams ad-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh aḏ-
 ahabī (673/1274-748/1348) who said Ragib was alive in 450/1058,113 Ismāʿīl Pāša, who gave 
Ragib’s death date as 500/1107,114 Muḥammad Bāqir al- wānsārī (d. 1313/1895) who gave it as 
565/1170,
115 and then Carl Brockelmann (d. 1956) and Wilhelm Ahlwardt (d. 1909), both 
following Gustav Flügel (d. 1870), who provided 502/1108-1109.116 These materials have been 
reviewed in both Arabic and English and it appears to me that there has been a clear connection 
over the centuries between the vacuum of information about Ragib during or near his lifetime, 
and the need of the biographical tradition to fill that vacuum with numbers.
117
 The biographical 
                                                 
112 Ibn Fūrak is the author whose work appears first in the collection (ma mūʿah). Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. 
Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib, Abū al-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Qušayrī, and Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Fūrak al-
Iṣfahānī. Ma mūʿah. Ragıb Paşa 180 (dated 1163/1750), Süleymaniye, Istanbul. f.1a. as-Sārīsī, ar-Rāġib, 33. Ragib, 
Letters, 5. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 28, 72. Ismāʿīl Pāšā b. Muḥammad al-Baġdādī, Hadīyat al-ʿ rifīn: Asmāʾ al-
Muʾallifīn wa-  ār al-Muṣannifīn, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Wikālat al-Maʿārif, 1951-1955). 1:311. 
113 Šams ad-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad ad- ahabī, Siyar Aʿlām an-Nubalāʾ, ed. Šuʿayb al-Arna’ū , 23 vols. (Beirut: 
Mu’assasat ar-Risālah, 1985). 18:120-121. 
114 al-Baġdādī, Hadīyat al-ʿ rifīn, 311. 
115 Muḥammad Bāqir b. Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn al- wānsārī, Rawḍāt al-Ǧannāt fī Aḥwāl al-ʿUlamāʾ wa-s-Sādāt, 8 vols. 
(Beirut: ad-Dār al-Islāmīyah, 1991). 216. 
116 Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur (GAL), 3. Aufl. ed., 2 vols. (Leiden / New York: E.J. 
Brill, 1996). 1:289. ———, Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur (GALS) [Supplementband], 2. Aufl. ed., 3 vols. 
(Leiden / New York: E.J. Brill, 1996). 1:505. Wilhelm Ahlwardt, Ver eichnis der arabischen Handschriften, 10 vols. 
(Berlin: Schade, 1887-1899; repr., Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1980-1981). 1:268f, 5:5, 7:328f. Dagmar A. 
Riedel, "Searching for the Islamic episteme: The status of historical information in medieval Middle-Eastern 
anthological writing" (Ph.D. Thesis, Indiana University, 2004), 118-119. 
117 For reviews of the material see aš-Šidī: Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 52-62. Also Dagmar Reidel, who identifies 
 alāl ad-Dīn as-Suyū ī’s (d. 911/1505) biography as the key driver for the subsequent attributions of late death 
dates, and gives details of Flügel’s influential choice of 502/1108-1109. Reidel should however be read in the light 
of the corrective information on Ragib’s works and references to them that I provide in the rest of this chapter. 
Riedel, "Searching for the Islamic episteme," 106-128.  
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tradition did not have access to or knowledge of the London manuscript of the Quranic Glossary 
that proves Ragib was alive in or before 409/1018.   
Early Biographies 
The first mention of Ragib by a third party is in Mufaḍḍal b. Saʿd b. al-Ḥusayn al-
Māfarrūḫī’s book Kitāb Maḥāsin Iṣfahān (The Good Qualities of Isfahan), written between 
465/1072 and 485/1092.
118
 Ragib appears only as a name (“Abū al-Qāsim ar-Rāġib”) in a list of 
those Isfahanis who excelled in language-based disciplines.
119
 
The second mention of Ragib comes in a compendium of “philosophers” biographies by 
Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Zayd (Ibn Funduq) al-Bayhaqī (ca. 490/1097-565/1169).120 This work was 
intended as a continuation and completion of an earlier compendium of philosophers, the  iwān 
al- ikmah (The Wardrobe of Wisdom), intended to preserve and share the sage aphorisms of 
Greek and Islamic philosophers working in a single tradition, from Anaxagoras and Pythagoras 
to contemporaries of Ragib in Baghdad and elsewhere.
121
  
                                                 
118 Paul, "The Histories of Isfahan," 117f. 
119 Al-Māfarrūḫī’s description of this category of people reads: 
Those with extensive knowledge in grammar and desinential syntax (iʿrāb), who investigate rare 
morphological patterns and Bedouin dialects, who extemporize eye-opening poetry (al-muqtaḍibīna li-l-
aṣʿāri –l-mufattiḥah), who invent admired poetic ideas in Arabic and Persian, who sign off on elegant 
compositions (al-muwaqqiʿīna –l-muḥsinīna li-l-maʿānī –l-mustamlaḥah), and who ease beautifully through 
dictation (al-mutarassilīna –l-mu īdīna imlāʾan). 
 al-Māfarrūḫī, Maḥāsin Iṣfahān, 32. Al-Māfarrūḫī’s work was translated into Persian in the fourteenth century, for 
the reference to Ragib see ———, Tarjumah-e Maḥāsen-e Eṣfahān a  ʿArabī be Fārsī, ed. ʿAbbās Iqbal, trans. 
Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. Abī ar-Riḍā Āvī (Tehran: Sāzemān-e Farhangī-ye Tafrīḥī-ye Šahrdārī-ye Iṣfahān, 2006). 
159. 
120 Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Zayd al-Bayhaqī, Tārī   ukamāʾ al-Islām [Tatimmat Siwān al- ikmah], ed. Muḥammad 
Kurd ʿAlī (Damascus: Ma būʿāt al-Maǧmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-ʿArabī, 1946). For details and an abbreviated paraphrase of 
116 entries (Ragib is #62) see: Max Meyerhof, "ʿAli al-Bayhaqi's Tatimmat Siwan al-Hikma: A Biographical Work 
on Learned Men of the Islam," Osiris 8(1948). 
121 Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir as-Siǧistānī, The  iwān al- ikmah of Abū Sulaimān as-Sijistānī: Arabic text  introduction 
and indices, ed. D.M. Dunlop (The Hague: Mouton, 1979). Abū Sulaymān as-Siǧistānī (ca. 300/912-375/985). For 
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Al-Bayhaqī brings the list up to date with biographies of poets, physicians and other 
scholars from “all the different races and religions of the Near East”, many of whom were known 
to him or to his father.
122
 They include al-Fārābī and Abū Bišr Mattā (see above), the Iḫwān aṣ-
Ṣafāʾ (see below), and al-Bayhaqī’s contemporaries. There are relatively few scholars working in 
the traditional Islamic disciplines of lexicography and Quranic exegesis other than Ragib, whose 
entry makes the claim that he combined religious law (aš-šarīʿah) and philosophical wisdom (al-
ḥikmah) and that he was particularly proficient in the rational disciplines (kāna ḥaẓẓuhū min –l-
maʿqūlāti ak ar).123 Al-Bayhaqī then quotes at length from Ragib’s Analysis of the Two 






Ragib’s best known and most easily accessible works, the Quranic Glossary, Path to 
Nobility, and Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, provide a valid but incomplete representation of his ideas. 
The lacunae are felt most strongly with regard to his sectarian positions, which have attracted a 
                                                                                                                                                             
manuscript details and corroborative texts and editions see: Dimitri Gutas, "Review: The  iwān Al- ikma Cycle of 
Texts," Journal of the American Oriental Society 102, no. 4 (1982). For further detail and a persuasive questioning 
of the work’s attribution to Abū Sulaymān see: Wadad al-Qadi, "Kitab  iwan al- ikma: Structure, Composition, 
Authorship and Sources," Der Islam 58(1981). 
122 Meyerhof, "Tatimmat Siwan al-Hikma," 131, 132. 
123 al-Bayhaqī, Tārī   ukamāʾ al-Islām, 112. 
124 Ragib, Analysis of the Two Creations. Al-Bayhaqī quotes from pages 27-28 (authorial introduction), 63 (chapter 
eight), 117 (chapter eighteen), 126 (chapter twenty), 143 (chapter twenty-four), 147 (chapter twenty-five), 153 
(twenty-seven), and 178-180 (chapter thirty-two). 
125 This list supersedes my entry for Ragib in Essays in Arabic Literary Biography entry, although Essays does 
provide succinct epitomes of the content of his works. Alexander Key, "al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī," in Essays in Arabic 
Literary Biography I, ed. Mary StGermain and Terri de Young (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2011). 
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great deal of speculation over the centuries despite being clearly laid out in On Creeds. The 
problem is that manuscripts of On Creeds were not widespread, and printed copies of the work 
are so rare today as to almost require their cataloguing. A similar problem exists with regard to 
his Exegesis, and his work on poetics remains unpublished and only exists in a single 
manuscript. The details below will establish Ragib’s authorship of On Creeds and the Exegesis, 
but the fact remains that his reception and reputation continue to be dominated by the vagaries of 
print runs and manuscript transmissions.
126
  
Exegesis of the Quran (Tafsīr) 
Ragib’s Exegesis includes a methodological introduction and is extant up to the end of 
Quran 5:120 (al-Māʾidah). Editors have used the titles Tafsīr ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī (Ragib al-
Iṣfahānī’s Exegesis) and Ǧāmiʿ at-Tafāsīr (Collection of Exegeses).127 In the introduction to The 
Path to the Nobilities of the Revelation (Kitāb aḏ-Ḏarīʿah ilā Makārim aš-Šarīʿah) Ragib 
mentions having written a work called Taḥqīq al-Bayān fī Taʾwīl al-Qurʾān (An Investigation of 
Clarity in Quranic Interpretation) in which he had discussed the difference between the Quran’s 
ethical qualities and legal judgements,
128
 but I have been unable to locate any such discussion in 
the extant parts of his Exegesis.  
                                                 
126 It is impossible to purchase a copy of On Creeds or the Exegesis in the Arabic-speaking world, and they are held 
in only a very limited number of libraries in Europe and America. The problems this causes are demonstrated in as-
Sārīsī’s ignorance of al-ʿAǧalī’s edition of On Creeds, Mīr Lawḥī’s apparent lack of access to as-Sārīsī’s scholarship, 
and the fact that aš-Šidī’s edition of the Exegesis published in Riyad in 2003 appears to have fallen into a black hole.  
127 ṢafwānʿAdnād Dāwūdī prefers Ǧāmiʿ at-Tafsīr, but the point may be moot because the reference to this title 
comes in a work that may well not be Ragib’s. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib, [Quranic 
Glossary] Mufradāt Alfāẓ al-Qur’ān al-Karīm, ed. Ṣafwān ʿAdnān Dāwūdī (Beirut / Damascus: Dār al-Qalam / Dār 
aš-Šāmīyah, 1992; repr., Qum: Ṭalīʿat an-Nūr, 2006). 8. Hāfi̮ẓ Muḥammad  ālid Ṣiddīqī, "A critical edition of Imām 
Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī's manuscript "Durrat al-Ta’wīl wa Ġurrat al-Tanzīl fī-l-Ayāt al-Mutašābihah wa-l-Muta’aḫirah"" 
(Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1977), 469 re. Quran 109 (al-Kāfirūn). 
128 Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib, [The Path to the Nobilities of the Revelation] Kitāb 
aḏ-Ḏarīʿah ilā Makārim aš-Šarīʿah, ed. Abū al-Yazīd al-ʿAǧamī (Cairo: Dār as-Salām, 2007). 59. Ali Reza 
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The methodological introduction has been published three times: as an appendix to al-Qādī 
ʿAbd al- abbār’s Tan īh al-Qurʾān ʿan al-Maṭāʿin (Freeing the Quran from its Calumnies) 
edited by Muḥammad Saʿīd ar-Rāfiʿī (Cairo: al-Ma baʿah al- amālīyah, 1911); as an appendix 
to Ṣalāh ad-Dīn ʿAbd al-La īf an-Nāhī’s al-Ḫawālid min  rāʾ ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī fī Falsafat al-
A lāq wa-t-Tašrīʿ wa-t-Taṣawwuf (Selections of Ragib’s Opinions on the Philosophies of Ethics, 
Legislation, and Sufism); and by Aḥmad Ḥasan Farḥāt as Muqaddimat Ǧāmiʿ at-Tafāsīr (The 
Introduction to the Collection of Exegeses) with the addition of the exegesis of Quran 1:1 (al-
Fātiḥah) to Quran 2:5 (al-Baqarah).129 The section Quran 2:5 to Quran 3:1 (Āl ʿImrān) has been 
imperfectly published online,
130
 and the remainder is the subject of two diligent theses at Umm 
al-Qurā University in Mecca by ʿĀdil b. ʿAlī aš-Šidī (Ph.D., published) and Hind Bint 
Muḥammad b. Zāhid Sardār (M.A., unpublished).131 
The primary manuscript for the bulk of the Exegesis is Carullah 84 in the Süleymaniye 
Library in Istanbul. It is undated, acephalous, and stops suddenly at Quran 5:120 without a 
colophon. Corroboration is found primarily in other Istanbul manuscripts: Ayasofya 212, Atıf  
Efendi 362-002, and Laleli 171 in the Süleymaniye, and Emanet Hazine 1616 in the Topkapı 
                                                                                                                                                             
Karabulut suggests that Taḥqīq al-Bayān is an alternative title for the Exegesis, but without any supporting evidence. 
Ali Reza Karabulut, Muʿ am al-Ma ṭūṭāt al-Mawjūdah fī Maktabāt Istānbūl wa  nāṭūlī, 3 vols. (Qayṣarī, Turkey 
Dār al-ʿAqabah, 2005). 1:470.  
129 Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn ʿAbd al-La īf an-Nāhī, al-Ḫawālid min  rāʾ ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī fī Falsafat al-A lāq wa-t-Tašrīʿ 
wa-t-Taṣawwuf  (Amman / Beirut: Dār ʿAmmār / Dār al- īl, 1987). Ragib, Methodological Introduction and 
Exegesis ed  Farḥāt. 
130 Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Basyūnī’s 1999 Ph.D. dissertation in the Faculty of Arts at Tanta University, Egypt is 
an edition of Ragib’s Exegesis from the methodological introduction to the end of Quran 2:286. It is to the best of 
my knowledge only available through the online database http://shamela.ws, where it has been entered as text and 
integrated with the editions of aš-Šidī and Sardār. The consequent absence of Basyūnī’s introduction or scholarly 
apparatus makes evaluation of his work impossible, but the text at http://shamela.ws has significant departures and 
omissions (often at verse ends) from Carullah 84 and Ayasofya 212 and should not be relied upon. 
131 Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī. ———, [Exegesis of Quran 4:114 to 5:120] Tafsīr ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī, ed. Hind 




 Ayasofya 212 starts at the beginning of the methodological introduction and finishes 
with no colophon at Quran 2:223. It appears to have been collated against Carullah 84. Atıf  
Efendi 362-002 contains the full methodological introduction and finishes with no colophon at 
Quran 2:216. It varies from both Ayasofya 212 and Carullah 84 and appears to have been 
collated against neither. Laleli 171 and Emanet Hazine 1616 both contain the methodological 
introduction and end at Quran 2:6. The latter was used by Farḥāt, while aš-Šidī and Sardār both 
use Carullah 84, Ayasofya 212, and Atıf  Efendi 362-002.133 Carullah 84 appears to be the oldest 
of the manuscripts (angular nas  scholar’s bookhand, Quranic verses in larger tawqīʿ script, dark 
brown paper, approximately eleventh to fifteenth centuries?). Ayasofya 212 could be placed 
somewhat later (rounded nas  scholar’s bookhand, Quranic verses overlined in red, white paper), 
and the remainder of the manuscripts mentioned above appear to be from the Ottoman period 
(scholars’ nastaʿlīq bookhands, illuminated headpieces, rule-borders and frames).  
 Internal references show that the Exegesis was once a coherent whole. In exegesis of 
Quran 2:106 Ragib writes that “the essence of abrogation and the difference between it and 
specification has been discussed above at the outset of this book” and that this is an accurate 
reflection of the chapter in the methodological introduction on “requisite knowledge of the 
difference between abrogation and specification”.134 In exegesis of Quran 4:127 (an-Nisāʾ) Ragib 
writes that “the fact that a single action can correctly be attributed, with different expressions, to 
                                                 
132 See the Appendix for an annotated listing of all Tafsīr manuscripts.  
133 Ragib, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 16-24 (with plates). ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 
388-400 (with plates). ———, Exegesis ed  Sardār, 136-145 (with plates). 
134 qad taqaddama –l-kalāmu fī māʾīyati –n-nas i wa-l-farqi baynahū wa-bayna –l-ta ṣīṣi fī ṣadr –l-kitāb. ———. 
Ms  of Tafsīr [Exegesis of Quran 1:1 to Quran 5:120]. Carullah 84 (dated ?), Süleymaniye, Istanbul. f.84b. faṣlun 
fīmā yaḥtā u ilayhi fī-t-tafsīri min –l-farqi bayna –n-nas i wa-t-ta ṣīṣ. ———, Methodological Introduction and 
Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 82. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 114. 
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two different agents has been established at the outset of this book”. This is an accurate 
reflection of his discussion in the methodological introduction.
135
 Internal references also 
confirm that Ragib is the author of the Exegesis. He refers to his The Path to the Nobilities at one 
point,
136
 and the discussions and definitions of key terms are almost identical to those in his 
Quranic Glossary,
137
 and The Path to the Nobilities.
138
 
Aš-Šidī has demonstrated that Ragib’s Exegesis was used as a source by Šaraf ad-Dīn al-
Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad a -Ṭībī (d. 743/1324), Abū Ḥayyān Aṯīr ad-Dīn al-Ġarnā ī al-Andalusī 
(Granada to Cairo, 654/1256-745/1344), Abū ʿAbdallāh Badr ad-Dīn Muḥammad az-Zarkašī 
(Cairo, 745/1344-794/1392), and  alāl ad-Dīn ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān as-Suyū ī (Cairo, 849/1445-
911/1505).
139
 Each of these authors quotes Ragib by name, and their quotes can be traced back to 
the Exegesis manuscripts.
140
 As-Suyū ī quotes, at length, only the methodological introduction. 
He quotes sections that are not quoted by az-Zarkašī, showing that he engaged independently 
with Ragib’s work.141 A -Ṭībī was known for his strong rejection of Hellenistic philosophy,142 
                                                 
135 ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 63f. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. 
Nāhī," 101f. 
136 ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 131. ḥasaba mā ḏukira fī kitābi –ḏ-ḏariʿati ilā makārimi –š-šarīʿah. ———. 
Carullah 84. f.297b. 
137 ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 131-134. See also the definitions of al-kufr and al-qawl. ———. Carullah 84. 
ff.14b-15a, ff.17b-18a. ———, Quranic Glossary, 688, 714.    
138 ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 102-104; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis 
ed  Farḥāt, 63-65; ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 297-298. 
139 ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 121-134. 
140 Ibid. For example Abū Ḥayyān’s exegesis of Quran 4:69 accurately quotes twelve lines of Ragib’s text (qāla ar-
Rāġib…). Muḥammad b. Yūsuf Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī, Tafsīr al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, ed. ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-
Mawǧūd and ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwad, 8 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1993). 3:300. Ragib. Carullah 
84. ff.475b-476a. ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 1311-1312.   
141 As-Suyū ī: qāla –l-Iṣbahānī fī-tafsīrih…with regard to Quranic inimitability.  alāl ad-Dīn as-Suyū ī, al-Itqān fī 
ʿUlūm al-Qur’ān, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 4 vols. (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-ʿAṣrīyah, 1997). 4:10-12. 
Cf. Ragib, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 104-109. ———, "Methodological Introduction 
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and we therefore already have indications that in the centuries after his death Ragib’s varied 
portfolio of works would appeal both to those who collected philosophers such as al-Bayhaqī, 
and those like a -Ṭībī who rejected them. 
Finally, Ragib’s Exegesis is mentioned in two bibliographical works. Abū a -Ṭāhir 
Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb al-Fīrūzābādī (729/1329-817/1415) described it as “large, in ten bound 
volumes, extremely detailed”.143 Kâtip Çelebi (1017/1609-1067/1657) wrote that it was one of 
the sources of Nāṣir ad-Dīn ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar al-Bayḍāwī’s (d. ca. 710/1310-11) famous 




                                                                                                                                                             
ed. Nāhī," 128-131. This is misattributed to Ibn Baḥr al-Iṣfahānī (Abū Muslim Muḥammad, 254/868-322/934) by 
van Ess: van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 4:610. For Ibn Baḥr, whom Ragib quotes on a number of occasions in 
the Exegesis, see: Wilferd Madelung, "Abū Moslem Eṣfahānī," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New 
York: Iranicaonline Website, 2011); Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 160f; van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 4:250.  
As-Suyū ī: qāla –l-Iṣbahānī fī tafsīrih… with regard to the difference between exegesis and interpretation (tafsīr and 
taʾwīl). as-Suyū ī, al-Itqān, 4:168. Ragib, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 47-48. ———, 
"Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 92. As-Suyū ī: qāla –l-Iṣbahānī…with regard to the nobility of the 
discipline of exegesis. as-Suyū ī, al-Itqān, 4:173. Ragib, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 91-
92. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 118-119. Cf. Badr ad-Dīn Muḥammad az-Zarkašī, al-Burhān fī 
ʿUlūm al-Qurʿān, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 4 vols. (Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabīyah, 1957). 468-
169 (index). In all these cases as-Suyū ī’s quotations differ slightly from the Istanbul manuscripts, including those 
used by Farḥāt and an-Nāhī. These references are partly missed by aš-Šidī and wholly missed by Reidel. Ragib, 
Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 130. Riedel, "Searching for the Islamic episteme," 122-123. 
142 kāna … šadīdu -r-raddi ʿalā –l-falāsifah… Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-ʿAsqalānī Ibn Ḥaǧar, ad-Durar al-Kāminah fī Aʿyān 
al-Miʾah a -Ṯāminah, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dār al- īl, 1993). 2:69. Kaḥḥālah, Muʿ am al-Mu’allifīn, 1:639. 
143 la-hū at-tafsīru –l-kabīru fī ʿašarati asfārin ġāyatu –t-taḥqīq. Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb al-Fīrūzābādī, al-Bulġah fī 
Tarā im Aʾimmat an-Naḥw wa-l-Luġah, ed. Muḥammad al-Maṣrī (Damascus: Dār Saʿd ad-Dīn, 2000). 122.  Ragib, 
Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 121. Cf. Riedel, "Searching for the Islamic episteme," 124. 
144 Kâtip Čelebi, Kašf aẓ-Ẓunūn ʿan Asāmī al-Kutub wa-al-Funūn, ed. Gustav Flügel, 7 vols. (London: R. Bentley 
for the Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland, 1964). 2:361. This assertion has been doubted 
(Riedel, "Searching for the Islamic episteme," 123-124.), and al-Bayḍāwī does indeed not cite his sources, but a 
cursory review shows that a number of discussions share the same contours and examples. For example: Nāṣir ad-
Dīn ʿAbdallāh al-Bayḍāwī, Anwār at-Tan īl wa-Asrār at-Taʾwīl al-Maʿrūf bi-Tafsīr al-Bayḍāwī, ed. Muḥammad 
ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Marʿašlī, 5 in 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ at-Turāṯ al-ʿArabī, 1998). 33f. Cf. Ragib, Methodological 
Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 145f. However, it is in the nature of exegesis that authors’ discussions share 
the same contours, and consequently nothing can be proven. Mīr Lawḥi has shown a number of correspondences 
between al-Bayḍāwī’s Anwār and Ragib’s Quranic Glossary  Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 212f.  
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Quranic Glossary (Mufradāt Ġarīb al-Qurʾān al-Karīm)  
There is virtually no difference between the texts of London Quranic Glossary and the 
current preferred critical edition by Ṣafwān ʿAdnān Dāwūdī despite the intervening 974 years, 
and despite the fact that Dāwūdī did not use the London manuscript itself.145 This is testament to 
the numerous and accurate transmissions of this work of Ragib’s, which themselves reflect the 
work’s popularity across the centuries. As can be seen from the list in the appendix, there are 
catalogued witnesses to this text in manuscript libraries from Patna to Michigan, and from 
Sana’a to Berlin. In a testament to the efforts of the Ottoman Empire, the majority are in 
Istanbul. Like Ragib’s Exegesis, the Quranic Glossary is replete with lexicographical data, often 
with a great deal of overlap between the two, for when Ragib starts to discuss a verse in the 
Exegesis, he usually glosses the key terms first.
146
 Again like the Exegesis, the Quranic Glossary 
was praised and used by, inter alia, az-Zarkašī and as-Suyū ī.147 The latter quotes the Quranic 
Glossary throughout his manual for exegetes as well as in his al-Mu hir fī ʿUlūm al-Luġah (The 
Illumination of the Linguistic Sciences).
148
 




                                                 
145 The only aspect of the work that tends to differ is the title: Mufradāt Alfāẓ al-Qurʾān,  Muʿ am Mufradāt Alfāẓ 
al-Qurʾān, Mufradāt Ġarīb al-Qurʾān. See Key, "al-Rāghib."  
146 See note 137. 
147 Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 136. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 223-224. 
148 as-Suyū ī, al-Itqān, 4:292 (index). ———, al-Mu hir fī ʿUlūm al-Luġah wa-Anwā’ihā, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad 
Baǧāwī, Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, and Muḥammad Aḥmad  ād al-Mawlā, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-
Kutub al-ʿArabīyah, 1957). 1:184, 1:201. 
149 For example: “I have indicated in The Path to the Nobilities…”, “I have mentioned in The Path to the 
Nobilities…”, “I have explained in The Path to the Nobilities…” Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 54, 226, 714, 1186 
(index). ———. Mufradāt al-Ḫaṭīb Collection. f.1b, f.37b, ff.161a-161b. One might be tempted to guess that the 
Quranic Glossary was written after The Path to the Nobilities and before the Exegesis. 
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On Creeds (al-Iʿtiqādāt) 
 In On Creeds Ragib reviews the standard topics of theological disagreement and presents 
his own beliefs. He lays out “the Sunni consensus”, and argues that Sunni beliefs are supported 
by proofs reasoned from the Quran and Sunna. At times, this project leads him to engage in 
heresiography, wherein he criticises excessive anthropomorphism, excessive partisanship in 
favour of Ali, and the Muʿtazilah. He distinguishes himself from the Ašāʿirah, and situates 
himself in a “traditionist” camp called ahl al-a ar, that is itself distinguished from the partisans 
of Hadith (ahl al-ḥadī ).150 
Unlike the majority of Ragib’s works, On Creeds has been published only once, in 1988 by 
Šamrān al-ʿAǧalī working in Tlemcen, Algeria.151 Al-ʿAǧalī took the title al-Iʿtiqādāt (The 
Creeds) from the incipit, while the two manuscripts with titles have Risālah fī-l-Iʿtiqād (Epistle 
on Creeds) and Kitāb fī-l-ʿAqāʾid (Book on Creeds).152 He produced a critical edition from three 
of the four known manuscripts (detailed in the Appendix) but the resultant codex printed in 
Beirut by Muʿassasat al-Ašraf is marred by numerous and substantive errors and confusions. Al-
ʿAǧalī struggled to integrate the differing structures of the manuscripts; a task which the 
Appendix shows was indeed a difficult one. Over half of what may be the oldest witness (Āstān-
e Quds-e Ra āvī 56) is missing and there appears to be substantial confusion in chapter two of 
what might otherwise be the best witness (Chester Beatty AR 5277), which is itself undated. Al-
                                                 
150 These affiliations will be addressed below. 
151 It had previously been edited as an M.A. thesis by Aḫtar  amāl Muḥammad Luqmān, using only the Chester 
Beatty manuscript. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib, [On Creeds] Kitāb al-Iʿtiqād, ed. 
Aḫtar  amāl Muḥammad Luqmān (Mecca:  āmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1981-1982), M.A. Thesis. See also: ———, 
Quranic Glossary, 11. ———, [On Creeds] al-Iʿtiqādāt, ed. Šamrān al-ʿAǧalī (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Ašraf, 1988). 
12. 
152 raġabtu raġbatan ṣādiqatan an aʿmala risālatan ubayyinu fīhā anwāʾa –l-iʿtiqādāt…(“I had a true desire to write 
an epistle in which I would explain the different creeds…”). ———, On Creeds, 10, 14. See Appendix for 
manuscript details. 
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ʿAǧalī is nevertheless the only person to reproduce the lines of the manuscripts’ texts in a printed 
form and thereby make them accessible to a wider audience. A new critical edition remains a 
desideratum. 
In a section of the book that is extant in the Mashhad and Dublin manuscripts, Ragib refers 
to his Path to Nobility and thereby establishes that On Creeds is indeed his: “…for I have 
explained this in the book The Path to the Nobilities…”.153 In The Path to the Nobilities, when 
discussing the number of sects into which the Muslim community has split, he may refer to On 
Creeds as “a separate composition” of his in which this subject is explained.154 
The Path to the Nobilities of the Revelation (Kitāb aḏ-Ḏarīʿah ilā Makārim aš-Šarīʿah) 
This is Ragib's major ethical treatise, it demonstrates his catholic synthesis of Islamic, 
Aristotelian and pre-conquest Iranian ideas, and it has at its heart an ambitious goal for 
humanity. The Path to the Nobilities is an account of the ways in which human beings can fulfil 
their divine potential and deserve to be described as God’s vicegerents ( alīfah, pl.  ulafāʾ) on 
the earth. It has been published numerous times since the late nineteenth century and translated 
into Persian and English.
155
 Of all Ragib’s works it has attracted the most attention in European-
                                                 
153 fa-qad bayyantuhā fī kitābi –ḏ-Ḏarīʿati ilā Makārimi –š-Šarīʿah… ibid., 62. ———. Ms  of al-Iʿtiqādāt [On 
Creeds]. Āstān-e Quds Re āvī 56 (dated 1280), Āstān-e Quds-e Ra āvī, Mashhad. f.75a. ———. Ms  of al-Iʿtiqādāt 
[On Creeds]. AR 5277 (dated ?), Chester Beatty, Dublin. f.96b.  
154 wa-qad ḏukira ḏālika wa-buyyina fī risālatin mufradah. ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 191. Cf. ———, On 
Creeds, 23-24. On Creeds may also be the Kitāb al-Īmān wa-l-Kufr (Book of Belief and Unbelief) that appears in the 
bibliographic tradition. For example: Muḥsin al-Amīn al-Husaynī al-ʿĀmilī, Aʿyān aš-Šīʿah  (Damascus: Ma baʿat 
Ibn Zaydūn, 1948). 27:220. 
155 In Persian as Rāh-e Bu urgvārī dar Islām: tarjume-ye al-Dharī‛ah… (Tabriz: Surūsh, 1958), and Karāne-ye 
Sa‛ādat: bakhshe mabsūt dar arkān-e akhlāq-e Islāmī, ed. & trans. Mahdī Shams al-Dīn (Qum: 1997). In English as 
The path to virtue: the ethical philosophy of al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī: an annotated trans   with critical introduction  of 
Kitāb al-Dharīah ilā Makārim al-Sharīah [chapter one and introduction only], trans. Yasien Mohamed (Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC), International Islamic 
University Malaysia (IIUM), 2006), and Yasien Mohamed “Knowledge and Purification of the Soul. An Annotated 





 Wilferd Madelung was the first to demonstrate that over half of Abū 
Ḥamīd Muḥammad al-Ġazālī’s (450/1058-505/1111) Mī ān al-ʿAmal (The Scale of Action) is 
taken unattributed from Ragib’s The Path to the Nobilities.157 Al-Ġazālī’s working method, in 
which he reworked his ideas from book to book, means that his magnum opus Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm ad-
Din (Revival of the Religious Sciences) also incorporates a great deal, equally unattributed, of 
Ragib’s ethical thought. 
As noted above, Ragib refers to The Path to the Nobilities in his Exegesis, Quranic 
Glossary, and On Creeds. 
Analysis of the Two Creations and Attainment of the Two Happinesses (Tafṣīl an-
Naš’atayn wa Taḥṣīl as-Saʿādatayn) 
Ragib’s shorter ethical treatise has much more Quranic quotation than The Path to the 
Nobilities, and is shorn of many of its complex epistemologies of reason and knowledge in 
favour of rhetorical phrases and repetition. It may have been intended for use in teaching, or 
indeed as a text from which to preach. Its most important slogan is that human reason (ʿaql) and 
divine revelation (šarʿ) are mutually dependent and jointly productive (chapter 18). Despite its 
                                                                                                                                                             
Studies 6 (1995) 1:51-75. 
156 Wilferd Madelung, "Ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī und die Ethik al-Ġazālīs," in Islamwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen 
Frit  Meier  um 60sten Geburtstag, ed. R. Gramlich (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1974; reprint, Religious Schools 
and Sects in Medieval Islam. London: Variorum Reprints, 1985). Hans Daiber, "Griechische Ethik in islamischem 
Gewande. Das Beispiel von Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī (11. Jh.)," Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi 1(1991). Yasien 
Mohamed, "The Ethical Philosophy of al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī," Journal of Islamic Studies (Oxford) 6, no. 1 (1995). 
For details of editions and translations see: Key, "al-Rāghib." For details of the Persian translations see: Mīr Lawḥī, 
Rāġeb, 256-264. For details of the relationship of the printed editions to each other see: Yasien Mohamed, 
"Knowledge and Purification of the Soul. An annotated translation of Iṣfahānī's Kitāb al-Dharīʿa ilā Makārim al-
Sharīʿa (58-76; 89-92) " Journal of Islamic Studies (Oxford) 9, no. 1 (1998): 66-67. Cf. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. 
Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib and Yasien Mohamed, The Path to Virtue: the ethical philosophy of al-Rāghib al-
Iṣfahānī: an annotated trans   with critical introduction  of [Chapter One of] Kitāb al-Dharīah ilā Makārim al-
Sharīah, trans. Yasien Mohamed (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization 
(ISTAC), International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), 2006). 
157 Madelung, "Ar-Rāġib." Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 250-256. NB: The Path to the Nobilities is quoted by name by az-
Zarkašī: qāla –r-Rāġibu fī-ḏ-Ḏarīʿah… az-Zarkašī, al-Burhān, 3:345. Cf. Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 144. 
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popular tone, the Analysis is also heavier on Hellenistic philosophical terminology than any of 
Ragib’s other works. For example, he describes God as “necessary of existence” (wā ib al-
wu ūd), a phrase that would come to be associated with his more famous contemporary 
Avicenna.
158
 In its earliest extant manuscript (Yahuda 3555), the Analysis is copied together with 




 itt  ateu s  Ripostes and Poets  and Eloquent Men s Rejoinders (Muḥāḍarāt al-Udabāʾ 
wa-Muḥāwarāt aš-Šuʿarāʾ wa-l-Bulaġāʾ) 
Litt rateurs’ Ripostes is perhaps Ragib’s best known work after the Quranic Glossary. It is 
a literary anthology, a work of adab, a tightly structured, comprehensive and quality-controlled 
selection of the most apt quotations and the best poetry for any one of the hundreds of situations 
and subjects that make up its chapters, sub-chapters, and sub-sub-chapters. Although existing in 
a number of manuscripts and printed a number of times, it has only recently been produced in a 
critical edition with indexes. As-Sārīsī has a number of complaints about this edition by ʿAbd al-
Ḥamīd Murād, but its indexes nevertheless provide a great service.160 Even before being indexed, 
Litt rateurs’ Ripostes had been the subject of two Ph.D. dissertations in the United States, and its 
                                                 
158 ———, Analysis of the Two Creations, 40. See also: ———, On Creeds, 48, 56-58. ———, Quranic Glossary, 
854. Robert Wisnovsky has highlighted Ragib’s connection to Avicenna: Robert Wisnovsky, "One Aspect of the 
Avicennian Turn in Sunni Theology," Arabic Science and Philosophy 14(2004): 88-90. Cf. ———, Avicenna's 
Metaphysics in Context, vol. ` (London: Duckworth, 2003). 196f. 
159 al-Bayhaqī, Tārī   ukamāʾ al-Islām, 112-113. 
160 Ragib, Litt rateurs’ Ripostes. as-Sārīsī, "Ḥawla Taḥqīq." Murād used three of the manuscripts detailed in the 
Appendix. 
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There are no references in Litt rateurs’ Ripostes to any of Ragib’s other works, nor do any 
of his other work in exegesis or creed refer to his adab compilations. We have to assume that the 
author of Litt rateur’s Replies, who lived around the end of the tenth century and was familiar 
with Isfahan, is the author of the Quranic Glossary, On Creeds, The Path to the Nobilities, and 
the Exegesis, who was alive at or before the start of the eleventh century, whose Quranic 
Glossary was purchased from Isfahan in 420/1029, and who had the same name. We are in good 
company making this assumption; as-Suyū ī read both Ragib’s adab (Litt rateurs’ Ripostes) and 
his exegesis (Quranic Glossary) and considered them to have one and the same author: “he has 
the Quranic Glossary, and The Branches of Eloquence [see below], and Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, 
and I have seen all three”.162 
The Confluence of Eloquence (Ma maʿ al-Balāġah) 
The Confluence is a shorter, more technical and linguistic, adab compendium. It provides 
its reader with strings of related words, short phrases and linguistically significant snatches of 
poetry, rather than the somewhat longer stories and quotations of Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, which 
themselves still rarely run beyond a short paragraph. The editor of the only published edition, as-
Sārīsī notes substantial overlap between the two works.163 
                                                 
161 Stephanie Bowie Thomas, "The Concept of Muḥāḍara in the Adab Anthology with special reference to al-Rāghib 
al-Iṣfahānī's Muḥāḍarāt al-Udabāʾ" (Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 2000). Riedel, "Searching for the Islamic 
episteme." 
162 la-hū Mufradātu –l-Qurʾāni wa-Afānīnu –l-Balāġati wa-l-Muḥāḍarātu waqaftu ʿalā – - alā ah. as-Suyū ī, Buġyat 
al-Wuʿāh, 2:297. As-Suyū ī is also credited with an abridgement of Litt rateurs’ Ripostes (see Appendix for 
manuscript reference).  
163 Ragib, Confluence of Eloquence, 1:17-18. 
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Ragib on Innovative Figures of Speech (Kitāb min Kalām ar-Rāġib fī-l-Badīʿ) 
Existing in only a single manuscript in The Landberg Collection at Yale University’s 
Beinecke Library, the manual of poetics Ragib on Innovative Figures of Speech has usually been 
referred to, on the rare occasions when it has been mentioned in European or Arabic-language 
scholarship, as The Branches of Eloquence (Afānīn al-Balāġah). This is because Count Carlo 
Landberg (1848-1924), the eminent Swedish arabist who donated the manuscript to Yale, 
connected its subject matter of poetics to the title The Branches of Eloquence (Afānīn al-
Balāġah) attributed to Ragib by Kâtip Çelebi, of which no other manuscripts are known.164 
However, the title Kitāb min Kalām ar-Rāġib fī-l-Badīʿ is found on the title page of the 
manuscript in the same hand as the textblock. It is perhaps more likely, though equally unproven, 
that The Branches of Eloquence was an alternative title for The Confluence of Eloquence. The 
attribution of this work to Ragib rests only on its content, style, and his name being on the title 
page. 
Ab idgement of ‛The Refo m of Speech  by Ibn as-Sikkīt (Mu taṣar Iṣlāḥ al-Manṭiq li-Ibn 
as-Sikkīt) 
Like Ragib on Innovative Figures of Speech, this work remains unedited. Abū Yūsuf 
Yaʿqūb b. Isḥāq Ibn as-Sikkīt (d. ca. 244/858) had a particular concern for lexicography and 
semantic nuances,
165
 and Ragib epitomised his Reform of Speech, which is in large part a review 
and analysis of morphological patterns. Ragib wrote in the introduction: 
                                                 
164 Čelebi, Kašf aẓ-Ẓunūn, 1:370. 
165 R gis Blachère, "Origine de la th orie des adʾdād," in L'Ambivalence dans la culture arabe, ed. Jean Paul 
Charnay (Paris: Éditions Anthropos, 1967), 398. 
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My approach [to The Reform of Speech] has been to extract the essence and remove the 
lines of poetry adduced as evidence. For each long chapter containing repetitions, I have 
provided a revision in alphabetical order, starting with the letter ham ah and then the letter 
bāʾ. The repeated material has consequently been erased. For those expressions, in a single 
chapter, that conveyed the same idea, I have organised them so that you no longer need 
repeated explanations. For the different morphological structures such as faʿala and fuʿila, I 
have reduced their categories so that each occurs just once, and their explanations are dealt 
with together. This process has resulted in acquired memorization and a proximity to 
comprehension. Success lies with God.166 
The attribution of this epitome to Ragib rests on the single manuscript in Cairo (see Appendix). 
On the Difference between the Wo ds ‛One  and ‛Absolute One  (Risālah fī Ḏikr al-Wāḥid 
wa-l-Aḥad) 
This short lexicographical and theological epistle has been edited by as-Sārīsī from a single 
Istanbul manuscript,
167
 the title page of which is the only proof available for its attribution to 
Ragib, other than similarities in style and content with his other works (see, for example, the 
discussion in the Appendix of a passage on the word ‘one’ in the Āstān-e Quds-e Ra āvī 56 copy 
of On Creeds). 
                                                 
166Ragib’s text as reproduced by Ibrāhīm reads: 
ʿamadtu ilayhi wa-sta ra tu  ulāṣatahū wa-aʿfaytuhū min ḏikri –l-abyāti –l-mustašhadi bi-hā wa-ʿamadtu 
ilā kulli bābin ṭawīlin kāna yaqaʿu fīhi –t-takrīrātu fa-ḥarrartuhū ʿalā tartībi ḥurūfi –l-muʿ ami fa-qadamtu 
mā awwalahū –l-ham ata  umma –l-bāʾa fa-fī ḏālika suqūṭu –l-mukarrari wa-mā kāna min –l-alfāẓi bi-
maʿnan wāḥidin fī-l-bābi –l-wāḥidi naẓamtuhā li-tastaġniya ʿan takrīri tafsīrihā wa-mā kāna min abniyatin 
mu talifatin ka-faʿala wa-fuʿila [patterns unvowelled in text] –qtaṣartu fī katbihā ʿalā dafʿatin wāḥidatin wa-
a a tu tafsīra  amīʿihā wa-fī ḏālika taḥṣīlu –l-ḥifẓi wa-qurbu –t-tanāwuli wa-bi-llāhi –t-tawfīq. 
Muḥ̈ī ad-Dīn Tawfīq Ibrāhīm, Ibn as-Sikkīt al-Luġawī (M A  Thesis  Cairo University)  (Baghdad: Printed with the 
assistance of Baghdad University, 1969). 165-169. 
167 Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib, "[On the Difference Between the Words ‛One’ and 
‛Absolute One’] Risālah fī  ikr al-Wāḥid wa-l-Aḥad," in [The Letters of ar-Rāġib] Rasā’il ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī, ed. 
ʿUmar ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān as-Sārīsī (Irbid: ʿĀlam al-Kutub al-Ḥadīṯ, 2005). As-Sārīsī notes that he had published this 
epistle previously in Amman with Dār al-Furqān in 1992. ———, Letters, 3. 
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On the Correct Ways to Mix with People (Risālah fī  dāb al-I tilāṭ bi-n-Nās) 
This epistle (with an internal contents section) of ethical adab has been edited by as-Sārīsī 
as above,
168
 and by Mīr Lawḥī under the title The Circumstances of Friendships and the 
Observances of Loves (Aḥwāl al-Mawaddāt wa-Murāʿāt al-Maḥabbāt).169 The title page and 
similarities in style and content are the only proof available for its attribution to Ragib.  
On Human Virtue Arising from the Disciplines of Knowledge (Risālah anna Faḍīlat al-
Insān bi-l-ʿUlūm) 
This ethical and epistemological epistle (with an internal contents section) has been edited 
by as-Sārīsī as above.170 The title page and similarities in style and content are the only proof 
available for its attribution to Ragib. 
On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions (Risālah fī Marātib al-
ʿUlūm wa-l-Aʿmāl ad-Dunyawīyah) 
This shorter epistemological and theological epistle has been edited by as-Sārīsī as 
above.
171
 The title page and similarities in style and content are the only proof available for its 
attribution to Ragib. 
                                                 
168 ———, "On the Correct Ways to Mix With People." As-Sārīsī notes that he had published this epistle previously 
in Amman with Dār al-Bašīr in 1998. ———, Letters, 3. 
169 See Appendix. Mīr Lawḥī’s edition appeared in Našrī-ye Dānešgāh-e Adabīyāt va-ʿUlūm-e Insānī-e Dānešgāh-e 
Iṣfahān #4,5 in 1371(Š)/1992. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 248 note 2 (and bibliography). 
170 Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib, "[On Human Virtue Arising from the Disciplines of 
Knowledge] Risālah anna Faḍīlat al-Insān bi-l-ʿUlūm," in [The Letters of ar-] Rasā’il ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī, ed. 
ʿUmar ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān as-Sārīsī (Irbid: ʿĀlam al-Kutub al-Ḥadīṯ, 2005). As-Sārīsī notes that he had published this 
epistle previously in the Ma allat Kullīyah ad-Dirāsāt al-Islāmīyah wa-l-ʿArabīyah #22 in Dubai in December 
2001. ———, Letters, 3. 
171 ———, "[On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions] Risālah fī Marātib al-ʿUlūm wa-l-
Aʿmāl ad-Dunyawīyah," in [The Letters of ar-Rāġib] Rasā’il ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī, ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān as-
Sārīsī (Irbid: ʿĀlam al-Kutub al-Ḥadīṯ, 2005). As-Sārīsī notes that he had published this epistle previously in Afāq 
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The Correct Way in Chess (Adab aš-Šaṭran ) 
Recorded by Theodor Menzel as the title of a manuscript in Kazan, Russia.
172
 It may be 




On Knowledge of the Soul and On Invocation of God s Name (Risālah fī-Maʿrifat an-Nafs  
Risālah fī-ḏ-Ḏikr) 
These two titles are attributed to Ragib in the catalogue entry for a single manuscript 
containing 145 works in Istanbul. During my visit to the Süleymaniye the manuscript was being 
repaired and I was only able to consult a scanned image, the quality of which was insufficient to 
determine the text of these works, which appear to be found copied in the margins. See Appendix 
for details. 
The Key to Success: Commentary on the Morning Personal Prayer (Šarḥ li-Duʿāʾ aṣ-Ṣabāḥ 
al-mawsūm bi-Miftāḥ an-Na āḥ)  
The attribution of this commentary on a prayer attributed to ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (fourth 
caliph, reg. 35/656-40/661) is uncertain. See Appendix. 
Lost and Spurious Titles 
Anecdotes from Historical Reports (Nukat al-A bār) 
Mentioned by Ragib in introduction to Litt rateurs’ Ripostes.174 
                                                                                                                                                             
a -Ṯaqāfah wa-t-Turā  #38, published by Markaz  amīʿat al-Māǧid li-ṯ- aqāfah wa-t-Turāṯ in Dubai in 2002. ——
—, Letters, 3. 
172 Theodor Menzel, "Das heutige Russland und die Orientalistik," Der Islam, no. 17 (1928): 94. Carl Brockelmann, 
"Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī," in E J  Brill's First Encyclopaedia of Islam  1913-1936, ed. M. Th. Houtsma, Thomas 
Walker Arnold, Ren  Basset, Richard Hartmann, and A. J. Wensinck (Leiden: Brill, 1987).  
173 Ragib, Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, 2:726-733. 
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Choice Poetry (ʿUyūn al-Ašʿār) 
Mentioned by Ragib in introduction to Litt rateurs’ Ripostes.175 
On Calling Attention to the Lessons of the Quran (ar-Risālah al-Munabbihah ʿalā Fawāʾid al-
Qurʾān) 
Mentioned twice by Ragib in the Quranic Glossary.
176
 
On the Nobility of Sufism (Kitāb Šaraf at-Taṣawwuf) 
Mentioned by Ragib in Exegesis of Quran 2:37 and 2:49.
177
  
On the Relationships between Expressions (Risālat Munāsabāt al-Alfāẓ) 
Mentioned by Ragib in introduction to the Quranic Glossary.
178
 
On Synonyms (Taḥqīq al-Alfāẓ al-Mutarādifah ʿalā al-Maʿnā al-Wāḥid) 
Mentioned by Ragib as a book that he plans to write after the Quranic Glossary.
179
 
The Principles of Derivation (Uṣūl al-Ištiqāq) 
Mentioned twice by Ragib in the Quranic Glossary.
180
 
                                                                                                                                                             
174 Ibid., 1:3. 
175 Ibid. 
176 ———, Quranic Glossary, 53, 229. 
177 ———. Carullah 84. f.42a line 15, f.51a line 14. Cf. Ibid., f.44b line 7. ———, "On the Ordering of Intellectual 
Disciplines and of Worldly Actions," 222.  
178 ———, Quranic Glossary, 55. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid., 118, 189. 
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Durrat at-Taʾwīl wa Ġurrat at-Tanzīl fī-l- yāt al-Mutašābihah wa-l-Mutaʾa  irah (The Pearl of 
Interpretation and the Finest of Revelation in Unclear and Delayed Verses)  
This work has usually been listed among Ragib’s but the recent study of Muḥammad 
Muṣ afā Āydīn is persuasive in attributing it to Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad al- a īb al-Iskāfī (d. 
420/1029).
181
 Āydīn has done a substantial amount of manuscript, bibliographical and content-
based research. The most important witness that he draws on is Ahmed III 85 (Topkapı Palace, 
Istanbul, Turkey), which was copied by the famous Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī (574 or 575/1179- 
626/1229). Yāqūt records a previous scribal note on the witness he was working from that 
described using an autograph copy by al-Iskāfī.182 The incipit of this manuscript, as well as the 
incipit of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 154 (Süleymaniye, Turkey, Istanbul), record dictation of the text by 
al-Iskāfī to Abū al-Faraǧ Ibrāhīm b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Ardastānī. 
The attribution to Ragib rests largely on the title on what appears to be a relatively early 
manuscript at Esad Efendi 176 (Süleymaniye, Turkey, Istanbul),183 al-Bayhaqī’s inclusion of the 
title in his biographical entry, and Muḥammad  ālid Ṣiddīqī’s incorrect claim that the incipit of 
British Museum OR 5784 (British Library, London, United Kingdom) contains Ragib’s name.184 
                                                 
181 Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad al- a īb al-Iskāfī, Durrat at-Tan īl wa-Ġurrat at-Taʾwīl, ed. Muḥammad Muṣ afā 
Āydīn, 3 vols. (Mecca: Umm al-Qurā University, 2001). 93-208. Cf. ʿUmar ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān as-Sārīsī, "Kitāb 
Durrat at-Tanzīl wa Ġurrat at-Ta’wīl li-r-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī wa Laysa li-l- ā ib al-Iskāfī," Ma allat Ma maʿ al-
Luġah al-ʿArabīyah bi-Dimašq 51, no. 1 (1976). Cf. Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 1:100-111. 
182 al- a īb al-Iskāfī, Durrat at-Tan īl, 1:190-191, 1:206. 
183 Ibid., 1:199-200. 
184 The incipit of British Museum OR 5784 does not contain Ragib’s name, pace Ṣiddīqī, "Durrat at-Ta’wīl," 16-18. 
NB. Al-Bayhaqī also gives another unsupported title: Kitāb Kalimāt aṣ- aḥābah (Words of the Prophet’s 
Companions), and appears only to have been personally familiar with Analysis of the Two Creations as discussed 
above. al-Bayhaqī, Tārī   ukamāʾ al-Islām, 112.  
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Kitāb al-Maʿānī al-Akbar (The Larger Book of Literary Ideas) 
Mentioned in the introduction to Durrat at-Taʾwīl, and therefore likely to have been written 
by al- a īb al-Iskāfī. 
Iḥti ā  al-Qirāʾāt al-Mu taṣṣah (Vindication of Specified Readings of the Quran) 
Mentioned in the introduction to Durrat at-Taʾwīl, and therefore likely to have been written 
by al- a īb al-Iskāfī. 
Šarḥ Kalām Rasūl Allāh fī Ḥaqq ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (Commenta y on the P ophet s Wo ds Conce ning 
the Right of Ali) 
No evidence for attribution to Ragib. See Appendix.  
 
Times 
We know almost nothing about Ragib’s life, for there is no information to be found in the 
Arabic and Persian biographical and bibliographical traditions. This makes it more urgent that 
we fit him into his intellectual context, which means evaluating the ideas and beliefs expressed 
frankly in his works against the ideas and beliefs of others. Yet at the same time, while we can 
revisit the mosques and courts of Isfahan we have no way of knowing whether or when Ragib 
“the Isfahanian” was actually there, or exactly why he might not have been.  
Isfahan 
Isfahan sits in a valley in the great mountain range (then known as the  ibāl) that separates 
Iraq from Iran. Baghdad and Basra lie to the west, Shiraz to the south, Ray (now Tehran) to the 
north, Kerman to the south east at the end of the mountains, and to the east the great high plains 
of the Iranian desert (al-mafā ah) beyond which lie Nishapur, Herat, and Marv. Trade and 
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scholarship arrived in and left Isfahan from all points of the compass, although the main routes 
ran mostly north, south, and west, avoiding the desert.
185
 Isfahan was at the heart of what was 
known as “Persian Iraq”, the twin of “Arab Iraq” over the mountains to the west.186 
In Ragib’s time Isfahan was a large, relatively prosperous, and relatively chaotic city.187 
The dynasty founded in the mid-tenth-century by the sons of Būyah b. Fannāh, a fisherman from 
the south shores of the Caspian Sea, was just starting to lose control.
188 Būyah’s grandson Faḫr 
ad-Dawlah died in 387/997, two years after his vizier aṣ-Ṣāḥib. Būyah’s great-grandsons would 
not be so successful. Maǧd ad-Dawlah (Rustam b. Faḫr ad-Dawlah, reg. 387/997-4201029), who 
succeeded his father aged four and scarcely ever ruled independently of his mother (Sayyidah, d. 
405/1014), lost control of Isfahan around 398/1008 to the founder of a new, smaller, dynasty 
originating from the same southern Caspian area, Ibn Kākūyah (ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawlah Abū  aʿfar 
Muḥammad b. Dušmanziyār, cousin of Sayyidah, reg. ca. 398/1008-433/1041).189  
                                                 
185 Durand-Gu dy discusses Isfahan’s “Iraqi identity” and analyses the movements of its scholars, few of whom 
headed east across the desert to  urasān (Nishapur, Herat, Marv, etc.). Durand-Gu dy, Iranian Elites, 32f. For trade 
routes see: Hugh Kennedy, An Historical Atlas of Islam  (Leiden: Brill, 2002). 34-35. Thomas Leisten, Heinz Gaube, 
and Margit Sauer, "The Eastern Part of the ʿAbbāsid Empire: Sāmānids and Ghaznavids between the 9th and 11th 
Cent. A.D.," in T binger Atlas des Vorderen Orients (TAVO) (Tūbingen1990). Fereydoun Rahimi-Laridjani and 
Dieter Ohnmacht, "The Empire of the Great Salǧūks until the Death of Malikšāh (485 h/1092 A.C.)," in T binger 
Atlas des Vorderen Orients (TAVO) (Tūbingen1992). 
186 The two Iraqs (al-ʿirāqayn) made up of ʿirāq ʿa amī and ʿirāq ʿarabī.  
187 Durand-Gu dy estimates 100,000-130,000 inhabitants around this time. (This would make it approximately the 
size (101,355 inhabitants) of the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States in the 2000 census). Durand-
Gu dy, Iranian Elites, 25-26. 
188 In Arabic al-buwayhiyūn, in Persian āl-e būya, in English usually Buyids or Buwayhids. See: Tilman Nagel, 
"Buyids," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New York: Iranicaonline Website, 1988). Cl Cahen, 
"Buwayhids or Būyids," in Encyclopaedia of Islam  Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, 
E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs (Brill Online: Brill, 2009). Bosworth, Islamic Dynasties, 154-157.   
189 In Arabic Ibn Kākūyah, in Persian pesar-e Kākū, in English the dynasty is therefore the Kakuyids or 
Kakawayhids. See: ———, "Kākuyids," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New York: Iranicaonline 
Website, 2010). ———, "Kākūyids, or Kākwayhids," in Encyclopaedia of Islam  Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, 
Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs (Brill Online: Brill, 2011). ———, "ʿAlā al-Dawla 
Moḥammad," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New York: Iranicaonline Website, 2010). ———, 
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In 409/1018, the same year that the London manuscript of Ragib’s Quranic Glossary was 
written, Ibn Kākūyah’s dynasty, with Isfahan as its capital, was recognised by the caliph in 
Baghdad and “was undeniably the major power of Western Iran”.190 Al-Māfarrūḫī describes how 
Ibn Kākūyah ruled Isfahan for forty and a half years in a state of constant watchfulness with 
spies in the camps of all his surrounding enemies. It is reported that upon learning that an enemy 
intended to attack Isfahan he would judge whether the enemy could be resisted, and then either 
fight back or retreat swiftly and tactically “to preserve the city”.191  
However, during one of these tactical absences in 420/1029, the year in which ʿAlī aš-
Šīrāzī was in the city buying the London Quranic Glossary manuscript, Masʿūd of Ġaznah (Abū 
Saʿīd Šihāb ad-Dawlah b. Maḥmūd b. Sebüktigin, reg. 421/1031-432/1040) entered Isfahan and 
ordered a large-scale massacre to punish a local population that had been resisting in their ruler’s 
absence.
192
 Ibn al- awzī tells of an “uncountable number of scholars being killed”, even in the 
city’s mosques. Ibn al-Aṯīr puts the number of dead at around five thousand.193 Could Ragib 
have been among them? In any case these were hard decades. According to Durand-Gu dy, “the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Islamic Dynasties, 160-161.  For the connection to Sayyidah see ———, ʿAlā al-Dawla. Cf. Paul, "The Histories of 
Isfahan," 127 note 36. 
190 Ibn Kākūyah received the title ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawlah from the ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Qādir (Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. 
Isḥāq, reg. 381/991-422/1031) in 409/1018. Durand-Gu dy, Iranian Elites, 50. Bosworth, Kākuyids.  
191 rawaġahū wa-tanaḥḥā ʿanhā ʿa alan wa-ta āfā ilā ṭarafin min –l-aṭrāfi muʿta ilan li-tuṣāna –l-baladah. (“He 
would leave Isfahan and relinquish it in haste for an area in which he could be isolated, in order that the city be 
protected”). al-Māfarrūḫī, Maḥāsin Iṣfahān, 101. Cf. Durand-Gu dy, Iranian Elites, 65. 
192 ———, Iranian Elites, 64, 62-65. 
193 Ibn al- awzī:  āʾa Masʿūd ibn Maḥmūd ibn Sabuktakīn fa-nahaba –l-balada wa-qatala ʿāliman lā yuḥṣā ḥattā 
qutila  amāʿatun fī-l- awāmiʿ. Abū al-Faraǧ ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Ibn al- awzī, al-Muntaẓam fī-Tārī  al-Mulūk wa-l-
Umam, ed. F. Krenkow, 10 vols. (Haydarabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUṯmānīyah, 1938; repr., Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 
1968). 8:70. Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī Ibn al-Aṯīr, al-Kāmil fī-t-Tārī , ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd as-Salām Tadmurī, 10 vols. (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1997). 7:711. Durand-Gu dy, Iranian Elites, 64-65.  
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city’s life was punctured by violent occupations, assaults, sieges, pillages, massacres, epidemics 
and want”.194 
Ibn Kākūyah would later recover his position, and in 429/1038 he built walls of mud brick 
covered in plaster around the city, with crenellations and platforms, and protected by moats.
195
 
However, the next threat was already on the horizon and Ibn Kākūyah’s son Farāmūz (Abū 
Manṣūr Ẓāhir ad-Dīn Šams al-Mulk b. Muḥammad, reg.433/1041-443/1051, d. after 455/1063) 
joined the forces of the incoming Salǧūk Ṭoġr l Beg (Muḥammad b. Mīkāʾīl b. Salǧūk, 
d.455/1063), whose siege of Isfahan would be delayed by the walls Farāmūz’s father had built 
for an entire year before the city fell in 443/1051. Another massacre and a sea change in 
intellectual life followed: “the creation of the Saljuqid state … in Isfahan  ... had a huge impact 
on the local urban society … the old local elites were marginalized and deprived of the networks 
that enabled them to play a role…”.196 
 We may never know to what extent Ragib was caught up in these events, if indeed he was 
still alive at this time. He may only have known Isfahan under the relative calm of Faḫr ad-
Dawlah and aṣ-Ṣāḥib, if indeed he was there. Nevertheless, it does seem likely that the 
preservation of his biography and his scholarly networks were affected by the turmoil. Scholars 
that he taught, who would otherwise have passed on details of his life, may not have survived the 
chaos that enveloped Isfahan in the early eleventh century. The same could be true of his works. 
It does not seem too much of a stretch to imagine that the library founded by aṣ-Ṣāḥib’s 
successor as vizier Abū al-ʿAbbās aḍ-Ḍabbī next to the great mosque, full of books on 
                                                 
194 ———, Iranian Elites, 53. 
195 Ibid., 57. 
196 ———, "Iranians at War Under Turkish Domination: The Example of Pre-Mongol Isfahan," Iranian Studies 38, 
no. 4 (2005): 596-597, 605. 
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everything from lexicography to logic, might have held copies of Ragib’s works.197 
Archaeologists have uncovered small fragments of this baked brick addition, but the library itself 
is unlikely to have survived Masʿūd’s attack and Ṭoġr l’s conquest intact.198 Perhaps the wide 
distribution of manuscripts of Ragib’s Quranic Glossary owes something to the fact that ʿAlī aš-
Šīrāzī bought a copy and took it out of Isfahan to the library of his employer in Damascus. 
Arabic and Persian Isfahan 
 Durand-Gu dy describes a diglossic situation in which the Isfahan vernacular was Persian 
while the intellectual elite, the scholars, spoke and worked in Arabic. During this period Persian 
was experiencing a literary and scholarly revival on the other side of the desert, but Isfahan 
turned more towards Arabic-speaking Baghdad.
199 Ragib fits this context perfectly; we have 
already seen that al-Māfarrūḫī lists him among scholars who were proficient in both languages, 
and there is evidence in his works, all of which are in Arabic, that he knew Persian as well. Mīr 
Lawḥī has produced extensive lists of Ragib’s use of Persian sources,200 Ragib notes Persian 
                                                 
197 The library catalogue took up three volumes and comprised works in exegesis, Hadith, grammar, lexicography, 
morphology (at-taṣrīf wa-l-abniyah), poetry, narrative history (al-a bār), lives of the prophets, caliphs, kings and 
princes, as well as collections of Hellenistic disciplines (min ʿulūm al-awāʾil) such as logic, mathematics, physics, 
metaphysics (ilāhīyāt) and more. al-Māfarrūḫī, Maḥāsin Iṣfahān, 85. 
198 Grabar, The Great Mosque, 47. Durand-Gu dy lists a number of lost histories of Isfahan, most pertinently for 
Ragib those by Muḥammad b. Isḥāq Ibn Mandah (d. 395/1005) and his son ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān (d. 470/1078). Durand-
Gu dy, Iranian Elites, 317-318. 
199 Ragib’s contemporary Abū al-Qāṣim Firdowsī (d. 416/1025) completed the Persian-language Iranian national 
epic, the Šahnāme, in 400/1010 in Ṭūs (now Mashhad). Djalal Khaleghi-Motlagh, "Ferdowsi, Abū'l-Qāsem: i. Life," 
in Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New York: Iranicaonline Website, 1999). Durand-Gu dy, Iranian 
Elites, 41-43. For aṣ-Ṣāḥib’s use of vernacular Persian at court, see: Erez Naaman, "Literature and Literary People at 
the Court of Al-Ṣāḥib Ibn ʿAbbād" (Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 2009), 8. 
200 Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 47-33, 1330139, Appendix Two. Cf. Dimitri Gutas, "Classical Arabic Wisdom Literature: 
Nature and Scope," Journal of the American Oriental Society 101, no. 1 (1981): 61. 
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etymologies and quotes Persian phrases at several points,
201
 and in Litt rateurs’ Ripostes he has 
a section on “poetry taken from Persian”.202 
Collegial Relationships 
There is some oblique evidence in Ragib’s Letters that at times he suffered from the 
vicissitudes of an intellectual culture that thrived on controversy, dispute, and factional 
disagreement. If anything, this shows that he was integrated into the rough and tumble scholarly 
culture that existed even when the broader political climate was relatively stable.
203
 In On the 
Difference Between the Words ‛One’ and ‛Absolute One’ and On the Correct Ways to Mix with 
People he refers to a senior scholar (aš-šay  al-fāḍil / aš-šay  aṭāla allāh baqāʾah) with whom 
he has had productive discussions. In On Human Virtue Arising from the Disciplines of 
Knowledge he dedicates the work to a figure in authority (al-ustāḏ), and then in On the Ordering 
of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions he complains that a senior scholar (aš-šay  al-
                                                 
201 Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 251. ———, Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, 1:397. ———, Quranic Glossary, 318.  
202 It is not immediately clear what the sub-sub-section “lines taken from Persian” (abyāt manqūlah min al-fārisīyah) 
means here. Of the sixteen poetic šawāhid, most of which are single lines, several are attributed to Arabic-speaking 
poets. Is Ragib making a claim with this section heading? That the lines were originally Persian? That the motifs or 
popular sayings (am āl) behind them were originally Persian? Is he referring to New Persian, which emerged in the 
tenth century, or Middle Persian, the language of the pre-Islamic Sasanian empire? ———, Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, 
4:852-855. Several of the lines in question appear in other collections, including al-Maydānī’s collection of am āl, 
without reference to any Persian connection: Abū al-Faḍl Aḥmad al-Maydānī, Ma maʿ al-Am āl, ed. Muḥammad 
Muḥyī ad-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, 2 vols. (Ma baʿat as-Sunnah al-Muḥammadīyah, 1955). 1:302, 1:349, 1:446. Aḥmad 
b. Muḥammad aṯ- aʿlabī, at-Tam īl wa-l-Muḥāḍarah, ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Ḥulw (Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-
ʿArabīyah, 1961). 104-105, 265, 376. Abū ʿUṯmān ʿAmr b. Baḥr al- āhiẓ, Kitāb al- ayawān, ed. ʿAbd as-Salām 
Muḥammad Hārūn, 7 vols. (Cairo: Muṣ afā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1966-1969). 4:36. ʿAbdallāh Ibn al-Muʿtazz,  abaqāt 
aš-Šuʿarāʾ, ed. ʿAbd as-Sattār Aḥmad Farrāǧ (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1968). 166. 
203 When one of Badīʿ az-Zamān al-Hamaḏānī’s narrators passes through Isfahan on the way to Ray, he is too afraid 
of the coarseness ( ušūnah) of Isfahan’s religious culture to leave the prayer early, and risks missing the departure of 
his caravan. Badīʿ az-Zamān al-Hamaḏānī, Maqāmāt Badīʿ a -Zamān al-Hamaḏānī, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbduh 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2003). 63 (al-Maqāmah al-Iṣfahānīyah). Durand-Gu dy follows W. J. 
Prendergast’s 1915 translation of  ušūnah as “savage fanaticism”. Durand-Gu dy, Iranian Elites, 40. The culture of 
controversies could affect even the most famous scholars, see: Gabriel Said Reynolds, "The Rise and Fall of Qadi 
ʿAbd al-Jabbar," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 37(2005). 
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fāḍil, the same one?) has slandered him to a figure in authority (al-ustāḏ, the same one?).204 
Ragib had also said that were it not for the encouragement of the senior scholar (aš-šay  al-fāḍil) 
he would not have written On the Difference between the Words ‛One’ and ‛Absolute One’, 




Integrated as Ragib may have been into the turmoil of scholarly life in Isfahan, he 
consistently expressed distaste for it. In The Path to the Nobilities he discusses how common it is 
to see scholars who have attained a certain position in a field criticising those above them and 
shunning those below.
206
 Competition between scholars, and the resultant mutual hatred and 
conflict, is an evil that it is incumbent upon the secular authorities (as-sulṭān) to control.207 
Furthermore, debate and dialectic itself is a bad thing. It is a reprehensible thing for intelligent 
scholars, and even more so for the ill-informed masses. Although debate may spur participants 
on to search for knowledge, the fact that they are driven by a desire to vanquish their opponent 
makes them unable to agree to anything, however true it may turn out to be. The right thing to do 
if one is faced with opponents girded for such argumentation is flee, and one should not be 
tempted to enlighten them with wisdom, for as the Prophet says “angels don’t enter a house with 
a dog in it”.208 The problem with debate is that it is much easier to break down an argument than 
                                                 
204 Ragib, "One and Absolute One," 24. ———, "On the Correct Ways to Mix With People," 71. ———, "On 
Human Virtue Arising from the Disciplines of Knowledge," 159. ———, "On the Ordering of Intellectual 
Disciplines and of Worldly Actions," 213-214. 
205 ———, "One and Absolute One," 44. 
206 ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 173. 
207 Ibid., 182. 
208 lā tad alu –l-malāʾikatu baytan fīhi kalbun [wa-lā ṣūratu tamā īl]. Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-ʿAsqalānī Ibn Ḥaǧar, Fatḥ 
al-Bārī Šarḥ  aḥīḥ al-Bu ārī, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAbdallāh Ibn Bāz and Muḥammad Fu’ād ʿAbd al-Bāqī, 18 vols. 
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provide a new one, just as humans are able to slaughter animals, but not create them.
209
 Again, 
these criticisms were popular tropes in the literature of the time; rarely, if ever, did a scholar 
praise the factional process of disagreements and sectarian quarrel. 
Fitting into the Institutional Landscape 
The Court 
In Ragib’s time it was very important to fit in. Careers could be made or broken based on a 
scholars’ ability to integrate themselves into circles of power and patronage. Erez Naaman, in a 
recent Harvard Ph.D. dissertation, writes persuasively about the challenges and rewards of fitting 
into what he calls “the courtly habitus”.210 He is mostly dealing with literary taste rather than 
theological or sectarian positions but his analysis of the hegemonic, but not simplistic or 
monolithic, tastes at the heart of each circle of power is pertinent. 
Naaman studied the court of aṣ-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād, an arena with which we know Ragib was 
in contact. The member of that court with whom Ragib corresponded, Abū al-Qāsim b. Abī al-
ʿAlāʾ, was described as a distinguished and leading member of the elite of Isfahan (min wu ūhi 
ahli Iṣfahān wa-aʿyānihim wa-ruʾasāʾihim).211 Despite his correspondence with a member of the 
elite, Ragib does not appear in any of the many records of the scholars at aṣ-Ṣāḥib’s court.212 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2000). 8:383f (#3224f). Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 87, 188. 
209 ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 186-188. 
210 Via Pierre Bourdieu. Naaman, "Literature and Literary People." Another recent Ph.D. dissertation deals with aṣ-
Ṣāḥib and his letters. Maurice Alex Pomerantz, "Licit Magic and Divine Grace: the Life and Letters of al-Ṣāḥib Ibn 
ʿAbbād (d. 385/995)" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 2010). 
211 Yāqūt, Muʿ am al-Udabāʾ, 2:703. Abū al-Qāsim b. Abī al-ʿAlāʾ is not described in this way by aṣ-Ṣāḥib himself, 
pace Durand-Gu dy, Iranian Elites, 27. 
212 For example: aṯ- aʿālibī, Yatīmat ad-Dahr 1956 ed  Yāqūt, Muʿ am al-Udabāʾ. at-Tawḥīdī, A lāq al-Wa īrayn. 
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It seems possible that Ragib’s absence from the records of his time could be the result of 
his failure to fit into a habitus in Isfahan, whether by choice or not. It is possible to read in some 
of his ideas a certain coolness towards secular authority, along with an ethically founded refusal 
to countenance that authority behaving badly. He wrote that God censures those who seek to 
govern others before they have first governed and improved their souls and bodies.
213
 God’s is 
the only real command, and when one human commands another it is just figurative language.
214
 
Kings do not deserve to rule because of their wealth or their inheritance, they deserve to rule if 
they are righteous, effective, and of sound body.
215
 Finally, anyone with a wife, a servant, and a 
house is a king! Or alternatively, anyone who does not have to work is a king!
216
 These do not 
sound like the words of a good client. 
Hadith 
The collection and study of Hadith presented an alternative source of cultural capital to that 
provided by the court. In Isfahan, its sectarian affiliations were directly opposed to the Shia and 
                                                 
213 wa-lā yaṣlaḥu li-siyāsati ġayrihī man lā yaṣlaḥu li-siyāsati nafsihī wa-li-hāḏā ḏamma –llāhu man taraššaḥa li-
siyāsati ġayrihī fa-amara bi-l-maʿrūfi wa-nahā ʿan –l-munkari wa-huwa ġayru muhaḏḏabin fī-nafsihī. Citing Quran 
2:44, 61:2-3, and 5:104. Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 84. 
214 wa-ḏālika anna šayʾan min –l-ašyāʾi lā yakūnu illā bi-amrihī subḥānahū wa-amru –s-sulṭāni iḏā uḍīfa ilā hāḏā 
wa-qūbila bihī wu ida ma ā an… (“…and that [Quran 36:82 where God commands things to “be!”] is because 
things only exist with God’s command, and if the command of a sultan is placed next to and compared to that it is 
found to be figurative”). ———, On Creeds, 165.  
215 For example, the first four (“rightly guided”) caliphs of Islam were rich in humility, not in material wealth. The 
subsequent text reads:  
inna –l-mulka yustaḥaqqu fī an yakūna –l-insānu min ʿunṣurin ṣāliḥin sawāʾun kāna min bayti –l-maliki 
qaylun aw lam yakun wa-an yakūna ḏā ʿilmi siyāsati nafsihī wa-ahluhū min raʿīyatihī wa-an yakūna fī 
 ismihī kāmila –l- ilqati šadīda –l-quwwati… (The human who deserves to be king must be of good stock, 
whether or not he is a princeling from the king’s family, he must know how to govern his own soul, his family 
must be among his flock, he must be, and appear to be, of sound body, and he must be strong…) 
———. Carullah 84. f.165a-b. Cf. ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 129. 
216———, Exegesis ed  Sardār, 310-311. 
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Muʿtazilī sympathies of aṣ-Ṣāḥib.217 Hadith partisans were either Ḥanbalī or Šāfiʿī, and there are 
reports of a lack of tolerance for anything close to Shiism. They vehemently defended the fifth 
caliph Muʿāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān (reg. 41/661-60/680), who took the caliphate from ʿAlī, to the 
extent that they considered a Hadith that classed him as a “king” rather than a “caliph” 
tantamount to a profession of Shiism.
218
 Aṣ-Ṣāḥib can only have been motivated by a desire to 
combat anti-Muʿtazilī sentiment in Isfahan when he built an entire new mosque to promote 
Muʿtazilī theology.219  
On the other side of the theological and sectarian fence from aṣ-Ṣāḥib’s Muʿtazilī Shiism, 
Hadith had its own institutions and its own habitus. Isfahan had a specialised institution for 
Hadith (bayt alʿilm wa-r-riwāyah / bayt al-ḥadī  wa-r-riwāyah) that produced the city’s chief 
judges and was attended by its prominent families.
220
 The men who dominated the Hadith scene 
in Isfahan during Ragib’s lifetime were engaged in bitter doctrinal quarrels, and in the process of 
                                                 
217 This should not be taken to mean that the boundaries between the two groups were necessarily fixed or rigid. 
Naaman discusses aṣ-Ṣāḥib’s inclusion of scholars with sectarian affiliations that clashed with his own. Aṣ-Ṣāḥib’s 
librarian, Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Muqriʿ (d. 381/991) was, after all, a Ḥanbalī. Naaman, "Literature and Literary 
People," 74-75. On the library, see: Pomerantz, "Licit Magic and Divine Grace," 111-114. Nevertheless, Faḫr ad-
Dawlah chose two Shia viziers to succeed aṣ-Ṣāḥib: Abū al-ʿAbbās aḍ-Ḍabbī and Abū ʿAlī b. Ḥamūlah al-Iṣfahānī. 
Durand-Gu dy, Iranian Elites, 40. Naaman confirms that aṣ-Ṣāḥib was a Zaydī Shia, pace Madelung: Naaman, 
"Literature and Literary People," 7 note 8. 
218 Al-Muqaddasī (Šams ad-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad, d. ca. 380/990) described almost being killed by his 
anti-aṣ-Ṣāḥib Isfahani host for maintaining that Muʿāwiyah was a king, and complains of the foolishness and 
fanaticism of Isfahanis (fī ahli iṣfahān balahun wa-ġulūw). Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Muqaddasī, Kitāb Aḥsan at-
Taqāsīm fī Maʿrifat al-Aqālīm, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden: Brill, 1967; repr., Cairo: Maktabat al-Madbūlī, 1991). 
399. Durand-Gu dy, Iranian Elites, 39-40. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 2:627.  
219 In the  urǧīr quarter of Isfahan. al-Māfarrūḫī, Maḥāsin Iṣfahān, 85-86. Grabar, The Great Mosque, 47-49 (with 
photographs). Durand-Gu dy, Iranian Elites, 39. 
220 The judge: Aḥmad b  Muslim b  Muḥammad b  Ismāʿīl b  Aḥmad al-Muʿaddal waliya qaḍāʾa –l-madīnati min ahli 
bayti –l-ʿilmi wa-r-riwāyati katabtu ʿanhu wa-ʿāša ilā sanata  alā a wa-sittīn. Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh Abū Nuʿaym al-
Iṣfahānī, Ḏikr A bār Iṣbahān, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, no date). 1:157.  The member of the Ibn 
Mandah family (possibly the father of the Ibn Mandah discussed in the text below): Isḥāq b  Muḥammad b  Yaḥyā b  
Mandah Abū Yaʿqūb kāna min ahli bayti –l-ḥadī i wa-r-riwāyati tuwuffiya fī ramaḍāna sanata iḥdā wa-arbaʿīna … 
raʾaytuhū wa-lam ar aq minhu samāʿa ḥadī ihī. Ibid., 1:221. Jūrgen Paul, "Isfahan: V. Local Historiography," in 
Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New York: Iranicaonline Website, 2006). 
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documenting both those quarrels and their own prestige. Ibn Mandah (Muḥammad b. Isḥāq, 
310/922-395/1005) was a leading Ḥanbalī and a descendant of the pre-Islamic Sasanian elite. He 
went on long, expensive journeys to receive transmission of Hadith and returned laden with it, 
followed by forty camels carrying records of the cultural capital he had amassed.
221
  
Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣfahānī (Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh, 336/948-430/1038) was an adherent of the 
legal school of aš-Šāfiʿī, and was such a controversial figure that someone who suggested going 
to hear Hadith from him was almost killed by Ḥanbalī partisans (referred to as ahl al-ḥadī ) with 
their pen-sharpening knives.
222
 From an old Persian family himself (his great-great-grandfather 
was called Mihrān), he engaged in and recorded his quarrel with Ibn Mandah.223 Just as with the 
records of events at court, Ragib is nowhere to be found in the histories of these achievements 
and controversies. 
Ragib was conversant with Hadith terminology and committed to the theory that Hadith, 
the iteratively verified reports of the sayings and actions of the Prophet, were a valid and 
valuable source of knowledge. He was not, however, engaged in the same sort of activity as Abū 
Nuʿaym or Ibn Mandah who were part of the system of transmission and verification that 
produced works such as Abū Nuʿaym’s Ḏikr A bār Iṣfahān (The Enumeration of Reports from 
Isfahan), a long and critical “literary inventory of the transmitters of traditions”.224 Instead we 
                                                 
221 Šams ad-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad ad- ahabī, Kitāb Taḏkirat al- uffāẓ, 5 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyah, 1990). 3:1031f. 
222 Ibid., 3:1095. 
223 Ibid., 2:278, 3:1097. Jacqueline Chabbi, "Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣfahānī," in Encyclopaedia of Islam  THREE, ed. 
Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill Online: Brill, 2011). Durand-Gu dy, 
Iranian Elites, 29, 35-41.  
224 Chabbi, Abū Nuʿaym. 
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find in Ragib’s works scattered references to the Hadith specialists (ahl al-ḥadī ), a group with 
whom Ragib does not identify himself and with whom he does not always agree. 
For Ragib, Hadith was a staging post on the scholar’s progression through the different 
intellectual disciplines and not the ultimate destination.
225
 It was a source of revealed truth to be 
used alongside the Quran, but unlike the Quran it must of course be carefully checked for 
authenticity.
226
 Those Hadith that have been related by enough parallel transmitters to remove 
any possibility of forgery and error (al-mutawātirah) have the status of necessary knowledge.227 
Less reliable Hadith with only a single chain of transmitters (a bār al-āḥād) can be rejected by 
reason.
228
 It is only the partisans of Hadith (ahl al-ḥadī ) who maintain that religion is known 
only through transmission to the complete exclusion of reason,
229
 a position with which Ragib 
disagreed. Religion, as he consistently maintained in his ethics, exegesis, and creed, is known 
                                                 
225 The different stages are listed: 
fa-min manā ilihī [al-ʿilm] maʿrifatu –l-luġati –llatī ʿalayhā buniya –šarʿu  umma ḥifẓu kalāma rabbi –l-
ʿi  ati  umma samāʿu –l-ḥadī i  umma –l-fiqhu  umma ʿilmu –l-a lāqi wa-l-waraʿi  umma ʿilmu –l-
muʿāmalāti wa-mā bayyana ḏālika min –l-wasāʾiṭi min maʿrifati uṣūli –l-barāhīni wa-l-adillah. (The stages 
of knowledge are: lexicography, upon which revelation is founded; then memorization of the Quran; then 
listening to Hadith; then law; then ethics and piety; and then the knowledge of correct actions together with 
the intermediaries that enable the correct actions to be known, intermediaries consisting of the principles of 
proofs and indications.) 
Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 172. 
226 One of the four sources of incorrect Quranic interpretation is the use of forged Hadith and its ilk ( abar 
mu awwar aw ka-l-mu awwar / ḥadī  mawḍūʿ). ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 48-
49. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 92-93. 
227 al-mutawātirah are an example of a bār that necessarily engender knowledge (wa-lā tuqāl nabaʾun illā li-kulli 
 abarin yaqtaḍī –l-ʿilma ka-l-mutawātirah). ———. Carullah 84. f.36a. The mutawātirah were already an 
established category in legal theory at this stage: mā  ubita min sunani -r-rasūli (ṣ) bi-t-tawāturi –l-mū ibati li-l-
ʿilm  . Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al- aṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl al-Fiqh al-Musammā al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl, ed. ʿUǧayl  āsim an-Našamī, 4 vols. 
(Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-š-Šu’ūn al-Islāmīyah. al-Idārah al-ʿĀmmah li-l-Iftāʾ wa-l-Buḥūṯ aš-Šarʿīyah 1994). 
1:169, 1:174, etc. Al- aṣṣāṣ, 305/917-370/981.  
228 fa-inna -l-a bāra -l-āḥāda turaddu fī-mā taʿāfuhū -l-ʿuqūlu -ṣ-ṣaḥīḥah. Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 1268-1269. 
229 maḏhabu ahli –l-ḥadī i anna lā wā iba illā min  ihati –n-nubuwwah (the doctrine of Hadith partisans is that no 
religious prescription is incumbent upon believers unless it comes from a prophet). ———, On Creeds, 115. 
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and followed through a combination of reason and revelation.
230
 Ragib was happy to cite the 
controversial Hadith about Muʿāwiyah  in On Creeds.231 This is not a set of convictions that 
would have allowed him to fit into Isfahan’s Hadith culture. 
Sectarian Affiliations 
Sunnis 
There is no doubt that Ragib saw himself as Sunni and would have been recognised as such 
by his contemporaries. In On Creeds he writes that “the Sunnis, those who follow the example of 
the Prophet’s Companions, are the sect in which salvation is found”.232  
The next chapter is titled “that which is incumbent upon Sunnis” and ends with the 
following list of “the authorities of Islam” (aʾimmat al-islām): Mālik b. Anas (Abū ʿAbdallāh, d. 
179/796), al-Layṯ b. Saʿd (ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān, 94/713-175/791), al-Awzāʿī (Abū ʿAmr ʿAbd ar-
Raḥmān, 88/707–157/774), Sufyān aṯ- awrī (Abū ʿAbdallāh b. Saʿīd, 97/716-161/778), Ibn 
ʿUyaynah (Sufyān al-Hilālī, 107/725-196/811), aš-Šāfiʿī (d. 204/820), and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal 
                                                 
230 maḏhabu ak ari ahli –l-a ari anna ḏālika [dīn allāh] baʿḍuhū ʿaqlī wa-baʿḍuhū šarʿī. The doctrine of the ahl al-
a ar (see below) is that some of God’s religion is known by reason and some by revelation. Ibid. See also ———, 
Analysis of the Two Creations, 117-121 (chapter 18).  
231 “The caliphate will continue after me for thirty years and then it will become a kingdom” (al- ilāfatu baʿdī 
 alā ūna sanatan  umma taṣīru mulkan) was cited by Ragib to argue that all Muslim rulers after 40/661 should be 
subject to evaluation and correction by their subjects. ———, On Creeds, 30. For all the protestations of the 
Isfahani Hadith partisans, this Hadith also appears in Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal’s collection. Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad, 6 
vols. (Cairo: al-Ma baʿah al-Maymanīyah, 1895). 5:221. 
232 wa-l-firqatu –n-nā iyatu hum ahlu –s-sunnati wa-l- amāʿati –llaḏīna –qtadaw bi-ṣ-ṣaḥābah. Ragib, On Creeds, 
26. Al-ʿAǧalī is following the Dublin manuscript here. ———. Chester Beatty AR 5277. f.4b. The sixteenth-century 
Istanbul manuscript has the inexplicable wa-l-firqatu fī –n-nāḥiyah [?]. ———. Ms  of al-Iʿtiqādāt [On Creeds]. 
Sehid Ali 382 (dated 1554), Süleymaniye, Istanbul. f.18b. In the seventeenth-century Istanbul manuscript this entire 
phrase has been replaced with the names of the first four caliphs in a larger hand: anna Abā Bakr wa-ʿUmar wa-
ʿU mān wa-ʿAlī raḍiya –llāh. ———. Ms  of al-Iʿtiqādāt [On Creeds]. Feyzullah Efendi 2141 (dated 1680), 




 All these men had been dead for over a century when Ragib was writing, 
and all were famous jurists and transmitters of Hadith. The men who would give their names to 
three of the four major legal schools are present (Mālik, aš-Šāfiʿī, and Aḥmad) and the only 
notable absentee is the fourth: Abū Ḥanīfah (an-Nuʿmān b.  ābit, d.150/767).234 The list 
confirms that Ragib was Sunni, and while it suggests a certain degree of coolness towards the 
Ḥanafī school of jurisprudence, a minority affiliation in Isfahan at the time,235 Ragib is happy to 
cite Ḥanafī positions without criticism in his Exegesis.236 
Shia 
Although we have established that Ragib was Sunni and not Shia, his works still contain a 
tremendous amount of quotations from, and venerations of, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib.237 That he could do 
this while confidently identifying himself as a Sunni tells us that the boundaries between these 
two major confessional groups were not in exactly the same places as in later centuries. Ragib 
                                                 
233 ———, On Creeds, 28-31. Al-ʿAǧalī follows Sehid Ali. ———. Sehid Ali 382. f.19a-b. Chester Beatty and 
Feyzullah Efendi have aslāf (forefathers) for aʾimmat al-islām (imams of Islam). ———. Chester Beatty AR 5277. 
f.6a-b. ———. Fey ullah Efendi 2141. ff.38b-39a. 
234 Cf. al-Bayhaqī’s (Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn, d. 458/1066) list of the Sunni imams, which is exactly the same 
as Ragib’s with the addition of Abū Ḥanīfah, and of two scholars who are later than anyone in Ragib’s list, the 
authors of of the two canonical Hadith collections al-Buḫārī (Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl, 194/810- 
256/870) and Muslim (Abū al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḥaǧǧāǧ, d. 261/875). Abū al-Qāsim ʿAlī Ibn ʿAsākir, "The Exposure of 
the Calumniator's Lying Concerning what has been Imputed to the Imam Abu ʾl-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī," in The theology 
of al-Ashʿarī: the Arabic texts of al-Ashʿarī's Kitāb al-lumaʿ and Risālat istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām: with 
briefly annotated translations  and appendices containing material pertinent to the study of al-Ashʿarī, ed. Richard 
Joseph McCarthy (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953), 160. 
235 “…from the middle of the third/ninth century Hanafism steadily lost ground to Shafiʿism, which became the 
majority madhhab in Iṣfahān in the fourth/tenth century”. Durand-Gu dy, Iranian Elites, 36. 
236 Ragib appears to approve of a Ḥanafī rejection of the Šāfīʿī principle of negative implication. The Ḥanafī position 
is that negative implication is incorrect because it would mean that Quran 3:130’s prohibition of “doubled and re-
doubled” interest would produce an allowance of interest so long as it was not “doubled and re-doubled”. Ragib, 
Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 852. That this is an accurate reflection of the Ḥanafī position is confirmed by: al- aṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl 
al-Fiqh, 1:291, 1:296, 1:301. For confirmation of this being a Šāfiʿī position: Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 60. 
For another example of Ragib citing a Ḥanafī position see: Ragib, Exegesis ed  Sardār, 205. 
237 These have been enumerated by Mīr Lawḥī, together with Ragib’s references to other Shia imams. Mīr Lawḥī, 
Rāġeb, 39, 115, Appendix One. 
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was pro-ʿAlī, as reflected by his relating an anecdote in which ʿAlī’s failure to persuade the 
masses of his legitimacy is the result of their being blinded by his light.
238
 He was also against 
the love of ʿAlī when it reached the stage of attacking the Prophet’s other companions and 
wives.
239
 He stated that the Shia were wrong about the imamate.
240
 
Traditionists, Senior Sufis, and Wise Philosophers  
Ragib was unquestionably Sunni, but the biographical tradition in subsequent centuries 
would not be satisfied with simply placing him in such a broad church and neither should we. 
The majority of On Creeds, and much of the work of other heresiographers, focussed on the 
differences of opinion, controversies, and sectarian battles within Sunni Islam. The problem is 
that it is by no means clear into which existing category Ragib should be placed, and it appears 
problematic to assert that someone whose work was so popular could be sui generis and in his 
own category. Nevertheless, that appears to be the case. Ragib affiliates himself with ahl al-a ar 
wa-muḥaṣṣilī aṣ-ṣūfīyah wa-l-ḥukamāʾ (“traditionists, senior Sufis, and wise philosophers”); a 
                                                 
238 The anecdote in The Path to the Nobilities, in a section addressing the problems faced by the wise when 
preaching to the masses, reads: 
Salmah b. Kuhayl was asked what it was about Ali that led the masses to reject him while he was clearly 
sharper than them? Salmah replied that the masses’ eyes were too dim to see Ali’s light, and people always 
lean towards those similar to themselves. (wa-qad qīla li-Salmah b  Kuhayl mā li-ʿAlī (r) rafaḍathu –l-
ʿāmmatu wa-lahū fī kulli  ayrin ḍirsun qāṭiʿun fa-qāla li-anna ḍawʾa ʿuyūnihim qaṣura ʿan nūrihī wa-n-nāsu 
ilā aškālihim amyal). 
Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 183. 
239 yatawaṣṣalūna bi-madḥihī wa-iẓhāri maḥabbatihī ilā ḏammi -ṣ-ṣaḥābati wa-a wā i –n-nabīy. ———, On 
Creeds, 14. In later centuries the Persian-language biographical tradition would latch onto Ragib’s veneration of ʿAlī 
and class him as Shia. This appears to have started with ʿImād ad-Din a -Ṭabrisī (fl. 1299) whose assertion that 
Ragib was an Imāmī Shia was oft-repeated. ʿImād ad-Dīn al-Ḥusayn a -Ṭabrisī, Asrār al-Imāmah  (Mashhad: 
Islamic Research Foundation, 2001). 514. See also: al-ʿĀmilī, Aʿyān aš-Šīʿah, 27:220. ʿAbbās al-Qummī, al-Kunā 
wa-l-Alqāb, 2 vols. (Qum: Muʾassasat an-Našr al-Islāmī, 2004). 2:262. Cf. Riedel, "Searching for the Islamic 
episteme," 125-126. 
240 Ragib, On Creeds, 26. 
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grouping that I have not found attested anywhere else. The remainder of this chapter is an 
attempt to understand what it meant to him and what it would have meant to his contemporaries. 
Traditionists (ahl al-a ar) 
The Ašʿarī theologian, and contemporary of Ragib, Ibn Fūrak used the name ahl al-a ar for 
a group of scholars that al-Ašʿarī himself debated with in Baghdad in the tenth century. Al-Ašʿarī 
disagreed with them, but was prepared to defend them against those who would belittle their 
knowledge, saying that their cautiousness about legitimate word usage was not necessarily 
incorrect, but due to an excess rather than a lack of knowledge.
241 Al-Ašʿarī was an ex-Muʿtazilī 
arguing for theological solutions that were more consistent with revelation and required less 
hermeneutical recourse to figurative interpretations of Quran and Sunna than those of the 
Muʿtazilah.  
The ahl al-a ar in al-Ašʿarī as reported by Ibn Fūrak appear to represent the Ḥanābilah, 
theologians who were engaged in a political, cultural, and theological struggle with the 
Muʿtazilah that often rested on Ḥanbalī commitments to literal interpretation of revelation, and 
consequent Muʿtazilī claims that the Ḥanābilah were simplistic and stupid. Ragib himself was 
                                                 
241 In this passage the traditionsists (called both ahl al-a ar and aṣḥāb an-naql wa-l-a ar) maintain that one should 
refuse to describe any expression of the words of the Quran as either created or uncreated in order to avoid giving 
the impression that the Quran itself could be described as created. Al-Ašʿarī himself was more confident and held 
that one could make a distinction between the sounds created by the movement of the tongue and lips during 
recitation of the Quran, and the thing that was being recited, the Quran itself. Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Fūrak, 
Maqālāt aš-Šayȟ Abī al- asan al-Ašʿarī, ed. Aḥmad ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān as-Sāyiḥ (Cairo: Maktabat aṯ- aqāfah ad-
Dīnīyah, 2005). 61-62. Al-Ašʿarī also mentions the ahl al-a ar as a group who believed that Quranic phrases that 
name or praise God may be abrogated by other Quranic verses that were revealed later. This is a minority position: 
“most people” do not allow abrogation of historical information (a bār), praise, or the names of God. al-Ašʿarī, 
Maqālāt, 610-611. 
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Ragib confirms the identification of ahl al-a ar with literal interpretations in his Exegesis, 
where the ahl al-a ar are the group that take literally God’s “we will write down what they say” 
in Quran 3:181 rather than seeing it as an analogy for his memory.
243
 The ahl al-a ar also follow 
what Ragib calls the literal (aẓ-ẓāhir) meaning of Quran 3:195: when God forgives the sins of the 
early believers who fought for the cause it refers to forgiveness on the day of judgement, rather 




An a ar is an impression, a trace, a vestige, a remnant, and it is consequently used for the 
traces of God’s words and the traditions and contexts that preserved the revelation.245 The 
theological group most committed to the literal interpretation of revelation would therefore be 
keen to describe themselves as the partisans of the tradition (ahl al-a ar), and it is indeed the 
term that the Ḥanbalī ʿAbd al-Qādir al- īlānī (470/1078–561/1166) used to describe his own 
                                                 
242 For examples of Ragib’s familiarity with, and rejections of, Muʿtazilī ideas, see: (re. Quran 4:48 and 4:79)  
Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 1265f, 1333f. Cf.  alāl ad-Dīn as-Suyū ī, al-Iklīl fī Istinbāṭ at-Tan īl, ed. Sayf ad-Dīn 
ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Kātib (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2007). 93, 95. Aš-Šidī lists Ragib’s Muʿtazilī sources: 
Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 158-161.  For a further example of familiarity followed by disagreement, see: ———, 
On Creeds, 216-218, 243. 
243 ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 1014-1017. 
244 Ibid., 1056. 
245 “To transmit (knowledge), to relate it. Imperfect vowel u. Verbal nouns a ran, a āratan, u ratan. Origin: to follow 
something’s trace.” (wa-a artu –l-ʿilma rawaytuhū ā uruhū a ran wa-a āratan wa-u ratan wa-aṣluhū tatabbaʿtu 
a rahū). ———, Quranic Glossary, 62. The knowledge of revelation’s context is called ʿilm al-ā ār wa-l-a bār and 
comprises the study of the occasions of revelation (asbāb an-nu ūl) together with explanations of the prophetic and 
historical narratives (al-aqāṣīṣ) in the Quran. ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 95. —
——, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 121. Ragib distinguishes ahl al-a ar from jurists and students of 
eloquence as a group that studies the narratives (qiṣaṣ) in the Quran:  fa-l-balīġu ya taṣṣu bi-maʿrifati balāġatihī 
[al-qurʾān] wa-faṣāḥatihī wa-l-faqīhu ya taṣṣu bi-maʿrifati aḥkāmihī wa-ahlu –l-a ari ya taṣṣu bi-maʿrifati qiṣaṣih. 
(“Scholars of eloquence specialise in knowledge of the Quran’s expressiveness and eloquence, jurists specialise in 
knowledge of its legal judgements, and traditionists specialise in knowledge of its narratives”). ———, On Creeds, 
177.    
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group a little more than a century after Ragib.
246 Al- īlānī was also connected to Sufism, of 
which see more below. 
The clearest indication that Ragib considers “traditionists, senior Sufis, and wise 
philosophers” to be his preferred affiliation comes in his list of the different schools of thought 
about the existence of evils in the world. This category is the seventh and final school of thought 
listed, and they believe that there is wisdom in God’s actions although humans are not always 
able to perceive it, and that the question of evil in the world is part of the issue of predestination, 
which is God’s secret and not to be investigated.247 The sixth school was the Ašāʿirah, who 
believed that God does what he wills with his servants and that while there is no wisdom 
requiring him to do so, everything he does is good. Ragib says that there is “no objection” to the 
Ašʿarī position, which is clearly compatible with that of the traditionists, senior Sufis, and wise 
philosophers, indicating that Ragib wished to make the point that while he did not necessarily 
disagree with the Ašāʿirah, he did not consider himself one of them. 
The same dynamic is at play in Ragib’s position on the attribution of human actions to 
God. Ragib supports the ahl al-a ar, who hold, against the Muʿtazilah, that human actions are 
created by God and that the ink made with gallnuts and vitriol is in fact created by God, who put 
                                                 
246 Al- īlānī wrote that their heretical opponents (ahl al-bidaʿ) would call the ahl al-a ar a variety of pejorative 
names: ḥašwīyah, mu birah, mušabbihah, and nāṣibah. ʿAbd al-Qādir al- ilānī, al-Ġunyah li- ālibī  arīq al- aqq 
fī-l-A lāq wa-l-Taṣawwuf wa-l- dāb al-Islāmīyah, ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Aʿǧam, 2 in 1 vols. (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 
1996). 1:102. 
247 The first five schools are: al-Bakrīyah who maintain that pain is falsely imagined due to a lack of faith (but cf. al-
Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, 287-288. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 2:108-118.); the dualist Magians (al-Mā ūs) who 
source evil in Satan and good in God; the dualists (a - anawīyah, Zoroastrians) who believe in an eternal light of 
good struggling with an eternal darkness of evil; the transmigrationists (at-tanāsu īyah) who believe in eternal souls 
doomed by an initial act of disobediance to God to inhabit multiple bodies until they gradually reform themselves 
(see ibid., 3:428f.); and the Muʿtazilah who believe that God created humans for paradise, but will prevent them 
from entering paradise unless they are Muʿtazilī and have not committed grave sins, actions that are rationally 
incumbent upon God, who would otherwise be in the reprehensible position of rewarding people who do not deserve 
the reward. Ragib, On Creeds, 250-253. See also notes 481f below. 
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the specific potentiality to make ink into those two substances.
248
 Humans’ actions must 
therefore be attributed to God, even though the expressions “action”, “work”, and “acquisition” 
(kasb) appear to attribute them to humans.
249
 Little of the act of writing, from the conception of 
ideas in the soul to the pen in the hand, is actually a human act because humans simply 
administer existing things with defined potentialities “and this is what is called acquisition 
(kasb)”.250 The position of the ahl al-a ar is wholly compatible with Ašʿarī doctrine, which used 




Ragib writes that the ahl al-a ar are correct when they espouse the principle that humans 
may not use any word to describe divinity other than those that have already occurred in divine 
revelation.
252
 For example, the word “eternal” (qadīm) could only be used to describe God if 
God had already used it to describe himself in the Quran or Sunna. In the Quranic Glossary, 
Ragib is clear that no such precedent exists, while in On Creeds he appears to accept that a 
devotional Hadith rejected in the Quranic Glossary provides sufficient precedent to allow 
                                                 
248 Iron-gall ink (for writing) was made from gallnuts (or oak apples, ʿafṣ), which “are formed from swellings 
produced by insects laying their eggs under oak leaves”, together with vitriol (a sulphate,  ā ) obtained from alum (a 
mineral salt), and gum arabic from the acacia tree. Gacek, Vademecum, 132-135.  
249 Ragib, On Creeds, 28-29, 277-279. See also notes 481f below. 
250 Ibid., 284. In the Quranic Glossary, Ragib expresses the same point as follows: God acts in one of two ways. He 
either actually does the whole action in one go (an abdaʿahū kāmilan dufʿatan), or he creates both the principles for 
the act and the potentiality for their implementation in a certain fixed way (mā  aʿala uṣūlahū maw ūdatan bi-l-fiʿli 
wa-a  āʾahū bi-l-quwwati wa-qaddarahū ʿalā wa hin lā yataʾattā minhu ġayru mā qaddarahū fīhi). ———, 
Quranic Glossary, 658. He repeats this point at: ———, On Creeds, 265-266. 
251 al-Ašʿarī, The Theology, 39f, 43-44. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 35, 109-111. 
252 ḏakara ahlu –l-a ari anna –llāha ‛a  a wa- alla lā yaṣiḥḥu an yūṣafa illā bi-mā warada –s-sam‛u bihī … wa-
hāḏā huwa aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ. Ragib, On Creeds, 79. lā naṣifu –llāha ta‛ālā wa-lā naṣifu –l-umūra –l-ilāhīyata illā bi-mā 
wurida bihī –s-sam‛. Ibid., 173.  
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“eternal” but not “eternality” (qidam).253 This second position may be equivalent to one taken by 
a group of the followers of Ibn Kullāb (ʿAbdallāh b. Saʿīd al-Qa  ān, d. ca. 241/855), an early 
opponent of the Muʿtazilah with argumentation along broadly Ašʿarī lines, although we do not 
know the reasoning behind his follower’s position in this case.254 
As for the Ašāʿirah in Ragib’s time, al-Bāqillānī (Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. a -Ṭāyyib, d. 
403/1013) is comfortable using the word “eternal” to describe God while maintaining the same 
principle as Ragib, that descriptions of God must have divine precedent. He does not mention the 
question of precedent for “eternal”.255 Ibn Fūrak both uses “eternal” and rejects the principle.256 
                                                 
253 We have no way of knowing whether Ragib wrote the Quranic Glossary before or after On Creeds (both mention 
The Path to the Nobilities). In the Quranic Glossary he says while the devotional phrase yā qadīmu –l-iḥsān (“o 
eternally beneficient”) is a precedent, it is not “in the Quran or in correct Hadith” (min –l-qurʾāni wa-l-ā āri -ṣ-
ṣaḥīḥah). ———, Quranic Glossary, 661. In On Creeds, he writes that “some of the ahl al-a ar” are incorrect to 
describe God’s capability (qudrah) and knowledge as eternal (bi-l-qidam) because “we” hold the principle that any 
description of God must have a precedent in revelation, and  yā qadīmu –l-iḥsān is such a precedent. ———, On 
Creeds, 89. The phrase yā qadīmu –l-iḥsān appears in a prayer that was learnt from the Prophet Muḥammad in a 
dream. Muḥibb ad-Dīn a -Ṭabarī (Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Makkī, 615/1218-694/1294) states that Abū ʿUṯmān Ismāʿīl aṣ-
Ṣābūnī (a widely travelled transmitter of Hadith, 373/983-449/1057) related that Muḥammad b. Wazīr (al-Wāsi ī, d. 
257/871) had seen the Prophet in a dream, asked him for beneficial prayers, and been provided with a prayer that 
included the phrase yā qadīmu –l-iḥsān. Muḥibb ad-Dīn a -Ṭabarī, ar-Riyāḍ an-Naḍirah fī Manāqib al-ʿAšarah, ed. 
Muḥammad Badr ad-Dīn an-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī, 2 vols. (Cairo: al- ānǧī, 1951). 1:30. For al-Wāsi ī: Šams ad-Dīn 
Muḥammad b. Aḥmad ad- ahabī, Kitāb Taḏkirat al- uffāẓ, 5 vols. (Hyderabad: Osmania Oriental Publications 
Bureau, 1958). 2:502. ———, Siyar, 12:185. For aṣ-Ṣābūnī: Kaḥḥālah, Muʿ am al-Mu’allifīn, 1:368. 
254 “Some of them claim that God is eternal without ‘an eternality’, and others claim that God is eternal with ‘an 
eternality’” (fa-minhum man  aʿama anna –llāha qadīmun lā bi-qidam wa minhum man  aʿama annahū qadīmun bi-
qidamin). al-Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, 170, 547. Cf. note 428. 
255 Al-Bāqillānī is discussing whether God can be described as “desiring” (bi-š-šahwah): 
That is correct as an idea, but he has made a mistake and gone against the community by describing the 
eternal as desiring for there is no evidence for that in the Quran or Sunna, and because God’s names are not 
fixed by analogy. (ḏālika ṣaḥīḥun min ṭarīqi –l-maʿnā ġayra annahū a ṭaʾa wa- ālafa –l-ummata fī waṣfi –l-
qadīmi bi-š-šahwati iḏ lam yarid bi-ḏālika kitābun wa-lā sunnatun li-anna asmāʾuhū taʿālā lā tu batu 
qiyāsan). 
Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. a -Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf fī-Mā Ya ib Iʿtiqāduhū wa-Lā Ya ū  al-Ǧahl bi-hī, ed. 
Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawṯarī (Cairo: Mu’assasat al- ānǧī, 1963). 39. Al-Bāqillānī also repeats the principle and 
attributes it to al-Ašʿarī: qawlu –š-šay i mawṣūfun bimā waṣafa biḥi nafsahū fī kitābihī wa-ʿalā lisāni nabīyihī. 
Ibid., 34. 
256 Calling God “eternal” is the consensus of the imams (i māʿ al-aʾimmah) “even though the expression is found in 
neither the Quran nor the Sunna” (wa-in lam yarid bi-lafẓihī naṣṣu kitābin wa-lā sunnah). Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn 
Fūrak, Mu arrad Maqālāt al-Ašʿarī, ed. Daniel Gimaret (Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq, 1987). 42. 
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The Muʿtazilah’s overriding principle was to rely on reason and analogy to decide questions such 
as how to describe God, so it is hardly a surprise to find that they are comfortable describing God 
as “eternal”, and the same holds true for those working in the Hellenistic philosophical tradition 
(the falāsifah).257 
If not the Ašāʿirah or the Muʿtazilah, who is it that agrees with Ragib’s principle, and who 
might therefore be connected to the ahl al-a ar? A prominent member of the Shia of Baghdad, 
aš-Šayḫ al-Mufīd (Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad, d. 413/1022) took the same position as al-
Bāqillānī, assuming that God could be called “eternal” but stating the position that he could only 
be described following divine precedent. Like the Ašāʿirah and the Ḥanābilah, aš-Šayḫ al-Mufīd 
was developing a theology opposed to the Muʿtazilī over-reliance on reason, but it is hard to 
imagine Ragib’s ahl al-a ar being Shia.258 A slightly more likely group are the Māturīdīyah, 
followers of Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad al-Māturīdī (d. 383/993) in Samarkand and Transoxania. 
They too maintained the principle that God could only be described in his own words, but they 
were Ḥanafī and I have already noted Ragib’s pointed exclusion of Abū Ḥanīfah from his list of 
                                                 
257 al-Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, 180. Johannes Reinier Theodorus Maria Peters, God's created speech: a study in the 
speculative theology of the Muʿta ilī Qāḍī l-Quḍāt Abū l- asan ʿAbd al-Jabbār bn Aḥmad al-Hamaḏānī  (Leiden: 
Brill, 1976). 246-247. For the falāsifah, see: Wisnovsky, "One Aspect of the Avicennian Turn," 68f.  
258 As a Shia, aš-Šayḫ al-Mufīd of course considered divine precedent to include the sources of proof that came after 
Muḥammad, i.e. the imams: 
The creator can only be named with that which he named himself in the Quran, or that which his Prophet 
called him, or that with which he is named by one of the imams. (lā ya ū u tasmiyatu –l-bārī taʿālā illā bi-
mā sammā bihī nafsahū fī kitābihī aw ʿalā lisāni nabīyihī (ṣ) aw sammā bihī hu  atun min  ulafāʾi nabīyihī). 
Aš-Šayḫ al-Mufīd then goes on to say that if one removes the imams from this list, and replaces them with 
consensus (i māʿ), then the position becomes acceptable to all Imāmī Shia, all the Muʿtazilah in Baghdad, all the 
Murǧiʿah, and the partisans of Hadith (aṣḥāb al-ḥadī , for whom read the Ḥanābilah). Reliance on consensus is also 
an Ašʿarī position (see note 256). aš-Šayḫ al-Mufīd, Awāʾil al-Maqālāt, ed. Mehdi Mohaghegh and M. J. 
McDermott (Tehran: Institute of Islamic Studies: University of Tehran / McGill University, 2004). 4, 13. 
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the imams of Islam.
259
 Furthermore, Madelung remarks that before the Salǧūk period they were 
“virtually unknown” west of the Iranian desert.260 
The group most likely to have influenced Ragib were the Ḥanābilah. As we have discussed 
above, they were a dominant force in pre-Salǧūk Isfahan and they were also a loud voice in 
Baghdad, which was much closer to Isfahan than Samarkand and Transoxania. Al-Barbahārī 
(Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī, d. 329/941), whose defence of Ḥanbalī positions had been so 
strident as to spark rioting on a number of occasions in Baghdad, put forth the principle that God 
could only be described in his own words in his creedal statement.
261
 
The Ḥanābilah were also the group that tended to share Ragib’s professed distaste for 
theological niceties. When Ragib addresses the question of whether God should be described as 
                                                 
259 Although Abū Ḥanīfah does imply in his discussion of God’s will (mašīʾah) that God should only be described in 
the way that he has already described himself, i.e. according to precedent: 
If someone says no [to the question of whether God could have chosen to make his entire creation as obedient 
as his angels] then they have described God with something other than that with which he described himself 
(fa-in qāla lā fa-qad waṣafa –llāha taʿālā bi-ġayri mā waṣafa bihī nafsuhū).  
Abū Ḥanīfah, "al-Fiqh al-Absa ," 55. For a discussion, with references, of the probability that this work is an 
accurate transmission of Abū Ḥanīfah’s teaching, see: Hiroyuki Yanagihashi, "Abū Ḥanīfa," in Encyclopaedia of 
Islam  THREE, ed. Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill Online: Brill, 2011). 
260 fa-huwa musammā bi-mā sammā bihī nafsahū mawṣūfun bi-mā waṣafa bihī nafsaḥ. Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad al-
Māturīdī, Kitāb at-Tawḥīd, ed. Fathalla Kholeif (Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq, 1970). 44. Ulrich Rudolph, al-Māturīdī und 
die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand  (Leiden: Brill, 1997). 76. Wilferd Madelung, "Māturīdiyya," in 
Encyclopaedia of Islam  Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. 
Heinrichs (Brill Online: Brill, 2010). 
261 His creed read: 
Only talk about God with what he described himself with in the Quran, and what the messenger of God 
explained to his companions  (wa-lā yatakallam fī-r-rabbi ṣubḥānahū wa-ta‛ālā illā bi-mā waṣafa bihī 
nafsuhū ʿa  a wa- alla fī-l-qurʾāni wa-mā bayyana rasūlu –llāhi (ṣ) li-aṣḥābih).  
Muḥammad Ibn Abī Yaʿlā and Šams ad-Dīn Muḥammad al-Qādir, I tiṣār  abaqāt al- anābilah, ed. Aḥmad ʿUbayd 
(Damascus: al-Maktabah al-ʿArabīyah, 1931). 301. For further details on al-Barbahārī’s creed, from which this 
statement is taken, and the rioting in Baghdad, see: Christopher Melchert, "al-Barbahārī," in Encyclopaedia of Islam  
THREE, ed. Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill Online: Brill, 2011). 
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“willing” (murīd) he accepts that it is a legitimate description because of the Quranic 
precedent,
262
 but then expresses frustration with subsequent theological parsing: 
And the discussions about whether God wills for himself, or whether he wills with an 
eternal will, or with a created will, and if with a created will is the will in a specific place or 
not in a specific place – God has protected us from needing to deal with these matters.263 
These are exactly the questions debated by the Ašāʿirah and Muʿtazilah,264 and avoided by the 
Ḥanābilah. As discussed above, Ragib had distaste for the dialectic processes of theological 
debate, a distaste shared by Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal who said that following the Sunna meant 
abandoning debates, dispute, and quarrels about religion.
265
 Theologians (al-mutakallimūn) often 
appear in On Creeds as a group that is in error.
266
 In an important passage that I will return to 
below, Ragib writes that it is because the Muʿtazilah fail to either submit to revelation (istislām 




The problem with identifying Ragib’s ahl al-a ar with the Ḥanābilah is that Ragib himself 
makes a clear distinction between ahl al-a ar and Hadith partisans (ahl al-ḥadī ) in which Hadith 
                                                 
262 Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 371. 
263 wa-l-kalāmu fī anna –llāha taʿālā huwa murīdun li-nafsihī aw bi-irādatin qadīmatin aw muḥda atin wa-annahū 
wa-in kāna murīdan bi-irādatin muḥda atin fa-hal hiya fī maḥallin aw lā fī maḥallin mimmā [al-ʿAǧalī has fa-mā 
after Sehid Ali 382 ≠ the other three mss.] kafānā allāhu amrahā. ———, On Creeds, 270. 
264 Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (543/1149-606/1209) writes that the community agrees God is willing but disagrees on the 
exegesis. Muḥammad b. ʿUmar Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Tafsīr al-Fa r ar-Rā ī al-Mušahhar bi-t-Tafsīr al-Kabīr wa 
Mafātīḥ al-Ġayb  (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1981). 11:180 (Quran 5:6). For the disagreements: al-Ašʿarī, The Theology, 
23. Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt ed  as-Sāyiḥ, 70. Muḥmammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm aš-Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa-n-Niḥal, 
ed. Amīr ʿAlī Mahnā and ʿAlī Ḥasan Fāʿir, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1993). 1:100. 
265 Muḥammad Ibn Abī Yaʿlā,  abaqāt al- anābilah, ed. Muḥammd Ḥāmid al-Faqī (Cairo: Ma baʿat as-Sunnah al-
Muḥammadīyah, 1952). 1:130, 1:241. Nimrod Hurvitz, The Formation of  anbalism: piety into power (London: 
Routledge / Curzon, 2002 ). 138. 
266 Ragib, On Creeds, 157-158, 160, 300. 
267 Ibid., 167-168. 
 82 
partisans rely solely on prophecy to determine religion, whereas “most of the ahl al-a ar” rely on 
both reason and revelation.
268
 Ibn Fūrak made a comparable distinction between two types of 
Hadith partisans (aṣḥāb al-ḥadī ): those who focussed on the simple transmission of tradition and 
its correctness, and those who were more concerned with the principles, analogies, structures 
(tartīb al-furūʿ ʿalā –l-uṣūl), and proofs in the traditions themselves.269 Both Ibn Fūrak and 
Ragib seem to identify a grouping that shares the beliefs of the Hadith partisans while also 
delving into more complex theories than were required by the simple process of collection, 
verification, and transmission of Hadith. These classifications are not just a problem for us; they 
must also have been a problem for Ragib in Isfahan in the tenth/eleventh centuries. His 
opposition to, and criticism of, the Muʿtazilah prevented him from joining their circles and his 
commitment to reason at the expense of sole reliance on prophecy would have been a problem 
for the Ḥanābilah. His distaste for the use of theological neologisms to describe God may have 
                                                 
268 Ragib also identifies a non-Muslim group as relying solely on reason to the exclusion of prophecy. Patricia Crone 
has discussed how this group (al-Barāhimah) were often used in kalām as placeholders for such an idea. Patricia 
Crone, "Barāhima," in Encyclopaedia of Islam  THREE, ed. Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and 
Everett Rowson (Brill Online: Brill, 2011). Ragib: 
On God’s Religion: is it based purely on reason, or purely on prophecy, or on a mixture of the two? There are 
three schools of thought: (1) the Brahmins who reject prophecy and say that one only knows what to do 
through reason; (2) the Hadith partisans who say that one only knows what to do through prophecy; (3) the 
majority of the ahl al-a ar who say that some of religion is known through reason, and some through religion. 
(al-kalāmu fī dīni –llāhi taʿālā hal huwa ʿaqlīyun maḥḍun aw nabawīyun maḥḍun am baʿḍuhū ʿaqlī wa-
baʿḍuhū nabawī li-n-nāsi fī hāḏā  alā atu maḏāhiba –l-awwalu maḏhabu –l-barāhimah fa-innahum ankarū –
n-nubuwwata wa-qālū lā wā iba illā min  ihati –l-ʿaqli wa- - ānī maḏhabu ahli –l-ḥadī i anna lā wā iba illā 
min  ihati –n-nubuwwati wa- - āli u maḏhabu ak ari ahli –l-a ari anna ḏālika baʿḍuhū ʿaqlīyun wa-baʿḍuhū 
šarʿī). 
Ragib, On Creeds, 114-115. 
269 Ibn Fūrak likened the first group to the treasury of a king, and the second group to the patricians who defend that 
treasury against its opponents. Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Fūrak, Kitāb Muškil al- adī  aw Taʾwīl al-A bār al-
Mutašābihah, ed. Daniel Gimaret (Damascus: Institut Francais de Damas, 2003). 2. This passage is commented 
upon by Frank, who translates tartīb al-furūʿ ʿalā –l-uṣūl as “how the secondary dogmas … are derived from those 
that are primary”. Frank, "Elements`," 148-149, cf. 180-181. 
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been the reason for his decision not to identify himself with the usual Ašʿarī middle position 
between the Ḥanābilah and Muʿtazilah. 
This absolute commitment to the combination of reason with revelation, expressed by 
Ragib in his ethics as well as his theology,
270
 is what would lead him to agree with the 
Muʿtazilah on several key issues, although he would never name them or admit that their 
position was valid, as he was prepared to do with the Ašāʿirah. These positions of Ragib’s were 
then most probably the cause of the reputation for Muʿtazilī beliefs that would follow him after 
his death. At the end of the fifteenth century as-Suyū ī would write that “lots of people think that 
he is Muʿtazilī”.271 Even as-Suyū ī himself had thought this until he came across a note that 
alerted him to Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s (543/1149-606/1209) statement that Ragib was “a Sunni 
imam”.272 
The “lots of people” that as-Suyū ī refers to would indeed have had cause to think Ragib 
was a Muʿtazilī if, like as-Suyū ī himself, they did not have access to Ragib’s On Creeds or his 
complete Exegesis. In the methodological introduction to the Exegesis, Ragib states that the 
Quran is inimitable in part because God actively prevented the Arabs at the time, who were 
highly skilled users of language, from even trying to imitate it.
273
 This is the doctrine of ṣarfah 
                                                 
270 Ragib, Analysis of the Two Creations, 117-121 (chapter 18).  
271 as-Suyū ī, Buġyat al-Wuʿāh, 2:297. 
272 Ibid. As-Suyū ī says that the note was in the handwriting of az-Zarkašī, and that it cited this judgement as being 
in Faḫr ad-Dīn’s Taʾsīs at-Taqdīs. The extant statement in Faḫr ad-Dīn’s Asās at-Taqdīs is not quite the same: Ragib 
is mentioned along with al-Ġazālī as believing in immaterial souls and substances, and as belonging to the same 
group as the Sunni Faḫr ad-Dīn (wa-mi la Abī –l-Qāsim ar-Rāġib wa Abī  amīd al-Ġa ālī min aṣḥābinā). Faḫr ad-
Dīn ar-Rāzī, Asās at-Taqdīs, ed. Aḥmad Ḥiǧāzī as-Saqā (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulīyāt al-Azharīyah, 1986). 16-17. Cf. 
Riedel, "Searching for the Islamic episteme," 112,122-123. 
273 Ragib, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 108-109. ———, "Methodological Introduction 
ed. Nāhī," 130-131. For further discussion of Ragib’s position on Quranic inimitability, see: Alexander Key, 
"Language and Literature in al-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī," in Reflections on Language and Knowledge in Middle Eastern 
Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 40-48. 
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(the turning aside), and it is widely recognised as a Muʿtazilī doctrine, first heard of from an-
Naẓẓām (Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm, d. ca. 840), maintained by Ragib’s Muʿtazilī contemporaries in 
Baghdad such as aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍā (Abū al-Qāsim ʿAlī, 355/967-436/1044), and rejected by 
the Ašāʿirah.274 Ragib must have been well aware of aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍā, a powerful Baghdadi 
Shia, and did indeed quote his brother aš-Šarīf ar-Raḍī (Abū al-Ḥasan Muḥammad, 359/970-
406/1016) on numerous occasions in his adab compendia.
275
 
Ragib was also prepared, at times, to interpret the Quran figuratively. He writes in the 
methodological introduction to the Exegesis that the words “God’s hands are outspread” in 
Quran 5:64 mean that his blessing is continuous, and not that God actually has hands.
276
 He 
repeats this reading in the Quranic Glossary and the Exegesis itself.
277
 It was a central tenet of 
Ašʿarī, and of course Ḥanbalī, creed to reject this figurative reading, and a well-known Muʿtazilī 
                                                 
274 We can also connect Ragib to the brother of this powerful Baghdadi Shia Muʿtazilī aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍāwhom 
Ragib quotes: ———, "Language and Literature," 43-44. Saʿīd b. Muḥammad Abū Rašīd an-Nišābūrī. Ms  
Fragment of Ziyādāt aš-Šarḥ. Or. 8613 (dated est. 11th C.), in Oriental Manuscripts, British Library, London. ff.17-
27. Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. a -Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, Iʿ ā  al-Qur’ān, ed. Aḥmad Ṣaqr (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1954). 
30. Richard C. Martin, "Inimitability," in Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe (Brill Online: 
Brill, 2009). 
275 Ragib, Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, 4:358 (index).  ———, Confluence of Eloquence, 2:852 (index).  
276 Ragib attributes this position to al-ḥukamāʾ and ahl al-ḥaqāʾiq.  ———, Methodological Introduction and 
Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 40-41. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 87-88. See full quotation at note 580. 
277 ———, Quranic Glossary, 889-890. ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 926. ———, Exegesis ed  Sardār, 393. 
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position to accept it.
278 Al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār described it as a choice of reason (ʿaql) above 
literal meaning (ẓāhir).279  
We do not know whether Ragib’s incompatibility with the major theological and socio-
political groups of his time was the result of his own choices, perhaps his refusal to make the 
intellectual compromises needed to fit into a particular school, or whether it is the result of our 
own incomplete knowledge of his context, and he in fact fitted perfectly into a habitus of which 
we are now ignorant. In any case, it appears that the ahl al-a ar as he understood them are, as far 
as we know, close to the Ḥanābilah but also distinct from them on crucial points. Perhaps this is 
why Ragib chose to put the ahl al-a ar together with two better-known and potentially more 
easily definable groups: senior Sufis and wise philosophers (muḥaṣṣilī aṣ-ṣūfīyah wa-l-ḥukamāʾ). 
Senior Sufis (muḥaṣṣilī aṣ-ṣūfīyah) 
  Ragib’s combination of Sufism and traditionism was a common one in the Isfahan of his 
day. There were long-established Sufi institutions in the city, and an acceptance of Sufism on 
both sides of the juristic-political conflict between the Ḥanābilah and Šāfiʿīyah.280 A 
contemporary of Ragib’s, and close associate of the powerful Isfahani Ḥanbalī Ibn Mandah, 
made an explicit attempt to argue that Ḥanbalī ideas were the only natural partner for Sufi ethics 
and lifestyle. Abū Manṣūr al-Iṣfahānī (Maʿmar b. Aḥmad, d. 418/1027) wrote that his adherence 
                                                 
278 al-Ašʿarī, The Theology, 237. ———, Maqālāt, 218. Al-Bāqillānī adjusts al-Ašʿarī’s position to include the 
statement that while God does have hands, they are not limbs ( āriḥatayn) and do not have form (ṣūrah) or structure 
(hayʾah). al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, 23. Cf. Frank, "Elements`," 163f, 175, note 87. Ibn Fūrak, however, admits that at 
least one instance of God’s “hands” (aydin) in the Quran (51:47, aḏ- ārīyāt) means both “ability” and “potentiality” 
(al-qudrah wa-l-quwwah), and later Ašʿarī scholars such as Imām al-Ḥaramayn al- uwaynī (Abū al-Maʿālī ʿAbd al-
Malik b. ʿAbdallāh, 1028-1085) would agree. Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt ed  as-Sāyiḥ, 45; W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic 
Philosophy and Theology: an extended survey  (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985). 83. 
279 Ibn Aḥmad al-Asadābādī al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, Mutašābih al-Qurʾān, ed. ʿAdnān Muḥammad Zarzūr (Cairo: 
Dār at-Turāṯ, 1969). 230f. 
280 On the Šāfiʿī side Abū Nuʿaym (see above) combined Hadith and Sufism. Isfahan also had long-standing Sufi 
institutions ( ānqāh). Durand-Gu dy, Iranian Elites, 37. 
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was to the Sunna and to Sufism, and that he belonged to ahl as-sunnah wa-l-a ar. The a ar here 
can only be a reference to Abū Manṣūr’s Ḥanbalī creed.281 The only explicit profession of 
Sufism that Ragib made was his reference to a work called On the Nobility of Sufism in which he 




Abū Manṣūr wrote that there are two ways for humans to approach God: through worship, 
and through mysticism. This is perhaps the central claim of Sufism, that there is a mystic and 
inspired route to the truth that has the potential to bypass the normal human approaches to 
knowing and learning. Abū Manṣūr did not believe that any of his contemporaries were good 
enough to travel on the second mystic path.
283
 Ragib seems to have been more optimistic. There 
is a repeated conviction throughout Ragib’s ethical works that human beings have the potential 
to become as good as the angels, and indeed that this is their purpose.
284
 The attainment of such 
status, or of something close to it, puts humans in a position where they can receive divinely 
                                                 
281 Muʿammar Abū Manṣūr al-Iṣfahānī and Nasrollah Pourjavady, "Du Azar-e Kūtāh Az Abū Manṣūr Eṣfahānī," 
Maʿārif 3, no. 6 (1970): 41. ———, "Kitāb al-Manāhiǧ bi-Šāhid as-Sunnah wa-Nahǧ al-Mutaṣawwifah," Maʿārif 3, 
no. 7 (1971): 20. For details of Abū Manṣūr, who married Ibn Mandah’s widow, see: Nasrollah Pourjavady, "Abū 
Manṣūr al-Iṣfahānī," in Encyclopaedia of Islam  THREE, ed. Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and 
Everett Rowson (Brill Online: Brill, 2009). Also Durand-Gu dy, Iranian Elites, 37-38. 
282 li-kulli firqatin maqāmātun maʿdūdatun yatarattabu baʿḍuhā ʿalā baʿḍin wa-hāḏihī masʾalatun ka īratun [sic] 
aḥkamtuhā fī kitābi šarafi –t-taṣawwufi wa-bayyantu ta ṣīṣa kulli maqām. Ragib. Carullah 84. f.42a. Elsewhere, 
Ragib in fact tended to describe Sufi positions as “Sufi” as if they were a group with which he agreed but to which 
he did not necessarily belong. For example (inter alia): ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 755, 1213. ———, On Creeds, 
38, 77, 85, 95, 185, 255. Aš-Šidī notes that one position described by Ragib as Sufi was indeed held by al-Qušayrī 
(Abū al-Qāsim ʿAbd Karīm, 376/986-465/ 1072), and also that Ragib’s divisions of believers into levels was 
described by Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī as “resembling Sufi ideas” (šabīhun bi-kalāmi –l-mutaṣawwifah). ———, 
Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 614 (note 2), 1313 (note 1). Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3:300. 
283 Abū Manṣūr al-Iṣfahānī and Pourjavady, "Du Azar-e Kūtāh," 41. 
284 A Hadith used by Ragib in this context, “my community are almost prophets themselves”, is found in Aḥmad b. 
Ḥanbal’s collection. Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad 1895, 1:296. The Path to the Nobilities is an account of the ways in which 
a human being can fulfill his divine potential and come to deserve to be described as God’s vicegerent ( alīfah) on 
the earth. The Analysis is an exhortation that we become as good as, or even better than, the angels. Ragib, The Path 
to the Nobilities, 59f. ———, Analysis of the Two Creations, 185-186 (chapter 33). 
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provided knowledge (al-ʿulūm al-mawhabīyah) directly.285 Abū Manṣūr, who shared Ragib’s 
profession of distaste for theology, would no doubt also have agreed with this theory.
286
 In On 
the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines Ragib called those who had attained the top level of 
divinely provided knowledge “the senior figures” (al-kubarāʾ), and distinguished them from the 
scholars (al-ʿulamāʾ) and the wise (al-ḥukamāʾ). His “senior figures” are the same group that he 




Where Ragib perhaps strays from mainstream Sufism is in his confidence that those who 
attain the highest levels of knowledge and access divine inspiration are scholars schooled in 
reasoning rather than mystic hair shirt-clad itinerants. In a section of The Path to the Nobilities 
on the necessity of earning a living, Ragib attacks those who refuse to work while claiming to be 
Sufi for their clogging up the streets and pushing up prices.
288
 Elsewhere in The Path he makes a 
threefold split between angelic humans, demonic humans, and merely human humans in which 
                                                 
285 ———, On Creeds, 92-95. ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 95-96. ———, 
"Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 122. ———, "On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly 
Actions," 220-223. Wisdom can only be attained through correction by a teacher (muhaḏḏab) or through divine 
inspiration (ilāhī). ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 142. Cf. ———, "On Human Virtue Arising from the 
Disciplines of Knowledge," 176-178. The idea of divinely-provided knowledge had been discussed by Ibn Wahb al-
Kātib (Abū al-Ḥusayn Isḥāq, fl. ca. 950) under the title “the divinely-provided reason” (al-ʿaql al-mawhūb). [ascrib. 
to Qudāmah b.  aʿfar] Ibn Wahb al-Kātib, al-Burhān fī Wu ūh al-Bayān [Kitāb Naqd an-Na r], ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd 
al-ʿAbbādī and Taha Ḥusayn (Cairo: Wizārat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUmūmīyah, 1933). 7. Cf. note 501. 
286 Abū Manṣūr al-Iṣfahānī and Pourjavady, "Kitāb al-Manāhiǧ," 17. 
287 The ʿulamāʾ have acquired knowledge of theology, law, and similar subjects. The ḥukamāʾ have acquired 
knowledge of ethics and act according to them. The kubarāʾ have acquired the divinely-provided knowledge. Ragib, 
"On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions," 222. ———. Carullah 84. f.42a. The Hadith 
that Ragib quotes in both these places: “ask the scholars, mix with the wise, and sit with the senior figures” is found 
in the collection of the Sufi Hadith specialist al-Ḥakīm at-Tirmiḏī (Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad, d. ca. 320/938) and 
is also used by Ragib in The Path to the Nobilities. Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥakīm at-Tirmiḏī, Nawādir al-Uṣūl fī Maʿrifat 
Aḥādī  ar-Rasūl, ed. Ismāʿīl Ibrāhīm Mutawallī ʿAwaḍ, 2 vols. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Imām al-Buḫārī, 2008). 1:434. 
Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 123 (and note 2).  
288 ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 268, 281. Madelung, "Ar-Rāġib," 162. 
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the angelic, the “real believers”, are those who “use their reason as much as possible”.289 Ragib’s 
angelic humans are thinkers. 
The divinely provided knowledge that some humans are able to access provides them with 
certainty (yaqīn).290 It is the sort of certainty that humans require when faced with problems such 
as unclear verses in the Quran (al-mutašābih), and Ragib’s solution to that problem is to posit the 
existence of scholars who are firmly-rooted in knowledge (ar-rāsi ūna fī-l-ʿilm) and are able to 
deal with the lack of clarity in some verses because they are always able to determine which 
interpretative option is correct.
291
 The status of these people, which Ragib describes as almost 
approaching the level of prophecy, relies upon God having endowed humans with the ability to 
think and through their thinking (al-fikr wa-t-tamyī ) to become his vicegerents on the earth, a 




On the one hand, just as Abū Manṣūr thought no-one at the time he was writing could 
attain such a rank, the only examples Ragib gives of humans who attained it are perhaps self-
                                                 
289 fa-l-malakīyu –llaḏī yastaʿmalu –l-quwwata –l-ʿāqilata bi-qadri  ahdihī wa-hum –l-muʾminīna ḥaqqan. Ragib, 
The Path to the Nobilities, 128. 
290 ———, On Creeds, 92. ———, "On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions," 220.  
291 Doubt (šubhah) is the failure to distinguish between two things that are similar to each other (tašābuh), and Ragib 
defines the rāsi ūna fī-l-ʿilm as those unaffected by it. ———, Quranic Glossary, 352. Ragib understands unclear 
verses in the Quran as falling into three main categories: the wholly unknowable (the day of judgement etc.); the 
knowable through study (rare Quranic words); and an intermediate category that can only be understood by ar-
rāsi ūna fī-l-ʿilm. This means that Quran 4:126 can be read both ways depending on which category of al-
mutašābih is being dealt with. Either “no-one can interpret unclear verses in the Quran apart from God, and those 
firmly-rooted in knowledge say “we believe in it” or “no-one can interpret unclear verses in the Quran apart from 
God and the firmly-rooted in knowledge, who [also] say “we believe in it”. ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 412-430. 
———, Exegesis ed  Sardār, 226-230. ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 74, 89. ——
—, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 108-109, 117-118. ———, Quranic Glossary, 352, 443-445. See also 
discussion below at note 442. 
292 It is the most noble rank that the wise can attain (ašraf man ilah li-l-ḥukamāʾ). ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 427. 
———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 89. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 
117-118. See also note 446 below. 
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consciously uncontroversial and from the earliest years of Islam: “Ibn ʿAbbās, ʿAlī, and others” 
were firmly-rooted in knowledge. Divinely-provided knowledge is restricted to “prophets and 
some saints (awliyāʾ).293 Ragib describes ʿAlī as having certainty through divinely-provided 
knowledge, and as having reached the stage at which the veil was withdrawn. “Other wise men” 
who had attained this stage described it as seeing God in everything they saw.
294
 On the other 
hand, Ragib devoted his pedagogical and ethical works to explicitly encouraging his readers to 
strive to attain this rank, to become as good as or better than the angels, and to deserve to be 
described as human beings and God’s vicegerents on earth.295 Scholars should try to be saints.296 
Ragib believed that the only way that humans had been able, and were now able, to achieve 
this top level of divine certainty was through external acts of piety coupled with internal thought 
and reflection. Scholars must purify their souls in order for their minds to be clear, and to purify 
their souls they must act righteously.
297
 The broad claim that knowledge and action (al-ʿilm wa-l-
ʿamal) should be combined was not a new one, nor was it particularly controversial.298 However, 
                                                 
293 Abū al-ʿAbbās ʿAbdallāh b. al-ʿAbbās (d. 68/688), such an omnipresent figure in exegesis, including Ragib’s 
Exegesis, that he was known as the “father of exegesis”. ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 422-423. ———, On Creeds, 
92. 
294 ———, On Creeds, 94-95. 
295 ———, Analysis of the Two Creations, 186 (chapter 33). ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 59. For a 
comparative use of the verb istaḥaqqa see Peters’ discussion of how al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār analysed the 
relationship between a known reality and its description as “entitlement”. Peters, God's created speech, 152-153. 
296 Ragib writes that Quran 3:79’s “be divine” (kūnū rabbānīyīna) means “be wise saints for God” (ḥukamāʾ awliyāʾ 
li-llāh) and continues: “it is said that if the scholars are not saints then God will have no saint on earth” (fa-qad qīla 
in lam yakun –l-ʿulamāʾu awliyāʾa li-llāhi fa-laysa li-llāhi fī-l-arḍi walīy). Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 672. 
297 ———, On Creeds, 92. ———, "On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions," 220. 
298al-ḥikmatu iṣābatu –l-ḥaqqi bi-l-ʿilmi wa-l-ʿfiʿl. ———. Mufradāt al-Ḫaṭīb Collection. f.43a. Dāwūdī has al-ʿaql 
for al-fiʿl. ———, Quranic Glossary, 249. “The core of belief is true knowledge and pious action” (aṣlu –l-īmāni –
l-ʿulūmu -ṣ-ṣādiqati wa-l-aʿmālu -ṣ-ṣāliḥah). ———. Carullah 84. f.42a. Cf. Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, "ar-Radd ʿalā az-
Zanādiqah wa-l- ahmīyah," in ʿAqā’id as-Salaf, ed. ʿAlī Sāmī an-Naššār and ʿAmmār a -Ṭālibī (Alexandria: al-
Maʿārif, 1971), 112-114. For knowledge and action more broadly see: Erik S Ohlander, "Action, in Ṣūfism," in 
Encyclopaedia of Islam  THREE, ed. Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill 
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Ragib knew that the specific mystic conviction that knowledge could be accessed through pious 
acts rather than books or lessons was not shared by all his contemporaries. He wrote in On 
Creeds that theologians (al-mutakallimūn) thought it unlikely, and in On the Ordering of 
Intellectual Disciplines that it was rejected by some dialecticians (baʿḍ al- adalīyīn).299 He gave 
the idea its clearest expression in his Exegesis of Quran 3:103 where he wrote that a level could 
be reached in which the Quran and Sunna were no longer necessary.
300
 The only circles in which 
such an idea would have been acceptable were Sufi. 
Wise Philosophers (al-ḥukamāʾ) 
 It is a little bit of a stretch to translate ḥukamāʾ as “wise philosophers”. Ragib’s idea of 
“wisdom” (al-ḥikmah) was broader than what we mean by philosophy today in the English 
language. As we have seen above, “the wise” (al-ḥukamāʾ) included mystics who had attained a 
level of spiritual and intellectual achievement that brought them close to God, rather than those 
schooled in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Nevertheless, Ragib was familiar with the ideas of 
Hellenistic philosophy and we can see evidence of this throughout his works. Hellenistic 
philosophy was something that he was prepared to use and admire, but just as with the partisans 
of Hadith, the Sufis, and the theologians it was not an intellectual habitus with which he directly 
identified himself. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Online: Brill, 2011). 
299 Ragib, On Creeds, 93. ———, "On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions," 221. 
300 The verse talks of the rope of God (ḥabl allāh), which Ragib says is the Quran and the Sunna. The three stages 
are reliance on God (al-iʿtiṣām), faith in God (at-tawakkul), and then submission to God (al-islām) at which point 
the rope is no longer needed and the believer becomes as if God was a part of him (istaġnā ḥīynaʾiḏan ʿan –l-
wasāʾiti –llaḏīna hum ḥablu –llāhi wa-yaṣīru mimman qāla (ṣ) fīhi ḥikāyatan ʿan allāhi fa-iḏā aḥbabtuhū kuntu 
samʿahū). Aš-Šidī describes this position disapprovingly as “extreme Sufism”. ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 766-
767. For the Hadith (Qudsī) see: Ibn Ḥaǧar, Fatḥ al-Bārī, 14:414f (#6502).  
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Ragib’s definition of wisdom in The Path to the Nobilities shows that he felt Hellenistic 
philosophy was just one of the sources of knowledge available to him: “wisdom is a name for 
any good knowledge and any good action”, and it “has been defined with different expressions 
according to different perspectives”. The first perspective he reports defines wisdom as: 
“knowledge of the things that exist as they really are, which must mean universal categories of 
things because human knowledge is incapable of encompassing every specific thing”.301 These 




We have already seen that Ragib was included by al-Bayhaqī in a compilation of those 
working in the Hellenistic philosophical tradition, and this is confirmed by the contexts in which 
Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī mentioned Ragib. In Asās at-Taqdīs (The Foundations of Sanctification) 
Faḫr ad-Dīn was justifying his principle, with specific reference to God, that things could exist 
                                                 
301 wa-amma –l-ḥikmatu fa-smun li-kulli ʿilmin ḥasanin wa-ʿamalin ṣāliḥin … wa-qad ḥuddat –l-ḥikmatu bi-alfāẓin 
mu talifatin ʿalā naẓarātin mu talifatin fa-qīla hiya maʿrifatu –l-ašyāʾi –l-maw ūdati bi-ḥaqāʾiqihā wa-yaʿnī 
kullīyāta –l-ašyāʾi fa-ammā  u ʾīyātuhā fa-lā sabīla li-l-bašari ilā –l-aḥāṭati bi-hā. Ragib, The Path to the 
Nobilities, 141. 
302Avicenna opened his major philosophical work (aš-Šifāʾ) with the statement that the aim of falsafah was to 
comprehend “all things as they really are” (al-ġaraḍu fī-l-falsafati an yūqafa ʿalā ḥaqāʾiqi –l-ašyāʾi kullihā). Abū 
ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), "aš-Šifāʾ: al-Man iq I (al-Madḫal)," in aš-Šifāʾ, ed. Ibrāhīm Madkūr (Cairo: 
Wizārat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUmūmīyah, 1952; reprint, Qum: Ẕovī el-Qurbā, 2007), 12. On a less elevated scholarly plane, 
Ibn Farīġūn wrote that the aim of falsafah was “the essence of things as they really are” (kunh ḥaqāʾiq al-ašyāʾ). Ibn 
Farīġūn, Jawāmiʿ al-ʿUlūm, ed. Fuat Sezgin (Frankfurt: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, 1985). 143. ———, Ǧawāmiʿ al-ʿUlūm, ed. Qays Kāẓim al- ābī (Cairo: 
Maktabat aṯ- aqāfah ad-Dīnīyah, 2007). 254. Ibn Farīġūn was a student of Abū Zayd Aḥmad b. Sahl al-Balḫī, d. 
322/934, who was one of Ragib’s sources in the Exegesis. Ragib. Carullah 84. f.17a, f.66a. ———, Exegesis ed  aš-
Šidī, 492, 523. ———, Exegesis ed  Sardār, 175. For more on Ibn Farīġūn, see: Hans Hinrich Biesterfeldt, "Ibn 
Farīġūn on Communication," in In the age of al-Fārābī: Arabic philosophy in the fourth/tenth century, ed. Peter 
Adamson (London: Warburg Institute. Nino Aragno, 2008). ———, "Medieval Arabic Encyclopedias of Science & 
Philosophy," in The Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias of Science and Philosophy, ed. Steven Harvey (Boston: 
Kluwer, 2000), 84-85. Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian tradition: introduction to reading Avicenna's 
philosophical works  (Leiden: Brill, 1988). 245-248. Franz Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historiography  (Leiden: 
Brill, 1952). 34-36. V. Minorsky, "Ibn Farīġūn and the Ḥudūd al-Aʿlām," in A Locust's Leg: studies in honour of S  
H  Taqi adeh, ed. W. B. Henning and E. Yarshater (London: P. Lund, 1962). D.M. Dunlop, "The  awāmiʿ al-ʿUlūm 
of Ibn Farīġūn," in Zeki Velidi Toganʾa Arma an: Symbolae in Honorem Z  V  Togan (Istanbul: 1950-1955). Helmut 
Ritter, "Philologika XIII: Arabische Handschriften in Anatolien und Istanbul," Oriens 3, no. 1 (1950): 83-85. 
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and yet be imperceptible and outside of space and time. He wrote that Hellenistic philosophers 
agreed on the existence of substance, souls, and intellects that were imperceptible and immaterial 
in this way and he gave four examples of scholars who held this position: a Muʿtazilī, a Shia, and 
from his own Sunni community, Ragib and al-Ġazālī.303 In his Exegesis, Faḫr ad-Dīn describes 
the idea that humans are immaterial and immortal souls and says that it is held by the majority of 
metaphysical Hellenistic philosophers (al-ilāhīyīn min al-falāsifah) and “a large number of 




Ragib had indeed held the position that things could exist immaterially, writing in On 
Creeds that “most reasonable scholars” believed that, for example, angels and jinn consisted of 
pure imperceptible soul.
305 However, it appears that Faḫr ad-Dīn went too far in associating 
Ragib with Hellenistic philosophers, attributing to him the position that human existence is in the 
immaterial soul and not the body (al-insānu maw ūdun laysa bi- ismin wa-lā  ismānīyah). In 
fact Ragib, who was well aware that others believed only the soul was resurrected, maintained 
that humans were made up of the combination of body and soul and that their bodies would be 
resurrected on the day of judgement.
306
 Ragib identified these others with whom he disagreed as 
Hellenistic philosophers and the Ismāʿīlīyah (al-falāsifah wa-l-bāṭinīyah).307 
                                                 
303 Muʿammar b. ʿAbbād as-Sulami (d. 215/830) min al-muʿta ilah and aš-Šayḫ al-Mufīd min ar-rāfiḍah. ar-Rāzī, 
Asās at-Taqdīs, 15-17.  
304 Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ, 21:46 (Quran 17:85). 
305  ull al-ʿuqalāʾ. Ragib, On Creeds, 145. 
306 Ragib writes that the soul leaves the body at death and returns to it on the final day in order for the body to be 
resurrected. Ibid., 203, 224-225. ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 72-73. ———, Analysis of the Two Creations, 
60-62 (chapter 7). 
307 ———, On Creeds, 224. The term al-bāṭinīyah (“internalists”) was usually a pejorative term for the Ismāʿīlīyah, 
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Ragib was by no means the only scholar at the end of the tenth and beginning of the 
eleventh century to make use of Hellenistic philosophy while at the same time maintaining a 
commitment to Sunni Islam. Many of his ideas are shared with Miskawayh (Abū ʿAlī Aḥmad, d. 
421/ 1030),
308
 al-ʿĀmirī (Abū al-Ḥasan Muḥammad, d. 381/ 992), and the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (ca. 
949-983). However, he stands out among this group as the only scholar to have also written 
popular and influential exegesis.  
Ideas from Hellenistic philosophy are found throughout Ragib’s work, although they are 
most concentrated in the Analysis of the Two Creations. They range from God as a being 
necessary of existence, an unmoved mover beyond the heavenly spheres at the top of a chain of 
causality,
309
 to the creation of the reason before anything else followed by the four elements,
310
 
the first intellect and the active intellect,
311
 the human being as a microcosm,
312
 and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
who at this time were making their big push from Fatimite Egypt into Abbasid Iran and Iraq (Avicenna’s father had 
been an Ismāʿīlī dāʿī). Although we know very little about the Ismāʿīlīyah in Isfahan at this time (Durand-Gu dy, 
Iranian Elites, 142f.), this reference to al-bāṭinīyah is one of a number that make  it hard to imagine Ragib could 
have had any Ismāʿīlī sympathies. Ragib also attacks bāṭinīyah esotericism as a barrier to clear understanding of the 
Quran (Ragib, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 75. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. 
Nāhī," 109.) Al-ʿĀmirī (d. 381/992) identifies those who disagree with Ragib’s position that souls return to their 
bodies for resurrection (a belief that al-ʿĀmirī identifies as that of “the majority of the people of Islam”) as Stoic 
philosophers. Abū al-Ḥasan Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-ʿĀmirī and Everett Rowson, A Muslim philosopher on the soul 
and its fate: Al-ʿ mirī's Kitāb al-Amad ʿalā l-Abad, American Oriental Series (New Haven: American Oriental 
Society, 1988). 160-163. 
308 Ragib’s idea that humans should and could emulate the angels was present in the circle around Miskawayh in 
Baghdad. The phrase “for humans are likenesses of the angels” (fa-l-insānu am ilatu –l-malāʾikah) comes in the 
concluding paragraphs of a passage that puports to be Platonic, and that details the connections between the divine 
and humanity. Elvira Wakelnig, A Philosophy Reader from the Circle of Miskawayh, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming), #25 (13v). For further comparison of Ragib and Miskawayh’s ethical ideas see: 
Daiber, "Griechische Ethik." Mohamed, "Ethical Philosophy." ———, "Knowledge and Purification." Ragib and 
Mohamed, The Path to Virtue. 
309 Ragib does stress, against the errors of “some of the wise”, that the heavenly spheres are not eternal. Ragib, On 
Creeds, 47-56. Wisnovsky has highlighted the connection to Avicenna’s idea of the necessary of existence (wā ib al-
wu ūd). Wisnovsky, "One Aspect of the Avicennian Turn," 88-89. 
310 Ragib, Analysis of the Two Creations, 40-41 (chapter 2). For Madelung this is evidence that al-Bayhaqī was right 
to class Ragib as a Hellenistic philosopher. Madelung, "Ar-Rāġib," 161. 
311 Ragib discusses God’s creation of the first intellect in Analysis, and rejects the idea that God is coterminous with 
anything called the active intellect in On Creeds. Ragib, Analysis of the Two Creations, 41 (chapter 2). ———, On 
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injunction to “know thyself”.313 Ragib is most attracted to those elements of the philosophical 
tradition, like the human as microcosm (found in the Quranic Glossary as well as the Analysis), 
that enable him to argue for the human duty to emulate and approach the divine. Where the 
philosophical tradition restricts his ability to lay out his ambitious ethical goal for humanity, he 
rejects it. Ragib reads Quran 2:31, in which God instructs Adam to demonstrate his superior 
knowledge to the angels, as being in part a reminder that while previous traditions have regarded 
the human concupiscent and irascible faculties as weaknesses, the God of the Quran regards 
them as a constitution that uniquely qualifies humans to become God’s vicegerents.314 The 
ethical ideal of vicegerency to God ( ilāfah) is central to Ragib’s ethics, and is itself found in 
both al-ʿĀmirī and the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ.315  
Ragib never mentions the persistently mysterious and anonymous group of tenth-century 
authors known as the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, but he does share a number of their positions on key 
                                                                                                                                                             
Creeds, 63. 
312 ———, Quranic Glossary, 582. ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 73. ———, Analysis of the Two Creations, 
51, 65, 169 (chapters 4, 9, 31). See also: Daiber, "Griechische Ethik," 186. Mohamed, "Knowledge and 
Purification," 18-22. 
313 Ragib, Analysis of the Two Creations, 29, 33 (intro., chapter 1). 
314 For the division of the soul into rational, concupiscent, and irascible faculties, the latter two of which should  be 
subservient to the first, see: Plato, The Republic, trans. Desmond Lee, Penguin Classics (London: Penguin, 1955; 
repr., 2003). 434b-442b. Cf. al-ʿĀmirī and Rowson, A Muslim philosopher, 264. Ragib’s exegesis of Quran 2:31 
reads: 
…[as for that] human composition of different faculties, two of which are those that have been considered 
corrupting (by which I mean the concupiscent and irascible), God cautions them that even though there are 
some corrupting elements therein there are also numerous benefits, and the vicegerency for which humans are 
nominated can only be achieved with this composition. (…tarkība –l-insāni min –l-quwā –l-mutafāwitati –
llatī minhā l-quwwatāni –llatāni kānū yarawnahumā mufsidatayani aʿnī aš-šahwīyata wa-l-ġaḍabīyata wa-
nabbahahum [allāh] anna ḏālika wa-in kāna fīhi mufsidatan mā fa-fīhi maṣāliḥun ka īratun wa-anna –l-
 ilāfata –llatī ruššiḥa la-hā –l-insānu fī-l-arḍi lā yuṣlaḥu la-hā illā hāḏa –t-tarkīb) 
Ragib. Carullah 84. f.27a.  
315 For al-ʿĀmirī the most specific purpose of the human rational soul is to be God’s  alīfah on earth. al-ʿĀmirī and 
Rowson, A Muslim philosopher, 97, 118-119, 138-139, 268. Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, Rasāʾil I wān aṣ- afāʾ wa Ḫullān al-
Wafāʾ, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1957; repr., 2008). 4:125. Daiber writes that the Quranic idea (Quran 2:30, 6:165 
(al-Anʿām), 7:129 (al-Aʿrāf) etc.) of  ilāfah is what connects Ragib’s Neoplatonic ethics with the šarīʿah. Daiber, 




 Their combination of a rigorous and rational Neoplatonism with a commitment to 
Islamic ethics and revelation is a likely source for some of his ideas. The Iḫwān share Ragib’s 
belief that humanity must try to emulate the divine, his stress on the importance of pious self-
purification alongside intellectual endeavour, his equation of reason and revelation,
317
 his 
sympathy for ʿAlī,318 and his position on the physical resurrection of bodies when their souls are 
returned to them.
319
 The most salient difference between them is one of audience, and of 
emphasis. While Ragib wrote reference works and pedagogical ethics in public, the anonymous 
Iḫwān produced an intellectual manifesto for a restricted elite.  
Ragib was also attracted to those elements of the Hellenistic tradition that helped him 
explain definitions and word meanings. In his exegesis and ethics he uses the vocabulary of 
genus and species, necessary accidents and differentia, apodictic proof,
320
 and conception and 
                                                 
316 For introductions to the Iḫwān, see: Godefroid de Callataÿ, Ikhwan al-Safa': a brotherhood of idealists on the 
fringe of orthodox Islam, Makers of the Muslim world. (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005). Ian Richard Netton, Muslim 
Neoplatonists : an introduction to the thought of the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al- afāʾ)  (London / New York: 
Routledge / Curzon, 2002). 
317 Passages such as the following, from the Iḫwān’s fourteenth letter, could have provided much of the material for 
Ragib’s central ethical claims. 
Know that the philosophical disciplines and the prophetic religious law (alʿulūm al-ḥikmīyah wa-š-ṣ̌arīʿah 
an-nubūwīyah) are two divine entities that agree with regard to their aim, which is a principle, and they differ 
in the applications of that principle. The ultimate goal of philosophy is that which can be described as 
emulation of the divine according to human ability, as we have explained in all of our letters. Philosophy is 
based on four characteristics: knowledge of existents as they really are (maʿrifat ḥaqāʾiq al-maw ūdāt), 
correct beliefs, good morals and praiseworthy disposition, and pure actions and good deeds. The aim of these 
characteristics is the correction of the soul … so that it can ascend to be with the angels, who are of the same 
species. The aim of prophecy (an-nubuwwah wa-n-nāmūs) is also the correction and reform of the human 
soul in order to deliver it from the hell of a world of generation and corruption and bring it to paradise … For 
this is the aim of both the disciplines of philosophy and of the prophetic religious law. 
Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, Rasāʾil  Beirut, 3:30. Cf. Callataÿ, Ikhwan al-Safa', 80. 
318 Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, 100. De Callataÿ goes further and argues for their Shia affiliation and their 
millenarianism, neither of which would have been shared by Ragib. Callataÿ, Ikhwan al-Safa', 54, 57, 96, 99-100. 
319 Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, Rasāʾil  Beirut, 3:301. 
320 Ragib writes that a single idea can be indicated by a number of things: a name such as “human”; one of its 
necessary accidents ( aṣāʾiṣ lā im) such as “upright”, “walking on legs”, or “broad of fingernail” [the fourth 
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assent (taṣawwur wa-taṣdīq).321 He also ascribes such terminology to “logic” and “logicians” (al-
manṭiq, al-manṭiqīyūn), a discipline with which he seems familiar and that, unlike theology, 
nowhere attracted his opprobrium.
322
 Not everyone that Ragib encountered was as comfortable 
with the use of such terminology across political and cultural divides. In On the Ordering of 
Intellectual Disciplines Ragib tells us how a senior scholar refused to even say the word 
“potentiality” (quwwah) and exclaimed: “this expression is used by philosophers so instead I say 
‘ability’ (qudrah)!” Ragib was dismissive of this stance: “it was as if he didn’t know the 
difference between the two words in common usage, never mind among specialists!”323 
In the final analysis Ragib is always defined by the combinations that he made, whether of 
logic and exegesis, Neoplatonic ethics and Ḥanbalī mysticism, or reason and revelation. The 
group that he said he approved of, traditionists, senior Sufis, and wise philosophers, is itself a 
                                                                                                                                                             
universal]; or one of its specific differentiae (faṣl lā im) such as “speaking” or “dying” [the third universal]. Ragib, 
Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 52. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 95. He 
defines burhān as apodeictic proof (allaḏī yaqtaḍī -ṣ-ṣidqa abadan lā maḥālah). ———, Quranic Glossary, 121. 
321 “Intellectual disciplines are achieved through two channels: conception and assent” (al-ʿulūmu min ḥay u –l-
kayfīyati ḍarbāni taṣawwurun wa-taṣdīq). He goes on to give examples of both and explain that conception is an 
idea, whereas assent is conception with the addition of proof (wa-t-taṣdīqu huwa an yutaṣawwara –š-šayʾu wa-
ya butu ʿindahū bi-dalālatin taqtaḍī ṣiḥḥatahū). ———, Analysis of the Two Creations, 139-140 (chapter 23). This 
understanding of conception and assent is shared by Avicenna. Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), "al-Madḫal," 17 (line 7f). See 
also: A. I. Sabra, "Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic," The Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 11 (1980): 757-762. 
322 In his Quranic Glossary discussion of al-qawl Ragib writes that: 
Logicians have a meaning unique to them: definition. They say the qawl of the substance, or the qawl of the 
accident. By this they mean its definition. (yastaʿmiluhū –l-manṭiqīyūna dūna ġayrihim fī maʿnā –l-ḥaddi fa-
yaqūlūna qawlu –l- awhari kaḏā wa-qawlu –l-ʿaraḍi kaḏā ay ḥadduhumā).  
Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 688 (cf. 267, 811). The phrase qawl al- awhar is inherited from the Arabic translations of 
Aristotle. The Greek λόγος τῆς οὐσίαϛ (“the word about / definition of the substance”) having been translated as 
qawl al- awhar. Aristotle, "Categories," 1a. ———, Organon Aristotelis in versione Arabica antiqua / Manṭiq 
Aristū, ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, 3 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīyah, 1948). 3.   
323 ka-annahū lam yaʿlam mā baynahumā min –l-farqi fī taʿārufi ʿawāmmi –n-nāsi faḍlan ʿan  awāṣṣihim. Ragib, 
"On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions," 214. Elsewhere Ragib explains that quwwah is 
an inevitable force in something (such as burning in fire) whereas qudrah is a force that the agent may choose 
whether or not to use. ———, On Creeds, 280. NB: on line 3 of p.280 al-ʿAǧalī has the erroneous qāla fa-l-quwwah 
while all four mss. have qāla fa-l-qudrah.———.  stān-e Quds-e Rażāvī 56. f.52b; ibid., f.84b; ———. Sehid Ali 
382. f.51a; ———. Fey ullah Efendi 2141. f.78b. 
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combination in which we can trace the traditionists to the Ḥanābilah, the wise philosophers to 
scholars such as the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, and the senior Sufis to the Sufis of Isfahan. Few of these 
parties would have been at all happy to have been combined with each other, and yet Ragib 
would not be last to attempt such a synthesis.  
Ragib s Beliefs 
The exercise of trying to understand Ragib through his real or potential affiliations has 
proved to be useful up to a point. I will now translate a brief example of his exegesis to complete 
the picture. 
‘Whenever we abrogate a verse or cause it to be forgotten, we bring another verse better 
than it or of a similar status; do you not know that God can do anything?’ (Quran 2:106).  
I have discussed the essence (māʾīyah) of abrogation and the difference between it and 
specification at the start of this book.324 The lexicographical understanding of abrogation is 
that it is when an image moves from one thing onto another, like the shadow moving over 
the sun.325 … Exegetes have interpreted abrogation and causing to be forgotten in two 
ways. The first way is that abrogation is the removal of the verse’s authority while its 
expressions remain and the removal of the verse’s judgement along with its expressions. 
Causing to forget is equivalent and means that the verse is not abrogated but is recited.326 
The second way is that abrogation is the removal of just the judgement, whether or not the 
expression remains, and that causing to forget is the removal of the expression, whether or 
not the judgement remains … Therefore we say, and success lies with God, that he created 
                                                 
324 ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 114-115; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis 
ed  Farḥāt, 82-85. 
325 an-nas u fī-l-luġati i ālatu -ṣ-ṣūrati ʿan aš-šayʾi wa-i bātuhā fī ġayrihī ka-nas i -ẓ-ẓalli li-š-šams. Cf. ———, 
Quranic Glossary, 801. 
326 an-nas u huwa i ālatu –l-mulki min ġayri –l-lafẓi wa-l-ḥukmi maʿa –l-lafẓi wa-l-insāʾu muqabilatun wa-huwa an 
lā yunsa u bal yuqraʾ. ———. Carullah 84. f.85a (line 1f). Ayasofya 212 has al-ḥukm for al-mulk. ———. Ms  of 
Tafsīr [Methodological Introduction plus Exegesis of Quran 1:1 to Quran 2:223] . Ayasofya 212 (dated ?), 
Süleymaniye, Istanbul. (Quran 2:106). Cf. ʿImād ad-Dīn Abū al-Fiḍāʾ Ismāʿīl Ibn Kaṯīr, Tafsīr Ibn Ka īr, ed. Muṣ afā 
Saʿīd al- inn, 2 vols. (Beirut: Muʾassasat ar-Risālah, 2002). 1:103 (right-hand column). 
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us on the earth as his vicegerents in it and inhabitants of it in order to become close to him 
and to approach him in a life after which there will be no death and in which there will be 
no want, and we will have ability unaffected by any disability. The only way to attain this is 
with a healthy soul, and its health has two components: knowledge and action … likewise 
the only way to attain a healthy soul is through two good things: one is internal and is 
reason, and one is external and is the Prophet … Aš-Šāfiʿī and his followers have used this 
verse to argue for their position that the Quran can only be abrogated by the Quran327 …  
and the Sunna is indeed not better than any verse of the Quran, nor is it of similar status ... 
but although God said ‘a verse’ he meant ‘a judgement’ because abrogation only occurs 
with regard to judgements.328 Therefore his words ‘better than it or of a similar status’ only 
refer to the verse’s judgements and it is as if the verse read “whenever we abrogate a 
judgement, we bring another judgement better than it or of a similar status”. That is the 
central point of God’s speech here (fa-ʿalā hāḏā madāru –l-kalām). Those committed to 
literal interpretation (ahl aẓ-ẓāhir) use this verse when they maintain that the abrogating 
verse has to be lighter than the abrogated, and they took lightness to mean that which the 
soul naturally finds more pleasant (mā yasta iffu –n-nafsu bi-ṭ-ṭabʿ).329 This is unlikely, for 
the revealed law (aš-šarīʿah) is built upon the principle of contradicting the soul and 
rejecting that which nature [seems to] require … for those divine matters that are pleasant 
and easy in this world and the next are exactly those which the soul finds burdensome…330 
                                                 
327 See Muḥammad Idrīs aš-Šāfiʿī, ar-Risālah, ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad Šākir (Cairo: Muṣ afā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 
1938). 106. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 90. 
328 Ragib argues in the omitted portion that the Šāfiʿī position rests on the Quran’s superior status as opposed to the 
Sunna. It is, after all inimitable while the Sunna is not. The claim that abrogation only occurs with regard to 
judgements then makes the Šāfiʿī distinction between Quran and Sunna irrelevant because they only represent 
different forms of divine judgement. I have not found this argument anywhere else. When the statement “abrogation 
only occurs with regard to judgements” was made by later authors (ʿAlāʾ ad-Dīn al-Buḫārī dies in 730/1330) it 
referred to abrogation being permissable in judgements but not in historical narratives (a bār). ʿAlāʾ ad-Dīn al-
Buḫārī, Kašf al-Asrār ʿalā Uṣūl al-Imām Fa r al-Islām ʿAlī b  Muḥammad al-Ba dawī, 4 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb 
al-Islāmī, 1917). 3:198.  
329 Al- aṣṣāṣ relates this position (qāla ā arūna lā yunsa u ḥukmun illā bi-mā a affu minhu) and disagrees with it, 
allowing abrogation by both what is lighter and what is more burdonsome for the person concerned. al- aṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl 
al-Fiqh, 2:223. Ahl aẓ-ẓāhir may be a reference to the Ẓāhirī school of theology and legal interpretation, for whom 
see: Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 78-88.  
330 Ragib. Carullah 84. f.84 (lines 12f, 21f), f.85a (lines 1f, 12f, 18f) f. 86a (lines 14f, 20f), f.86b (lines 1f, 12f).  
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All the salient aspects of Ragib’s belief system are here, from the initial reliance on 
lexicography, to the technical discussions of exegetical theory, the knowledge of the legal 
implications of exegesis, and then the ethical and religious goal of becoming God’s vicegerent 
on earth, a goal which can only be attained by a mystic, and perhaps even Neoplatonist, 
insistence on suppressing one’s soul’s base natural desires.  
This is what Ragib believed. It is a combination of monotheism, Hellenistic ethics, and 
mysticism that he thought was reasonable and rational. When he encountered opposition to his 
beliefs, that opposition consisted of rival exegetical options ranging from a rejection of anything 
mystic in favour of reasoned theologies, to a complete rejection of any reasoning, to even a rival 
cosmology in which the heavenly spheres were eternal and Islamic revelation was almost 
irrelevant. It is possible that he encountered some form of scientifically based unbelief; the 




Nevertheless, Ragib did discuss the problem that some people with reputations for 
abundant rationality denied the existence of the afterlife. Their denial in turn led ignorant people 
to say “if they don’t believe in it, and they are so rational, it must not be true”. Ragib explained 
that the error lay in a failure to understand that reason can only master either the question of the 
afterlife or the matters of this world. If, as is the case with those who have reputations for deep 
                                                 
331 These naturalists denied the existence of anything purely spiritual because it lacked a sensible origin, and they 
denied that an afterlife exists ———, On Creeds, 145. Patricia Crone, to whom I am grateful for the following 
references, writes that the ṭabīʿīyūn, or aṣḥāb aṭ-ṭabāʾiʿ, “were empiricists in the sense of that they held all genuine 
knowledge to be based on sense impressions in conjunction with reasoning”, and were so called because of their 
belief that the world is composed of four natures (hot, cold, wet and dry). Crone, Patricia "The Dahrīs According to 
al-Jāḥiẓ” M langes de l’Universit  Saint-Joseph, forthcoming. See also: al-Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, 348. Abū al-Ḥusayn al-
Baṣrī, Taṣaffuh al-Adillah: the extant parts introduced and edited, ed. Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmidtke 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006). 82. Muḥmammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm aš-Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa-n-
Niḥal, ed. Muḥammad b. Fatḥallāh Badrān (Cairo: Ma baʿat al-Azhar, 1947-1955). 661. For some mediaeval authors 
the aṣhāb aṭ-ṭabāʾiʿ are coterminous with the dahrīyūn (deniers of the afterlife / eternalists), for whom see Martin J. 
McDermott, "Abū ʿĪsā al-Warrāq on the Dahriyya," M langes de l’Universit  Saint-Joseph 50(1984). 
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rational investigation of this world (whom I assume to be the naturalists mentioned above), their 




In our terms, Ragib’s conclusion is that too much effort spent on natural science renders a 
rational person unable to comprehend what they could otherwise understand, for example, that 
an eternal afterlife exists. His beliefs rest on very different assumptions about human reason and 
its limitations from those we are used to today. However, in Ragib’s context these were 
assumptions that were rational for him to hold.
333
 Ragib also claimed that his beliefs were 
rational and that they were the product of the mutual dependency of divine revelation and human 
reason. For example, he maintained that it is in accordance with reason to say that the fate of the 
world and its inhabitants is God’s secret and should not be investigated.334 As historians, it is 
because this belief was “widely accepted as rational and indeed indubitable” in his context that 
we can think it was rational for him to have held it.
335
  
Although Ragib shared the same basic assumptions about a monotheistic creator as the 
majority of his contemporaries, we have seen in the discussion above that mediaeval intellectual 
culture in late tenth and early eleventh-century Isfahan was not homogeneous on almost any 
other theological question. Faced with this plurality of opinion and controversy, Ragib seems to 
have chosen not to affiliate himself with a powerful group but rather to develop his own 
                                                 
332 Ragib, Analysis of the Two Creations, 180. 
333 See Skinner, who defines rationality as follows: “When I speak of agents as having rational beliefs, I mean only 
that their beliefs (what they hold to be true) should be suitable beliefs for them to hold true in the circumstances in 
which they find themselves”. Skinner, Visions of Politics, 31, 35. 
334 al-qadaru sirru –llāhi fa-lā tad ulū fīhi … wa-l-ʿaqlu lā yankaru an yu fā wa hu ḏālika. Ragib, On Creeds, 260.  
335 Skinner, Visions of Politics, 36. Skinner is talking about the beliefs of sixteenth-century European peasants in the 
Bible being the inspired word of God. 
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idiosyncratic combination of creeds and philosophies. He appears to have been part traditionist, 
part Sufi, and part philosopher without being fully integrated into any one known group. That 
said, the contingent nature of the single manuscript discovery that has alone enabled us to be sure 
that he was alive at that time is a valuable reminder that Ragib himself might not recognise this 
sketch of himself as an outsider, and would consequently be saddened to learn that the records of 
his successful professional life and his many scholarly companions had been lost to the 





3. RAGIB’S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 
This chapter starts with an abstraction. I have taken the analyses and comments on language that 
are scattered across Ragib’s works in all genres and assessed his hermeneutical approaches to 
both divine texts and literature, all in order to produce a six-page synopsis of what I believe to be 
his philosophy of language. I will provide the textual evidence for the claims in this synopsis in 
the remainder of this chapter, but for the time being Ragib’s philosophy of language and theory 
of meaning, if they are indeed worthy of the attention I am giving them, must be able to stand on 
their own as concepts that make sense.  
Synopsis 
The constellation of assumptions and claims laid out by Ragib at various points across his 
portfolio of works constitutes a philosophy of language that contains claims, preferences, and 
attitudes in fields that range from ontology to semantics. It is important to remember that we are 
not dealing with a field of enquiry that can be easily mapped onto any of our own. As Tony 
Street observed,  
[w]hereas there is an Arabic term (manṭiq) that equates to ‘logic’, there is no such term or 
phrase for ‘philosophy of language’. As it happens, philosophers tried to solve problems 
which are now taken to be the concern of a philosophy of language, but this they generally 
did in the midst of either a logic treatise or a treatise on grammar.336  
                                                 
336 Street also remarked that “[i]t is a sad fact of modern scholarship that those who study the Greek-derived 
traditions of philosophy of logic in Arabic are unlikely to have the competence to deal with parallel traditions within 
the Islamic sciences, and vice versa”, a criticism I hope to answer in what follows. Tony Street, "Arabic and Islamic 
Philosophy of Language and Logic," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/arabic-islamic-language/Fall 2008 Edition). 
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Ragib, of course, worked in genres (exegesis, ethics, creed, and literary theory) beyond the logic 
and grammar mentioned by Street.
337
  
Ragib’s theory is based around the ontological assumption that the pairing of expression 
and idea is all that there is, and all that we need, to understand and manipulate the interaction 
between language, mind, and reality. Expressions are the physical product of the vocal chords, 
while ideas are an entity that can subsist in our minds, our books, or our speech. The division is 
between the action by which an idea is vocalized, and the places in which that idea can subsist 
before, during, and after its vocalization. There is no doubt that Ragib saw the physical act of 
speech as the primary locus for the insubstantiation of ideas, and therefore also assumed speech 
to be the primary means of linguistic communication.
338
 
Unlike many of the other important binaries of mediaeval hermeneutics and epistemology, 
expression and idea have an existence outside analytical processes in addition to their uses 
                                                 
337 “Philosophy of Language” is a name often given, in the European and American academy today, to theories about 
language. An instructive example of how it functions in this academy as a disciplinary name, and some of the topics 
it is taken to include, can be taken from the “Philosophy of Language” section of the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy entry for the German philosopher Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834). Many of the 
issues on which Schleiermacher is presented as theorizing can be found in this dissertation: 
Schleiermacher nowhere presents his philosophy of language separately; instead, it is found scattered through 
such works as his lectures on psychology, dialectics, and hermeneutics. The following positions … are 
especially worth noting: (1) … on the question of the origin of language … (2) Language (and hence thought) 
are fundamentally social in nature … (3) Language and thought … lend a distinctive character to, all human 
mental processes. (4) Schleiermacher in his early work postulates an identity of thought with linguistic 
expression … (5) Schleiermacher adopts a view of meaning which equates it -- not with such items, in 
principle independent of language, as the referents involved, Platonic forms, or the mentalistic “ideas” 
favored by the British empiricists and others -- but with word usages, or rules for the use of words. (6) … 
Schleiermacher argues that thought and conceptualization are not reducible to the occurrence of sensuous 
images … (7) Human beings exhibit, not only significant linguistic and conceptual-intellectual similarities, 
but also striking linguistic and conceptual-intellectual diversities, especially between different historical 
periods and cultures, but even to some extent between individuals within a single period and culture … (8) 
Schleiermacher, importantly, develops a much more holistic conception of meaning than was yet found in his 
predecessors … (c) He holds that the distinctive nature of a language's grammatical system (e.g. its system of 
declensions) is also partly constitutive of the character of the concepts expressed within it … 
Michael Forster, "Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward 
N. Zalta (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/arabic-islamic-language/Fall 2008 Edition).  
338 Cf. the quotation beginning “[i]n a discussion of the nature of writing…” at page 137. 
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therein. For example, the theory that expressions can have either general (ʿāmm) or specific 
( āṣṣ) application (whether “pig” means all pigs or just this pig) is a hermeneutical theory 
constructed by scholars to assist with deciding whether or not to eat pigs in light of the Quranic 
text. Just as the conceptual distinction between a root principle (aṣl) and its practical application 
(farʿ) was made by scholars in order to help them understand and describe the difference 
between, for example, the principle that Muslims should follow the Quran and the subsequent 
applications of its rules to their lives. None of these conceptual distinctions (ʿāmm,  āṣṣ, aṣl, 
farʿ) is part of an objective or external reality that applies to both the divine and humanity. 
The pairing of expression and idea is part of such a reality. Ragib’s assumption is that ideas 
are objective rather than subjective, accessible to all and amenable to being referred to by 
expressions. Both expressions and ideas are created by God, for Ragib’s monotheistic cosmology 
has no place for anything else that could be ultimately responsible for them, but as it stands God 
has ideas just as humans have ideas. The Quran is an example of how he encapsulates his ideas 
in expressions.  
Expression and idea are not just exegetical or hermeneutical tools. For Ragib they are the 
model by which human communication functions. This is a familiar type of claim: “[m]ost 
philosophers of language today think that the meaning of an expression is a certain sort of entity, 
and that the job of semantics is to pair expressions with the entities which are their meanings”.339  
                                                 
339 This quotation, and much of my understanding of what a theory of meaning is, comes from: Speaks, Theories of 
Meaning. When Speaks says “meaning” he is referring to the same “sort of entity” as Ragib when Ragib says maʿnā, 
and his use of “meaning” is therefore analogous to Frank’s translation of maʿnā as “meaning” (see note 11). In this 
dissertation I translate maʿnā as “idea” because I believe the English word is more flexible, and more appropriate. 
While, in English, “words” do have “meanings”, people are better thought of as sharing “ideas” through language 
rather than sharing “meanings”, and one may be more easily able to think of, for example, the “idea” of God’s mercy 
rather than the “meaning” of his mercy, or of poetic motifs as “ideas” rather than “meanings”. The word “meaning” 
in English is inextricably connected to insubstantiation in language acts, whereas the existence of Ragib’s ideas does 
not depend on their being spoken, written, or heard. Most importantly, however, the word “meaning” in English 
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To sum up, Ragib’s model conceives of language as a series of connections that people 
make between the ideas in their minds and the sounds on their lips. Now, these connections are 
either direct references to objects, in which case they substitute for the physical gesture of 
indication or pointing, or they are polysemic references to ideas. The most common type of 
polysemy is homonymy, which is caused by the fact that ideas are infinite while expressions are 
finite. Homonymy is when multiple ideas share a single expression. It is the inevitable 
consequence of our need to make a finite vocabulary refer to an infinite number of ideas: “the 
finite cannot encompass the infinite”.340 
In this situation, where language is polysemic whenever it cannot be replaced by a physical 
act of pointing, people either follow the existing precedents or make new connections between 
ideas and expressions. Poetry is written through these new connections, and Ragib worked in a 
society where the linguistic innovation constituted by these unprecedented linkages had great 
cultural value. Perhaps the primary site of innovation was metaphor, where poets made complex 
sets of connections between big deep ideas and concise expressions that, thanks to the context 
provided by the surrounding words and the audience’s familiarity with the genre, conveyed those 
ideas in their totality.  
The ideas in question were not just numerically infinite, but they were also each 
semantically broad. Ideas could have a semantic range that covered a number of subsidiary ideas, 
so that depending on the identities of speaker and audience the single idea of “mercy” in the 
adjective “merciful” could apply to a number of very different types of mercy. 
                                                                                                                                                             
usually refers to the intent behind a speech act and as will be made clear below (page 119f), Ragib deals with intent 
as a separate category that links expressions to ideas.   
340 ġayru –l-mutanāhī lā yaḥwīhi –l-mutanāhī. Ragib, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 29. —
——, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 81. 
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This combination of infinity and semantic breadth on the level of the ideas with a finite 
corpus of expressions contained the potential for substantial linguistic ambiguity. Ragib managed 
that potential ambiguity by a process of circumscription. He assumed that two factors governed, 
and limited, the interactions between ideas and expressions: the intent of the speaker and the 
lexicon. By limiting ambiguity these two factors enabled language to function.  
People (and God) intend certain ideas when they use certain expressions. They choose the 
expressions that they use and they know what they mean when they use them. It is the task of the 
listener to recognize and understand the ideas being referenced.
341
 To limit the infinite potential 
of intent to generate meaning, listeners or readers have recourse to the lexicon, an iteratively 
produced record of the permissable connections that have been made between ideas and 
expressions. God made the first connections and taught them to Adam along with the principles 
for their use and development to which humans continue to adhere.
342
   
Listeners also have recourse to the context of the speech act, but Ragib saw context as just 
one of a number of ways to comprehend intent (a speaker’s intent could alternatively be 
apprehended through the use of the listener’s reason).343 Finally, the listener had recourse to the 
                                                 
341 However, it should be remembered that Ragib does not assume that meaning is only generated in conversations. 
Language happens whenever expressions are combined with ideas, not necessarily just when people are combined 
with other people. That said, the assumption that language was best analysed in terms of conversations between 
people, rather than, for example, writing, was very widespread. See: Carter, "Pragmatics and Contractual Language," 
36. 
342 These ideas about language are not unfamiliar to twentieth-century philosophy. Saul Kripke has developed a 
theory in which words have an initial baptism followed by histories of usage for certain purposes. Saul A. Kripke, 
Naming and Necessity  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980; repr., Wiley-Blackwell, 1981). 96, 106f. 
See also: Speaks, Theories of Meaning. Speaks also notes that Kripke’s theory would be compatible with mentalist 
(and mostly Gricean) theories of meaning that rely on intent because “introducing a term involves intending that it 
stand for some object or property” and transmitting a term involves people “intending to use it in the same way” 
(emphasis in original). Such a combination is achieved by Ragib’s theory of meaning, which combines an account of 
names with a reliance on intent.  
343 Ibn Taymīyah’s fourteenth-century theory of meaning would, in contrast, put much more stress than Ragib on the 
context in which a speech act took place. This is what led Ali to make his persuasive comparison of Ibn Taymīyah’s 
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work of scholars such as Ragib, who were engaged in the vast project of explaining how 
language had been used, how well it had been used, and how it could be used. This project was 
lexicographical in nature, but it swelled and spread out across the genres of theology and poetics. 
Ragib was confident that his ethics, piety, and scholarship would ensure that his prescriptions for 
language, just like his interpretations of sacred prose and profane verse, were correct. 
This account of the interaction of expressions and ideas interact is the theory of meaning 
that lies at the heart of Ragib’s philosophy of language.344 It explains how language is produced 
as well as how words can be interpreted, and it provides Ragib with the tools to manage 
ambiguity. The extent of his comfort with linguistic ambiguity, and with the process of 
negotiating and managing it, is where we can read him as having a philosophy of language built 
upon that theory of meaning. The theory is a structure that explains and enables polysemy, and 
the philosophy is the attitude of its author to the linguistic ambiguity it produces.  
In a very brief gesture towards the question of whether this conceptual package makes 
sense, I note two of its qualities that are, to my mind, advantages. They are the autonomy that it 
grants to language users and its terminological parsimony. The autonomy that the theory of 
intent gives to language users is substantial. Its impact can be felt both in Ragib’s appreciation of 
                                                                                                                                                             
linguistic thought to Gricean pragmatics. Ali, Pragmatics, chapter 4. Ibn Taymīyah’s change of tack did not 
necessarily represent theoretical progress, for recent work on the philosophy of language has demonstrated that the 
Gricean focus on communicative situations fails to address the problem of audible remarks addressed to oneself, 
something that does not pose a problem for Ragib’s theory. Jeff Speaks, "Conversational Implicature, Thought, and 
Communication," Mind & Language 23, no. 1 (2008).  
344 Ragib engaged with the subject matter of both what are now called semantic theories of meaning, which “assign 
[ ] semantic contents to expressions of a language” and foundational theories of meaning, which look for the reasons 
behind those assignments. See: ———, Theories of Meaning. In Ragib’s work these two genres of enquiry 
correspond to the relationship between expression and idea, which is a semantic theory of meaning, and to the issues 
of communicative intent (murād, qaṣd), the lexicon (al-luġah), and God’s coinage of languages (al-waḍʿ: tawqīf; 
iṣṭilāḥ), which are all components of a foundational theory of meaning. 
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how poetry freely creates new metaphors, and in the fact that he felt free to develop his own 
exegetical positions when it came to matters of religion.  
The aesthetic and practical impact of having just two terms to cover every hermeneutical 
and communicative situation is also substantial.
345
 We have a complete, self-sufficient, and 
terminologically indigenous account of language and its use without recourse to the neologisms 
and proliferation of levels that would characterize twentieth-century linguistics (there are no 
Carnapian intensions, Russellian propositions, or Fregean senses).
346
 This degree of economy 




Finally, the question of how conscious Ragib was of the theory I have laid out here should 
be addressed before we move onto the textual details of his thinking. Ragib self-consciously put 
                                                 
345 In Boeckx, the value of the minimalist program is to a substantial extent bound up in its aesthetic impact 
(“beautiful theories”). Boeckx, Linguistic Minimalism, 116-123. 
346 Rudolf Carnap  (1891–1970), Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872–1970), and Gottlob Frege (1848-1925). 
See: Speaks, Theories of Meaning. 
347 Linguistic minimalism was a response to the proliferation of concepts, such as the intensions, propositions and 
senses referenced above, that had accrued in late twentieth-century linguistics. It claimed to follow Ockham’s razor 
and it rested on three pillars: economy (i.e. as few components and levels as possible); virtual conceptual necessity 
(big inevitable facts); and symmetry (of syntactic operations and representations). The program was launched in 
1993 in: Chomsky, "A Minimalist Program." The presentation here is from: Boeckx, Linguistic Minimalism, 83. And 
see notes 9f. Ockham’s razor (attributed to William of Ockham (d. 1349) but of earlier origin) is the principle that 
entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem (in explaining anything no more assumptions should be made 
than are necessary). It is analogous to the law of parsimony. "Ockham's razor, n.,"  in OED Online (Oxford 
University Press, September 2011). One of the “big facts” of linguistic minimalism matches the pairing of 
expression and idea in Ragib’s theory of meaning: “[s]entences are pairings of form (sound/signs) and meaning”. 
Ragib might have recognised some other big facts as assumptions that were the concern of the mediaeval Arabic 
grammatical tradition: “sentences are basic linguistic units”; “sentences are composed of smaller expressions (words 
and morphemes)”; “[t]hese smaller units are composed into units with hierarchial structure i.e. phrases, larger than 
words and smaller than sentences”; “expressions that appear in one position can be interpreted in another”; “there’s 
no upper bound on the length of sentences”.  Hornstein, Nunes, and Grohmann, Understanding Minimalism, 7.  
Ragib certainly assumed that there was no conceptual alternative to the pairing of expression and idea (i.e. it was 
inevitable), and Ragib’s theory of meaning was furthermore symmetrical (homonymy is multiple ideas for one 
expression and synonymy is multiple expressions for one idea. We will see, in the next chapter, the same  basic 
symmetry in his theory of poetics: brevity is more idea than expression, prolixity is more expression than idea, and 
equality is equal idea and expression). It is perhaps no more than an irony of history that linguistics in twenty-first 
century Europe and America has had to work so hard to achieve a level of simplicity that was assumed by Ragib and 
his contemporaries to be inevitable. 
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forward a number of epistemological, ethical, political, and hermeneutical theories throughout 
his work but he never explicitly addressed the linguistic methodological assumption that lies at 
the centre of many of his theories. It seems that he regarded the pairing of expression and idea as 
a simple part of the epistemological and linguistic furniture, to be used rather than deconstructed. 
He was not alone in this. He was more explicit about the philosophy that stemmed from his 
theory of meaning, and he talked about truth, ambiguity, and hermeneutical complexity. His 
responses to the questions posed there mark him, and those like him in the Arabic Language 
Tradition, out from scholars in the Classical Language Tradition for whom language was a mere 
obstacle to logic. The elegant binary of expression and idea may have been a simple accident of 
Arabic vocabulary, or an assumption so basic that it was shared by everyone, but the subsequent 
choice to become obsessed with language and the negotiation of ambiguity was by no means as 
inevitable. 
Analysis 
Expression and Idea (lafẓ and maʿnā) 
In his Quranic Glossary, Ragib wrote that “‘language’ applies to both the syntactically 
structured expressions and to the ideas that lie beneath them”.348 This quotation comes from a 
                                                 
348 My emphasis. fa-l-kalāmu yaqaʿu ʿalā –l-alfāẓi –l-manẓūmati wa-ʿalā –l-maʿānī –llatī taḥtahā ma mūʿatan. 
Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 722. Cf. Ibid., 428. “Language” is “the method of human communication, either spoken 
or written, consisting of the use of words in a structured and conventional way” ("Language noun,"  in The Oxford 
Dictionary of English (revised edition), ed. Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson (Oxford Reference Online: 
Oxford University Press, 2005).), which is an acceptable rendering of al-kalām (an alternative could be “speech”). 
Abū Fatḥ ʿUṯmān b.  innī (d. 1002) defined al-kalām as “all self-contained expressions that convey an idea” (amma 
–l-kalāmu fa-kullu lafẓin mustaqillin bi-nafsihī mufīdin li-maʿnāhu). Abū Fatḥ ʿUṯmān Ibn  innī, al- aṣāʾiṣ, ed. 
Muḥammad ʿAlī an-Naǧǧār, 3 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīyah, 1952-1956). 1:17. More recently, C. H. M. 
Versteegh translated kalām as “language” while relating it to the Greek λόγος (in contrast to λέξις for qawl). C. H. 
M. Versteegh, Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking  (Leiden: Brill, 1977). 34. And Tamás Iványi wrote that 
Sībawayh used kalām to mean simply “the Arabic language”. Tamás Iványi, "Kalām," in Encyclopedia of Arabic 
Language and Linguistics Online Edition, ed. Kees Versteegh, Lutz Edzard, and Rudolf de Jong (Brill Online: Brill, 
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work that was more than just an exegetical reference. Ragib had taken the opportunity presented 
by the writing of a book about the meanings of words to define concepts that he considered 
important, irrespective of whether they actually appeared in the Quran. He included terms such 
as “accident” (al-ʿaraḍ), as used by theologians and philosophers, and terms that were used in 
both literature and exegesis, such as “the non-literal” (al-ma ā ).349 The quotation at the head of 
this paragraph is therefore an account of what language is and not simply an account of what 
“language” means when it occurs in the Quran. Language is all expressions so long as they are 
placed in linguistic structures, and all the ideas that lie behind them. The only limit on the plane 
of expressions is that they be syntactically structured.  
There is no limit on the plane of ideas, other than the fact that in order to be shared with 
people they must be put into expressions. Ragib reports a popular etymology of nuṭq (speech) 
that relates it to niṭāq (belt, girdle) because “an expression is like a belt that surrounds and 
encompasses the idea”.350 The same concept of tying up, or tying down, an idea into an 
expression is behind Ragib’s hermeneutic definition of the idea as “divulging that which the 
expression had encompassed”.351  
The pairing of expression and idea works in two directions. It is both a hermeneutic that 
explains the ideas behind words and a theory of meaning that shows how language is created by 
speakers. In this case, and unsurprisingly so in a glossary of the Quran, Ragib is thinking 
hermeneutically. He equates the idea behind a Quranic verse with the exegesis of that verse: “the 
                                                                                                                                                             
2009). As for “expression”, Ragib himself defined a linguistic “expression” as figuratively derived from the root’s 
lexical meaning “to eject from the mouth” (al-lafẓu bi-l-kalāmi mustaʿārun min lafẓi –š-šayʾi min –l-fam). Ragib, 
Quranic Glossary, 743.  
349 ———, Quranic Glossary, 211-212, 560.   
350 wa-qīla ḥaqīqatu –n-nuṭqi –l-lafẓu –llaḏī huwa ka-n-niṭāqi li-l-maʿnā fī-ḍammihī wa-ḥasrihī. Ibid., 812. 
351 wa-l-maʿnā iẓhāru mā taḍammanahū –l-lafẓu. Ibid., 591. 
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idea [behind an expression] is comparable to the exegesis [of that expression] even though there 
is a difference betweeen the two”.352 He expands on this comparison in On Creeds: 
The ‘idea’ is that which language intends to communicate and that which inheres in 
language. Its name is derived from the verb ‘to mean’ (ʿanā). It can also be defined as the 
intent contained beneath the expression. In this latter case it is derived from an equally 
likely source: ‘the captive’ (al-ʿānī), which means ‘the prisoner’ (al-asīr).  
‘Exegesis’ is the revelation of that which was intended by language. It has been said to be 
derived from ‘to unveil’ (as-safr) with the first two letters swopped around,353 but exegesis 
(al-fasr) specifically refers to revelation of ideas,354 which is why the vial of fluid is called 
al-fasr because it informs the doctor [i.e. gives the doctor ideas] about the temperament of 
the patient who produced it.355 ‘Unveiling’ on the other hand specifically refers to the 
revelation of substances, such as unveiling a mask from the face and a turban from the 
head.356 
To paraphrase: ideas are an inevitable and inseparable part of language and one way to conceive 
of them is as the intent behind a speech act. Exegesis is the process of revealing exactly which 
                                                 
352 wa-l-maʿnā yuqārinu –t-tafsīra wa-in kāna baynahumā farq. Ibid. 
353 Cf. as-safru kašfu –l-ġiṭāʾ (“unveiling is the removal of the cover”). Ibid., 412. 
354 Cf. al-fasru iẓhāru –l-maʿnā –l-maʿqūl (“exegesis is the divulgence of the mental idea”). Ibid., 636. Dāwūdī 
brackets this phrase in the Quranic Glossary as having been quoted in az-Zarkašī, al-Burhān, 2:148. However, az-
Zarkašī is in fact quoting Ragib, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 47. ———, 
"Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 91. Dāwūdī’s addition is nevertheless correct: ———. Mufradāt al-Ḫaṭīb 
Collection. f.140b.  
355 Cf. wa-minhu qīla li-mā yunbiʾu ʿanhu –l-bawlu tafsiratun wa-summiya bi-hā qārūratu –l-māʾ (“that which is 
communicated by urine (tafsirah) is derived from al-fasr and for this reason the water vessel is called al-fasr”). ——
—, Quranic Glossary, 636.  
356 al-maʿnā huwa –l-maqṣūdu ilayhi min –l-kalāmi –l-mubahhamu bihī min qawlihim ʿanā fulānun bi-kaḏā wa-qīla 
huwa –l-muḥtawī taḥta –l-lafẓi min –l-maqṣūdi ilayhi min qawlihim –l-ʿānī li-l-asīri wa-š-štiqāqāni yataqāribāni 
wa-t-tafsīru huwa –l-kašfu ʿan –l-maqṣūdi ilayhi bi-l-kalāmi wa-qīla –t-tafsīru maqlūbun ʿan –s-safri lākinna –t-
tafsīra mu taṣṣun bi-kašfi –l-maʿnā wa-li-hāḏā qīla li-qārūrati –l-māʾi fasrun min ḥay u annahū yunbiʾu ʿan ma ā i 
ṣāḥibihī li-ṭ-ṭabībī wa-s-safru ya taṣṣu bi-kašfi –l-aʿyāni ka-safri –l-qināʿi ʿan –l-wa hi wa-l-ʿimāmati ʿan –r-raʾs. 
———, On Creeds, 178. Al-ʿAǧalī claims to follow Āstān-e Quds-e Re āvī 56 when he gives qāḏifu –l-māʾi for 
qārūratu –l-māʾi, but the text there could only possibly be read as an inexplicable qāriʿatu –l-māʾi, and is best read 
as qārūratu –l-māʾi in accordance with the other three mss.: ———.  stān-e Quds-e Rażāvī 56. f.12a; ———. 
Sehid Ali 382. f.36b; ———. Chester Beatty AR 5277. f.50b; ———. Fey ullah Efendi 2141. f.61a. 
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ideas were intended by the expressions in question.
357
 Ragib’s argument in this quotation relies 
heavily on etymologies, and this is symptomatic of his tendency to rely on the lexicon, which is 
of course where the etymologies are recorded and stored. Furthermore, in this passage and 
throughout his works Ragib is not only using the lexicon, he is creating and refining it. In the 
centuries after his death, he would become a lexical authority himself. 
This quotation from On Creeds also reinforces the image of ideas being restricted by 
expressions. The infinite potential scope of ideas and intentions is held captive by a finite 
number of expressions, and language consequently has no option but to allow both homonymy 
and the potential for ambiguity that accompanies it:  
With regard to expressions, our principle is that they vary according to variations in the 
ideas. However, this is impossible, for the ideas are infinite while the expressions, despite 
the variations in their combinations, are finite. The infinite cannot be encompassed by the 
finite. Homonymy is therefore inevitable.358 
In this quotation Ragib raises the possibility of a theory of meaning that would be essentialist, in 
which each expression would refer to a single idea. He describes this possibility as a principle 
(aṣl), but a principle which must perforce be abandoned in the face of complex reality. There are 
                                                 
357 John Wansborough described how the word “idea” could be used to mean periphrastic exegesis, just as Ragib 
does here:  (“the idea of this verse is: [paraphrase of text]”). John Wansborough, "Majā  al-qur'ān: Periphrastic 
Exegesis," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 33, no. 2 (1970): 254 n.6, 256. Cf. Ella Almagor, 
"The Early Meaning of Majāz and the Nature of Abū ʿUbaydah's Exegesis," in  iḳre mi raḥ: le- ekher Daṿid Tsevi 
Benʻet / Studia Orientalia: memoriae D  H  Baneth dedicata, ed. Joshua Blau, Meir Jacob Kister, Shlomo Pines, and 
Shaul Shaked (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, Y. L. Magnes, 1979), 316. As we shall see below (note 417), for 
Ragib ma ā  meant any deviation at all from the lexicon and its standard literal use (aṣl al-luġah), whether a slight 
morphological variant in a dialect, an ellipsis, a pleonasm, or a complex metaphor. See also: Key, "Language and 
Literature," 52-53. 
358 wa-l-aṣlu fī-l-alfāẓi an takūna mu taliftan bi-ḥasabi - tilāfi –l-maʿānī lākinna ḏālika lam yakun fī –l-imkāni iḏ 
kānat –l-maʿānī bi-lā nihāyata wa-l-alfāẓu maʿa - tilāfi tarākībihā ḏāta nihāyatin wa-ġayru –l-mutanāhī lā yaḥwīhi 
–l-mutanāhī fa-lam yakun buddun min wuqūʿi –štirākin fī-l-alfāẓ. Ragib, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis 
ed  Farḥāt, 29. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 80-81. Cf. as-Suyū ī, al-Mu hir, 1:369. 
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just too many ideas out there for such a simple model of language to work, and expressions have 
to do the work of conveying multiple ideas. 
 Not only are there an infinite number of ideas accessible to those who use language, but 
these ideas themselves are also far from simple. Many of them have a broad semantic range. For 
example, Ragib’s exegesis of the word “merciful” in the basmalah 359 explains that “mercy” has 
a range of meaning, from the human feeling of delicacy (ar-riqqah) to the divine actions of 
favour and grace (al-ʿaṭf wa-t-tafaḍḍul). The same principle applies to “compassionate” (ar-
raʾūf)  and “generosity” (al- ūd). Ragib explains:  
This exegesis, I mean that of ‘generosity’, is according to the precedent set by the 
generation that came after the Prophet Muḥammad when they said ‘God’s generosity is 
blessing and favour while human generosity is delicacy and sympathy’.360 It is more 
obvious, a clearer methodology, and closer to the view of our forefathers than that of those 
who blindly grope around in their exegesis of this subject, claiming that the ideas behind a 
description do not change when the thing described changes. Those who make this claim 
fail to conceive that it is possible for there to be a substantial gap between the beginning 
and the end of an idea.361 
This is an unambiguous argument against an essentialist theory of descriptions; the claim that a 
descriptive expression refers to an unchanging essence is a fumble of the exegetical process. 
                                                 
359 The Quranic invocation that introduces all (except the ninth) of its suras: bi-smi –llāhi –r-raḥmāni –r-raḥīm (“in 
the name of God, the merciful the beneficient”). 
360 I have not yet found this exegetical statement quoted by Ragib anywhere outside his own works. 
361 wa-hāḏā –t-tafsīru aʿnī fī-r-raḥmati huwa ʿalā mā ruwiya ʿan –t-tābiʿīna ḥay u qālū –r-raḥmatu min –llāhi 
inʿāmun wa-ifḍālun wa-min –l-ādamīyīna riqqatun wa-taʿaṭṭufun wa-hāḏā -ṭ-ṭarīqatu aẓharu wa-abyanu wa-ašbahu 
bi-naẓari –s-salafi min naẓari man ta abbaṭa fī tafsīri ḏālika  āʿiman anna –l-waṣfa lā ta talifu maʿānīhi bi- tilāfi 
–l-mawṣūfīna wa-ḏālika anna qāʾila ḏālika lam yataṣawwar annahū qad yakūnu bayna mabdaʾi –l-maʿnā wa-
muntahāhu bawnun baʿīd. Ragib, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 115. Cf. ———, On 
Creeds, 270; ———, Quranic Glossary, 347. 
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Ideas are so semantically broad that expressions can refer to different parts of them, depending 
on what the expression in question is describing.
362
  
Why is this so important? The answer is that greater issues are at stake than mere linguistic 
structure. Ragib’s analysis is designed to combat the potential that language has to imply that 
divine and human qualities are the same. From the perspective of his beliefs it simply cannot be 
that the expression “generous” refers to exactly the same idea of generosity no matter whether it 
is used to describe God or to describe a shopkeeper. There has to be a hierarchy of meanings for 
descriptive words such as generosity, mercy, and compassion in order to differentiate between 
divine and human qualities. 
If Ragib’s theological convictions can guide him towards rejecting an essentialist theory of 
descriptions in the above exegetical situation, what happens to this position when questions of 
theological importance are not at stake? This is where Ragib’s manual of poetics becomes an 
important part of the process of understanding his assumptions about language. He writes in the 
section titled “the structure of language”: 
There are two types of language, that which is used and that which is not used.363 There is 
no need to discuss the latter. Language that is used can also be sub-divided into two types. 
There is language that enables us to make a distinction between two specific things and by 
doing so replace a physical gesture. This is the proper name. There is also language that 
exists in order to communicate through polysemy. This second type is then sub-divided 
again into two parts. One part applies to different things and opposites, such as the nouns 
                                                 
362 In the Quranic Glossary Ragib explains it thus: fa-maʿnāhu –l-maw udu fī-n-nāsi min –l-maʿnā –l-maw udu li-
llāhi taʿālā (“the idea of mercy that is present in humans is part of the idea of mercy that is applied to God”). ——
—, Quranic Glossary, 347.  
363 Alternatively “operative” and “inoperative”, see: Sophia Vasalou, "Subject and Body in Baṣran Muʿtazilism, or: 
Muʿtazilite Kalām and the Fear of Triviality " Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 17(2007): 205 note 9. As-Suyū ī uses 
Ibn Fāris (Abū al-Ḥusayn Aḥmad, d. 395/1004) to define inoperative language: it is either impermissable 
combinations of letters in a root, for example putting ʿayn next to ġayn, or it is a permissable combination of letters 
that is not found in the lexicon (or is not used by the Bedouin) such as ʿ-ḍ- . as-Suyū ī, al-Mu hir, 1:240. 
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‘colour’ and ‘substance’ and the verbs ‘to do’ and ‘to make’. The second part pertains to 
specifics, such as the nouns ‘horse’ and ‘donkey’ and the verbs ‘to go out’ and ‘to hit’.364  
There are different types of communicative expressions. There are those that are used for 
one specific idea, those that are used for two different ideas, and those that are used for two 
opposite ideas. There is no disagreement about the first type. With regard to the second and 
third types, there is no disagreement that this can happen in two different dialects,365 but 
there is disagreement about whether it can happen within a single dialect. Those who deny 
that it can happen in a single dialect require that every such expression has two aspects. 
Furthermore, people disagree about whether a single expression can refer to two different 
ideas. Many of the litterateurs and jurists deny that it can, some of them allow it, and the 
latter group are correct. An example of this is the line: 
Water, its supply tainted, deserted. The wild beasts dig at its edges.366 
 ‘Water’ can be applied to the place in which water is, and in this line both the water itself, 
and the place in which it is, can be what is intended by ‘water’. This is because ‘tainted’ is 
an attribute of water, ‘deserted’ is an attribute of place, and both can be attributed to 
‘water’.367  
                                                 
364 Colour, for example, can refer to the opposites of black and white. “To hit” is a potential homonym because it can 
apply to both “I hit Zayd” (ḍarabtu  aydan) and “I coined an analogy” (ḍarabtu ma alan). In each case it is used to 
convey a specific idea (yatanāwalu ma ṣūṣan). These examples come from a lost work by al-Mubarrad (Abū al-
ʿAbbās Muḥammad, d. 900), Kitāb Mā Ittafaqa Lafẓuhū wa-Ḫtalafa Maʿnāhu (The Book of Homonyms). ———, 
al-Mu hir, 1:388. 
365 As in, for example, the anecdote that tells how a man mistook a Yemeni king’s command to sit ( ib in Ḥimyaritic 
according to Ibn Fāris and as-Suyū ī) for a command to jump ( ib) and subsequently leapt obediently to his death 
from the hill they were standing atop. For Ragib, Ibn Fāris, and as-Suyū ī, Ḥimyaritic was a luġah just like other 
dialects, although we might call it a language. Abū al-Ḥusayn Aḥmad al-Qazwīnī Ibn Fāris, aṣ- āḥibī fī Fiqh al-
Luġah wa-Sunan al-ʿArab fī-Kalāmihā  (Cairo: al-Maktabah as-Salafīyah, 1910). 22; as-Suyū ī, al-Mu hir, 1:256-
257, 1:381, 1:396. 
366 al-wāfir. Rabīʿah b. Makrūm (d. ca. 672). A marginal annotation is recorded in the ms. at f.4a: “Marginal note. 
Digging (al-iʿtiqām) means excavating (al-iḥtiqār) at the side of a well. It is also said to mean hesitation, and this is 
more correct”. Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. ff.3b-4a. A more literal translation would follow Edward Lane: 
“Many a water, or and a water, of which the supplies are altered for the worse, and which is deserted, by the sides of 
which the beasts of prey dig hollows in the ground, app. to obtain water that has become purified by filtration … or, 
as some say, the meaning is … taraddadu i.e. go to and fro”. Edward William Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, 8 vols. 
(London: Williams & Norgate, 1863-1893). ʿ-q-m. 
367 The Arabic text is provided in Appendix Two. Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. ff.3b-4a. Ragib makes 
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Ragib divides language into two. The first type of language replaces a physical gesture of 
indication, and an essentialist theory of descriptions applies. The second type of language “exists 
in order to communicate through polysemy” (ḍarbun wuḍiʿa li-yufīda ʿalā ṭarīqi –l-ištirāk). 




Ragib’s claim that language is either an act of naming or a negotiation of polysemy can be 
brought into focus by a comparison with the discussion between Wittgenstein, whose work on 
language I have found useful for thinking about Ragib’s, and St Augustine of Hippo (d. 430). 
Augustine wrote that language is acquired by gradual memorisation of the names of things:  
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I 
saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant 
to point it out … as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various 
sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had 
trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.369 
                                                                                                                                                             
exactly the same point in the methodological introduction to his Exegesis:  
Water, its supply tainted, deserted. The poet mentions the water, and intends the water, and also the place of 
the water, for the place in which water is in can be called ‘water’. The indication that the poet intended both 
of them is that he described it as ‘its supply tainted’, which is an attribute of water, and as ‘deserted’, which is 
an attribute of place. (wa-māʾin ā inin –l- ammāti qafrin fa-ḏakara –l-māʾa wa-arādahū bihī wa-makānahū 
fa-qad yusammā makāna –l-māʾi māʾan wa-d-dalālatu ʿalā annahū arādahumā annahū qad waṣafahū bi-
ā ini –l- ammāti wa-ḏālika min ṣifati –l-māʾi wa-bi-qafrin wa-huwa min ṣifati –l-makān). 
———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 124; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  
Farḥāt, 99. 
368 al-ištirāk is polysemy whereas ištirāk al-lafẓ (for example note 358) is homonymy. Ragib understands polysemy 
as being broader (inclusive of names of genera) than homonymy (not inclusive of names of genera). His list of 
expressions that appear to be homonymous but can actually be explained as, for example, names of species, is at: —
——, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 82; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 
31-32. 
369 Augustine Confessions I.8 quoted and translated in Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #1. It should be 
noted that Wittgenstein is making polemical use of Augustine’s work here, and is consequently unconcerned with the 
question of whether his quotations are an accurate presentation of Augustine’s positions. 
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This is very similar to the first type of language described by Ragib: “a distinction between two 
specific things … [that] replace[s] a physical gesture”. Wittgenstein wanted to break down 
Augustine’s assumption that language is acts of naming and replace it with a focus on how 
people use language: “Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache”.370 The 
European tradition recognises this as an important step forward, one that would influence the 
development of theories of speech-acts and pragmatics by, among others, John L. Austin (1911–
1960) and John R. Searle (1932–). Like Wittgenstein, Ragib assumed that words were inherently 
ambiguous and that the way to identify their meaning was through knowledge of the speaker’s 
intent. The difference between them is that, as noted above,
371
 Wittgenstein rejected theories of 
meaning like Ragib’s, which were built around the two-part linguistic structure of expression and 
idea. This means that while the two men share the assumption of linguistic ambiguity, only 
Ragib held that this ambiguity operates through polysemy.
372
 
 In the quotation on “the structure of language” above, Ragib explains what he means by 
polysemy.
373
 The first sort of polysemy is the  ambiguity that results from the names of qualities 
and generic verbs. On this reading, “I do” is a homonym because the “doing” can refer to any 
number of actions, and “colour” can refer to opposites such as black and white. The second sort 
of polysemy is the ambiguity that results from the names of species and more specific verbs, and 
                                                 
370 “[T]he meaning of a word is its use in the language”. Ibid., #43. 
371 See note 38. 
372 My alibi for this flight of comparative fancy is Rorty, who writes: “[w]e need to imagine Aristotle studying 
Galileo or Quine and changing his mind, Aquinas reading Newton or Hume and changing his…” “[R]econstructions 
are necessary to help us present-day philosophers think through our problems”. Rorty, "The Historiography of 
Philosophy," 51, 54, 68. 
373 Page 114. 
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it is what Ragib elsewhere calls “expressions in concert” (al-lafẓ al-mutawāṭiʿ) with the example 
of the expression “human being” referring to two different people (Zayd and ʿAmr, of course).374  
In all of these cases, when expressions are used they are either intended to refer to a single 
idea, in which case they are uncontroversial, or they are intended to refer to two different things, 
or even two opposites. Ragib sides with what he implies is a minority position (“many deny … 
some allow”) that permits a single expression to mean two different things at the same time. In 
the methodological introduction to his Exegesis he sharpens this to mean that a single expression 
in the Quran can only refer to different ideas when those ideas can be read as different aspects of 
a single general idea.
375
 Indeed, in the quotation on “the structure of language” above the 
example given is one where the different ideas behind “water” are closely related.376  
                                                 
374 Ragib, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 81; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  
Farḥāt, 29. The term al-mutawāṭiʿ comes from the Classical Language Tradition, where it sits in a three-part 
division that originated in Aristotle’s Categories. Things either share a name in the way that a man and a picture 
share the name “animal” (al-muttafiqah asmāʾuhā), share a name in the way that a man and an ox share the name 
“animal” (al-mutawāṭiʿah asmāʾuhā), or their names are derived in the way that a “brave” man is called “brave” 
from “bravery” (al-muštaqqah asmāʾuhā). Aristotle, "Categories," 1a; ———, Organon Aristotelis, 1:1. Cf. 
Aristotle and Ackrill, Categories, 71-73; Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), "aš-Šifāʾ: al-Man iq II (al-
Maqūlāt)," in aš-Šifāʾ, ed. Ibrāhīm Madkūr (Cairo: Wizārat aṯ- aqāfah wa-l-Iršād al-Qawmī, 1959; reprint, Qum: 
Ẕovī el-Qurbā, 2007), 9f; Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm, at-Taqrīb li- add al-Manṭiq wa-l-Mad al 
ilayhi bi-l-Alfāẓ al-ʿ mīyah wa-l-Am ilah al-Fiqhīyah wa-yalīhi Miḥakk an-Naẓr fī-l-Manṭiq taʾlīf Abī  āmid 
Muḥammad al-Ġa ālī, ed. Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2003). 39-40; Zimmermann, 
Commentary and Short Treatise, xxv (note 2). 
375 Ragib, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 123-125; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  
Farḥāt, 98-101. See also the paraphrase and discussion of this section below at note 422. 
376 In a further example, Ragib writes in his Exegesis that “that which has been recited to you” (mā yutlā ʿalaykum) 
in Quran 4:127 can be understood as meaning, by a process of suppletive insertion (taqdīr), both “that which has 
been recited to you will be made clear to you” (mā yutlā ʿalaykum bayyana la-kum) and “God states to you that 
which has been recited to you” (yuftīkum allāhu mā yutlā ʿalaykum). Ragib explains that this expression can mean 
two things at the same time according to the exegetical principle he laid out in his methodological introduction to the 
Exegesis: that a verb can have two different agents when it is considered in two different ways (wa-qad taqaddama 
fī ṣadri –l-kitābi anna fiʿlan wāḥidan yaṣiḥḥu an yunsaba ilā fāʿilayni bi-ʿtibārātin mu ṭalifah). ———, Exegesis 
ed  Sardār, 178; ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 101-104; ———, Methodological Introduction 
and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 63-67.   
 119 
Intent (murād, qaṣd)377 
The tension at the heart of the relationship between expression and idea is that Ragib 
believes that language is ambiguous, but he also believes that it is comprehensible. His theory of 
meaning necessitates the assumption that polysemy is everywhere, and the consequent 
uncertainty about which expression refers to what idea can only lead to ambiguity. But Ragib 
does not appear to be overly concerned about whether this ambiguity can be managed. He 
assumes that intent links expression and idea,
378
 and that this intent can be known. If the speaker 
has sufficient ability, then the intent will be known: the audience fails to understand only when 
speakers either can’t properly conceive what they want to say, or can’t express their conception. 
It scarcely needs adding that this failure to talk properly never happens with God.
379
 
When God says something, he means something by it. His intent can be misconstrued by 
his audience, in which case he can clarify what he meant. For this principle Ragib gives an 
example from the early days of Islam, when God was in conversation with the detractors of the 
new religion through his prophet and Quran. God asked the rhetorical question “who will make a 
                                                 
377 And occasionally (and potentially confusingly), the verb yaʿnī and the noun maʿnā. See, for example: wa-qīla 
maʿnā qawlihī yuʾminūna bi-l-ġaybi yaʿnī bi-l-qalbi wa-n-nūri –llaḏī ātāhum allāhu wa-huwa –l-ʿaql. (“It is said 
that the idea behind [or “the meaning of”] ‘they believe in that which is hidden’ [Quran 2:3] means ‘they believe in 
the heart and the light that God gave them’, and this is the reason”) . [My emphasis]. ———, Methodological 
Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 156.  
378 This is what Speaks would call a “mentalist” theory of meaning, one that “aim[s] to explain the nature of 
meaning in terms of the mental states of language users”. Speaks, Theories of Meaning. See Ragib as quoted above 
(note 356): al-maʿnā huwa al-maqṣūdu min –l-kalām. Ragib, On Creeds, 178. The fact that Ragib continues “it can 
also be defined as the intent contained beneath the expression” disproves Kouloughli’s assertion (repeated by 
Versteegh) that when maʿnā is intent it is not a correlate of lafẓ. Kouloughli, "A propos de lafẓ et maʾnā," 44. 
Versteegh, "The Arabic Tradition," 229-230. 
379 Paraphrase of: faṣlun fī –l-āfāti –l-māniʿati min fahmi –l-mu āṭabi murāda –l-mu āṭib  al-āfātu –l-māniʿati min 
ḏālika  alā atun … wa- - ānīyatu rā iʿatun ilā –l-mu āṭibi wa-ḏālika li-ḍaʿfi taṣawwurihī li-mā qaṣada –l-inbāʾa 
ʿanhu aw quṣūri ʿibāratihī ʿan taṣawwuri mā qaṣada –l-inbāʾa ʿanhu wa- iṭābu –llāhi ʿa  a wa- alla muna  ahun 
ʿanhā. Ragib, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 86; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  
Farḥāt, 39. 
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good loan to God that God may return it to him doubled?”380 This was gleefully misunderstood 
by Muhammad’s opponents to mean that his God was in need of their money. God subsequently 
said “we have heard those who say that ‘God is poor and we are rich’, and we will record what 
they say together with their unlawful killing of previous prophets, and we will say ‘taste the 
painful torment!’”381 Ragib explains that they had not really thought that God was poor, and God 
was therefore not correcting a miscomprehension, but rather they had construed God’s speech 
“against its intended force” and God was correcting their insincere failure to understand what he 
meant.
382
 Ragib appears to be sensitive to the implication that God’s speech could be unclear, 
and he is keen to shift the blame to the wilful audience. 
In the methodological introduction to his Exegesis it again appears that Ragib does not 
think misapprehensions of intent are a major problem for communication. While he states that 
communication functions when the audience comprehends the speaker’s intent,383 in his lengthy 
enumeration of ways in which language can get in the way of understanding he only obliquely 
refers to intent as a potential problem. He writes that the difference in illocutionary force 
between “do!” being a demand, plea, or command is a supplementary factor to the expression 
and it can be solved with reference to the context in which the words were spoken.
384
  
                                                 
380 Quran 2:245 and Quran 57:11 (al-Ḥadīd). 
381 Quran 3:181. 
382 wa-innamā ʿayyarahum ta āhulahumm wa-takḏībahum wa-ṣarfahum –l-kalāma ilā ġayri –l-wa hi –l-maqṣūdi 
bihī (“rather he condemned them for their feigned ignorance, their slander, and their construing of [God’s] speech 
against its intended force”). Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 1014. 
383 ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 86; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  
Farḥāt, 39. See note 379. There can of course be confusion, and exegetical discussion, about the intended audience 
for a particular Quranic address, for example whether the “you” in Quran 4:79 “that which affects you” (wa-mā 
aṣābaka) refers to all humans or just to the Prophet. ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 1340f.  
384 [wa-lafẓun ġāmiḍun] wa-immā min  ihati –l-iḍāfati wa-ḏālika bi-ḥasabi -ʿtibāri ḥāli –l-mu āṭibi naḥwi qawluka 
–fʿal fī -ṭ-ṭalabi wa-š-šifāʿati wa-l-amr. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 86; ———, 
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Ragib also deals with deliberate misinterpretation of God’s speech in his discussion of 
Quran 4:46 in the Quranic Glossary. He explains that the phrase “they twist the words out of 
their place” (yuḥarrifūna –l-kalima ʿan mawḍūʿihī) can be read as referring to the expressions or 
to the ideas. If it refers to the expressions, then it means that the Prophet’s Jewish opponents 
were swopping and changing the words of the Quran. If it refers to the ideas, then they were 
“interpreting God’s speech in a way that was contradictory to what God intended and 
required”.385 Ragib prefers the second reading because “if expressions circulate in common 
currency it is hard to swop them”;386 although it is possible for divine intent to be deliberately 
misinterpreted, the the lexicon provides checks and balance. 
The Lexicon 
The lexicon is a store of semantic connections that guides how words can be used. Ragib 
used the pairing of expression and idea to create a theory of meaning that guaranteed some words 
would have multiple meanings, but he did not solve all of the resultant ambiguity with 
pragmatics. Although he assumes that speakers’ intentions determine the ideas to which their 
expressions refer, unlike Ibn Taymīyah in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and Grice in the 
twentieth, Ragib does not always explain ambiguous language by working out what the speaker 
meant. Perhaps Ragib felt that it would be too rootless an exegetical strategy, or perhaps he 
simply assumed that the tradition in which he worked was the right one. There was certainly a 
tremendous amount of cultural weight behind the lexicographical project of the Arabic Language 
Tradition, which had for several centuries by Ragib’s time been producing a record of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 38. 
385 innahū kāna min  ihati –l-maʿnā wa-huwa ḥamluhū ʿalā ġayri mā qaṣada bihī wa-qtaḍāhu. ———, Quranic 
Glossary, 725. 
386 wa-hāḏā am alu –l-qawlayni fa-inna –l-lafẓa iḏā tadāwalathu –l-alsinatu wa-štahara yaʿṣubu tabdīluhū. Ibid. 
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Ragib solves the problem of polysemy with precedent rather than pragmatics. For any 
homonymous expression, the lexicon will contain a list of potential ideas to which it may refer. 
An ambiguous phrase can usually be split into its constituent expressions, or it can be related to a 
phrase someone else has used previously. The lexicon in the form of dictionaries is a source of 
both these precedents and their legitimacy; if a usage is in the lexicon then it has been approved. 
The lexicon is also more than just dictionaries and it can in some cases encompass whole genres 
of literature or the entire opera of famous authors. When Ragib comes to explain a complex 
image in a recent line of poetry, he can look back across centuries of poems that everyone knows 
for precedents that could explain the new image’s constituent parts. The lexicon is therefore in 
everyone’s heads as well as in the dictionaries on their shelves. Finally, the lexicon is a work in 
progress. Ragib did not only refer to it, he created it.
388
 Subsequent generations of scholars 
would refer to his Quranic Glossary as a reliable indication of what someone could be said to 
have said. 
                                                 
387 It was helped by the fact that Arabic’s broadly trilateral root structure, which it shares with other Semitic 
languages, facilitates the process of linking words to other words. Petr Zemánek, "Root," in Encyclopedia of Arabic 
Language and Linguistics Online Edition, ed. Kees Versteegh, Lutz Edzard, and Rudolf de Jong (Brill Online: Brill, 
2010). Mohssen Esseesy, "Semantic Extension," in Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics Online 
Edition, ed. Kees Versteegh, Lutz Edzard, and Rudolf de Jong (Brill Online: Brill, 2010). Dictionaries such as that of 
Ibn Fāris would make the explicit argument that all word meanings derived from a limited number of roots. Abū al-
Ḥusayn Aḥmad al-Qazwīnī Ibn Fāris, Muʿ am Maqāyīs al-Luġah, ed. ʿAbd as-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn (Cairo: ʿĪsā 
al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1946-1952). 
388 For example, in his Exegesis Ragib engages with and corrects his lexicographical predecessors: kāfir, which in 
the lexicon (fī-l-luġah) means the act of covering is not enshrined in the lexicon as a name for the night (because it 
covers people in darkness) or the sower (because he covers the ground with seeds) “as some lexicographers have 
thought” but rather “it is a description taking the syntactic role of the thing described” (fa-innna ḏālika ʿalā iqāmati 
al-waṣfi maqāma –l-mawṣūf). Little is at stake here except the lexicographical nicety that the relationship of kāfir to 
layl is ma ā  (deviation from the lexicon’s fiat coinage) rather than ḥaqīqah (adherence to the lexicon’s fiat 
coinage). See below for the discussion of these two terms. Ragib. Carullah 84. ff.14b-15a.  
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Where did the lexicon come from? This was a well-established point of theological 
discussion to which Ragib gives his answer in exegesis of the verse that says “God taught Adam 
all the names”.389 The quotation below runs to several pages, but it deserves to be reproduced in 
full (and edited in Arabic in the Appendices) because Ragib clearly felt he was discussing the 
essence of language rather than, as elsewhere, giving hermeneutical or poetic strategies for 
working with language. He also makes a number of interesting epistemological claims along the 
way: 
One can scarcely explain Quran 2:31 without dealing with the question of how God taught 
the names to Adam, and whether there is an indication therein that languages were created 
by fiat, or that the first languages were created by convention. Furthermore, did God teach 
Adam the names without the ideas behind them, or did he teach the names and their ideas 
together? …  We say (although the final arbitration is God’s) that people disagree about 
languages. Some theologians think that the first languages were created by convention and 
the remainder of languages were then created by fiat. They deduce this from the fact that 
God’s intent can only be known through his speech and it cannot just be necessarily evident 
because knowledge of God’s intent is subsidiary to knowledge of God’s essence, and 
knowledge of God’s essence is not necessarily evident, it is acquired. It is not possible for 
God’s intent to be necessarily evident while knowledge of his essence has to be acquired 
                                                 
389 Quran 2:31. Adam’s role in the origin of language is not unique to the Islamic tradition. While the God of the 
Quran is explicitly a teacher, in the Bible (Genesis 2:19-20) God creates and then it is Adam that does the naming. 
Just as scholars like Ragib in the eleventh century and earlier had engaged with the origin of language as reported in 
the Quran, so philosophers like Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and John Locke (1632-1704) worked on 
explanations of the Biblical account. Both men took the position that Adam worked out the names on the basis of 
onomatopoeia. Both chose, like Ragib, to use Adam to talk about the origin of language. The account in Plato’s 
Cratylus, where Socrates posits a “namegiver” in order to discuss the origin of names (and ultimately knowledge), 
appears to have been a less satisfying starting point (it was certainly available to Leibniz and Locke, whereas it 
might not have been to Ragib). For Leibniz and Locke see: Roy Harris and Talbot J. Taylor, Landmarks in Linguistic 
Thought I: the Western tradition from Socrates to Saussure  (London: Routledge, 1997). 36-38. For a discussion of 
Adam’s role see: Michael Carter, "Adam and the Technical Terms of Islam," in Words  texts  and concepts cruising 
the Mediterranean Sea: studies on the sources  contents and influences of Islamic civili ation and Arabic philosophy 
and science: dedicated to Gerhard Endress on his sixty-fifth birthday, ed. Gerhard Endress, Rüdiger Arnzen, and 
J rn Thielmann, Orientalia Lovaniensia analecta (Peeters, 2004). For a review of Arabic positions, see: Henri 
Loucel, "L'origine du langage d'après les grammariens arabes: I-IV," Arabica 10-11, no. 2-3, 1-2 (1963-1964). 
 124 
because this would mean that hidden knowledge was necessarily evident while clear 
knowledge had to be acquired. Their argument is unsound, but it is what they said.390  
The correct position, God willing, is that to which the great mass of people adhere: that 
language was created by fiat. Before we provide the evidence for this we will clarify that, 
however God may have taught his servants, discussion and resolution of this question is 
facilitated by the fact that God referred to the matter when he said: ‘God only speaks to 
humans through revelation, or from behind a veil, or he sends a messenger to whose ear he 
reveals what he will’.391  
The Quran therefore says that God speaks to humans in one of these three ways. The most 
noble is the dispatch of a messenger who both sees God and hears his speech as the Prophet 
did when he was with Gabriel (ṣ). The second way is when God casts speech into hearing 
without sight as happened to Moses (ṣ) at the beginning of his mission. The third is when 
God reveals, and ‘revelation’ here specifically refers to God’s casting into the soul, and his 
acts of inspiration, command, and dream. God must have taught Adam the names in one of 
these three ways (dispatch of messenger, hearing without sight, revelation). 
To return to the evidence for creation by fiat, it is impossible for expressions to have 
developed through convention before God taught Adam because convention requires the 
existence of speech that people are already using together. Such a position would lead to 
there being neither convention nor any language! 
                                                 
390 This is the Muʿtazilī position espoused by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- ābbār: God is someone whose intent cannot be 
known as a matter of necessity because his intent is a subsidiary of his essence, which would itself then have to be 
known as a matter of necessity. God’s essence cannot be known as a matter of necessity because that would negate 
the need to acquire and believe in his essence, which is one of the tasks that humans have been given in order to earn 
their reward. (wa-qad ʿulima anna –l-qadīma taʿālā mimman lā yuṣaḥḥu an yuḍṭarra ilā murādihī maʿa –t-taklīfi li-
anna –l-ʿilma bi-ḏātihī iḏā wu iba kawnuhū muktasaban fa-l-ʿilmu bi-irādatihī bi-an ya iba ḏālika fīhi maʿa 
annahū farʿun ʿalā –l-ʿilmi bi-dātihī ūlā). Ibn Aḥmad al-Asadābādī al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, al-Muġnī fī Abwāb at-
Tawḥīd wa-l-ʿAdl, ed. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, 14 vols. (Cairo: ad-Dār al-Miṣrīyah li-t-Ta’līf wa-n-Našr, 1965-74). 7:182.  
Ragib does not spell out all the steps in this Muʿtazilī argument about the origin of language, which are that since we 
must know God’s intent by acquired knowledge, we have to have some prior knowledge of language before we can 
do the necessary acquiring. Were we to know God’s intent by necessarily evident knowledge then language could be 
bypassed, but this is not the case. Our prior knowledge of the language in which God subsequently speaks must have 
come about by convention. Ibid., 7:182-184. See also: Peters, God's created speech, 386. 
391 Quran 42:51 (aš-Šūrā) 
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One may be confronted by someone saying ‘seeing as you do not deny that physical signs 
and noises can be used for communication between people, well then people who are mute 
can do that for they have a mouth with which to form sounds and we know that people who 
do not talk can understand and be understood despite having no language’. The answer to 
this objection (which implies that signage could have been used as a convention before 
language was created by fiat) is that one understands physical signs through a process of 
deduction, similar to other proceses of deduction, that would function even if we were to 
imagine that speech did not exist. People who are mute can only deduce and they have no 
capacity to form and compose expressions. Their sounds are like the sounds of a child that 
has not yet grasped those expressions. However, language is only language when it 
includes compositions of the three types of individual words.  
Were there any way to achieve language without education then that which passes between 
people who are deaf and dumb would necessarily become formed as language, because the 
defect of combined deafness and dumbness is in the hearing, and deaf and dumb people are 
unable to speak because of their inability to comprehend through hearing. This proves that 
the start of the process of language acquisition requires a teacher, and that is what happened 
when God taught Adam in the ways described above. 
One may also be confronted by someone saying ‘how did God teach Adam all the names 
when we know that in every age the people of that time ascribe names to ideas and physical 
things by either inventing them or by transferring them from other ideas?’ The answer to 
this question is that while some people say that God taught Adam all such names in their 
individual specifics even though they then appeared at certain times and among certain of 
his peoples, the correct position is that real knowledge depends on knowledge of principles 
that can be implemented. These universal ideas, which encompass individual specifics are 
for example, the substance ‘human’ or ‘horse’.392 They are also the rules by which the 
                                                 
392 Interestingly, this is different from Ibn Fāris’ division of the study of language into principles and their 
applications. For Ibn Fāris, the application (farʿ) of the knowledge of Arabic is knowledge of names and attributes 
such as “horse” and “long” (these are principles for Ragib), while Ibn Fāris’ principle (aṣl) is discussion of the origin 
of language and subsequently of the exemplary customs of Bedouin speech. (inna li-ʿilmi –l-ʿarabi aṣlan wa-farʿan 
ammā –l-farʿu fa-maʿrifati –l-asmāʾi wa-ṣ-ṣifāti ka-qawlinā ra ulun wa-farasun … wa-ammā –l-aṣlu fa-qawlu ʿalā 
mawḍūʿi –l-luġati     umma ʿalā rusūmi –l-ʿarabi fī mu āṭabātihā). Ibn Fāris, aṣ- āḥibī, 2. as-Suyū ī, al-Mu hir, 1:4.  
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realities of things are known such as the multiplication principle in mathematics, the 
properties of dimension and quantity in geometry, and the principles upon which many a 
subject is built in the law, theology, and grammar. Knowledge of individual specifics 
without the principles is not knowledge, and a person who only knows the individual 
specifics is no scholar but rather a parrot who imitates expressions. Therefore, God taught 
Adam all the names by teaching him the rules and principles to cover individual specifics 
and implementations. It is after all known that teaching the universals is a greater wonder 
and something closer to the divine than simply teaching a boy one letter after another. 
When God said ‘all the names’ he intended ‘the expressions and the ideas in single words 
and combinations, their realities, and the essences of the things in themselves’.393 The 
evidence for this is that names are used in two ways, one of which is the first position: the 
three types that are subject, predicate, and connector (these are expressed by ‘noun’, ‘verb’ 
and ‘particle’). This way of using names is what is intended in this verse, for God did not 
teach Adam ‘man’ and ‘horse’ to the exclusion of ‘to go’, ‘to leave’, ‘from’, and ‘about’. A 
human must know what something is in order to be able to name it when presented with it. 
Don’t you see that were we to know words in an Indian or other unknown language without 
knowing the images that the words represented we would not know these things when we 
saw them?394 We would only know mere noises.  
We have therefore established that one only knows a word when one knows what it 
represents, and when this knowledge of the named thing itself is in one’s heart. The things 
that one knows in this way could be substances, accidents of quantity or quality, additional 
aspects, or any of the other sorts of accidents. Words are made for each single thing 
according to these considerations and there is no doubt that humans have to comprehend 
these ideas together and separately in order to know the words produced from amongst 
them. For example, a single person is called ‘so-and-so’ when considering his given name, 
‘man’ when considering his genitalia, ‘son’ when considering his parents, ‘father’ when 
considering his children, ‘brother’ when considering those who surround him and to whom 
                                                 
393 Ragib repeats this and a number of the subsequent points at: Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 428. 
394 From this point on, following Ragib’s explanation that the asmāʾ are not just names or nouns, I am free to 
translate asmāʾ as ‘words’. 
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he is related, Qurayshite or Isfahanian when considering his tribe and country, and so on 
with regard to a countless number of words…395 
In this passage, Ragib reiterates his position that language is the communication of ideas through 
a corpus of expressions. If the expressions do not communicate any ideas, or if the expressions 
themselves are not structured according to the right principles, it is not language. He also makes 
two claims that apply to both language and other types of knowledge: the first is that all 
knowledge is structured, and learnt, according to principles, and the second is that in order to 
know a thing one must know both its name and its essence. I will return to that second 
epistemological claim in the section below. 
The claim that all knowledge runs according to principles, and that species names are an 
example of those principles in the field of language, is couched here in a way that is typical of 
Ragib’s work. He borrows from the mereological vocabulary of the Classical Language 
Tradition with the assumption that concepts such as “universals”, “species” and “accident” are 
familiar,
396
 but without any sort of comprehensive attempt to use the universals of the Organon 
tradition to describe the principles by which he claims language functions.
397
  Ragib then gives 
the principles a quasi-divine status: it is more noble and more godly to think and learn through a 
                                                 
395 Ragib. Carullah 84. ff.26a-27a. See Appendix for Arabic text. My translation here follows Carullah 84 with some 
variations after Ayasofya 212 that can be checked in the notes on the Arabic text. 
396 Mereology is the study of the relationships of parts to wholes, and its starting point is usually Aristotle’s Topics. 
Cf. Andrew Arlig, "Medieval Mereology," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/mereology-medieval/Fall 2011 edition). 
397 By way of contrast, Ragib’s younger Andalusian contemporary Ibn Ḥazm (Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Aḥmad, d. 
456/1064, of whom see more below) would make the explicit argument that Aristotelian logic provided the 
methodological tools needed to understand exactly how God taught Adam the names. Ibn Ḥazm, at-Taqrīb li- add 
al-Manṭiq, 9-10. 
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structure of principles and their applications than to simply deal in particulars. This is 
reminiscent of his mystic approaches to knowledge as discussed in chapter two.
398
 
Ragib makes his claim about the principles of language in order to answer a common-sense 
objection to his doctrine that language was created by fiat. How can the fiat model answer the 
documented human tendency to constantly expand and manipulate the lexicon? The answer is 
that God taught Adam, in addition to all the words and their meanings, principles that humans 
could use to produce new words for new contexts.
399
  
The record of all these words, old and new, is the source of the data that Ragib produces 
during his explanation of what homonymy is, what homonymy isn’t, and where homonymy 
comes from. Where else but in the lexicon can one find the information that the expression fulk 
(“small ship”) can mean both the plural and the singular without any morphological or phonetic 
                                                 
398 The presence of a divine element marks Ragib out from those of his contemporaries who shared his esteem for 
the theoretical principles that were being developed in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Ibn Fāris wrote that while 
the passage of time had led to the loss of knowledge about certain rare pieces of vocabulary, the principles of 
religion and the theoretical exactitude and productivity of their application in legal theory, grammar, and metrics 
meant that “every age has its knowledge, and the noblest knowledge of all is that of our own age”. (wa-ʿulamāʾu 
hāḏihī –š-šarīʿati wa-in kānū –qtaṣarū min ʿilmi hāḏā [al-muštabahu –llaḏī lā yuqālu fīhi –l-yawma] … fa-qad -
ʿtāḍū ʿanhu daqīqa –l-kalāma fī uṣūli –d-dīni wa-furūʿihī min –l-fiqhi wa-l-farāʾiḍi wa-min daqīqi –n-naḥwi wa-
 alīlihī wa-min ʿilmi –l-ʿarūḍi … wa-li-kulli  amānin ʿilmun wa-ašrafu –l-ʿulūmi ʿilmu  amāninā hāḏā wa-l-ḥamdu 
li-llāh.) Ibn Fāris, aṣ- āḥibī, 37. Ibn Fūrak also appears to have attempted to draw, from al-Ašʿārī’s works, the 
statement that God revealed the principles of language before allowing its applications to be developed iteratively. 
Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt ed  as-Sāyiḥ, 42. 
399 It has been remarked on more than one occasion in European-language scholarship that mediaeval Arabic 
theories of language are synchronic rather than diachronic and consequently lack an explanation of how languages 
change and develop. However, this downplays the importance of the extended discussions of how vocabularies 
expand to include new technical and religious terminology, and indeed how they decline as rare words fall away. See 
for examples Ragib’s statement that words in common circulation are hard to change, as well as: Ibn Fāris, aṣ-




 or that ṣaqr means “very bitter milk” in most Bedouin dialects but “date paste” in the 
dialect of most people in Medina?
401
 
The dialectical variation within Arabic that allows one expression to mean either sour milk 
or date paste is the first source that Ragib enumerates when he lists the places that homonymy 
comes from in the methodological introduction to his Exegesis. The other sources of homonymy 
are lexical as well, and they are also diachronic: the creation of new meanings for existing words. 
Specialists in a certain discipline can take an existing connection between an expression and an 
idea and change the idea to another one that fits their specific purpose. The expression therefore 
becomes homonymous. The most common example of this is the new, specifically Islamic, 




In other cases, Ragib explains that an expression already connected to an idea by fiat is 
borrowed from that idea and given to a different idea, which already had an expression of its own 
in the lexicon. This is the mechanism that he, and others, call istiʿārah (borrowing),403 and the 
                                                 
400 Ragib, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 82; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  
Farḥāt, 32. Cf. ———, Quranic Glossary, 645. 
401 ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 83; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  
Farḥāt, 33. 
402 ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 83; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  
Farḥāt, 33. Al-Bāqillānī disagreed, see: Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. a -Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, at-Taqrīb wa-l-Iršād, ed. 
ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. ʿAlī Abū Zunayd, 3 vols. (Beirut: Muʾassasat ar-Risālah, 1998). 1:387f. Also: Vishanoff, Islamic 
Hermeneutics, 167. 
403 See below (page 172f) and also: Heinrichs, The Hand of the Northwind; ———, "Istiʿārah and Badīʿ and their 
Terminological Relationship in Early Arabic Literary Criticism," Zeitschrift f r Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 1(1984); ———, "Metaphor," in Encyclopedia of Arabic literature, ed. Julie Scott 
Meisami and Paul Starkey (London / New York: Routledge, 1998). This term istiʿārah was well-established by 
Ragib’s time, having been used with the apparent assumption that it did not need definition in the work of Qudāmah 
b.  aʿfar (Abū al-Faraǧ, d. ca. 823/939), and defined by, inter alia, ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā ar-Rummānī (Abū al-Ḥasan, 296/909-
384/994). Qudāmah b.  aʿfar, Kitāb Naqd aš-Šiʿr, ed. Seger Adrianus Bonebakker (Leiden: Brill, 1956). 103, 104, 
129. ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā ar-Rummānī, "an-Nukat fī Iʿǧāz al-Qurʾān," in Ṯalā  Rasā’il fī Iʿ ā  al-Qurʾān, ed. Muḥammad 
 
 130 
consequence is that the expression in question becomes a homonym. For example, the expression 
“lion”, which is already connected to the idea of a large carnivorous quadruped of yellowish 
brown colour, is borrowed from the quadruped and given to a brave person despite the fact that 
this person already has their own lexical expression (“human”). According to Ragib, the 
difference between the way these two types of language change function is that in the first case 
the usage must follow a precedent set by specialists in the discipline concerned, whereas in the 
second case: 
anyone can borrow an expression and use it so long as they intend an idea that is correct, 
and as long as the idea is true to the comparison. For example, you could say ‘I rode a 
lightening bolt’ and intend with that expression that you rode a horse that was fast like 
lightening.404 
Anyone can reorder the lexicon, so long as they make sense.  
Scholars like Ragib were preserving both linguistic precedent and language development. 
In the Quranic Glossary, the entry for the root gīm-wāw-zay includes the following statement: 
“you can say ‘I asked so-and-so to pass me and he did pass me’ if you asked someone for water 
and he gave you water. This is istiʿārah”.405 Lexicographers like Ragib have allowed a new 
connection to be made between the expression “to pass” and the idea of giving water despite the 
fact that there was already a word for giving water.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 alaf Allāh (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1959), 79. 
404 wa-l-farqu bayna ḥukmi –l-manqūli wa-l-mustaʿāri anna –l-manqūla šarṭuhū an yuttabaʿa fīhi ahlu tilka -ṣ-
ṣināʿati wa-l-mustaʿāru li-kulli aḥadin an yastaʿīra fa-yastaʿmalahū iḏā qaṣada maʿnan ṣaḥīḥan wa-yakūnu 
mutaḍammanan li-maʿnā –t-tašbīhi naḥwi an taqūla rakabtu barqan fa-taʿnī bihī farasan ka-l-barqi surʿatan. 
Ragib, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 83; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 
33-34. 
405 qīla –sta a tu fulānan fa-a ā anī iḏā –stasqaytahū fa-saqāka wa-ḏālika –stiʿāratun. ———, Quranic Glossary, 
211. 
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Ragib understood this iterative process by which lexical precedent was created as 
something ongoing, potentially even into his own lifetime. Again in the Quranic Glossary, his 
proof for reading God’s resurrection (našr) of the dead as an istiʿārah, in which the source 
domain is the spreading out (našr) of cloth, is a line of poetry from around a century before his 
own birth.
406
 Elsewhere in the same work he uses the poetry of al-Mutanabbī (Abū a -Ṭayyib 
Aḥmad, 303/915-354/955), a man with whose lifetime his own may well have overlapped, as 




It is because Ragib works in both exegetical hermeneutics and poetics that he has such an 
open view of language and its potential to do new things in the hands of its users. Metaphor in 
general, and istiʿārah in particular, are the mechanisms that break open the lexicon and poetics is 
the discipline in which language changes and develops.
408
 Without them, the lexicon risked 
                                                 
406 “[Upon death] the affairs of your life will envelop you after they were spread out [within it] / just as the affairs of 
God are an enveloping and a resurrection” (ṭawatka  uṭūbu dahrika baʿda našrin / ka-ḏāka  uṭūbuhū ṭayyan wa-
našrā). Ibid., 805. The London manuscript has našrika baʿda dahrin for dahrika baʿda našrin in what must be a 
scribal error. ———. Mufradāt al-Ḫaṭīb Collection. f.183a. Al- āḥiẓ’s (Abū ʿUṯmān ʿAmr b. Baḥr, d. 255/868) 
recension has a more likely inversion of the order of the last two words of the second hemistich, and attributes the 
line to Abū al-ʿAtāhīyah (Abū Isḥāq Ismāʿīl, d. ca. 210/825). Abū ʿUṯmān ʿAmr b. Baḥr al- āhiẓ, al-Bayān wa-t-
Tabyīn, ed. ʿAbd as-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, 4 vols. (Cairo: Maktabat al- ānǧī, 1960). 1:408, 3:257. Al-
Mubarrad’s recension follows al- āḥiẓ. Muḥammad b. Yazīd al-Mubarrad, The Kamil of el-Mubarrad  edited for the 
German Oriental society from the manuscripts of Leyden  St  Petersburg  Cambridge and Berlin, ed. William 
Wright, 2 vols. (Leipzig: G. Kreysing, 1864-1892). 1:230. Dāwūdī’s attribution of the line to Diʿbil al- uzāʿī 
(148/765-246/860) in his edition of the Quranic Glossary appears to be based on a misreading of Wright’s edition of 
al-Kāmil. 
407 The full line, which Ragib quotes in The Path to the Nobilities while attributing it to al-Mutanabbī, is: “Around 
me, everywhere, physiognomies / that you would be wrong to enquire about with the pronoun ‘who’” (ḥawlī bi-kulli 
makānin minhum  ilaqun / tu ṭī iḏā  iʾta bi-stifhāmihā bi-man). Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 80. In the 
Quranic Glossary he only cites the first hemistich and attributes it to “some modern poets” (baʿdu –l-muḥdi īna). —
——, Quranic Glossary, 778. Abū a -Ṭayyib al-Mutanabbī and ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān al-Barqūqī, Šarḥ Diwān al-
Mutanabbī, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2002). 2:1212.  
408 However, Ragib would never have gone so far as to take the step taken by al- urǧānī later in the eleventh 
century, most probably several decades after Ragib’s death. Al-  urǧānī rejected the lexicon as a theoretical 
component of language and argued that language is not the intrinsic connection of expressions to ideas fixed by fiat, 
but rather their contextual combination and the listener’s interpretation of this combination. While Ragib, engaged 
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becoming a set of restrictive precedents and protocols, that which Frank identified as the 
grammarians’ view of language as “a closed system: a self-contained realm of linguistic reality, 
of semiotic entities variously related to one another by consistent, intrinsic relationships of 
equivalence and non-equivalence, morphological patterns, rules of syntactic combination, etc.”. 
409
 It was not just grammarians who believed in a closed system. For those working in strictly 
hermeneutical disciplines, such as the legal theorist al- aṣṣāṣ (Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, 305/917-370/981), 
deviations from coinage by fiat are “lexicalized and cannot freely be formed by analogy”.410 
Ragib’s contemporary al-Bāqillānī agreed.411 God used such deviations in the Quran because 
they were part of the Arabic of the time, but as for scholars in the tenth century: “the principle 
with regard to expressions that deviate from coinage by fiat is they are governed by precedent 
and found in the lexicon. We may not go beyond those recorded uses”.412    
Metaphor, metonymy, and indeed all figurative language are the process of exchanging one 
word for another related word. Ragib, and others, explained these mechanisms as deviations 
from the lexicon, and consequently dependent on the lexicon as a reference point from which 
changes are made. The relationship between expressions and ideas therefore lies at the root of 
                                                                                                                                                             
as he was in the lexical practice through his Quranic Glossary, was never prepared to abandon the lexicon to this 
extent, he did share al- urǧānī’s belief in the importance of syntactic structure (naẓm), a theoretical concept that had 
been around since the ninth century and that was part of Ragib’s theory of Quranic inimitability (for which see the 
subsequent chapter). ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān al- urǧānī, Dalā’il al-Iʿ ā , ed. Muḥammad Maḥmūd aš-
Šinqī ī (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1978; repr., 1987). 206, 415. Sophia Vasalou, "Iʿjāz," in Encyclopedia of Arabic 
Language and Linguistics Online Edition, ed. Kees Versteegh, Lutz Edzard, and Rudolf de Jong (Brill Online: Brill, 
2010). ———, "The miraculous eloquence of the Qurʼan: general trajectories and individual approaches," Journal 
of Qurʼanic Studies 4, no. 2 (2002): 32. 
409 Frank, "Meanings " 277.  
410 Heinrichs, "Contacts," 269. 
411 al-Bāqillānī, at-Taqrīb, 1:354; Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 166. 
412 al-aṣlu fī-l-alfāẓi –l-ma ā i anna ṭarīqahā –s-samʿu wa-mā wurida fī-l-luġati wa-laysa ya ū u la-nā an 
nataʿaddā bi-hā mawḍaʿahā –llatī takallamat –l-ʿarabu bi-hā. al- aṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 1:367. Al- aṣṣāṣ, like 
Ragib, explains ma ā  as deviation from coinage by fiat: “ma ā  is that which goes beyond the  
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them all. Expressions and ideas form the binary linguistic structure that enables one to both 
conceive and explain how figurative language works. Istiʿārah, for example, is a mechanism by 
which an expression is borrowed from one idea and given to another, while ma ā , the larger 
category of which istiʿārah is a part,413 is the name for any deviation whatsoever from the 
connection, enshrined in coinage by fiat, between an expression and an idea.
414
 
The relationship between expressions and ideas is therefore the best way to understand the 
binary of literal and non-literal language (ḥaqīqah and ma ā ): either the expression-idea 
connection remains fixed according to its fiat coinage (literal), or the expression-idea connection 
is reworked and remade into something new (non-literal). This new something does not have to 
be as grand as a poetic metaphor. While literal language is the stable system fixed in place by the 
lexicon, when “an expression is used according to its original fiat coinage”,415 non-literal 
language is absolutely everything else, be it a metaphor, an ellipsis, or a pleonasm (however 
minor).
416
 The pithy definition that Ragib settled on in his Quranic Glossary is that non-literal 
language goes walkabout but literal language stays in its place.
417
 
                                                 
413 “Istiʿārah is a category of ma ā ” (wa-l-stiʿāratu min bābi –l-ma ā ). Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. 
f.11a. 
414 Over a century after Ragib’s death, these connections would be the subject of extensive taxonomy and 
commentary in the “science of coinage” (ʿilm al-waḍʿ). See: Bernard Weiss, "ʿIlm al-waḍʿ: An Introductory Account 
of a Later Muslim Philological Science," Arabica 34, no. 3 (1987); ———, "Language in Orthodox Muslim 
Thought: a study of "waḍʿ al-lughah" and its development" (Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University, 1966). 
415 al-kalāmu ḍarbayni ḥaqīqatun wa-ma ā un fal-ḥaqīqatu –l-lafẓu –l-mustaʿmalu fī-mā wuḍiʿa la-hū fī aṣli –l-
luġati. Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. f.4a. [al-ḥaqīqatu] –l-lafẓu –l-mustaʿmalu fī-mā wuḍiʿa la-hū fī aṣli –l-
luġati min ġayri naqlin wa-lā  iyādatin wa-lā naqṣānin wa-l-ma ā u ʿalā ʿaksi min ḏālik. ———, "Methodological 
Introduction ed. Nāhī," 97; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed. Farḥāt, 56. This is an example of 
how consistent Ragib’s positions are across the genres of poetics and exegesis. 
416 The deviation from the original fiat coinage can be very minor indeed. For example, the lengthening of a vowel 
from anẓuru to anẓūru (from “I look” to “*I loook”) is ma ā . ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 97-
99; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 55-60. 
417 al-ma ā u min –l-kalāmi mā ta āwa a mawḍaʿahū –llaḏī wuḍiʿa la-hū wa-l-ḥaqīqatu mā lam yata awa  ḏālik. 
———, Quranic Glossary, 211-212. Ragib’s understanding of ḥaqīqah as original fiat coinage and ma ā  as 
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Non-literal language is such a broad category that it must apply to almost all of poetics, and 
indeed Ragib only addresses the literal/non-literal binary at the very beginning of his poetics 
manual before moving onto istiʿārah and other rhetorical figures in more detail.418 However, as 
the references above to al- aṣṣāṣ indicate, the question of literal and non-literal language is 
much more important in hermeneutical disciplines such as legal theory, and the Quranic exegesis 
on which legal theory in part depends. It is in this context that Ella Almagor raised the question 
of whether “the medieval Arab speaker …[felt] the need for a clear distinction between the 
lexical meaning of a word, the abstract idea which it comes to convey, and the mode of 




                                                                                                                                                             
absolutely everything else follows that of al- aṣṣāṣ, who wrote that the Arabic language was one or the other, and 
that ḥaqīqah is when a thing is named according to coinage by fiat while ma ā  is that with which this coinage by 
fiat is bypassed, and the thing is then named with a non-literal name (fa-l-ḥaqīqatu mā summiya bihī –š-šayʾu fī aṣli 
–l-luġati wa-mawḍūʿihā wa-l-ma ā u mā ya ū u bihī –l-mawḍaʿa –llaḏī huwa ḥaqīqatun la-hū fī –l-aṣli wa-
summiya bihī mā laysa –l-ismu la-hū ḥaqīqatan). al- aṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 1:359-361. It is also close to the less-
explicitly expressed understanding of Ibn Qutaybah. Heinrichs, "Contacts," 259f; Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh Ibn 
Qutaybah, Taʾwīl Muškil al-Qurʾān, ed. Aḥmad Ṣaqr (Cairo: Dār at-Turāṯ, 1973). 102f. It is impossible to know 
whether Ragib and al- aṣṣāṣ’ understanding of ma ā  might have been shared by Abū ʿUbādah (d. ca. 209/824) 
some two centuries previously, but were it to have been, it would solve the interpretative difficulties experienced by 
both Wansborough and Almagor in their respective articles. Following Ragib’s model, the ma ā  of a Quranic verse 
could be its paraphrase, its figurative expressions, and indeed pretty much everything else. Cf. Almagor, "The Early 
Meaning of Majāz."; Wansborough, "Majā  al-qur'ān." Ragib’s definition of ma ā  would in fact solve 
Wansborough and Almagor’s problem along exactly the lines proposed by Heinrichs, whose “etymological 
translation cum interpretation” defines ma ā  is “that place in a discourse where the explicit meaning goes beyond 
… the actual wording of a phrase and leaves it behind”. Heinrichs, "The  aqīqa-Majā  Dichotomy," 127.  
418 Ragib also makes use of the literal/non-literal binary in his ethics, where unbelievers are only called “human” 
figuratively (ma ā an) because they lack the reason that defines real humans, and those with lots of money are only 
figuratively rich because the true riches are those of the soul. Ragib, Analysis of the Two Creations, 129 (Chapter 
20). 
419 Almagor, "The Early Meaning of Majāz," 314-315.  
420 As, indeed, Heinrichs had hoped: “[a]pproaching the ma ā  problem from the angle of the lafẓ-maʿnā confusion 
seems to be very appropriate”. Heinrichs, "The  aqīqa-Majā  Dichotomy," 126. 
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A homonymous expression can refer to two different ideas in two different ways at the 
same time.421 It can refer to one idea via a mode of literal correspondence between 
expression and idea as laid down in the lexicon according to coinage by fiat. This mode is 
called ‘literal’. At the same time, it can refer to a different idea via a mode in which there is 
a deviation from that lexical coinage. This alternative mode is called ‘non-literal’. It can be 
achieved by the simplest of grammatical applications such as the imperative ‘do’ applying 
to both men and women, a more complex dual reference such as ‘whale’ referring to both 
Pisces in the sky and the mammal in the sea, or by istiʿārah. Speakers need not be 
explicitly conscious of which mode they are using. Nevertheless, in all these cases there 
must a general overarching idea that connects the two different ideas to which the 
expression in question refers. This connecting idea must also be discernible to those 
scholars who are concerned with language. For example, if one were to say ‘fear the lion 
and the donkey’ and mean both the beasts in question (literally) and the humans who share 
their characteristics of bravery and stupidity (non-literally), then the connecting idea which 
would work in both the literal and non-literal modes would be ‘fear the brave animal and 
the stupid animal’.422 
Ragib uses the pairing of literal and non-literal, the latter inclusive of istiʿārah, to explain how 
apparently ambiguous language works, and to answer Almagor’s query about the modes by 
which ideas are conveyed. The linguistic structure for his explanation is the pairing of expression 
and idea, and the literal and the non-literal are two of the modes by which they interact with each 
other and with the lexicon. Ragib also provides an explicit insubstantiation of the “abstract idea” 
                                                 
421 “At the same time” is the crucial point of contention. Jurists, legal theorists, and theologians had been arguing 
about this point since the ninth century. See Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 216-219. Ragib sides with the 
Muʿtazilī al- ubbāʾī (Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad, d. 303/916), the Muʿtazilī al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, and the Ḥanafī al-
 aṣṣāṣ against the Ḥanafī Abū al-Ḥasan al-Karḫī (d. 340/952) and the Muʿtazilī Abū Hāšim (the son of al- ubbāʾī, 
d. 321/933). See: al- aṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 1:77f, 1:369-370; al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, al-Muġnī, 17:84; Abū Isḥāq 
Ibrāhīm aš-Šīrāzī, Šarḥ al-Lumaʿ, ed. ʿAbd al-Maǧīd Turkī, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Ġarb al-Islāmī, 1988). 1:177. 
422 This is a paraphrase of: Ragib, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 123-125; ———, Methodological 
Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 98-101.  
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that Almagor was looking for when Ragib explains how “brave animal” is the “general idea” that 
connects “brave lion” and “brave human”. 
The Referents of “Idea” 
What are the limits of “the idea” in Ragib’s structure of linguistic assumptions? Is the 
maʿnā an idea in the mind, or can it also refer to external physical reality? On the one hand, this 
is where the aesthetic impact of a theory with only two parts breaks down. However, Ragib is 
indeed aware of the three-way conceptual difference between ideas, words, and things; between 
mind, language, and reality.  
Ragib knew that one must comprehend the essence of the thing being named (the 
musammā) if one is to understand the name. Otherwise, we would be able to learn foreign 
languages just by parroting their sounds.
423
 He also knew that the things being named could be 
physical things (aʿyān) or they could be ideas (maʿānī).424 Indeed, the ideas might not even be 
connected to any physical reality at all: “imagination is when you conceive a form in your soul, 
whether or not it has any existence outside, for example the form of a person who does not exist 
such as the phoenix or hircocervus”.425 
                                                 
423 ———, Quranic Glossary, 428. And towards the end of the long quotation above from the Exegesis, see note 
395. 
424 “ascribe names to ideas and physical things”, see quotation from the Exegesis at page 125. 
425 wa-l-wahmu ṣūratun tatṣawwaruhā fī nafsika sawāʾun kāna la-hā wu ūdun min  āri in ka-ṣūratu insānin mā 
lam yakun la-hā [Ayasofya 212 has la-hū] wugūdun ka-ʿanqāʾa muġribin wa-ʿa āyila [sic.] wa-l- ayālu taṣawwuru 
mā adrakahū –l-ḥāssatu fi-n-nafs. Ragib. Carullah 84. f.27a. The word ʿa āyila should be read ʿan -ayyil. It is the 
hircocervus, or “goat-stag”, from the Arabic translation of Aristotle’s On Interpretation. Al-Fārābī had paired it with 
“phoenix” to the same effect as Ragib does here (Zimmermann notes that al-Fārābī was following the translation of 
Aristotle’s Physics, which mentions both non-existent animals). Aristotle, "On Interpretation," 16a.15f; ———, 
Organon Aristotelis, 60; Abū Naṣr Muḥammad al-Fārābī, Šarḥ al-Fārābī li-Kitāb Arisṭūṭālīs fī-l-ʿIbārah, ed. 
Wilhelm Kutsch and Stanley Marrow (Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq, 1986). 28 (lines 14-15 and 21-22); Zimmermann, 
Commentary and Short Treatise, 15 (note 4). 
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In a discussion of the nature of writing with respect to the Quran, Ragib makes the 
following ontological statement: 
There are four ways that a thing can exist: (1) existence in essence, which refers to the 
physical things; (2) existence in human thought, which refers to the ideas; (3) existence in 
the expression; and (4) existence in writing, the final existence that is only ever subsequent 
to existence in memory or in expression.426  
The simple pairing of expression and idea has perforce been expanded to take into account the 
real world outside language. Ragib includes the fourth category of existence in writing because 
he is at this point concerned about the status of God’s written word in the Quran, but for our 
purposes here the interesting ontological categories are (1), (2), and (3): the expression, the idea, 
and the physical thing; language, mind, and reality. The problem is whether the expression 
relates to the idea, to the physical thing, or to both. 
Ragib was aware of this problem too, and he used it as a stick with which to beat the 
Muʿtazilah. In his discussion in On Creeds of the controversy over the Quran being an attribute 
of God or a recited and copied thing among humanity, Ragib describes a golden age in which 
there were but two valid approaches to the problem: a conservative one that chose not to 
investigate further, and the divinely inspired approach of those who had attained the highest 
ranks of certainty. This happy situation persisted until a group of dialecticians ( adalīyīn) 
neglected God’s guidance and went beyond revelation into error: 
They failed to advance beyond the stage of things that can be sensed and described into the 
stage where things that are reasoned are investigated. They took speech to be just 
                                                 
426 Paraphrase of: al-ašyāʾu la-hā arbaʿu wu ūdātin wugūdun fī ḏātihī wa-huwa –l-aʿyānu wa-wu ūdun fī fikri –l-
insāni wa-huwa –l-maʿānī wa-wu ūdun fī lafẓihī wa-huwa –l-ʿibāratu wa-wu ūdun fī-l-kitābati wa-huwa wu ūdun 
kitābīyun wa-l-wu ūdu –l-kitābīyu ā aru –l-wu ūdāti iḏ lā yū adu –š-šayʾu kitābatan illā baʿda an yū ada ḥifẓan 
aw lafẓan. Ragib, On Creeds, 274. This same four-part division is found in Ibn Wahb al-Kātib: Ibn Wahb al-Kātib, 
al-Burhān [an-Naqd], 10. 
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something sensed, and thought that it was impossible for a body that could be sensed, 
which was in a place, to then be in another place. They did not know that pure reasoned 
forms are different from shapes that can be sensed. They also disagreed amongst 
themselves.  
The bulk of the Muʿtazilah said that God’s speech never reaches the point of existence. 
This is because speech is a series of composed letters, and each letter cannot exist until the 
previous letter has ceased to exist. Things that exist cannot be combined with things that do 
not exist, and therefore the existence of God’s speech cannot be conceived of in any way, 
neither in the souls of those who memorize it, nor in the recitation of those who recite it, 
nor in the writing of its scribes. That which exists in all these cases is a human act and a 
creation attributable to humans from every aspect. No part of God’s speech has ever 
existed, neither now nor in the time of the Prophet.427 
The Kullābīyah claimed that God’s speech subsisted in the essence of the creator, and that 
it was neither a sound, nor a letter, nor a command, nor a prohibition, nor indeed was it any 
part of speech. The Quran does not exist among humans at all, and indeed with 
investigation it is not God’s speech, for the Quran is the sounds and the letters that are an 
expression of God’s speech.428 
Perhaps the mistake that they made was with regard to the fact that ‘Quran’ is a homonym. 
It applies to the speech that subsists in the essence of the creator, and to that which is in the 
                                                 
427 This is an accurate, albeit unsympathetic, representation of the Muʿtazilī position as laid out by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-
 abbār. Al-Qāḍī wrote that God’s speech was “an accident that can never exist in a place” (ʿaraḍun yastaḥīlu 
kawnuhū maḥallan). The composition of God’s speech is an aspect of mind (maʿqūl), not of external reality. 
Whether divine or human, speech cannot be composed outside the mind because composition in external reality 
requires the combination of two things that exist, while in speech each letter replaces the previous one “and if we 
allowed them both to remain then something that existed would be composed with something nonexistent, and that 
is impossible” (fa-law a batnā –l-baqāʾa fīhimā la-adā ilā kawni –l-maw ūdi muʾallafan bi-l-maʿdūmi wa-hāḏā 
muḥāl). al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, al-Muġnī, 16:227. 
428 This is an accurate representation of the position of Ibn Kullāb (Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh b. Saʿīd, d. ca. 
241/855) as reported by al-Ašʿarī: the Quran among humans is an expression (ʿibārah) of God’s speech. Human 
speech is made up of commands and prohibitions, whereas God’s speech has no sound or any other divisions. al-
Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, 584-585. 
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hearts of the believers, and to the written copies. This means that the Quran is three things 
each of which is different from the other, and indeed many different things.429 
Were the Muʿtazilah and the Kullābīyah to have taken into consideration that most simple 
of considerations, that reasoned forms are different from things that can be sensed, then 
they would not have been so foolish. After all, we know that pieces of knowledge can 
travel from the soul of the teacher to the soul of the pupil without leaving the soul of the 
teacher. The piece of knowledge can then exist in the two souls at the same time. The form 
of a piece of handiwork is reasoned in the soul of its creator and then exists as a thing that 
can be sensed when it has been made, in the same way as an engraving exists on the ring 
and in the wax imprint without leaving the ring, and a single form can be reflected in many 
mirrors without it leaving its formed substance. If this principle is established for the 
Quran, which is God’s speech (albeit that it cannot be compared to human speech with 
regard to nobility), then it can scarcely be surprising that God’s speech exists  at one and 
the same time with God on the preserved tablet, and with humans in their souls, their 
recitations, in the hearing of those who listen to it being read, and in the written copies.430 
Ragib’s point is straightforward: the Muʿtazilah fail to understand that the homonymous 
expression “Quran” refers to both ideas and to physical things.431 Rather than being part of the 
problem of language versus mind versus reality, homonymy is the solution. Expressions can 
refer to both ideas and to things. 
                                                 
429 This is indeed the mistake that they made, or rather, in the case of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, the conviction to 
which they held. See the subsequent chapters below and: al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, al-Muġnī, 7:14.  
430 Ragib, On Creeds, 168-169.  
431 Ragib’s position on how God’s speech reaches humans is discussed just before this quoted passage, in terms 
similar to his Exegesis (see note 395). Ragib writes that there are two kinds of speech: that which is sensed (maḥsūs) 
and that which is in the mind (maʿqūl). The maḥsūs speech is that which relies on the physical abilities to speak and 
hear, and on the transmission of the sound through the air. The maʿqūl speech is the ideas behind the expressions. 
God is capable of making his ideas reach humans in a number of different ways: direct maḥsūs speech, inspiration, 
divine command without sound, etc. Ibid., 163-164. Mī Lawḥī is mistaken in his identification of this passage with 
the Ašʿarī distinction between kalām nafsī and kalām lafẓī. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 36-39, 109-115. The Ašʿarī binary 
was designed to solve the problem of the status of the Quran in the world by positing two separate ontological 
categories of Quran: a nafsī one with God and a lafẓī one among humans. Ragib, on the other hand, uses a single 
linguistic structure (homonymy) to show how the Quran can be both divine and human at the same time. Cf. Key, 
"Language and Literature," 35. 
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The relation of words to things comes up in another related theological talking point, the 
meaning of the word “name” (ism) in the invocation “in the name of God” (the basmalah) with 
which the Quran and many of its suras begin. Once again, Ragib turns to homonymy and 
remarks: “the disagreement about whether the name is the thing named or something else is 
really two opinions coming from two different perspectives, each correct on its own terms”.432 
Ragib’s explanation is that “name” is a homonym, the expression of which can either refer to the 
thing named (as in “I saw Zayd”, the musammā) or the naming of the thing (as in “I called my 
son ‘Zayd’”, the tasmīyah). In the absence of an assumption of homonymy, the explanations of 
this issue look very different. Al-Bāqillānī maintains that the name and the thing named are 
identical in essence, because he is determined to ensure that God’s attributes cannot be seen as 
separate from God.
433
 This forces him to maintain elsewhere that the word “fire” cannot be the 
name of the conflagration, because if it was, then it would be identical to the conflagration, and 
the letters f-i-r-e would burn the speaker’s mouth. Instead, he says that the act of naming that 
involves the letters f-i-r-e is ontologically separate from the name. 
434
 Homonymy enables Ragib 
to avoid such tortuous reasoning, and he can simply say that “no reasoning person” would 
maintain that the letters Z-a-y-d are the same as the person Zayd. 
                                                 
432 wa-mā ḏukira min –l- ilāfi fī anna –l-isma huwa –l-musammā aw ġayruhū fa-qawlāni qālūhumā bi-naẓarayni 
muḥtalifayni wa-kullāhumā ṣaḥīḥun bi-naẓarin wa-naẓar. Ragib, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  
Farḥāt, 111. 
433 anna –l-isma huwa –l-musammā bi-ʿaynihī wa-ḏātihī. Al-Bāqillānī then goes on to imply that a name is literally 
an actual thing: “the act of naming that indicates the thing named is only a name in the non-literal sense” (wa-t-
tasmīyatu –d-dāllatu ʿalayhi –sman ʿalā sabīli –l-ma ā ). al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, 57-58. Al-Bāqillānī is concerned to 
combat the Muʿtazilī position that God’s names are just human speech acts that describe him, for which see: Naṣr 
Ḥāmid  Abū Zayd, al-Itti āh al-ʿAqlī fī-t-Tafsīr: dirāsah fī qaḍīyat al-ma ā  fī-l-qurʾān ʿinda al-muʿta ilah  (Beirut: 
Dār at-Tanwīr, 1982). 83-84; al-Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, 172. See also my discussion of the divine attributes starting at page 
159 below. 
434 Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. a -Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, Kitāb at-Tamhīd, ed. R. J. McCarthy (Beirut: al-Maktabah aš-
Šarqīyah, 1957). 232-233. Cf. Abū Barakāt ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Ibn al-Anbārī, Kitāb al-Inṣāf fī Masāʾil al-Ḫilāf / die 
grammatischen Streitfragen der Basrer und Kufer herausgegeben  erkl rt und eingeleitet, ed. Gotthold Weil 
(Leiden: Brill, 1913). 23; Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt ed  as-Sāyiḥ, 38; al-Mufīd, Awāʾil, 55-56. 
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Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) thought that surrogationalism, the mistaken belief that 
language is a nomenclature in which words just stand for things, was at the heart of the problem 
of language, mind, and reality.
435
 Saussure’s answer was that [l]e signe linguistique unit non une 
chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique.
436
 Ragib, on the other hand, who 
organised his linguistic structures differently, believed that a sound pattern can refer to both a 
concept and a thing. The difference between these two theories lies in the fact that Ragib did not 
share Saussure’s assumption that concept and sound pattern (signifi  and signifiant) were part of 
a third entity called a sign (signe). For Saussure, it was the sign that provided order and structure 
to the plan ind fini des id es confuses and [plan] non moins ind termin  des sons,437 but for 
Ragib, as we have seen, polysemy provided enough structures to link the two planes together 
without confusion or indeterminacy. 
Truth and Quranic Ambiguity 
Just as Ragib assumes that expressions can refer to both ideas and to things, he understands 
truth as the accurate correspondence between that which is in a person’s heart and something 
external to that person. The something external can be a thing, an idea, or an action. He does not 
understand truth, or truthfulness, in terms of the relationship between a speech act and external 
physical reality. Instead, “the truth” (al-ḥaqq) is either the correspondence between a fact of life 
and our knowledge that it is real (for example death is real) or it is the correspondence between 
                                                 
435 Harris and Taylor, The Western tradition, 221. 
436 “A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between a concept and a sound pattern”. 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de Linguistique G n rale, ed. Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye, and Albert Riedlinger 
(Paris: Payot, 1949). 98; ———, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Roy Harris (London: Duckworth, 1983; repr., 
2005). 66. 
437 “[P]lane of vague, amorphous thought” and “equally featureless plane of sound”. ———, Cours, 156; ———, 
Course, 110-111.   
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the belief that an idea or thing exists and its actual existence (for example he believes that 
resurrection is real).
438
 Truthfulness (aṣ-ṣidq) is primarily a correct predication in a speech act as 




Truth is therefore both a quality of language and a quality of external physical reality. It is 
not something that enables us to differentiate between language and reality in the way that 
Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) intended when he said: 
it is only when we are concerned with whether what is said is true or false that we are not 
satisfied with merely grasping the thought … it is the striving for truth that drives us 
always to advance from the sense to the reference.440 
Frege thought that expressions referred to ideas and that we only cared about external physical 
reality when we needed to evaluate the truth of the expressions. For Ragib, on the other hand, 
truth is the realm of ontological fact in which nothing is disputed. This includes things that today 
one might call a belief rather than a fact, such as divine reward and punishment. Ragib’s concept 
                                                 
438 Ragib writes that al-ḥaqq is used in two ways: (1) with regard to an existing thing the necessary existence of 
which is required by wisdom (wugūduhū bi-ḥasabi muqtaḍī –l-ḥikmah), or (2) with regard to a belief that 
corresponds to the existence of a thing in itself (li-l-iʿtiqādi –l-muṭabaqi li-wu ūdi –š-šayʾi fī nafsihī) or a statement 
of belief that corresponds to the idea of the thing that the idea relates to (fī-l-qawli –l-muṭābaqi li-maʿnā –š-šayʾi –
llaḏī huwa ʿalayhi). Ragib, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 97; ———, Methodological Introduction and 
Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 55. 
439 Ragib writes that: 
The core of truth and falsity is the speech act, whether past or future, a promise or otherwise. Truth and falsity 
are only the primary matter in speech acts, and in speech acts they are only ever predicates … truth and falsity 
may be accidents in parts of speech other than the predicate, such as requests for information [that truthfully 
reveal the questioner’s ignorance]. (aṣ-ṣidqu wa-l-kiḏbu aṣluhumā fī-l-qawli māḍīyan kāna aw mustaqbalan 
waʿdan kāna aw ġayrahū wa-lā yakūnāni bi-l-qaṣdi –l-awwali illā fī-l-qawli wa-lā yakūnāni fī-lqawli illā fī-l-
 abari dūna ġayrihī min aṣnafi –l-kalāmi … wa-qad yakūnāni bi-l-ʿaraḍi fī ġayrihī min anwāʿi –l-kalāmi ka-
l-stifhām… 
———, Quranic Glossary, 478. In his ethical work he defines truthfullness as the correspondence between internal 
speech and the thing being thought about (ḥaddu -ṣ-ṣidqi –t-tammi huwa muṭābaqatu –l-qawli -ḍ-ḍamīri wa-l-
mu bari ʿanhu). ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 193.  
440 Quotated translations from Über Sinn und Bedeutung (in P. Geach and M. Black, Philosophical writings of 
Gottlob Frege (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966). 62,63) in: Harris and Taylor, The Western tradition, 200-201. 
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of right and wrong was inextricably caught up with his beliefs, and in his major ethical work he 
writes that “there is no worthier pillar on which rests the survival of the world than truth, for 
were a world without truth to be imagined, it would be a world without order that would not 
survive”.441 
What happens when these lofty principles come into contact with the practice of Quranic 
exegesis? The answer is that the linguistic structures and assumptions that we have been 
discussing provide Ragib with sufficient conceptual resources to deal with most of the problems 
he encounters. What is particularly interesting is that he in no way seeks to downplay the 
difficulties of exegesis and the ambiguities of language. In fact, he expresses a preference for 
complexity and a degree of comfort with confusion. Behind this comfort, as we now might have 
come to expect, lies a confidence that scholars have the potential to reach the highest levels of 
divine knowledge and certainty.  
For Ragib, the Quran contained linguistic ambiguity. The name that the Quran itself gave 
to this ambiguity was mutašābih or “mutual similarity”, which meant that there were Quranic 
expressions that resembled other expressions, and Quranic ideas that resembled other ideas.
442
 
The ambiguity came from the fact that the human reader did not always know which idea God 
intended when he used which expression. While the Quran contained ambiguity it did not 
contain contradictions, the difference between the two being that ambiguity is linguistic,
443
 
                                                 
441 wa-ṣ-ṣidqu a daru arkāni baqāʾi –l-ʿālami ḥattā law tūhamu murtafaʿan la-mā ṣaḥḥa niẓāmuhū wa-baqāʾuh. 
Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 193. I have discussed Ragib’s attitude to linguistic, Quranic, and poetic truth in: 
Key, "Language and Literature." See also: Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 124, 1297. 
442 Ragib reiterates his position on the mutašābih across the following works: ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 412-428, 
1347-1350; ———, Exegesis ed  Sardār, 226-230; ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 115-118; ——
—, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 86-90 ; ———, On Creeds, 27, 186-190; ———, 
Quranic Glossary, 443-445. He references Quran 3:7 and 4:126. See also note 291. 
443 Examples include ambiguity resulting from rare words, homonyms, brevity, prolixity, and syntactic composition. 
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whereas contradictions are irreconcilable references to external physical reality (for example 
“Zayd is going” and “Zayd is not going” referring to the same Zayd, the same place, and the 
same time).
444
 There are aspects of the Quran that are wholly unknowable for humans, but these 
are divine mysteries such as the last day, and they are not the result of language. Ragib calls 




Two problems, and two consequent tasks remain: solving the linguistic ambiguity, and 
determining which Quranic verses fall in which category and therefore whether they can indeed 
be solved. Both these tasks fall to the scholars. Ragib identifies the highest ranks of scholars, 
whose understanding and piety is such that their understanding of the Quran can be relied upon, 
with those firmly rooted in knowledge (ar-rāsi ūna fī-l-ʿilm) who can be read as the only group 
other than God to understand the whole Quran.
446
  
                                                                                                                                                             
———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 416-417; ———, Quranic Glossary, 444.  
444 ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 1348. 
445 mutašābihun min  ihati –l-maʿnā faqaṭ. ———, Quranic Glossary, 443-444. In the Exegesis Ragib classes the 
syntactic confusion in Quran 48:25 (al-Fatḥ, in which the verbal phrase ant taṭaʾūhum is postponed until after its 
object) as an ambiguity of idea alone, whereas in the Quranic Glossary he identifies the same verse as an ambiguity 
of expression. ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 418; ———, Quranic Glossary, 444. Elsewhere in the Exegesis, Ragib 
refers to aspects of God, such as the place that he is in, that cannot be fully known through the expression (lā 
yumkinu –l-kašfu ʿan ḥaqāʾiqihā bi-l-lafẓ) and must instead by known through God’s inspiring light (wa-innamā 
yudrikuhū –l-insānu bi-ḥasabi mā  aʿalahū la-hū min nūrihī). ———, Exegesis ed  Sardār, 222. In On Creeds, 
Ragib describes, without identifying them, Quranic verses in which the expression could refer to a number of 
different ideas and while reason provides some guidance, only God knows which one he intended. Ragib compares 
this to someone approaching a group of people and while he knows Zayd is amongst them, he does not know exactly 
where Zayd is. It seems most likely that this passage refers to those same parts of the Quran that cannot, by virtue of 
their subject matter, be known by humans. (anna fī-l-qurʾāna āyātun fussirat ʿalā ʿašarati aw uhin fa-ṣāʿidan wa-l-
lafẓu yaḥtamilu –l-kulla wa-l-ʿaqlu yadfaʿu ašyāʾa minhā wa-murādu –llāhi wa-in lam ya ru  min wāḥidatin min 
hāḏihī –l-wu ūhi fa-laysa huwa maʿlūman la-nā muʿayyanan … fa-inna man ṣādafa qawman wa-ʿalima anna 
 aydan ma alan huwa fī-mā baynahum lākin lā yaʿrifuhū muʿayyanan…) ———, On Creeds, 190. 
446 Those firmly rooted in knowledge (ar-rāsi ūna fī-l-ʿilm) know what humans are able and unable to know 
(maʿrifata mā li-l-insāni sabīlun ilā maʿrifatihī mimmā lā sabīla la-hū), because it is the wise (al-ḥukamāʾ) who 
know what may and may not be known , and by doing so occupy the noblest rank (humu –llaḏīna yumayyi ūna 
bayna mā yumkinu ʿilmuhū wa-mā lā yumkinu an yuʿlama…wa hāḏā ašrafu man ilatin li-l-ḥukamāʾ). ———, 
Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 426-427. Ragib allows that both readings of Quran 4:126 are possible. See note 291. 
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How are scholars able to conquer the problem of linguistically ambiguous Quran? Ragib 
believes that one factor in their favour is that while there may be ambiguity about exactly what 
God intends, his general or overall meaning is always apparent. It is not as if the Quran were in a 
foreign language.
447
 This is a substantial limit on ambiguity, and it rests on a belief in a God who 
makes sense. Ragib goes further: if speech is from God, then it is in accordance with reason and 
if it is not in accordance with reason then it is not from God.
448
 This fits with his ethical slogan 
that reason and revelation are mutually dependent,
449
 and the way that he describes the scholars 
who use their reason to interpret the Quran also matches the high aspiration for humanity that he 
lays out in his ethics: that people follow the prophets.
450
 Indeed, the reasons that a reasonable 
God would make some of the Quran linguistically ambiguous were to train the scholars’ minds, 
                                                 
447 Ragib explains this point as follows. He makes a distinction between knowing God’s overall intent (mu malan) 
and knowing it in detail (mufaṣṣalan). Ambiguity resides in the detailed knowledge, but detailed knowledge is less 
important. The examples of unknowable intent that Ragib gives are the mysterious letters that appear at the 
beginning of a number of Quranic verses, and those religious ordinances we are unaware of the reason behind:  
That which some people say, that if God can address us without making us know his intent then he might as 
well address us in an African or Byzantine language, can be answered as follows: the intent of Byzantine and 
African speech is unknown whether it is taken together as a whole or broken down into its separate parts. 
However, the intent of the ambiguous parts of the Quran is known when it is taken together as a whole but 
unknown when broken down into its separate parts, because each verse has been explained by exegetes in a 
number of different ways. We know that God’s intent must be adhered to, but we do not know which of these 
different ways God intended. This is clear, and it follows the principle that it is not inconceivable for God to 
charge us to recite letters the ideas behind which we do not know and then reward us for our recitation of 
them. In the same way, he charges us with actions that we we do not know the wisdom behind in order to 
reward us for performing them. (wa-mā qāla baʿḍuhum innahū law  ā a an yu āṭibanā  umma lā yuʿarrifunā 
murādahū la- ā a an yu āṭibanā bi-kalāmi – - an i wa-r-rūmi fa-l- awābu ʿanhu anna kalāma –r-rūmi wa-
 - an i lā yuʿlamu minhu –l-murādu mu malan wa-lā mufaṣṣalan wa-l-mutašābihu yuʿlamu minhu 
murāduhū mu malan wa-in lam naʿlamhu mufaṣṣalan li-anna kulla āyatin qad fassarahā –l-mufassirūna ʿalā 
aw uhin fa-maʿlūmun anna –l-murāda lā yu ra u minhu  umma taʿyīnu murādi –llāhi taʿālā minhā ġayru 
maʿlūmin wa-hāḏā ẓāhirun ʿalā annahū lam yakun yumtanaʿu an yukallifanā taʿālā tilāwata aḥrufin lā 
naʿrifu maʿanāhā fa-yu ībanā ʿalā tilāwatihā kamā yukallifunā afʿālan lā naʿrifu wa ha –l-ḥikmati fīhā li-
yu ībanā ʿalayhā). 
Ibid., 424-426. 
448 Ibid., 1349. 
449 ———, Analysis of the Two Creations, 117-121 (chapter 18). 
450 an yaṣīra –n-nāsu tabʿan li-l-anbiyāʾ. Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 428. See also note 284. 
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to enable them to earn the rewards they deserve for their efforts, to demonstrate their nobility, 
and “to demonstrate the nobility of thought”.451 
The Value of Complexity and Analogy 
It would appear that linguistic ambiguity was a problem, albeit a good sort of problem that 
could be solved by an analytical process that brought divine rewards to scholars. However, 
Ragib’s philosophy of language, as has already been noted, was more than just a hermeneutic. 
He had ideas about how language should be produced as well as how it should be interpreted. 
These ideas applied to everybody who used language: both God and humanity.
452
 
In The Path to the Nobilities, Ragib says while discussing the role of the teacher that it is 
the right and the duty of scholars to guide those who wish to be taught on the right path with kind 
words “and oblique speech, for communication is more effective when it is oblique than when it 
is straightforward”.453 He then gives five examples of how this can be the case: 
                                                 
451 iẓhāru šarafi –l-fikr. Ibid., 428-429. See also: ———, On Creeds, 186. 
452 I reached the same conclusion when reviewing Ragib’s ideas about Quranic inimitability. See: Key, "Language 
and Literature." And for a comparison to al-Ġazālī on the same subject: Paul A. Hardy, "Epistemology and Divine 
Discourse," in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, ed. Tim Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 292. Cf. also Carter’s statement that “the language of the holy texts conforms entirely to the 
principles of human discourse”. Carter, "Pragmatics and Contractual Language," 26. 
453 wa-taʿrīḍin fī-l- iṭābi fa-t-taʿrīḍu ablaġu min –t-taṣrīḥi. Other translations for taʿrīḍ could be 
“circumlocutionary”, “periphrastic”, or “equivocal”. It is not one of the terms in Ragib’s manual of poetics, but in 
the Quranic Glossary he defines it as: 
language that has two aspects, one true and one false, or one explicit and one implicit. For example Quran 
2:235 ‘your taʿrīḍ to women is not a sin’. It is said that such taʿrīḍ is saying ‘you are beautiful’ while 
doubting that fact. (wa-t-taʿrīḍu kalāmun la-hū wa hāni min ṣidqin wa-kiḏbin wa ẓāhirin wa-bāṭinin qāla 
wa-lā  unāḥa ʿalaykum fī-mā ʿarraḍtum bihī min  uṭbati –n-nisāʾi qīla huwa an yaqūlu la-hā anti  amīlatun 
wa-marġūbun fī-ka wa-naḥwu ḏālika). 
Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 560. For some justification of my translation of balāġah as effective communication see: 
Key, "Language and Literature," 37-40. 
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[1] Virtuous souls, because they have a natural inclination towards the discovery of 
ideas, tend to communicate obliquely because they love to think through the ideas 
behind language.454 
[2] Oblique communication preserves our awe and covers up our shame.455 
[3] Straightforward communication has but a single aspect whereas oblique 
communication has a number of aspects, which in itself makes oblique 
communication more effective.456  
[4] Oblique communication can be expressed in multiple different ways, and can 
therefore be adduced for multiple different reasons. Straightforward 
communication, however, can only be used for a single purpose according to its 
single expressive option.457 
[5] A straightforward prohibition can be enticing.458  
                                                 
454 anna –n-nafsa –l-fāḍilata li-maylihā ilā –stinbāṭi –l-maʿānī yamīlu ilā –t-taʿrīḍi šaġfan bi-sti rā i maʿnāhu bi-l-
fikr. Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 178. 
455 anna –t-taʿrīḍa lā tuntahaku bihī su ūfu –l-haybati wa-lā yurtafaʿu bihī satru –l-ḥišmah. Ibid., 179. 
456 Ragib goes on to give Quran 39:73 (az-Zumar) as an example of communication that has multiple aspects. The 
text with which he introduces the Quranic quote is not entirely clear. Al-ʿAǧamī has: 
Straightforward communication has but a single aspect whereas oblique communication has a number of 
aspects, which in itself makes oblique communication more eloquent, and from this aspect [also] a great 
number of answers have been elided with regard to the necessary conditions for reward and punishment. For 
example, Quran 39:73… (annahū laysa li-t-taṣrīḥi illā wa hun wāḥidun wa-li-t-taʿrīḍi wu ūhun fa-min hāḏā 
–l-wa hi yakūnu ablaġun wa-min hāḏā –l-wa hi ḥuḏifa a wibatun [/-tan?] ka īrun [sic ] min aš-šurūṭi –l-
muqtaḍīyati li- - awābi wa-l-ʿuqābi naḥwi qawli –llāhi taʿālā…) 
Ibid. A manuscript variant, however, has:  
…which in itself makes oblique communication more eloquent, and because of this same idea, a great 
number of answers have been elided with regard to the necessary conditions for reward and punishment… 
(…fa-min hāḏā –l-wa hi yakūnu ablaġun wa-li-hāḏā –l-maʿnā ḥuḏifa a wibatun ka īran [sic ] min aš-
šurūṭi…) 
———. Ms  of aḏ-Ḏarīʿah ilā Makārim aš-Šarīʿah [The Path to the Nobilities]. Gedik 17308/1 (dated 1605), Afyon 
Gedik Ahmet Paşa İl Halk Kütüphanesi, Milli Kütüphane-Ankara, Istanbul. f.48b. 
457 anna li-t-taʿrīḍi ʿibārātun mu talifatun fa-yumkinu īrāduhū ʿalā wu ūhin mu talifatin wa-lā yumkinu īrādu –t-
taṣrīḥi illā ʿalā wa hin wāḥidin iḏ laysa la-hū illā ʿibāratun wāḥidah. ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 179. 
458 anna ṣarīḥa –n-nahī dāʿin ilā –l-iġrāq. Ragib then cites a popular saying, a line of poetry, and a prophetic Hadith 
that make the same point. Ibid. 
 148 
We have met the idea behind Ragib’s [1] already: scholars love thinking, and thinking is in and 
of itself a good thing. The extra thought that is required by language that is not straightforward is 
therefore also a good thing. In [3], complexity in the sense of multiple interpretative options is 
given a poetic stamp of approval: it is more effective as communication, or more eloquent. 
Ragib’s [4] is interesting because it appears to speak to adab, the process by which one learns the 
right things to say and the right times at which to say them. The multiple interpretations available 
in an oblique expression are particularly valuable because one can have a single quotation in 
one’s head with the potential to make it fit any number of situations. Straightforward language is 
less malleable to context and therefore less useful.  
How can we tally these principles with Ragib’s oft-stated division of language into that 
which is clear and that which is unclear? As we have seen above, Ragib distinguished between 
clear and unclear language by defining polysemic language as unclear while clear language was 
made up of simple statements such as “thanks be to God” or “praise God”.459 Now it seems that 
language that can be interpreted in more than one way is in fact more effective communication 
than simple straightforward language. 
Ragib squares this circle with the analogy. The analogy (al-ma al) is not simple language 
and it is not straightforward. In analogy, the basic correspondence between expression and idea 
that is enshrined in coinage by fiat is broken down and the expressions consequently become 
polysemic; they come to refer to a different set of ideas: 
Should someone ask you ‘what is the use of switching to an analogy?’ You should reply: 
the analogy is the most noble form of expression because of the quality of the comparison, 
                                                 
459 ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 84-85; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  
Farḥāt, 35-36. 
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syntactic composition, and brevity therein.460 With regard to ideas, it is the most noble 
because it denotes both that which is intended and that with which the intended meaning 
combines. Its reference is universal rather than partial, and it refers obliquely rather than 
straightforwardly. There is a subtlety in oblique communication, and it is the most noble 
level that speakers can attain.461 
The most important point here is that the analogy is powerful because it does two things at once. 
The expression refers to two ideas at the same time, and these two ideas are connected to each 
other. This is one example of what Ragib meant when he wrote in his ethics that the best 
communication has multiple aspects (in the quotation above this was [4]).  
Ragib goes on to say that the analogy is the language used by the wise (al-ḥukamāʾ), that 
Arabic as a language is particularly replete with analogy, that only the elite are qualified to 
deconstruct and identify all the analogies, and that God honoured the community by revealing 
the Quran in language equally replete. Later on he gives the example of Quranic descriptions of 
paradise:  
Generally, most of the circumstances of the day of resurrection are described in the Quran 
by way of analogy, for example Quran 47:15 (Muḥammad): ‘the ma al of the paradise that 
                                                 
460 In his poetics, which will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter, Ragib deals with ma al only 
briefly under the heading tam īl (making a ma al), which is one of the types of brevity. Brevity occurs when there is 
more idea than expression, i.e. when an expression communicates a disproportionate amount of idea. ———. 
Innovative Figures of Speech. ff.16a-b. This was a standard understanding of tam īl in the ninth and tenth centuries, 
see: Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Early Ornate Prose and the Rhetorization of Poetry in Arabic Literature," in Literary and 
Philosophical Rhetoric in the Greek  Roman  Syriac and Arabic Worlds, ed. Fr d rique Woerther (Hildesheim: 
Georg Olms, 2009), 227-228; Qudāmah b.  aʿfar, Naqd, 90. Wansbrough describes “the Quranic mathal [as] … 
primarily an extended similie” in his perceptive synchronic analysis of rhetoric and allegory in exegesis. John 
Wansborough, Quranic Studies: sources and methods of scriptural interpretation  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977). 227-246, 239. 
461 fa-in qīla fa-mā –l-fāʾidatu fī-l-ʿudūli ilā –l-ma ali qīla –l-ma alu ašrafu lafẓan li-mā fīhi min aṣ-ṣīġati fī ḥusni –
t-tašbīhi wa-n-naẓmi wa- tiṣāri –l-lafẓi wa-ašrafu maʿnan li-dalālatihī ʿalā –l-maqṣūdi ilayhi wa-ʿalā ġayrihī 
mimmā yušārikuhū fa-dalālatuhū dalālatun kullīyatun lā  u ʾīyatun wa-taʿrīḍun lā taṣrīḥun wa-fī-t-taʿrīḍi talaṭṭufun 
wa-huwa ašrafu man ilatin li-l-mu āṭibīn. Ragib, On Creeds, 183.  
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the pious are promised is that it has in it rivers of pure water’. This means that the analogy 
for paradise is a garden in which are rivers.462    
Ragib uses analogy to deal with those verses in the Quran that describe God in anthropomorphic 
terminology and mention the things he does with his hands, or the throne on which he sits. Ragib 
takes what we might call a figurative approach to such verses. This is what we mean when we 
say that a piece of language is figurative, or that it should be taken figuratively rather than 
literally. Ragib writes that the words “God’s hands are outspread” in Quran 5:64 mean that 
God’s blessing is continuous, and not that God actually has hands.463 This is God “using 
comparison and istiʿārah in the same way as the Bedouin Arabs did”.464  
The difference between the way we use the phrase “figurative” today and the way that 
Ragib understood the analogy is that today we might tend to assume that if something is 
figurative it is not real. For Ragib this was not the case: an analogy may involve manipulations of 
the relationship between expression and idea that was enshrined in coinage by fiat and recorded 
in the lexicon, and this manipulation may be described as a deviation from that literal meaning, 
but he is not making an ontological claim that everything God communicates through the 
analogy is unreal. 
Instead, the reason that God used analogy is that the lexicon cannot cope with his divinity. 
Human beings use the expressions in circulation that have been fixed by coinage to a limited 
                                                 
462 anna ʿāmmata aḥwāli –l-qiyāmati maḏkūratun ʿalā ṭarīqati –l-ma ali ka-mā qāla taʿālā ma alu –l- annati –llatī 
wuʿida –l-muttaqūna fīhā anhārun min māʾin ġayri āsinin ay ma alu –l- annati ma alu  annatin fīhā anhār. Ibid., 
193. Cf. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 99; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis 
ed  Farḥāt, 58-59. 
463 ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 40-41. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. 
Nāhī," 87-88. ———, Quranic Glossary, 889-890. ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 926. ———, Exegesis ed  Sardār, 
393. See also notes 276f. 
464 wa-tašbīhu –l-yadi ʿalā ṭarīqati kalāmi –l-ʿarabi fī –stiʿārati hāḏihi –l-lafẓ. ———, Exegesis ed  Sardār, 393. 
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number of ideas. At the time of the Quran’s revelation, these ideas had tended to be based on 
sensory experience, and it was therefore impossible for them to deal with the inconceivable 
divinity of, for example, paradise. This is why God turned to analogy.
465
 Descriptions of heaven 
and hell in the Quran are analogies and allusions that could be misconstrued if taken literally. 
Those who have been trained in rhetorical figures such as istiʿārah will not make this mistake.466 
There is a clear parallel between the way that Ragib explains the analogy and the way that 
he explains homonymy. Homonymy exists because there is an infinite amount of ideas and only 
a finite amount of expressions with which to describe them. Both God and humans deal with this 
mismatch by using expressions that communicate a disproportionate amount of ideas. These 
expressions are figurative, analogical, metaphorical, metonymic, and homonymous, and they 
refer to ranges of meaning. The analogy exists because sometimes God has no option but to use 
it to convey ideas the divine infinity of which is inacessible to humanity. His language is 
therefore made up of expressions that speak to multiple and multifarious ideas. 
 
  
                                                 
465 kānat -l-alfāẓu –l-mutadāwilatu mawḍūʿatan li-maʿānin maqṣūratin. ———, On Creeds, 186-187. 
466 wa-hāḏihī kulluhā išārātun wa-tam īlātun fa-lā tunāfī … wa-hāḏā ẓāhirun li-man tadarraba minhu fī bābi –l-
balāġāti wa-l-istiʿārāt. Ibid., 241-242. 
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4. RAGIB’S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE IN PRACTICE 
Ragib once wrote that there were three types of knowledge. Knowledge was connected to 
either expressions, or to expressions and ideas, or just to ideas. The knowledge that was 
connected to expressions dealt either with the the essences of expressions, in which case it was 
lexicography, or it dealt with their attributes (lawāḥiq), in which case it comprised etymology, 
syntax, morphology, prosody, and rhyme. Ideas remained necessary intermediaries (wasāʾiṭ) in 
all these cases. The type of knowledge that was connected to both expressions and ideas was 
knowledge of certain proofs, dialectics and debate, oratory, effective communication, and poetry. 
The knowledge that had to do with ideas alone was either theoretical, “in which the only aim is 
knowledge”, or practical, “in which it is necessary to know and then act”. Theoretical knowledge 
ranged from theology to physics and medicine via “knowledge of the reason and of the soul”, 
and practical knowledge ranged across ethics and religious ordinances.
467
  
All but one of the four shibboleths of mediaeval Islamic intellectual culture that I will 
examine in this chapter (God’s attributes, compulsion and free will, poetics, and figurative 
                                                 
467 Paraphrase of:  
anwāʿu –l-ʿilmi  alā atun nawʿun yataʿallaqu bi-l-lafẓi wa-nawʿun yataʿallaqu bi-l-lafẓi wa-l-maʿnā wa-
nawʿun yataʿallaqu bi-l-maʿnā dūna –l-lafẓi fa-ammā mā yataʿallaqu bi-l-lafẓi fa-huwa mā yuqṣadu bihī 
taḥṣīlu –l-alfāẓi bi-wasāʾiṭi –l-maʿānī wa-ḏālika ḍarbayni aḥaduhmā ḥukmu ḏawāti –l-alfāẓi wa-huwa ʿilmu 
–l-luġati wa- - ānī ḥukmu lawāḥiqi –l-alfāẓi wa-ḏālika šayʾāni šayʾun yaštariku fīhi –n-naẓmu wa-n-na ru 
wa-huwa ʿilmu –l-ištiqāqi wa-ʿilmu –n-naḥwi wa-ʿilmu –t-taṣrīfi wa-šayʾun ya taṣṣu bihī –n-naẓmu wa-huwa 
ʿilmu –l-ʿarūḍi wa-ʿilmu –l-qawāfī wa-ammā –n-nawʿu –l-mutaʿallaqu bil-lafẓi wa-l-maʿnā fa- amsatu 
aḍrubin ʿilmu –l-barāhīna wa-ʿilmu –l- idāli wa-ʿilmu –l- iṭābati wa-ʿilmu –l-balāġati wa-ʿilmu –š-šiʿri wa-
ammā –n-nawʿu –l-mutaʿallaqu bi-l-maʿnā fa-ḍarbāni ʿilmīyun wa-ʿamalīyun fa-l-ʿilmīyu mā quṣida bihī an 
yaʿlama faqaṭ wa-ḏālika maʿrifatu –l-bārī taʿālā wa-maʿrifatu –n-nubūwati wa-maʿrifatu –l-malāʾikati wa-
maʿrifatu yawmi –l-qiyāmati wa-maʿrifatu –l-ʿaqli wa-maʿrifatu –n-nafsi wa-maʿrifatu mabādiʾi –l-umūri 
wa-maʿrifatu –l-arkāni wa-maʿrifatu –l-ā āri –l-ʿulwīyati min –l-falaki wa-n-nayyirayni wa-n-nu ūmi wa-
maʿrifatu ṭabāʾiʿi –n-nabāti wa-yuqālu lahū ʿilmu –l-falāḥati wa-maʿrifatu ṭabāʾiʿi –l-ḥayawānāti wa-
maʿrifatu ṭabāʾiʿi –l-insāni wa-yuqālu ʿilmu -ṭ-ṭibb wa-l-ʿamalīyu wa-huwa mā ya ību an yuʿlama  umma 
yuʿmalu bihī wa-yusammā tāratan –s-sunana wa-s-siyāsāta wa-tāratan –š-šarīʿata wa-tāratan aḥkāma –š-
šarīʿati wa-makārimahū wa-ḏālika ḥukmu –l-ʿibādāti wa-ḥukmu –l-muʿāmalāti wa-ḥukmu –l-maṭāʿimi wa-
ḥukmu –l-manākiḥi wa-ḥukmu –l-ma ā ir. 
———, The Path to the Nobilities, 169-170. 
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readings of the Quran) are, in this epistemology, connected to ideas alone.
468
 Only poetics is 
explicitly understood as knowledge of the interaction of expressions with ideas. However, it will 
become appararent in the sections that follow that even when Ragib is dealing with an “ideas 
only” topic, he uses linguistic analyses to explain it, in just the same way as he recognises that 
knowledge connected to expressions cannot be stripped of all connection to ideas. What is more, 
it will also become apparent that, just as in the epistemology paraphrased above, Ragib loves to 
return to the pairing of expression and idea in order to explain almost anything. Language, the 
force that connects expressions and ideas, is at the heart of everything. 
Compulsion and Free Will 
Compulsion and free will were already an established source of theological debate in the 
ninth century when Ibn Qutaybah discussed the questions of whether the adherents of these two 
doctrines were indeed referred to in Prophetic Hadith,
469
 and what they should be called. As 
tended to be the case, adherents were named by their opponents; those who believed in free will 
were called al-qadarīyah, while those who believed that God compelled all outcomes were 
called al- abrīyah. This despite the fact that both these words in Arabic mean almost the same 
thing: God’s predestination (qadar) or compulsion ( abr). Ibn Qutaybah reported that it had 
consequently been suggested that “the  abrīyah are the qadarīyah” but he then acerbically noted 
that were this to be the case then there would be no need for the name  abrīyah, and furthermore 
                                                 
468 I have addressed Ragib’s discussions of another shibboleth of mediaeval Islamic intellectual culture, Quranic 
inimitability (iʿ ā ), elsewhere: Key, "Language and Literature." 
469 He concluded that while the Prophet did say “the qadarīyah are the Magians of this community…”, references to 
the  abrīyah, rāfiḍah, mur īʿah, or  awāri  came from early sources other than the Prophet. Abū Muḥammad 
ʿAbdallāh Ibn Qutaybah, Taʾwīl Mu talif al- adī , ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī ad-Dīn al-Aṣfar (Beirut: al-Maktab al-
Islāmī, 1999). 136. 
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“names just fall into place and [the names of sects] only adhere to their adherents”.470 By the 




 The importance of the act of naming should come as no surprise, but there is a substantial 
theological and ethical issue at stake here. If God is all-powerful and aware of everything that 
has happened and will happen, then he must know what people are going to do. If this is the case, 
then how can humans have any free will to choose to obey or disobey him? If humans lack free 
will, then what are their motivations for following God’s instructions? 
Ragib’s answer is that God compels humans to act as they do, but gives them the 
impression that they are acting of their own free will.
472
 He explains that the  abrīyah believe 
that humans are wholly incapable of those acts that they are preordained not to carry out, while 
the qadarīyah believe both that humans are capable of acts they are preordained not to carry out, 
and that those things could in fact happen despite God knowing they will not. Another group, 
known as the mufawwiḍah (having full power), believe that humans do what they want and obey 
orders, or not, as they choose. For Ragib, the correct position is to avoid both these extremes and 
say that “there is neither compulsion nor free will”.473  
                                                 
470 wa-qad yaḥmilu baʿḍuhum –l-ḥimyata ʿalā an yaqūla –l- abrīyatu hum –l-qadarīyah … wa-l-asmāʾu lā taqaʿu 
ġayra mawāqiʿihā wa-lā tal amu illā ahlahā. Ibid., 137. 
471 al-Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, 430. Although the discussion about the counter-intuitive nature of the names was still going 
on: ———, The Theology, 74-75. 
472 “God created man as compelled to act, [but] in the form of being free to choose” (wa- aʿalahū mu baran fī 
ṣūratin mu ayyar). Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 184-185. Cf. ———, On Creeds, 28-29. 
473 lā  abra wa-lā tafwīḍ. ———, On Creeds, 282.  
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In al-Ašʿārī’s heresiography, this phrase was understood as a Shia formulation,474 and 
Ragib’s contemporary al-Ābī (Abū Saʿd Manṣūr, d. 421/1030) attributes it to the Shia Imam 
 aʿfar aṣ-Ṣādiq (Abū ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad Bāqir, sixth Imam of the Twelver Shia, d. 
148/765).
475
 Nevertheless, Ragib justifies this formulation at length. There cannot be any 
compulsion because that would render irrelevant the reason, thought, and contemplation with 
which God endowed humans so that they could distinguish between real and false beliefs, true 
and untrue speech, and good and bad actions, and choose the real, the true, and the good in order 
to become his vicegerents on earth. “For God to create human reason, the most noble thing that 
exists, and then render it irrelevant would be repugnant”. Furthermore, if humans did not act then 
it would make no sense for their reason to query, as it does, the motivations for their actions.
476
 
Human reason therefore stands at the heart of Ragib’s beliefs about free will and 
predestination. Alongside it stand his belief in God’s wisdom, which can be trusted and is the 
guiding principle behind all preordained acts and events, and his belief that human passivity is 
                                                 
474 “A second group of the Shia (ar-rāfiḍah) claim that there is no compulsion, as al- ahmī said (according to al-
Ašʿārī:  ahm b. Ṣafwān, d. 128/745, see: al-Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, 279-280.), and no free will, as the Muʿtazilah said…” 
ibid., 41.  
475 Al-Ābī reports that ʿAlī b. Mūsā ar-Riḍā (Abū al-Ḥasan, eighth Imam of the Twelver Shia, d. 203/818) was asked 
about the meaning of the statement of  aʿfar aṣ-Ṣādiq that “there is no compulsion nor free will; [it should be] a 
matter between two matters” (lā  abra wa-lā tafwīḍa amrun bayna amrayn). ʿAlī ar-Riḍā replied: 
whoever claims that it is God who does our actions (anna –llāha yafʿalu afaʿālanā) and then punishes us for 
them has spoken according to the doctrine of compulsion. Whoever claims that God delegated the affair[s] of 
creation and blessing to his creation (anna –llāha fawwaḍa amra –l- alqi wa-r-ri qi ilā  alqihī) has spoken 
according to the doctrine of free will (bi-t-tafwīḍ). The adherent of the doctrine of compulsion is an 
unbeliever (kāfir), and the adherent of the doctrine of free will is a polytheist (mušrik). 
 Upon being subsequently asked the nature of the correct middle position, ʿAlī ar-Riḍā said: “it is finding the path to 
doing what one is ordered and not doing what one is forbidden” (wu ūdu –s-sabīli ilā ityāni mā umirū bihī wa-tarki 
mā nuhū ʿanhu). Abū Saʿd Manṣūr b. al-Ḥusayn al-Ābī, Na r ad-Durr, ed. Muḥammad ʿAlī Qurnah, ʿAlī 
Muḥammad al-Baǧāwī, Ḥusayn Naṣṣār, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān, and Sayyidah Ḥāmid ʿAbd al-ʿĀl, 8 
vols. (Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-ʿĀmmah li-l-Kitāb, 1981-1991). 1:363-364. This formulation is also attributed to  aʿfar 
aṣ-Ṣādiq in: aš-Šahrastānī, al-Milal wa-n-Niḥal, 1:195.  
476 …wa-qabīḥun an yū ida –llāhu taʿālā –l-ʿaqla –llaḏī huwa ašrafu maw ūdin  umma yabṭulu fāʾidatahū… Ragib, 
On Creeds, 282. 
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not an option. Ragib’s ethical principles do not allow him to countenance a human refusal to use 
reason to try and do the right thing, and he quotes the Quran: “humans will have nothing but that 
for which they strive”.477 
In the methodological introduction to his Exegesis, Ragib explains his beliefs about free 
will and predestination by deconstructing the language in which they are couched. In doing so, 
he addresses another critical dimension of the theological debate around compulsion and free 
will: the question of whether human actions are attributable to God, or to the human actors 
themselves. Ragib makes the argument that an expression denoting an action (fiʿl) can refer to 
two different actors (fāʿilān) according to different perspectives (naẓarān).478 As is so often the 
case, the evidence is a line of poetry, which in this case most likely comes from the pre-Islamic 
period: 
[Camels] given to us by our ancestor, by the god, and by the harsh chopping blow.479 
Ragib explains that the verb “given to us” has three agents: the first cause (God), the immediate 
cause (the blow), and the intermediary (the ancestor). All actions can be looked at in two ways. 
On the one hand the human being is the immediate actor (mubāšir), while on the other hand God 
is the first cause. Ragib argues that this duality is reflected in the Quran, which states in different 
                                                 
477 Quran 53:39 (an-Naǧm): wa-an laysa li-l-insāni illā mā saʿā. Ibid., 282-283. 
478 The title of the chapter in which he does so is: “explanation of the aspects that determine a noun’s expression as 
an agent” (faṣlun fī tabyini –l-wu ūhi –llatī yu ʿalu li-a lihā –l-ismu fāʿilan fī-l-lafẓ). ———, "Methodological 
Introduction ed. Nāhī," 101f; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 63f. Large sections of 
the text are repeated in: ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 297f. 
479 ḥabānā bihī ġaddunā wa-l-ilāhu / wa-ḍarbun lanā  aḏimun ṣāʾibun [al-mutaqārib]. ———, "Methodological 
Introduction ed. Nāhī," 102; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 63. ḥabānā bihā 
ġaddunā wa-l-ilāhu / wa-ḍarbun lanā a ḏamu ṣārimun. ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 297. The poet is Ḥazāz 
b. ʿAmr from the tribe of ʿAbd Manāf. According to the editors of both the Mubhi  and the  amāsah, he is pre-
Islamic and to be identified with Ḥarrān b. ʿAmr b. ʿAbd Manāh, who appears elsewhere in the  amāsah. Abū Fatḥ 
ʿUṯmān Ibn  innī, al-Mubhi  fī Tafsīr Asmāʾ Šuʿarāʾ al- amāsah, ed. Marwān al-ʿA īyah and Šayḫ ar-Rāšid 
(Beirut: Dār al-Hiǧrah, 1988). 170-171; Abū ʿAlī al-Iṣfahānī al-Marzūqī and Ḥabīb b. Aws a -Ṭā’ī Abū Tammām, 
Šarḥ Dīwān al- amāsah, ed. Aḥmad Amīn and ʿAbd as-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dār al- īl, 
1991). 1017, 1671.  
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verses that on the one hand God, and on the other hand the angel of death, take souls when they 
die. Ragib also reads the Quranic reference to God’s assistance to the Muslims in their first 
major military victory in 2/624 as referring to a general truth about all human action: “you did 
not kill them, it was God that killed them, and when you threw [stones at them (according to the 
exegetical tradition)], you did not throw, but rather it was God that threw”.480 
Ragib’s conclusion is that God is the only real actor and everyone else is only an actor “by 
semantic extension”.481 In other words, the fiat coinage connection between the expression 
“actor” and the idea of acting only remains fixed when it is God that is being described, and in 
all other cases the relationship between the expression and the idea behind is manipulated and 
extended. This can lead to ambiguity, for example when the  abrīyah say “actor” and intend 
“immediate actor” (humans) while the qadarīyah say “actor” and mean “first cause” (God).482 
Having established the principle of semantic extension with regard to actions, Ragib goes 
on to claim that it had been an operative assumption throughout both the revelation itself and the 
work of the early generations of Muslim scholars.
483
 Ragib’s claim is that everyone always 
shared the assumption that an expression denoting an action could refer to two different actors 
according to different perspectives, and that human actions could therefore remain human and be 
                                                 
480 Quran 8:17 (al-Anfāl): fa-lam taqtulūhum walākinna –llāhu qatalahum wa-mā ramayta iḏ ramayta walākinna –
llāhu ramā. Ragib, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 103; ———, Methodological Introduction and 
Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 67. Ragib was by no means the first exegete to make similar use of this verse, see for example: 
Muḥammad b.  arīr a -Ṭabarī, Tafsīr aṭ- abarī: Ǧāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Taʾwīl  y al-Qurʾān, ed. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbd al-
Muḥsin at-Turkī, 26 vols. (Riyad: Dār ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 2003). 11:82-83f. 
481 fa-huwa –l-fāʿilu –l-ḥaqīqīyu wa-mā siwāhu fāʿilun ʿalā ḍarbin min at-tawassuʿ. Ragib, "Methodological 
Introduction ed. Nāhī," 104; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 67. See also notes 249f. 
482 ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 87; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  
Farḥāt, 40. 
483 wa-bi-hāḏihī –n-naẓri warada –š-šarʿu wa-a maʿu -ṣ-ṣadri –l-awwali min –l-muʾminīna… ———, 
"Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 104; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 67. 
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attributable to God at the same time. This is why “there is neither compulsion nor free will”. 
Compulsion requires that human actions are attributable to God alone, and free will requires that 
they are attributable only to humans. Ragib’s linguistic principle is a polysemic mean: the 
expression “act” refers to multiple agents, neither of which can be the sole agent. The connection 
by fiat coinage may be between the expression “agent” and the idea of God’s agency, but the 
subsequent connections by semantic extension between the expression “agent” and ideas of 
human agency are also fully linguistically operational.
484
 
Ragib ends the chapter with the observation that this principle applies whenever language 
confronts divinity. He writes that the early generations of Muslim scholars used the expression 
“thing” to describe both God and his creation, again “according to two different perspectives” 
(bi-naẓarayni mu talifayn).485 Furthermore, he remarks that this polysemic principle, in which 
one expression can refer to two different ideas according to perspective, is a fact of the language 
itself. This is because the Arabic verbal noun (al-maṣdar) can be used to refer to both an active 
                                                 
484 Ragib does not take us through this line of reasoning with the level of detail I have provided in these two 
sentences. Instead, he states the relevance of this chapter (titled “explanation of the aspects that determine a noun’s 
expression as an agent”, see note 478) to the question of free will and predestination in its first sentence (wa-huwa 
faṣlun tak uru –š-šubahu li-a lihī wa-yataʿallaqu bihī –l-farīqāni –l-mansūbāni ilā –l- abri wa-l-qadar), and 
explains later that the chapter erases the doubt that comes from thinking that actions are only attributable to either 
God or to humans, and not to both at the same time (wa-bi-taṣawwuri hāḏā –l-faṣli ya ūlu –š-šubahu fīmā yurā min 
–l-afʿāli mansūban ilā –llāhi taʿālā manfīyan ʿan –l-ʿabdi wa-mansūban ilā –l-ʿabdi tāratan manfīyan ʿan –llāhi 
taʿālā). ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 101, 103; ———, Methodological Introduction and 
Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 63, 65. 
485 The question of whether the word šayʾ could be used to describe God was indeed a subject of theological 
discussion, but I have been unable to find anyone making Ragib’s point about the maṣdar or polysemy (for which 
see page 159). See: al-Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, 181; Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ, 1:123-125, 12:186-188; Ibn Fūrak, 
Maqālāt ed  as-Sāyiḥ, 43; Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad al-Māturīdī, Kitāb at-Tawḥīd, ed. Bekir Topaloǧlu and 
Muhammed Aruçı (Istanbul / Beirut: Irşhad Kitap Yayin Daǧitim / Dār Ṣādir, 2001). 104-107. Al-Māturīdī, Ibn 
Fūrak, and Faḫr ad-Dīn agree with Ragib that šayʾ is a legitimate expression to use for God, and Faḫr ad-Dīn 
ascribes opposition to this position to  aḥm b. Ṣafwān (d. 128/745), a historical figure who nevertheless often 
occupies an almost apocryphal role in theological discussions. Faḫr ad-Dīn also makes the pertinent observation that 
this is a theological debate on the level of expressions, not ideas: God is definitely a thing, the question is just 
whether or not to call him one (fa-hāḏā ni āʿun fī mu arradi –l-lafẓi lā fī-l-maʿnā). Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ, 
1:125.  
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agent (al-fāʿil) and a passive recipient (al-mafʿūl), and “conceiving of this actuality behind the 
expression ‘thing’ is something that reminds us that this language is from God”.486 Polysemy is 
not just an explanatory tool, or a linguistic assumption. It is a linguistic structure so productive 
and effective that it constitutes evidence of intelligent design.  
Attributes 
God’s attributes may well be the most important subject in Islamic theology. From at least 
the eighth century onwards, scholars had engaged in a prolonged dialectical attempt to 
understand what God was. Uniquely among the religions of the mediaeval Middle East, these 
Muslim scholars had a scripture that they believed was God’s actual word, right down to the 
vowels and the grammar, scarcely corrupted by its passage through mortal hands. Less uniquely, 
many of them developed a commitment to the interpretative and analytical power of their own 
reason, and thus one could easily read the history of Islamic theology as a long, multifarious 
interaction between reason and revelation. This is certainly true in the case of Ragib, as we will 
see below. 
The fixed corpus of Islamic scripture was unable to answer all the questions about God that 
were posed over the centuries across a febrile theological landscape in which many of the key 
questions about the nature of God had already been asked, and answered, in other religious 
traditions (most notably Christianity, Neoplatonism, and combinations thereof). The Quran, and 
to a much lesser extent the Hadith,
487
 told believers that God knew, was powerful, sat on a 
                                                 
486 wa-taṣawwuru hāḏihī –l-ḥaqīqati min lafẓati –š-šayʾi mimmā yunabbihunā anna hāḏihī –l-luġati min  ihati –
llāhi taʿālā. Ragib, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 104; ———, Methodological Introduction and 
Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 67. 
487 See, for example, note 253. 
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throne, and had hands. The fact they these were God’s own words and not the words of humans 
describing him meant that Muslim scholars had to give the words substantial epistemological 
weight, regardless of where those scholars stood on the primacy of revelation or reason.  
Harry Austryn Wolfson made the critically important point that the problem of the 
attributes is both ontological and semantic.
488
 It is ontological in the sense that scholars sought to 
understand the actual nature of God (physical or not) and whether the existence of, for example, 
God’s knowledge alongside him implied that he was made up of more than one thing. It is 
semantic in the sense that scholars sought to understand on the one hand how God could be both 
wholly unlike his creation and at the same time describe himself with words that he also used to 
describe them, and on the other hand how they themselves could then go on to describe God 
using the language they shared with him.
489
 
 For Ragib, unsuprisingly, the problem was largely semantic. In his Quranic Glossary, he 
reads God’s Quranic phrase: “the lord of glory, above that which they describe” as being: “a 
warning that most of his attributes are not as they are believed to be by most people, and cannot 
be conceived of by way of analogy or comparison”.490 This admission of the limits of language, 
however polysemic, to deal with the ontological reality of God is reflected at the start of On 
Creeds, where the first two of the seven beliefs that define Sunni faith address the attributes. 
Ragib’s first principle of Sunni belief is that God is one, unlike anything else that exists, and all 
                                                 
488 Wolfson, Philosophy, 205. 
489 Ibid., 207. My assertion that God and humanity shared the language does not come from Wolfson. See references 
at note 452. 
490 qawluḥu ʿa  a wa- alla rabbi –l-ʿi  ati ʿammā yaṣifūn [Quran 37:180 (aṣ-Ṣaffāt)] tanbīhun ʿalā anna ak ara 
ṣifātihī laysa ʿalā ḥasabi mā yaʿtaqiduhū ka īrun min -n-nāsi lam yutaṣawwar ʿanhu tam īlun wa-tašbīhun wa-
annahū yataʿālā ammā yaqūlu –l-kuffār. Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 873. Only the final phrase (“and that God is 
above that which the unbelievers say” is the standard interpretation of the verse in the exegetical tradition. See, for 
example: a -Ṭabarī, Tafsīr, 19:661.   
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that he shares with others are “some of his names, such as ‘knowing’ and ‘powerful’, with regard 
to the expression, not the idea”.491 Language is therefore the only thing that connects humanity to 
the divine and it does so only on the level of expressions. Second, Sunnis must: 
believe that God is alive, knowing, powerful, hearing, seeing, and the other attributes for 
which there is precedent in the revelation and upon which the community agrees. 
Furthermore, that he has knowledge, power, and sight that cannot be apprehended by the 
senses. Sunnis must also abandon investigation into the idea behind his attributes unless 
that investigation was already carried out by our forefathers. They must not engage in 
theological discussions about whether descriptions of God are themselves eternal or 
temporal, whether they are God or something other than God, or not God and not 
something other than God, for that is all heresy and engagement with that which the 
Prophet’s Companions and the generation after them left aside; it is the blasphemy with 
regard to God’s names that God mentioned in the Quran: ‘throw off those who blaspheme 
with regard to his names’.492 
This position is consistent with Ragib’s tendency to disparage and caricature theological 
argumentation. However, later in the same work he will engage in a prolonged theological 
discussion of the problem of the attributes. How can we explain this apparent contradiction? 
Perhaps the answer lies in Wolfson’s distinction between the ontological and semantic aspects of 
the problem, and Ragib’s intellectual distaste is in fact for ontological speculation about God’s 
                                                 
491 awwalan anna –llāha ʿa  a wa- alla wāḥidun lā yušbihuhū šayʾun min –l-maw ūdāti wa-lā yušārikuhū bi-
wa hin illā fī baʿḍi asmāʾihī lafẓan lā maʿnan naḥwu ʿālimin wa-qādir. Ragib, On Creeds, 28.  
492 The text reads: 
a - ānī an yaʿtaqida fī ṣifātihī annahū ḥayyun ʿālimun qādirun samīʿun baṣīrun ilā ġayri ḏālika min aṣ-ṣifāti 
–llatī warada bihī –š-šarʿu wa- tamaʿat ʿalayhi –l-ummatu wa-anna lahū ʿilman wa-qudratan wa-baṣaran lā 
ʿalā –l-wa hi –l-maḥsūsi wa-yatruka –l-baḥ a ʿan maʿnā ṣifātihī siwā mā warada ʿan –s-salafi wa-yatruka –
l-kalāma fī waṣfihā annahā qadīmatun aw muḥda atun wa-hal hiya huwa aw ġayruhū aw lā hiya huwa wa-lā 
ġayruhū [following ———. Chester Beatty AR 5277. f.5b. Apparently corrupt alternatives are: wa-hal hiya 
huwa aw ġayruhū wa-lā huwa huwa wa-lā ġayruhū. ———. Fey ullah Efendi 2141. f.28b. And: wa-hal 
huwa aw ġayruhū wa-lā huwa wa-lā ġayruhū. ———. Sehid Ali 382. f.19a.] fa-inna ḏālika kulluhū bidʿatun 
wa- awḍun fīmā amsaka ʿanhu -ṣ-ṣaḥābatu wa-t-tābiʿūna bal ilḥādun fī asmāʾihī –l-maḏkūrati fī qawlihī wa-
ḏarū –llaḏīna yulḥidūna fī asmāʾihī [Quran 7:180]. 
———, On Creeds, 28. Cf. Ibid., 270.  
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attributes: the question of whether the attributes actually constitute part of God or are separate 
from him is heretical innovation.
493
 On the contrary, the semantic question about what God said 
and what humans can and should say about him is a valid one. Ragib engages with it in depth, 
and I will record his discussion of the attributes in detail because it shows how language lay at 
the centre of his understanding of perhaps the most important problem in Islamic theology. What 
follows is an explanatory and greatly abbreviated paraphrase of the discussion, including a 
number of direct quotations that are represented as such:  
Ragib starts with an explanation of the concept of similarity (mumā alah) in order to 
establish that there is no similarity between God and humanity. Bearing in mind that God 
shares nothing with any part of his creation, it is better for us not to refer to him with our 
‘tongues of flesh’, in order to avoid describing him as having human characteristics.494 The 
only reason we do so is because God, through the Prophet, mercifully permitted us to do so. 
There are two types of attributes: those that hold God aloof (muna  ihah) and those that 
praise him (muma  idah).495 The attributes that hold God aloof can then be subdivided into 
those that do so through both expression and idea, and those that do so only through the 
idea. For example, while the Quranic verses ‘neither begetting nor begotten’ and ‘taken 
neither by light nor heavy sleep’ are made up of expressions that communicate ideas that 
describe God negatively, the idea of oneness (aḥad) on its own denies any duality to God 
‘even if the expression establishes it’.496  
                                                 
493 Wolfson, although he had not read Ragib, agreed: “[n]o basis for this problem is to be found in the Koran. It 
originated under the influence of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity…”. Wolfson, Philosophy, 206. 
494 …an nuna  iha –llāha ʿa  a wa- alla ʿan an naḏkurahū bi-l-alsinati –l-laḥmīyati faḍlan ʿan an naṣifahū bi-ṣ-
ṣifāti –l-bašarīyah. Ragib, On Creeds, 75. Cf. Ibid., 270. 
495 Ibid., 75-76. I have not found this division of the attributes outside Ragib’s work. The more usual division at his 
time was between attributes of God’s essence (ḏāt) and attributes of his actions (afʿāl). See: al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, 
25; Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt ed  as-Sāyiḥ, 48. 
496 Quran 112:3 (al-Iḫlāṣ) and Quran 2:255. wa-ḍarbun fī-l-maʿnā dūna –l-lafẓi ka-qawlihī lanā aḥadun –llaḏī yufīdu 
nafīya –l-u nawīyati wa-in kāna lafẓuhū i bātan. Ragib, On Creeds, 76. 
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What Ragib is saying here is that there are cases in which the idea overrides the expression. 
Some of the ideas behind the language of revelation are so central to the conception of God that 
they must be adhered to even if the revelation also contains expressions that contradict them. The 
Quran makes the ontological claim that God is one, and this overrides any semantic questions 
about how this claim is expressed.
497
 
Ragib continues with the argument that the attributes that hold God aloof are superior to 
those that praise him, in large part because human knowledge of God is necessarily so 
limited and imperfect that we can more accurately say what God is not than what he is. 
While attributes that praise God, on the other hand, inevitably associate him with 
descriptions that also apply to humans, and are consequently problematic. It is for this 
reason that the 112th Sura of the Quran, al-Iḫlāṣ, despite being only seventeen words long, 
is held to be equivalent to a third of the Quran. Its second two verses state negative 
attributes (‘neither begetting nor begotten, with none comparable to him’), and its first two 
verses (‘say: he is God the one, God the eternal source’), ‘while their form is positive, are 
in reality negative because oneness negates duality and multiplicity, and being an eternal 
source is a negation of any need for food, drink, limbs, and tools…’.498 Precedent is the 
only reason that we use positive attributes that praise God. It is precedent that leads us to 
reject the position of some philosophers (ṣinfun min –l-falāsifah) that God should only be 
described negatively in order to avoid implying that God is composite or shares human 
characteristics. In fact, the philosophers themselves also use positive terminology to 
describe God, such as ‘the pure that-ness’ (an-annīyah al-maḥḍ) or ‘the true he-ness’ (al-
huwīyah bi-l-ḥaqq),499 but in doing so fall into the trap of positive description, and then by 
adding qualifers to those descriptions they fall into the trap of polytheism. 
                                                 
497 Cf. the discussion of figurative readings below (from lafẓ to maʿnā versus from maʿnā to lafẓ) at page 191. 
498 Quran 112:1-4: qul huwa –llāhu aḥadun  allāhu ṣamadun lam yalid wa-lam yūlad wa-lam yakun lahū kufūwan 
aḥad. Ragib writes: wa-anna lafẓata –l-aḥadi wa-ṣ-ṣamadi wa-in kānat bi-ṣūrati –l-i bāti fa-hiya fī –l-ḥaqīqati 
salbun wa-nafyun fa-inna –l-aḥadīyata nafyu –l-u nawīyati wa-l-ku rati wa-ṣ-ṣamadīyata nafyu –l-ḥā ati ilā -ṭ-
ṭaʿāmi wa-š-šarābi wa-l-aʿḍāʾi wa-l-ālāti… Ragib, On Creeds, 78. 
499 For a discussion of these terms, see: Toby Mayer, "Anniyya," in Encyclopaedia of Islam  THREE, ed. Gudrun 
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The Muʿtazilah claimed that God could be described with any word that made sense 
according to human understanding,500 whereas the traditionists (ahl al-a ar) maintained that 
precedent was the only source that could legitimate a description, and that the precedent 
had to be either certain [with regard to its historical accuracy], or agreed upon by the 
community. These traditionists were aware that the names enumerated in divine precedent 
were accidents of quantity, quality, time, and place that if they had been arrived at 
independently by human reason would have led to false equations between God and 
humanity. Human reasoning was problematic, because even in the case of specialists (aḥl 
al-ḥaqāʾiq) it could lead to well-motivated false attribution of good human qualities to God 
(tašbīh), or conversely false denial of qualities that are enshrined in revelation (taʿṭīl).501 
Attributes that praise God can be divided into those that come in pairs, such as ‘the first 
and the last’,502 and those that come singly and often at the end of Quranic verses, such as 
‘the wise’, or ‘the knowing’. They can also be divided into names (ism) and descriptions 
(waṣf), although all agree that ‘God’ is the only name, while the rest are descriptions.503 
Attributes can be restricted, such as ‘God is the light of the heavens and earth’,504 which 
does not mean that God is just ‘the light’, or they can be reliant on accompanying 
expressions for context, such as ‘they plotted, and we plotted’, which does not mean that 
                                                                                                                                                             
Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill Online: Brill, 2011). 
500 This is an accurate epitome of the Muʿtazilī position. See, for example, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, who maintains 
that God can be described with those descriptions to which he is indeed entitled. Peters, God's created speech, 152-
153, 250f; al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, al-Muġnī, 7:53, 7:117. 
501 Ragib, On Creeds, 80. These specialists (ahl al-ḥaqāʾiq) are ill-defined. It often appears that Ragib understands 
the ḥaqāʾiq to be the accurate connections drawn between expressions and ideas, but in the absence of textual 
evidence this can only remain an inference. Ragib does, however, place the ḥaqāʾiq alongside the disciplines of 
divinely-provided knowledge (ʿulūm al-mawhabah) that the highest levels of humanity can access. ———, "On the 
Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions," 220, 222. Cf. page 87. 
502 Quran 57:3: huwa –l-awwalu wa-l-ā iru wa-ẓ-ẓāhiru wa-l-bāṭinu wa-huwa bi-kulli šayʾin ʿalīm. Ragib returns to 
this point in more detail in what follows. He notes that theologians analyse God as being the first and last in terms of 
him existing before anything else, and after everything has gone (this is an accurate representation of the position of, 
for example: Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt ed  as-Sāyiḥ, 44.) Ragib raises the question of whether this reading implies that at 
the current time (i.e. neither before nor after) the verse is false, because creation is here and so is God. Ragib then 
answers this potential objection by clarifying that God simply intended (qaṣada) to highlight the amazing nature of 
his attributes and the fact that he is the source of all creation. Ragib, On Creeds, 90. 
503 This topic was in fact the subject of more debate than Ragib implies. See, for example: Peters, God's created 
speech, 251. 
504 Quran 24:35: allāhu nūru –s-samāwāti wa-l-arḍ. 
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God is an inveterate plotter.505 Attributes can also be divided into those specific to God, 
such as ‘the merciful’, and homonymous attributes that God shares with others, which refer 
to quantity, quality, adjunction,506 time, ownership, emotion, and place. 
Next, Ragib expands on the difference between names and descriptions, and this leads him into 
discussion of the nature of name (ism), attribute (ṣifah), and description (waṣf): 
‘The name is an expression (lafẓah) that acts as a sign for an essence in order that listeners 
understand what they have heard. The attribute expresses (ʿibārah ʿan) a state that the 
essence is in.507 The description is what the describer says when he says something is such-
and-such. Furthermore, the expression (lafẓah) ‘attribute’ can be used in the place of 
‘description’ and vice versa, as happens with measure, weight, number, and time.508 The 
fiat coinage of ‘name’ is more general than that of ‘attribute’ because every attribute can be 
called a name, whereas not every name can be called an attribute’.509 
Names are either proper names, or not. The proper name (al-ʿalam) is that which is not 
considered to have an idea behind it, but rather it is just a sign. For example, one does not 
                                                 
505 Quran 27:50 (an-Naml): wa-makarū makran wa-makarnā makran. This verse is part of the narrative in which 
God sends the prophet Ṣāliḥ to the people of  āmūd. 
506 mā yadillu ʿalā iḍāfatin naḥwu –l-maw ūd  The implication here appears to be that some attributes, such as 
existence, can be added or adjoined to God without the result being polytheism. Ragib, On Creeds, 82. 
507 This is a critical departure from the Ašʿarī position of al-Bāqillānī, who makes a distinction between the 
ontological ṣifah, which is a “real existent residing in God”, and the semantic waṣf  which is a speech act. For Ragib, 
ṣifah is not an ontological fact but an expression of one, that itself is made up of an expression (lafẓ) and an idea 
(maʿnā). This is made clear by Ragib’s reference in the next sentence to lafẓatu -ṣ-ṣifati (see note 509 below). Abū 
Bakr Muḥammad b. a -Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd al-Awāʾil fī Tal īṣ ad-Dalāʾil, ed. ʿImād ad-Dīn Aḥmad Ḥaydar 
(Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Kutub aṯ- aqāfīyah, 1987). 247, 250; Claude Gilliot, "Attributes of God," in Encyclopaedia 
of Islam  THREE, ed. Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill Online: Brill, 2011). 
508 Another Ašʿarī, Ibn Fūrak, contradicts al-Baqillānī (see note 507) and makes the same point as Ragib, writing that 
al-Ašʿarī had said that there was no difference between the words ṣifah and waṣf. Ibn Fūrak also uses some of the 
same examples as Ragib (measure, weight, number, time). Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt ed  as-Sāyiḥ, 38.  
509 anna –l-sma lafẓatun  uʿilat simatan li-ḏātin min –l-ḏawāti li-yafhama bihā –l-mu āṭabu mā yulqā ilayhi wa-ṣ-
ṣifatu ʿibāratun ʿan ḥālin min aḥwāli –ḏ-ḏāti wa-l-waṣfu qawlu –l-wāṣifi wa-huwa an yaqūla huwa kaḏā aw laysa 
bi-kaḏā wa-qad taḍaʿu lafẓatu -ṣ-ṣifati mawḍaʿa –l-waṣfi wa-lafẓu –l-waṣfi mawḍaʿa -ṣ-ṣifati ka- - inati wa-l-wa ni 
wa-l-ʿiddati wa-l-waʿdi wa-l-smu aʿammu fī-l-waḍʿi min aṣ-ṣifati li-anna kulla ṣifatin yuqālu lahū –smun wa-lā 
yuqālu li-kulli –smin ṣifah. Ragib, On Creeds, 83. 
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think of an idea of ‘increase’ (a - iyādah) when one hears the name ‘Zayd’, rather one 
thinks of the person Zayd.510  
Names other than proper names are either derived (muštaqq) from other words that share a 
connecting idea, or not. Non-derived names are all those which are coined by fiat for a 
specific idea.511 
There are two sorts of attributes. Firstly, those that ‘express an idea that subsists in the 
essence of the thing described, such as black and moving’.512 When this type of attribute is 
used to describe two things it requires that they actually do share something. This first type 
can be either essential, such as heat in fire, or it can be accidental, such as heat in water. 
The second type of attribute “expresses an idea that does not subsist in the essence of the 
thing described, but is rather applied to it because of a relationship between it and 
something else’.513 For example ‘king of the house’ is a phrase in which the relationship 
                                                 
510 ʿalamun wa-huwa –llaḏī lā yuʿtabaru fīhi maʿnan wa-innamā ya rī ma rā –l-išārati ilayhi ka-Zaydin –llaḏī lā 
yurāʿī fīhi maʿnā – - iyādah. Ibid. 
511 wa-ġayru muštaqqin kullu –smin wuḍiʿa fī aṣli –l-luġati li-nawʿin mā min ġayri -ʿtibāri maʿnan fīhi huwa 
maw ūdun fī ġayrihī. Ibid., 84. The next section is unclear:  
The difference between the derived name and the description is that the description does not depend, in all its 
constituent parts, on every aspect that is found in the attribute. With regard to the name, however, one follows 
the coiner of the language by fiat, and the name cannot be generally applicable to everything that is found in 
the idea.  
Ragib’s point appears to be that waṣf is an unstructured speech act from which deductions cannot be made, while 
this is not the case with the ism al-muštaqq, from which deductions about the referent can be made with the help of 
the lexicon. The translation above follows Feyzullah Efendi 2141. Al-ʿAǧalī’s edition is corrupt (ibid.), and the other 
two mss. have less convincing versions.  
wa-l-farqu bayna –l-smi –l-muštaqqi wa-bayna –l-waṣfi anna –l-waṣfa lā yatawaqqafu fī a  āʾihī ʿalā kulli 
mā wa ada fīhi tilka -ṣ-ṣifatu wa-l-smu yuttabaʿu fīhi wāḍiʿa –l-luġati wa-lā yu ʿalu muṭṭaradan fī kulli mā 
wa ada fīhi ḏālika –l-maʿnā. ———. Feyzullah Efendi 2141. f.44b. 
wa-l-farqu bayna –l-smi –l-muštaqqi wa-bayna –l-waṣfi anna –l-waṣfa lā yataġayyaru bi-tawaqqufin fī 
a  āʾihī ʿalā kulli mā wa ada fīhi tilka -ṣ-ṣifatu wa-l-smu yuttabaʿu fīhi wāḍiʿa –l-luġati wa-lā yu ʿalu 
muṭṭaradan mā wa ada fīhi ḏālika –l-maʿnā. ———. Sehid Ali 382. f.23b. 
wa-l-farqu bayna –l-smi –l-muštaqqi wa–l-waṣfi anna –l-waṣfa lā yatawaqqafu fī a  āʾihī ʿalā kulli mā 
wa ada fīhi tilka -ṣ-ṣifatu wa-l-smu yuttabaʿu bihi wāḍiʿa –l-luġati wa-lā yu ʿalu muṭṭaradan ġayra maʿnan 
mā wa ada fīhi ḏālika –l-maʿnā. ———. Chester Beatty AR 5277. f.17b. 
512 mā huwa ʿibāratun ʿan maʿnan yaqūmu bi-ḏāti –l-mawṣūfi ka-l-aswadi wa-l-mutaḥarrik. ———, On Creeds, 84. 
513 mā huwa ʿibāratun ʿan maʿnan lā yaqūmu bi-ḏātihī bal yuṭlaqu ʿalayhi li-ʿalāqatin baynihī wa-bayna ḏālika. 
Ibid. 
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between an actual king and the king of a house is not one where something is actually 
shared between their two separate essences. 
When Ragib argues for a distinction between attributes that do not imply real ontological 
connections and those that do, he is clearly thinking about God. He wants to imply that the 
relationship between God and knowing in “God is knowing” is not the same as the relationship 
between “the stone” and “black” in “the stone is black”. Instead God is knowing in the same way 
as the castle in ‘an Englishman’s home is his castle’ is a real castle with crenellations and a 
drawbridge. 
In the immediately preceding discussion about the nature of names and attributes, Ragib 
makes some interesting points about linguistic structure and the way in which it relates to the 
external physical world. Proper names are expressions that directly indicate external physical 
referents, not ideas. This is a reiteration, using different terminology, of his argument in his 
manual of poetics, where he says that language is either a proper name or it is polysemous.
514
 We 
can now refine this as follows: language is either a connection between an expression and the 
ideas shared between people’s minds, in which case it is inevitably polysemous, or it is a proper 
name that connects an expression directly to an external physical referent. 
Next, Ragib undertakes a brief heresiographical review of those attributes that are said to 
be connected to God’s essence, without mentioning names of schools or scholars. 
The first school of thought holds that ‘God is alive, powerful, and knowing, with a 
knowledge, power, and eternal life, and that these ideas subsist and exist for him in his 
                                                 
514 See page 115. 
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essence, thereby making him alive, powerful, and knowing’.515 This is an Ašʿarī position,516 
and Ragib’s objection to it is that it implies God is a composite. 
The second position is also Muʿtazilī,517 and holds that God does not have these attributes 
but that they are rather states (aḥwāl) to which he is entitled, which should not be described 
as eternal, or as things. Ragib’s objection here is that although the first school of thought 
was incorrect and implied polytheism, it did at least make sense whereas this second school 
of thought is incomprehensible.518 
The third position maintains that God is, for example, knowing with a knowledge in his 
essence, and that his essence is able to be the two things at the same time. Ragib allows that 
this might be the case, but notes that it does open the door for a perception of God as 
composite. 
The fourth position is that God is, for example, knowing, but does not have knowledge,519 
and that the idea behind the name ‘knowing’ is the same whether it is used for God or 
humans. Ragib objects both to the sharing of an idea between God and humans, and to ‘the 
invention of names, the referents of which it is impossible to know through the lexicon’.520 
The fifth position is that of the traditionists (ahl al-a ar), who maintain that God has these 
attributes, can be described with them, but there is no connection between the idea behind 
                                                 
515 anna –llāha taʿālā ḥayyun qādirun ʿālimun bi-ʿilmin wa-qudratin wa-ḥayātin qadīmatin wa-anna hāḏihī –l-
maʿānī qāʿimatun bi-ḏātihī maw ūdatun lahū wa-bi-hā ṣāra ḥayyan ʿāliman wa-qādiran. Ragib, On Creeds, 86. 
516Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt ed  as-Sāyiḥ, 39. However, al-Ašʿarī also attributes an analagous position to the Muʿtazilī Abū 
Huḏayl (Muḥammad b. al-Huḏayl al-ʿAbdī, d. ca. 227/842). al-Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, 165, 188; Peters, God's created 
speech, 251.  
517 It is attributed to Abū Hāšim al- ubbāʾī. See: ———, God's created speech, 252-253. 
518 Ragib’s objection is to the doctrine that God does not have these attributes (maḏhabu man lā ya butu lahū ʿilman 
wa-qudratan wa-ḥayātan) rather than the doctrine of states (aḥwāl), Ragib having previously stated that the 
attributes do express God’s states (wa-ṣ-ṣifatu ʿibāratun ʿan ḥālin min aḥwāli –ḏ-ḏāti). Ragib, On Creeds, 83, 86. 
519 Up to this point, this is the position that al-Ašʿārī attributes to “most of the Muʿtazilah” and a number of other 
sects. al-Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, 164. 
520 maʿa – tirāʿi asāmin lā sabīla ilā –l-wuqūfi ʿalā madlūlātihā min ḥay u –l-luġah. The implication here is that the 
idea of a “knowledge” that humans and God share is not in the lexicon. All that the lexicon can provide is 
explanations of the “knowledge” that humans have, in addition to negative explanations of how God’s knowledge is, 
for example, not limited. Ragib, On Creeds, 87. 
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them when applied to him, and the idea behind them when applied to humans. If these 
names are applied to humans, then they communicate a specific form (hayʾah) that 
involves (in the case of ‘knowing’) something being known, or (in the case of ‘doing’) 
some action being taken. On the contrary, when these names are applied to God they 
communicate absolute negatives: there is nothing that he does not know, and there is 
nothing that he cannot do. The expression ‘knowing’ is therefore effectively two 
expressions, one for humans and one for God. The expression for humans admits negatives 
and context, such as ‘he does not know that’, or ‘he can do that in such a place’. The 
expression for God admits neither negatives nor any limitation. 
Expressions of praise and blame have levels, and God is of course at the very highest level 
of the expressions of praise. This is why people have said that these expressions are literal 
when applied to God and non-literal when applied to humans. God is the one who is most 
entitled to be described with these words. The is the same dynamic as applies when humans 
are described as truly human only when they fulfill their ethical promise, otherwise they are 
described as donkeys or cows.521 
It is interesting that none of the five positions that Ragib lays out match the famous doctrine 
mainted by al-Ašʿarī: that God is knowing with a knowledge, but that knowledge cannot be 
God.
522
 The closest Ragib’s brief heresiography comes to this is the third position, which shares 
al-Ašʿārī’s formulation that God is knowing with a knowledge in his essence, but lacks his 
consequent statement that it is impossible for this knowledge to be God. Instead, we get Ragib’s 
phrase “and that his essence is able to be the two things at the same time”, which can be read as a 
positive rendering of al-Ašʿarī’s (and Ibn Kullāb’s)523 negative statements. Ragib is, in effect, 
                                                 
521 Ibid., 88-89. Ragib makes this same point in his ethical works, see: ———, Analysis of the Two Creations, 26-28 
(introduction). 
522 ṣaḥḥa annahū ʿālimun bi-ʿilmin yastaḥīlu an yakūna huwa nafsuhū. al-Ašʿarī, The Theology, 14. 
523 Ragib’s third position also lacked the related statement of Ibn Kullāb, who also said that God is knowing with a 
knowledge in his essence, but went on to say that “God’s attributes belong to his essence and subsist in him, but are 
not him, nor anything other than him, and they do not have attributes of their own”. ———, Maqālāt, 169.  
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arguing that if theologians want to say that God’s attributes are in God’s essence but are not God, 
then they must mean that his essence can be two things at once. 
It is therefore clear that Ragib is conscious of the ontological aspect of the problem of the 
attributes, and indeed his criticism of the first three positions is that they imply God is 
ontologically composite. However, both his argumentation throughout the long passage on the 
attributes, and the fifth position to which he adheres, have a semantic aspect. He writes that both 
of the two main concepts in question (name and attribute) are aspects of the relationship between 
language and essence: expressions that act as signs for essences, and expressions of the states of 
essences. This assumption that language is inextricably part of the problem was not shared by the 
Ašāʿirah and Muʿtazilah, who argued about the ontological relationship between God’s essence 
and his attributes, not about the relationship between language and essences.  
For Ragib, God’s attributes are linguistic structures that God used to describe himself in his 
revelation, and that humans can consequently use to describe him. These linguistic structures are 
made up of expressions that refer to ideas. The ideas are then ideas of ontological entities, such 
as God himself, or a human being. Ragib’s answer to the problem of the attributes uses this 
model to describe a situation in which each expression can refer to two different ideas. One idea 
is made up of negative associations and is of God, while the other idea is made up of positive 
associations and is of humans. Therefore the expression “knowing” can either refer to the idea of 
God not being ignorant of anything, or it can refer to the idea of Zayd knowing ʿAmr is at home 
(but possibly not knowing in which room). 
This model enables us to contribute to an interpretative problem highlighted by Heinrichs. 
An-Nāšiʾ al-Akbar (Abū al-ʿAbbās, d. 293/906) was reported to have written that the attributes 
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apply to God literally (fī-l-ḥaqīqah) and to anyone else non-literally (fī-l-ma ā ).524 Ragib 
proposed the same distinction, albeit with different reasoning. For an-Nāšiʾ, the literal or non-
literal binary was the only way in which the difference between attributes applied to God and 
attributes applied to humans could be described. He is reported to have written that names can 
apply to two different external physical referents (al-musammā) for four different reasons: either 
there is a similarity (ištibāh) in their essences; or a similarity in some quality of their essences 
(li-štibāhi mā -ḥtamalathu –ḏ-ḏātayn) such as “colour” or “movement”; or they share a 
necessary quality, the absence of which means they cease to be what they are, such as “sensible” 
or “created” (li-muḍāfin uḍīfa ilayhi wa-muyyi ā minhu lawlāhu mā kānā ka-ḏālika); or they 
apply to one literally and to the other non-literally. When it comes to the attributes, God, and 
humanity, there can be no sharing or similarity of essences or qualities, and the literal/non-literal 
binary is therefore the only option. Ragib, on the other hand, explained the applicability of the 
literal/non-literal binary to the problem of the attributes in terms of the breadth of semantic field 
available in any idea: there are always degrees of a quality, God is always at the highest degree, 




Heinrichs raises the question of whether an-Nāšiʾ’s use of “literally” (fī-l-ḥaqīqah) is a 
claim about the real nature of an external physical reality, or a claim about the nature of the 
                                                 
524 Or bi-l-ḥaqīqah and bi-l-ma ā . ibid., 184-185, 500-501; Heinrichs, "The  aqīqa-Majā  Dichotomy," 136-137; 
Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 22. 
525 al-Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, 184-185, 500-501; Ragib, On Creeds, 88-90. There is, of course, a degree of circularity in 
Ragib’s argument: the determining factor in what is coined by fiat is of course the fiat coiner himself – God. See 
also notes 214 and 521 for Ragib’s other uses of the literal/non-literal binary.  
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linguistic description of that reality.
526
 Looked at in light of the greater detail about linguistic 
structures available in Ragib’s work it would appear to be both. An-Nāšiʾ’s basic linguistic 
structure is one in which words (names, al-ism) refer to external physical reality (al-musammā) 
and the ways in which they do so are determined by the identity of that external physical reality. 
In Ragib’s more nuanced model, expressions refer to ideas in the mind, and the mind is sensitive 
to ontological problems. The language user therefore decides to which ideas the expressions refer 
based on ontological considerations. In the work of both scholars, separated by approximately 
100 years, the dynamic is neither purely semantic nor purely ontological. It is rather a dynamic in 
which semantic decisions are made on the basis of ontological considerations. 
Poetics 
Poetry was central to mediaeval Islamicate intellectual culture. It was both a source of 
linguistic precedent and an arena for innovation. By the eleventh century, for a scholar such as 
Ragib who may have lived his whole life in Iranian towns and villages where Persian was the 
most common spoken language, and for whom the Prophet and his companions were as 
chronologically distant as the Spanish Armada and the founding of New York and Boston are to 
us today, poetry was a living link to pre-Islamic Arabia. Ragib was familiar with the same poetic 
culture that Muḥammad grew up with in the seventh century, and he was also an active part of a 
development of poetic criticism that had been gathering momentum and complexity ever since 
the, possibly apocryphal, poetic competitions in the pre-Islamic Ḥiǧāz. 
One thread of the discussions about poetics is particularly relevant to this dissertation. It is 
the distinction often made between analysis of poetry in terms of its expressions, and analysis of 
                                                 
526 Heinrichs, "The  aqīqa-Majā  Dichotomy," 137. 
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poetry in terms of its ideas.527 As with many other of the apparently clear-cut distinctions that 
were popular with mediaeval scholars engaged in the process of writing, and indeed imagining, 
the history of poetic criticism, this binary is somewhat less of a chasm than it seems. Apart from 
a few oft-quoted claims that poetic expressions were the site of genius while poetic ideas were 
simply repetitions of what the man in the market was thinking,528 the majority of scholars 
                                                 
527 For more on the debates between “partisans of expressions” and “partisans of ideas” see: ʿAbbās, Tārī  an-Naqd, 
422f; Lale Behzadi, "Al-Jāḥiẓ and his Successors on Communication and the Levels of Language," in Al-Jāḥiẓ  a 
Muslim Humanist for our time, ed. Arnim Heinemann, Manfred Kropp, Tarif Khalidi, and John Lash Meloy 
(Würzburg: Ergon, 2009), 125-130; ———, Sprache und Verstehen: al-Ǧāḥiẓ  ber die Vollkommenheit des 
Ausdrucks  (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009). 75f; Ḥasīkī, "Al-ʿAlāqah Bayn al-Lafẓ wa-l-Maʿnā," 190-192; 
Wolfhart Heinrichs, "lafẓ and maʿnā," in Encyclopedia of Arabic literature, ed. Julie Scott Meisami and Paul Starkey 
(London / New York: Routledge, 1998); Larkin, The Theology of Meaning, 10. 
528 Abū ʿUṯmān ʿAmr b. Baḥr al- āḥiẓ (d. 255/868) is most often quoted. He cited the opinion that ideas were 
merely strewn in the street and accessible to the masses and foreigners whereas expressions were the true site of 
eloquence and linguistic skill. al- āhiẓ, al- ayawān, 3:131-132. Iḥsān ʿAbbās argued that when al- āḥiẓ talked 
about ideas being strewn in the street he was only referring to simple ideas. ʿAbbās was using al- urǧānī’s division 
of ideas into simple ones like those behind “Zayd left” and the more complex ideas created by metaphor and 
metonymy such as “the reins of the northwind”. ʿAbbās, Tārī  an-Naqd, 423-424. Elsewhere, al- āḥiẓ made the 
authorial statement that Abū ʿAmr al-ʿAttābī (d. ca. 835) was mistaken to say that command of language was simply 
making one’s interlocuter understand one’s need, because flawed grammar and pronunciation (failures of 
expression) that nevertheless successfully communicates an idea could not be good language. al- āhiẓ, al-Bayān 
wa-t-Tabyīn, 1:161. The Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, elitists to a man, agreed that the common man’s mind could scarcely be a 
repository of language excellence, and therefore good language must be a matter of good expression. They did, 
however, have a somewhat more elevated concept of what the ideas could be, hinting that sometimes great and true 
ideas (such as their own) could fall on stony ground. Their definition of effective communication was “the clearest 
and most concise communication of an idea”(wa-innamā –l-balāġatu hiya –t-tawaṣṣulu ilā ifhāmi –l-maʿnā bi-
aw ā i maqālin wa-ablaġi kalām). Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, Rasāʾil  Beirut, 3:121-122. 
 174 
believed that poetry involved both expressions and ideas,529 although they differed on which 
were most important.530 
Ragib’s theory of meaning, as described in the previous chapter, favours neither side. 
Language, and therefore poetry, is a matter of the connections that people make between 
expressions and ideas. Poetics, as we shall see below, is the study of how these connections are 
made, and how they differ according to the different rhetorical figures employed. Ragib also 
makes this position clear at two points in his adab compendium. In one anecdote a Bedouin 
praises a man by saying that it was “as if his expressions were the moulds of his ideas”, and in 
another, a poet says “his ideas adorn his expressions, and his expressions are the adornments of 
                                                 
529 Abū al-Fatḥ ʿUṯmān Ibn  innī (d. 392/1002) wrote, in a rejection of the apparently still prevalent argument that 
the early masters of poetry were only concerned with expressions, that the only reason one focuses on expressions is 
in order to make sure that one’s ideas are getting across (fa-lā tarayanna anna –l-ʿināyata iḏ ḏāka innamā hiya bil-l-
alfāẓi bal hiya  idmatun minhum li-l-maʿānī). Ibn  innī, al- aṣāʾiṣ, 215-217, 217. Cf. A. Elamrani-Jamal, Logique 
Aristot licienne et grammaire arabe  Étude et documents  (Paris: J. Vrin, 1983). 102. Unsurprisingly, given the 
nature of adab, al- āḥiẓ provides an anecdote that points in this direction as well. He records that Bišr b. al-
Muʿtamir (Abū Sahl al-Hilālī, d. ca. 210/825) defined effective communication (al-balāġah) as that in which the 
expressions are refined and sweet but the idea is commonly known and appropriate to one’s audience, whether that 
audience is the elite or the masses. An idea is not necessarily more noble because it is an elite idea, nor baser 
because it circulates among the masses, but rather the value of an idea lies in its linguistic correctness, its usefulness, 
and its appropriateness to the situation in which it is used. al- āhiẓ, al-Bayān wa-t-Tabyīn, 1:135-136. Cf. Thomas, 
"Concept of Muḥāḍara," 112-115. 
530 Ibn Rašīq (Abū ʿAlī Ḥasan al-Qayrawānī, d. ca. 456/1063) describes the different schools of thought on the 
matter in terms of the choice that poets themselves made, when composing, to either privilege the eloquence of their 
expressions or the quality of their ideas and motifs (presumably when faced with the need to make a choice to fit the 
metre). Ibn Rašīq al-Qayrawānī, al-ʿUmdah fī Maḥāsin aš-Šīʿr wa- dābihī, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī ad-Dīn ʿAbd al-
Ḥamīd, 2 in 1 vols. (Cairo: Ma baʿāt Ḥiǧāzī, 1934). 1:103f (chapter 19). At the end of the eleventh century al-
 urǧānī expressed his impatience with over-emphasis on expressions, writing that “the expressions are the servants 
of the ideas; the ideas decide how the expressions can circulate” (al-alfāẓu  idamu –l-maʿānī wa-l-muṣarrafatu fī 
ḥukmihā). ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān al- urǧānī, Asrār al-Balāġah: the mysteries of eloquence, ed. Hellmut 
Ritter (Istanbul: Government Press, 1954). 8. This exact point would be repeated by Ḍiyāʾ ad-Dīn Ibn al-Aṯīr (Abū 
al-Fatḥ Naṣrallāh, 558/1163-637/1239), who wrote that “expressions are the servants of the ideas, and there is no 
doubt that the one served is more noble than the servant”. Ḥasīkī, "Al-ʿAlāqah Bayn al-Lafẓ wa-l-Maʿnā," 190. 
Quoting Ibn al-Aṯīr’s al-Ma al as-Sāʾir fī-Adab al-Kātib wa-š-Šāʿir. Edited by Aḥmad al-Ḥawfī and Badawī 
Ṭabānah. Cairo: Maktabat Naḥḍat Misr, 1960. 1:240, 249. 
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his ideas”.531 The two central components of linguistic structure appear to interact on an equal 
basis.  
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the controversy about the primacy of 
expressions versus ideas helps us understand what ideas were thought to be. The criticism of 
ideas strewn in the street for the masses that we find reported in al- āḥiẓ (Abū ʿUṯmān ʿAmr b. 
Baḥr, d. 255/868) and believed in by the Iḫwān reinforces the notion that ideas were an entity 
that could be shared between language users. Ideas had an ontological status, albeit a non-
physical one. They were part of an objective shared reality. Ideas could also therefore be 
anything from the idea behind the simplest of nouns, shared by all, to the complex motif behind a 
line of poetry, equally accessible to poets and their audiences.532 
The title on our only manuscript of Ragib’s manual of poetics is Ragib on Innovative 
Figures of Speech (Kitāb min Kalām ar-Rāġib fī-l-Badīʿ).533 While it may not be the author’s 
own title, it is appropriate for a work in the introduction to which Ragib says: “this book contains 
the methodologies of the arts of innovation in prose and poetry” (wa qad intahaytu fī-mā amlaytu 
ṭuruqa funūni –l-badīʿi min an-naẓmi wa-n-na ri).534 The manual contains a taxonomy of 
rhetorical figures, the “methodologies and arts” to which Ragib refers. He wrote that he 
                                                 
531 madaḥa aʿrābīyun ra ulan fa-qāla ka-anna alfāẓahū qawālibu li-maʿnīhi  qāla –š-šāʿiru [min al-mutaqārib] 
ta īnu maʿānīhi alfāẓahū / wa-alfāẓuhū  āʾinātu –l-maʿānī. Ragib, Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, 1:125. (See also note 558). 
Ragib’s adab compendium tends to organise anecdotes on the maḥāsin/masāwī (good things/bad things) model, in 
which praise of something is always juxtaposed with its blame and vice versa. The section titled “an expression 
helping an idea to be good” (lafẓun sāʿada –l-maʿnā fī-l- ūd) consists in its entirity of just the two items quoted 
above, and is not complemented by a contradictory neighbouring section. This makes it likely that it reflects Ragib’s 
own opinion, though he makes no reference to the scholarly controversy itself. 
532 NB: at the end of the eleventh century, Ibn Rašīq would draw a distinction between “the crafted poetic idea” 
(maʿnā aṣ-ṣanʿah) achieved by rhetorical figures, and the normal “idea of speech”, which is the “spirit” (rūḥ) behind 
every expression. Ragib never makes such a distinction. Ibn Rašīq al-Qayrawānī, al-ʿUmdah, 1:111 (chapter 20). Cf. 
Heinrichs, lafẓ and maʿnā, 462. 
533 See details at pages 53 and 259.  
534 Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. f.2b. 
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enumerated these techniques in order to enable the reader to engage in criticism, distinguish 
between good and bad poetry, and compose good poetry.
535
 Where does innovation come in? I 
have argued in the previous chapter that Ragib’s understanding of the relationship of language to 
the lexicon was such that poetry would inevitably involve the creation of new connections 
between expressions and ideas. His manual of poetics is an explanation of how this happens. 
Good poetry, and indeed good prose, is characterised by successful manipulation of the 
relationships between expressions and ideas. Ragib’s manual records, classifies, and analyses 
these manipulations, and in the last (incomplete) chapter on literary plagiarism (as-sariqāt) he 
seeks to determine their originality and the dynamics of their transmission.  
The nature of poetry is that someone always uses connects an an idea to an expression for 
the first time, and then others either copy, or respond with variations that are subsequently 
assessed as good or bad. The term for innovation was badīʿ. I prefer this translation to reading 
badīʿ as a specific reference to the new style of the muḥda ūn (poets from the eighth-century 
onwards), or to a specific craft or collection of rhetorical artifices.
536
 Ragib wrote in The Path to 
                                                 
535 After the ḥamdallah, Ragib starts: 
You asked me, may God continue to bless you, to dictate something that could act as a signpost in the field of 
poetic criticism, and that would distinguish between the worthless and the choice. Whoever comes to recite 
and criticise poetry, even if he already knows most of its lexicographical, Arabic, historical, and analogical 
apparatus etc., and even if he has a natural inclination towards the best poetry, nevertheless he must have the 
tools of criticism to the extent that they guide and help him with that which he composes and criticises. 
(saʾaltum adāma –llāhu –l-imtāʿa bikum an umliya mā yu ʿalu amāratan fī naqdi –l-ašʿāri wa-fāriqan bayna 
–n-nufāyati minhu wa-l-mu tāri fa-l-mutaʿāṭī li-qarīḍi -š-šiʿri wa-naqdihī wa-in ḥaṣala  ulla adawātahū min 
–l-luġati wa-l-ʿarabīyati wa-l-a bāri wa-l-am āli wa-ġayri ḏālika wa-yakūnu ḏā ṭabʿin māyilin [sic.] ilā 
ʿuyūni –l-ašʿāri fa-lā budda lahū min ālāti –n-naqdi ilā mā yuršiduhū wa-yaʿḍudahū li-yakūna mu īdan fīmā 
yansi uhū wa-yanquduhū). 
Ibid., f.1b. 
536 It is true that the most prominent early work that deals explicitly with badīʿ, the Kitāb al-Badīʿ  of Ibn al-
Muʿtazz, gives the impression that it is a defined craft rather than a description. The caliph and critic writes that “we 
present in the chapters of this our book the part of what the muḥda ūn call al-badīʿ … Baššār, Muslim, Abū Nuwās 
and those who followed them were not the first to achieve this craft… (lam yusbiqū ilā hāḏā –l-fanni). ʿAbdallāh 
Ibn al-Muʿtazz, Kitāb al-Badīʿ, ed. Ignatius Kratchkovsky (London: E. J. W. Gibb Memorial, 1935). 1. It is also true 
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the Nobilities that ibdāʿ meant ex nihilo creation, and that while it was strictly only something 
that God could do, the Bedouin Arabs had used it to describe someone who dug a fresh well in a 
previously untapped area, and someone “who composed poetry or produced speech that had 
never been composed in that way before”.537 I think that for Ragib and many of his 
contemporaries the term badīʿ primarily served to isolate and recognise innovation.538 It may in 
fact be unproductive to draw a distinction between a “specific collection of rhetorical artifices” 
and “innovation” because the poets were innovative with rhetorical figures,539 which were then 
enumerated and collectively called “innovative”. For Ibn Rašīq (Abū ʿAlī Ḥasan al-Qayrawānī, 
d. ca. 456/1063), “producing something badīʿ means that the poet comes forth with an idea 
which is considered a novelty the like of which has never been habitual”.540  
                                                                                                                                                             
that the concept of badīʿ in literary criticism was inextricably linked with the muḥda  revolution when, as Heinrichs 
says, poetry became a literary rather than an oral tradition and the focus of attention shifted “from depicting reality 
… to ‘improving’ earlier poetry”. Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Paired Metaphors in Muḥdath Poetry," Occasional Papers of 
the School of Abbasid Studies 1(1986): 1. For these usages see ———, "Istiʿārah and Badīʿ," 191; ———, "Literary 
Theory: The Problem of Its Efficiency," in Arabic Poetry: Theory and Development, ed. G. E. von Grunebaum 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1973), 67-69; ———, "Paired Metaphors," 2-3; John Wansborough, "A Note on Arabic 
Rhetoric," in Lebende Antike  Symposium f r Rudolf S hnel, ed. H. Meller and H. J. Zimmermann (Berlin: 1967), 
57.  
537 al-ibdāʿu wa-huwa ī ādu –š-šayʾi dufʿatan lā ʿan maw ūdin wa-lā tartībin wa-lā ʿan naqṣin ilā kamālin wa-
laysa ḏālika illā li-l-bārī taʿālā wa-in kānat –l-ʿarabu qad tastaʿmilu –l-ibdāʿa fīman yaḥfiru biʾran fī makānin lam 
yaḥfir fīhi min qablu wa-fīman nasa a šiʿran aw awrada kalāman lam yansi  ʿalā minwālihī min qabl. Ragib, The 
Path to the Nobilities, 293. 
538 Cf. “[T]he second prerequisite for the rise of muḥda  poetry is a craving for innovation on the part of the poet as 
well as his audience”. Heinrichs, "Paired Metaphors," 2. 
539 See Heinrichs on “the rhetorization of poetry”. ———, "Early Ornate Prose," 229. 
540 ———, The Hand of the Northwind, 49. Cf. Beatrice Gruendler, "Motif vs. Genre: reflections on the Diwān al-
Maʿānī of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī," in Ghazal as world literature I. Transformations of a literary genre, ed. T. Bauer 
and A. Neuwirth (Beirut / Stuttgart: Ergon Verlag, 2005), 72. 
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In The Confluence of Eloquence Ragib has a subsection on kalām badīʿ in which he gives a 
series of apposite descriptions for people who invent original speech. One such description is 
“virgin speech”. Further descriptions are themselves in verse:541  
if he speaks, his speech is ungirdled by offspring.542  
And: 
too pure for the secret plagiarism, too honourable for the repeated idea.543 
In his Litt rateurs’ Ripostes section on the description of clouds tinged with colour that create 
good pasturage Ragib quotes a line of Imruʾ al-Qays: 
continuously raining in large drops and heavy, the cover of the earth chooses the best parts, 
and pours down.544 
Ragib then quotes the judgement of one of the al- ālidī brothers: “‘the cover of the earth’ [for 
‘rain’] is badīʿ untouched by anyone before or after the poet, and whoever [subsequently] 
engages in its [the motif’s] use is defiled by his own soul”.545 Elsewhere, Ragib describes the 
following line by al-Farazdaq (Ḥammām b. Ġālib, d. 110/728) as innovative: 
I am the immoderate flare of the hearth when someone wants a meal, and the dog’s mild 
restraint when the guest knocks at night.546 
                                                 
541 Ragib, Confluence of Eloquence, 95. 
542 wa-iḏā takallama lam yakun / fī –l-qawli minṭaqatan ʿiyālā. Anonymous? 
543 muna  ahatan ʿan –s-sarqi –l-muwarrī / mukarramatan ʿan –l-maʿnā –l-muʿādi. Ḥabīb b. Aws a -Ṭā’ī Abū 
Tammām and Muḥammad b. Yaḥyá aṣ-Ṣūlī, Šarḥ aṣ-Ṣūlī li-Dīwān Abī Tammām, ed.  alaf Rašīd Nuʿmān (Baghdad: 
Wizārat aṯ- aqāfah wa-l-Funūn, 1977). 386, #36. 
544 dīmatun haṭlāʾu fīhā waṭafun / ṭabaqu –l-arḍi taḥarrā wa-tadurr. Wilhelm Ahlwardt, The Divans of the Six 
Ancient Arabic Poets Ennabiga, 'Antara, Tharafa, Zuhair, 'Alqama and Imruulqais  (London: Trübner, 1870). 125, 
#18 Imruʾ al-Qays. 
545 Abū ʿUṯmān Saʿīd b. Hāšim al- ālidī d. 371/981 or Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Hāšim al- ālidī d. 370/980. Ragib, 
Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, 4:439. 
546 wa-innī safīhu –n-nāri li-l-mubtaġī –l-qirā / wa-innī ḥalīmu –l-kalbi li-ḍ-ḍayfi yaṭruqu. Ibid., 2:594 (line missing 
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He judged the line to be innovative because “the poet combines the immoderacy of the campfire, 
which means the extravagance of its flames, with the forbearance of the dog.
547
  
There is no imaginary dimension in al-Farazdaq’s line; a host may indeed immoderately 
leap up like a fire to serve a guest, and may indeed be calm and hospitable rather than angry 
when a guest arrives suddenly at night. This would make the line characteristic of the ancient, 
pre-muḥda , poets (al-qudamāʾ) whose metaphors Heinrichs has described as tending towards 
analogies in which the source is projected onto the target to create an image that seems natural, 
rather than the new muḥda  style in which the poet would take the image created in the target and 
progress further with it to a new imaginary image that has no natural link back to the source.
548
 
This means that Ragib is comfortable applying the term badīʿ to the pre-muḥda  style of pre-
muḥda  poets such as al-Farazdaq. If, as a critic, Ragib does not necessarily connect badīʿ to the 
new style of the muḥda ūn then I feel comfortable taking it to mean simply innovation.549 
Ragib structures his manual on poetic innovation according to a tripartite typology of 
interactions between expressions and ideas. The manual therefore represents further evidence of 
his theory of meaning in action.550 The structure is as follows:  
                                                                                                                                                             
from index). In Ragib’s poetics manual this this would be an example of muṭābaqah (antithesis) in which the ideas 
behind two nouns are contrasted while their scansion matches. ———. Innovative Figures of Speech. ff.26b-27a. In 
our modern English terminology, the line juxtaposes a pair of identifying genitive metaphors. 
547 safīh –n-nāri is opposed to ḥalīmu –l-kalbi but they have the same morphological pattern and metre. In Ragib’s 
terms: muṭābaqatu –l-lafẓi maʿnan wa-wa nan. ———. Innovative Figures of Speech. f26b. Cf. Heinrichs, 
Rhetorical Figures, 659. 
548 ———, "Paired Metaphors," 5. 
549 Although Avigail Noy has pointed out in personal correspondence that this line is an example of muṭabaqah 
(antithetical parallelism), which is itself a rhetorical figure, and therefore Ragib may still be using badīʿ to mean 
“rhetorical figures”. On innovation and creativity in mediaeval Arabic poetics more generally see: Kemal, Poetics, 
23f. 
550 It also takes Ragib into the realm of theory, rather than just taxonomy. Heinrichs noted the dominance of 
taxonomy (of rhetorical figures) in the history of Arabic poetics, and the paradigmatic example of this tendency is 
usually taken to be Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbdallāh, d. ca. 1010). B. Gruendler, "al-ʿAskarī, Abū Hilāl," 
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i. Introduction.  
ii. tar amat al-abwāb wa-l-fuṣūl. List of contents. 
1. taqāsīm al-kalām. The structure of language. 
2. al-ḥaqīqah wa-l-ma ā . Literal and non-literal expression. 
3. a nās al-balāġah  A typology of eloquence. 
3.1. al-ī ā . Concision. Of either expression or of idea. fa-l-ī ā u ʿalā ḍarbayni ī ā u lafẓin 
wa-ī ā u maʿnan.    
3.1.1. at-talwīḥ Indicating multiple maʿānī with a few alfāẓ. al-išāratu ilā –l-maʿnā –l-ka īri 
bi-lafẓin qalīlin. 
3.1.2. at-tašbīh. Comparison. Divided by number and type (ʿayn (thing) or ḥada  (event)) of 
target/source.  
3.1.3. al-istiʿārah. By type (ʿayn, ḥada   ism  fiʿl  ḥarf) of target/source. Also includes 
istiʿārat al-kināyah (metonymy) in which the poet makes a description (waṣf), an 
action (fīʿl), or a state (ḥāl) that belongs to the source (al-musta‛ār minhu) apply to the 
target (al-musta‛ār lahū).551  
3.1.3.1. al-irdāf. To indicate one idea, the poet uses an expression for another idea that 
follows from the first one. 
3.1.3.2. at-taqdīm. Delaying the intended meaning.  
3.1.3.3. iṭlāq al-lafẓ ʿalā mā yu āwiruhū. Naming something by that which is adjacent, or 
near to it. 
3.1.3.4. al-kināyāt. Allusion and euphemism. 
3.1.3.5. al-mu āwa ah. Borrowing the final clause of a conditional sentence for its initial 
clause, and vice versa. 
3.1.3.6. istiʿmāl al-lafẓ ʿalā at-tahakkum. Sarcasm, for example in reply to an image of 
praise. 
                                                                                                                                                             
in Encyclopaedia of Islam  THREE, ed. Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill 
Online: Brill, 2009); Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Rhetoric and Poetics," in Encyclopedia of Arabic literature, ed. Julie Scott 
Meisami and Paul Starkey (London: Routledge, 1998), 651; George J. Kanazi, Studies in the Kitāb aṣ- ināʿatayn of 
Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī  (Leiden: Brill, 1989). 202. 
551 The examples include the first hemistitch of the famous line by Abū  u’ayb: 
when Death sinks its claws in, you find all amulets of no avail 
wa-iḏā –l-manīyatu anšabat aẓfāahā / alfayta kulla tamīmatin lā tanfaʿu. 
Ragib wrote: “the poet intends to compare Death [target] to a ravaging wild beast [source] and therefore borrowed 
the wild beast’s action [contiguous effect of source] and weapon [attribute contiguous to source].” Ragib. Innovative 
Figures of Speech. f.12b. The translation is from: Heinrichs, The Hand of the Northwind, 4 (note 8), 14. This tallies 
with the usual understanding of metonymy as the substitution of a cause, effect, or attribute of something for the 
thing itself. But in the later tradition cf. ———, Rhetorical Figures, 661. 
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3.1.3.7. al-faḥwā. Use of a single lafẓ to indicate other things above or below it (such as ‘he 
wouldn’t cheat you out of a penny’ to mean he wouldn’t cheat you out of a pound 
either) 
3.1.3.8. at-tam īl. analogy. 
3.1.3.9. at-taḍmīn. Using a lafẓ with unrestricted application while intending it to have 
limited application. 
3.1.3.10. al-musāwāh. When the lafẓ is exactly equal to the maʿnā. 
3.2. al-basṭ. Used to ensure that everyone (whether astute or obtuse) understands, or to clarify 
ambiguous language. 
3.2.1. at-takmīl  Continuing with a maʿnā until there is no obstacle to understanding. 
3.2.2. at-tablīġ  Use of takmīl at the end of the line. 
3.2.3. at-taḏyīl  Repetition of part of the first hemistich in the second. 
3.2.4. al-istiʿānah  Bad poetry that results from irdāf, taqdīm, and faḥwā al- iṭāb that is 
unclear. 
3.2.5. a-taʾkīd  That which removes doubt and vagueness. 
3.2.6. at-takrīr  Repetition, which may be both superfluous and not. 
- faṣl. Extra section not listed in contents: many grammarians rightly allow superfluous words 
and particles. 
4. al-ḥaḏf. Elision of part or all of a word, or of the second half of a conditional. 
5. at-ta nīs. Puns and paronomasia. iʾtilāfu –l-lafẓi maʿa i tilāfi –l-maʿnā. 
6. at-taṣḥīf. A type of ta nīs where the words differ only in their pointing. 
7. al-muṭābaqah. Antithesis. 
8. al-muqābalah. Correspondence/opposition. More than one term on each side of the antithesis. 
9. at-tadāruk. Asserting that which has been negated and vice versa. 
10. al- amʿ bayn an-naqḍayn. Saying something and then invalidating it. Discussion of the 
question of truth in poetry. 
- at-taṣdīr: radd aʿ ā  al-kalām ilā ṣadrihī  Extra chapter not listed in contents. Putting the 
second hemistich in the place of the first (epanadiplosis). 
11. at-tabyīn. Separating out and explaining expressions that refer to more than one thing. 
12. at-taqsīm. Division. Enumeration of cases followed by an explicit mutual characterization of 
each. 
13. al-īġāl. A description that crosses the line and results in an impossibility. 
14. al-iltifāt. Switches of address from the third person to the second person and vice versa. 
15. at-tarṣīʿ. Rhymed prose. an takūna maqāṭiʿu –l-a  āʾi mutaʿādilatan fī-l-wazni. 
16. at-taṣrīʿ. Making the last foot of the first hemistich rhyme. 
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17. al-istiṭrād. An idea that leads to another idea, such as moving from old age into praise. al-
a ḏu fī maʿnan yutawaṣṣalu bi-hī ilā maʿnan ā irah muttaṣilin bi-hī min ḏālika –l-mula  iṣu 
min aš-šaybi ilā –l-maḏḥi.  
- faṣl: Extra section not listed in contents: the craft of poetry requires criticism of things 
unconnected to balāġah, such as the quality of the cola (fuṣūl). 
18. an-naẓm. Syntactic structure. 
19. al-wazn. Balancing the number of letters and short vowels (ḥarakāt). 
20. naqd aš-šiʿr. Poetic criticism. “Some prefer complicated ideas, other complicated wordplay.” 
Some say that one is never able to explain why one likes a particular piece of poetry. 
21. anwāʿ as-sariqāt  Types of literary borrowing  This final (according to the contents list) 
chapter is partially cut off by the end of the manuscript. The colophon is therefore missing. 
 
The manual is divided into three parts. The first four and a half folios (#s i-ii and 1-2) are 
introductory and consist of a discursive introduction with aposite quotations, a contents list, and 
analysis of the structure of language and the literal and non-literal. The next seventeen folios (#3) 
are a tripartite typology of effective communication (al-balāġah): “there are three types of 
effective communication: concision, equality and prolixity”.552  
The first way that effective communication can be achieved is through concision. 
Concision of expression is achieved through the use of morphological and grammatical 
structures that abbreviate, such as the diminutive (which stands for the combination of a noun 
and the adjective “small”) and the plural (which removes the need to repeat the noun).553 
Concision of idea is achieved when a single idea communicates a plurality of ideas, such as “that 
which is in the skies and that which is on the land” communicating the plurality of everything 
both in and between them.
554
 Ragib consistently understands concision as a limited amount of 
                                                 
552 The opening line of #3:  alā atu aḍrubin ī ā un wa-musāwāhun wa-basṭ. Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. 
f.5b. 
553 Ibid., ff.5b-6a. 
554 Quran 2:255 (al-Baqarah) &c..  
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expression communicating an excess of idea, whether through a word that stands for the ideas of 
multiple words, or through an idea that stands for multiple ideas. His three sub-divisions of 
concision (#s 3.1.1, 3.1.2, and 3.1.3) offer different ways in which this can be achieved. He 
makes a distinction between ordinary concision, which is part of the lexicon coined by fiat and 
includes abstract numbers (al-mubhamāt) and names of genuses, and the concision that 
constitutes the eloquent inventions of the poetic craft, and includes metaphor and metonymy.
555
  
The opposite of concision is prolixity (#3.2). In this case the idea is given and fixed, but for 
reasons specific to either the context or content of the speech act the speaker adds extra 
expressions in order to ensure clarity.
556
  
In between concision and prolixity lies equality, wherein expressions and ideas are 
perfectly aligned and balanced, with an excess of neither.
557
 Ragib explained equality with the 
                                                 
555 Ragib writes: 
There are two types of concise expressions. The first was coined by fiat in order that one could dispense with 
proliferations of expressions, for example those nouns which abbreviate and by which one understands 
[more], and many abstract numbers and genus names. The second type is that the form of which is invented 
by the eloquent after their investigations of the lexicon, and it is this type that is part of the craft of poetry. 
wa-alfāẓu –l-ī ā i ʿalā ḍarbayni ḍarbun wuḍiʿa fī aṣli –l-luġati li-yustaġniya bihī ʿan –l-alfāẓi –l-ka īrati ka-
l-asmāʾi –llatī yustafhamu bihā wa-yu ā ī bihā wa-ka īrin min –l-mubhamāt wa-asmāʾi –l-a nāsi wa-ḍarbun 
ya taraʿu ṣīġahā -l-bulaġāʾu baʿda –stiqrāʾi –l-luġati wa-huwa ad-dā ilu fī  bābi -ṣ-ṣanʿah.   
Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. f.6a. 
556 (Arabic text in Appendix). 
Prolixity is required in a number of situations specific to it. Its context may be such as to require that the 
masses are made to understand somebody [more] discerning [than them]; the masses include those near at 
hand and far away, the quick-witted, and the slow. Alternatively, the expression may be homonymous, 
conveying two literal ideas, or a literal and a non-literal one, or a general and a specific idea [and therefore 
requiring explanation]. The prolixity may also be required for true meticulousness about the source of the 
information in question, which is one that requires thoroughness”.  
Ibid., f.17a.  
557 al-musāwāhu wa-huwa an yakūna –l-lafẓu musāwīyan li-l-maʿnā lā  āyida [sic.] ʿalayhi wa-lā nāqiṣa ʿanhu. 
Ibid., f.16b. See Appendix for the Arabic text. 
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same piece of adab he used in Litt rateurs’ Ripostes: “it was as if his expressions were the 
moulds of their ideas”.558 He then provided the following four lines of poetry as examples.559  
There will be days that will show you that of which you were ignorant. He whom you had 
not furnished with provisions will bring you news.560 
And: 
… the one most content with his path is he who treads it.561 
And: 
I am bored of the burdens of life. Bastard! He who lives for eighty years becomes 
nauseated.562 
And: 
I have become bored of life, its length, and these people asking me how I am.563 
                                                 
558 NB. in the Murād edition of Litt rateurs’ Ripostes the expressions are the moulds of the speaker’s ideas (li-
maʿānīhi) whereas in this ms. they are the moulds of their own ideas (li-maʿānīhā). The latter is, I think, preferable. 
———, Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, 1:125. 
559 ———. Innovative Figures of Speech. ff.16b-17a. 
560 (Arabic text in Appendix) [aṭ-ṭawīl]. The poet is Ṭarafah b. ʿAbd (d. ca. 564).  Ṭarafah b. ʿAbd, Dīwān  arafah b  
ʿAbd, ed. Karim al-Bustānī (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir / Dār Beyrūt, 1961). 41.  
561 (Arabic text in Appendix) The full line reads:  
[aṭ-ṭawīl] Do not regret the path you tread, for the one most content with his path is he who treads it”  
 ālid b. Zuhayr ar-Rīyāšī/al-Huḏalī with rāḍī sunnatin instead of rāḍin sunnatan. Abū Saʿīd al-Ḥasan as-Sukkarī, 
Šarḥ Ašʿār al-Huḏalīyīn, ed. ʿAbd as-Sattār Aḥmad Farrāǧ (Cairo: Maktabat Dār al-ʿUrūbah, 196-). 213.. Abū Faraǧ 
al-Iṣfahānī, Kitāb al-Aġānī, ed. ʿAbd as-Sattār Aḥmad Farrāǧ, 24 in 25 vols. (Beirut: Dār aṯ- aqāfah, 1955-1962). 
6:261. With “do not be astonished at” (wa-lā taʿ abanna) instead of “do not regret the”. Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh 
Ibn Qutaybah, ʿUyūn al-A bār, 4 vols. (Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-Miṣrīyah al-ʿĀmmah li-l-Kitāb, 1964). 4:109.  
562 (Arabic text in Appendix) [aṭ-ṭawīl] Ragib names the poet, Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā (fl. sixth century), from whose 
muʿallaqah this line is taken. Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā, Dīwān Zuhayr b  Abī Sulmā, ed. Karim al-Bustānī (Beirut: Dār 
Ṣādir / Dār Beyrūt, 1964). 86.  aʿlab (816-904) explained the exclamation “bastard!” as the poet blaming himself. 
Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā and Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā aš-Šaybānī  aʿlab, Šharḥ Dīwān Zuhayr b  Abī Sulmā  
(Cairo: ad-Dār al-Qawmīyah li-l-Ṭibāʾah wa-n-Našr, 1964). 29.  
563 (Arabic text in Appendix) [al-kāmil] Ibn Rabīʿah Labīd and ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāh Ṭūsī, Šharḥ Dīwān Labīd b  
Rabīʿah al-ʿAmīrī, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Kuwait: Wizārat al-Iršād wa-al-Anbāʾ, 1962). 35. Ragib remarks that: “the 
ulamāʾ approved of Zuhayr’s line and judged it to be good because the poet said that he was bored of the burdens of 
life rather than of life itself, for life is not boring. They preferred it to this line of Labīd’s”. Ragib makes the same 
remark about the same two lines in Litt rateurs’ Ripostes. Ragib, Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, 4:315.  
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These are four famous and well-regarded lines of poetry, but none of them contain any imagery. 
Their expressions convey ideas effectively in metre, but neither duplicate each other by repeating 
an idea nor serve on their own to communicate a plurality of ideas. In each case, every single 
expression has its own single idea. This one-to-one correspondence might be expected to be the 
pattern of language from which one can deviate, but in Ragib’s manual it is relegated to one and 
a half folios at the end of the istiʿārah section, and just four lines of poetry. It is clear Ragib 
thinks that most good poetry and prose does not work like this. Eloquence is the act of 
manipulating the relationships that idea and expression have with each other so that individual 
ideas and expressions no longer correspond directly to each other. 
The concept of poetic equality has been little studied, to the best of my knowledge, and 
because it speaks so directly to the relationship in poetics between expression and idea it is 
worthy of a brief investigation here, alongside investigation of the tripartite typology and the 
structure in which it sits. Ragib used established typological components. Qudāmah b.  aʿfar 
(Abū al-Faraǧ, d. ca. 337/948), whom Ragib quoted both with and without attribution at 
numerous points in his manual, presented four ways in which the expression is connected to the 
idea: equality, concision, irdāf, and analogy. Qudāmah’s explanations of equality, concision, 
irdāf (3.1.3.1 above), and analogy (3.1.3.8 above) are almost identical to Ragib’s, although 
Qudāmah uses išārah (literally “indication”) for concision instead of Ragib’s ī ā .564 Qudāmah’s 
work is structured in two parts: examples of good poetry, followed by examples of bad poetry. 
                                                 
564 The expression “as if his expressions were the moulds of their ideas“ also appears in Qudāmah’s discussion of 
equality. Qudāmah b.  aʿfar, Naqd, 84. Qudāmah’s analogy (tam īl) is when: “one intends to point out an idea and 
puts down words that point to another idea, and that idea and those words are an analogue (mi āl) for the idea no one 
wants to express. Thus ‘analogy’”. Heinrichs, "Early Ornate Prose," 227-228. For a review of theories of concision 
see Geert Jan van Gelder, "Brevity: the long and the short of it in Classical Arabic literary theory," in Proceedings of 
the Ninth Congress of the Union europ enne des arabisants et islamisants: Amsterdam  1st to 7th September 1978, 
ed. Rudolph Peters (Leiden: Brill, 1981). 
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Each of these sections is divided into aspects of poetry related to the expressions (metre and 
rhyme) and aspects related to the ideas (everything from the genres of praise, satire and eulogy to 
the techniques of comparison and analogy, and the themes of love (naṣīb) and description 
(waṣf)). Ragib splits his manual in two as well: seventeen folios (#3) on effective communication 
structured according to the three ways expression and idea interact, followed by seventeen folios 
(#4-21) on aspects of poetry that do not involve manipulation of that interaction. 
The only author that I am aware of who used Ragib’s tripartite division of concision, 
equality, and prolixity wrote in Persian some two hundred years after Ragib’s death. Šams ad-
Dīn Muḥammad b. Qays ar-Rāzī (usually Šams-e Qays in Persian) wrote al-Muʾ am fī-Maʿāyīr 
Ašʿār al-A am (The Clarification of the Measures of Persian Poetry) in around 630/1233.565 
Šams-e Qays was fully conversant with Arabic poetics; he tells us that because Persian works 
quote Arabic poetry and vice versa he worked in both languages so that both peoples might 
benefit from his explanations.
566
  
In the Muʿ am, Šams-e Qays deals with metre, then rhyme, and ends with a chapter on the 
techniques used in good poetry and prose in which the trio appear. Concision is “when the 
expression is small and its idea is bigger”, equality (musāwat) “is when the expression and the 
idea are equal (barābār bāšad)”, and prolixity is when “the idea is explained with many 
                                                 
565 It has been hailed as “the most distinguished work in the history of Persian literary theory” for “from the Arab 
Conquest until the present day, a period of more than 1260 years, no such accurate, complete and comprehensive 
treatise on this subject has been composed in Persian”. Respectively: J. T. P. de Bruijn, "Badīʿ," in Encyclopaedia 
Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New York: Iranicaonline Website, 1988); (Šams ad-Dīn Muḥammad b. Qays ar-Rāzī) 
Šamš-e Qays, al-Muʾ am fī-Maʿāyīr Ašʿār al-A am ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Qazwīnī and E. G. 
Browne (Leiden: Brill, 1909). 187.  
566 In the end, partly because while his Arabic readers would know Persian but his Persian readers might not know 
Arabic, he split the work into two books. The Persian one has survived while the Arabic one, called al-Muʿarrab fī 
Maʿāyīr Ašʿār al-ʿArab (The Clear Expression of the Measures of Arabic Poetry), has been lost. ———, al-Muʾ am 
1909 ed , 7-8,187. ———, al-Muʾ am fī-Maʿāyīr Ašʿār al-A am ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-
Qazwīnī and Muḥammad Taqī Mudarris Rezāvī (Tehran: Entešārāt-e Zavvār, 2008). 23, 217. 
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expressions, for example when a homonym is clarified”.567 He then classifies rhetorical figures 
under these three headings just as Ragib did. The category of concision contains rhetorical 
figures based on metaphor and comparison, while the category of prolixity contains rhetorical 
figures that provide additional information or clarify ambiguities.
568
 Neither Ragib nor Šams-e 
Qays provides any sub-categories of equality, and Šams-e Qays in fact only produces a single 
line as an example: 
Now you always ask for more favour, and it is with your repeated asking, that your favours 
are accepted.569 
                                                 
567 …maʿnī-rā be-alfāẓ besyār šarḥ konad … čonānke agar lafẓī muštarek al-maʿnī bāšad bayān-e murād-e  aveš a  
ān bekonad… ———, al-Muʾ am 1909 ed , 348. ———, al-Muʾ am 2008 ed , 377. Cf. al-basṭu … kāna –l-lafẓu 
muštarikan bayna maʿnīyayni… Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. f.17a. 
568 I have interposed the numbers of the sections in Ragib’s manual into Šams-e Qays’ text:  
istiʿārāt [3.1.3] va-tašbīhāt [3.1.2]  umle a  bāb-e ī ā  [3.1] ast va īġāl va-takmīl [3.2.1] va-tabyīn va-tafsīr 
va-taqsīm va-istiṭrād [17] va-tafrīʿ va-harče a  īn ṣināʿāt a  bahr-e  iyādat-e bayānī yā rafʿ-e eštebāhī 
istiʿmāl konand hame a  qabīl-e basṭ [3.2] so an ast   
Šamš-e Qays, al-Muʾ am 1909 ed , 349. ———, al-Muʾ am 2008 ed , 378. Šams-e Qays’ definition of īġāl is 
equivalent to ar-Rāġib’s tablīġ [3.2.2] and therefore should indeed come under basṭ. The same is true for Šams-e 
Qays’ tabyīn and taqsīm, which are not the same as ar-Rāġib’s chapters 11 and 12. ———, al-Muʾ am 1909 ed , 
327, 341, 343. ———, al-Muʾ am 2008 ed , 357, 371, 372. However, other key terms in Šams-e Qays such as 
ma ā , istiʿārah and tam īl are in accordance with the Arabic tradition in which ar-Rāġib worked. For example, the 
beginning of the definition of itstiʿārah reads:  
a type of ma ā  (non-literal language), and ma ā  is that which is the opposite of ḥaqīqat (literal language). 
 aqīqat is when they use an expression for an idea in the way that the originator of the language first coined 
that expression for that idea in the lexicon (ḥaqīqat ān ast ke lafẓ-rā bar maʿnī-ī iṭlāq konand ke wāḍiʿ-e luġat 
dar aṣl-e waḍʿ-e ān lafẓ be-i āʾ-e ān maʿnī nehāde bāšad)… 
———, al-Muʾ am 1909 ed , 336. ———, al-Muʾ am 2008 ed , 365. Cf. Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. f.4a. 
Cf. ar-Rummānī, "an-Nukat," 79; Šamš-e Qays, al-Muʾ am 1909 ed , 346. ———, al-Muʾ am 2008 ed , 375. 
Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. f.33a.  
The most notable variation is the disagreement on where istiṭrād should be placed. On the one hand, istiṭrād is the 
continuation of an idea and can be read as prolixity, but on the other, in both Šams-e Qays and ar-Rāġib’s analyses it 
is an idea (maqṣūd in Šams-e Qays and maʿnā in ar-Rāġib) that is connected to another idea. It may therefore fit 
best in the second section of ar-Rāġib’s manual (17), where word units are moved around, rather than the 
expression-idea relationship itself being manipulated.  
569 suʾāl raftī bīš-e ʿaṭā hamīše kunūn / hamī ʿaṭā-ye to āyad paḏīre bīš-e suʾāl. Šamš-e Qays, al-Muʾ am 1909 ed , 
348. ———, al-Muʾ am 2008 ed , 378. Rezāvī attributes this line to Abū al-Ġāsim Ḥasan b. Aḥmad ʿUnṣūrī (d. ca. 
1039).  
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Just as in Ragib’s definition, equality is the absence of any imagery that would break the one-to-
one correspondence between expression and idea.  
Finally, Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. Sinān al- afāǧī (422/1031-466/1074), who was 
born around the time of Ragib’s death, reports the same tripartite structure in his Sirr al-Faṣāḥah 
(The Secret of Eloquence) but with different names for the three categories.
570
 All the lines of 
poetry adduced by these three critics share the lack of imagery that defines poetic equality.
571
 
                                                 
570 In al- afāǧī, concision is išārah (as in Qudāmah), prolixity is taḏyīl, and equality remains musāwāh. The 
definitions in terms of lafẓ and maʿnā are identical to ar-Rāġib’s. The expression “as if his expressions were the 
moulds of their ideas“ is repeated. Where Ragib wrote that prolixity is for situations when the speaker wants to 
ensure that listeners of all abilities understand (…tuḥtā u fīhi ilā tafhīmi –l-ʿāmmati  [ṣ: wa-fīhum] –l-qarību wa-l-
baʿīdu wa-ḏ-ḏakīyu wa-l baṭīʾu –l-fahima…), al- afāǧī agrees and extends this to mean that concision should only 
be used when dealing with the elite, and equality is for those situations that fall between the two (inna –t-taḏyīlu 
yuṣlaḥu … bi-ḥay u yakūnu –l-kalāmu mu āṭiban bi-hī ʿāmmata –n-nāsi … wa-l-išāratu tuṣlaḥu li-mu āṭabati –l-
 ulafāʾi wa-l-mulūki … wa-l-musāwāti –llatī hiya –l-wasaṭu bayna hāḏayni -ṭ-ṭarafayn). Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh 
b. Muḥammad al- afāǧī, Sirr al-Faṣāḥah, ed. ʿAbd al-Mutaʿāl aṣ-Ṣaʿīdī (Cairo: Maktabat wa-Ma baʿat Muḥammad 
ʿAlī Ṣabīḥ wa-Awlādih, 1969). 199, 209. Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. f.17a.  
571 Qudāmah cited two of the lines that Ragib used: “there will be days that will show you…” (note 560) and “for the 
one most content with his path…” (note 561, Qudāmah citing the full line). Al- afāǧī also cited “there will be days 
that will show you…”. The lines not cited by Ragib are as follows: 
Qudāmah: 
If you hide the malady we will not fear it, and if you declare war we will not remain seated. If you fight us we 
will fight you, and if you intend to spill blood we will do the same. I am prepared to leap into war on a steed, 
whether spurred on or allowed to walk.  
[al-mutaqārib] fa-in taktumū –d-dāʾi lā na ifhī / wa-in tabʿa ū –l-ḥarba lā naqʿudī // wa-in taqtulūnā 
nuqattilkumu / wa-in taqṣidū li-damin naqṣidī // wa-aʿdadtu li-l-ḥarbi wa  ābatan /  awāda –l-maḥa  ati wa-
l-murwadi. Ahlwardt, Divans, 123. Lines 7, 8, and 11 with tadfinu for taktumu in line 7. 
Qudāmah and al- afāǧī: 
And whenever a man has a characteristic it is known, even if he thinks it is hidden from people.  
[aṭ-ṭawīl] wa-mahmā yakun ʿinda –mruʾin min  alīqatin / wa-law  ālahā ta fā ʿalā –n-nāsi tuʿlamī. Zuhayr 
b. Abī Sulmā, Dīwān, 88. With takun and wa-in for yakun and wa-law. 
Qudāmah and al- afāǧī:  
If you fail to refrain from ignorance or obscenity then either you wound those of mild temperament, or [your 
fellow] ignoramuses wound you.  
[aṭ-ṭawīl] iḏā anta lam tuqṣir ʿan –l- ahli wa-l- anā / aṣabta ḥalīman aw aṣābaka  āhilū. In Zuhayr’s Diwān 
this poem is attributed to his son Kaʿb. Ibid., 71. In the Šarḥ by  aʿlab it is attributed to Zuhayr. Zuhayr b. 
Abī Sulmā and  aʿlab, Šharḥ Dīwān Zuhayr, 300. Ṭarafah as above. 
Qudāmah:  
A band tried to ambush some of them, yet they neither ambushed, nor were they reproached, nor did they fall 
short.  
[aṭ-ṭawīl] saʿā baʿdahum qawmun likay yudrikūhumū / fa-lam yudrikū wa-lam yulāmū wa-lam yaʾlū. Zuhayr 
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I will end this section on poetics with an example of how Ragib used the pairing of 
expression and idea in his Exegesis, and the rhetorical figures developed in his poetics manual, to 
deal with the Quran. It must also be remembered that Ragib assumed throughout his manual that 
the techniques for poetic innovation that he is analysing occur in both the Quran and profane 
poetry. Examples from the Quran abound throughout the manual. There appears to be no doubt 
                                                                                                                                                             
b. Abī Sulmā, Dīwān, 63. With yafʿalū for yudrikū and yulīmū for yulāmū. Cf. Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā and 
 aʿlab, Šharḥ Dīwān Zuhayr, 114. With yafʿalū for yudrikū.  aʿlab (815/6-904) explains the line as referring 
to a group of young men whose failed ambush was an attempt to emulate their fathers, whom they would go 
on to equal. 
Qudāmah:  
I swear by your life! It is death that, as it fails to catch the youth, is like the loose rope whose ends are held in 
the hand. 
[aṭ-ṭawīl] la-ʿamruka inna –l-mawta mā a ṭaʾa –l-fatā / la-ka-ṭ-ṭiwali –l-mur ā wa- inyāhu bi-l-yadī. Ṭarafah 
b. ʿAbd, Dīwān, 34. 
This is the line immediately preceding “there will be days that will show you…”, Qudāmah quotes them both. This 
line does contain the image of death being like a loose rope, but most likely Qudāmah felt that the lines needed to be 
quoted as a pair for them to be understood, despite equality only occuring in the second. al- afāǧī, Sirr, 209-210; 
Qudāmah b.  aʿfar, Naqd, 84-85. 
Qudāmah:  
May God not take you away o Tawbah, for the encounter with fate is the same whether one is in armour or 
undressed.  
[aṭ-ṭawīl] fa-lā yubʿidanka –llāhu yā Tawba innamā / liqāʾu –l-manāyā dāriʿan mi la ḥāsirī. Laylā al-
Aḫyalīyah (fl. 7th century).  Abū Faraǧ al-Iṣfahānī, al-Aġānī, 11:213. With Tawbu for Tawba. 
Al- afāǧī:  
Perhaps perfuming the breeze in welcome will restore her, take our breaths away, and augment her.  
[aṭ-ṭawīl] ʿasā mumsiku –r-rīḥi –l-qabūli yuʿīduhā / wa-yanquṣu min anfāsinā wa-ya īduhā. Abū Naṣr ʿAbd 
al-ʿAzīz Ibn Nubātah at-Tamīmī as-Saʿdī (939-1015). aṣ-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī, 3:190-193. 
Al- afāǧī:  
If the youth has a flaw in his perfection, then every sound member of mankind is defective.  
[aṭ-ṭawīl] iḏā kāna nuqṣānu –l-fatā fī tamāmihī / fa-kullu ṣaḥīḥin fī-l-anāmi ʿalīlu. Abū Naṣr Ibn Nubātah. To 
the best of my knowledge, these two lines by Ibn Nubātah are only extant in Sirr al-Faṣāḥah. 
Al- afāǧī:  
Fate’s children [i.e. previous generations] visited him in his youth and he cheered them up. We come to him 
when he is old  
[al-basīṭ] atā – - amāna banūhū fī šabībatihī / fa-sarrahum wa-ataynāhū ʿalā –l-haramī. al-Mutanabbī and 
al-Barqūqī, Šarḥ Diwān al-Mutanabbī, 2:1177.  
Al- afāǧī:  
He continued to outstrip [them] until a jealous person said ‘he has a shortcut to the heights’.  
[al-basīṭ] mā  āla yasbuqu ḥattā qāla ḥāsiduhū / la-hū ṭarīqun ilā –l-ʿulyāʾi mu taṣarū. Al-Buḥturī (not in 
Diwān). Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Malik aṯ- aʿālibī, Yatīmat ad-Dahr fī Maḥāsin Ahl al-Aṣr, ed. Mufīd 
Muḥammad Qamīḥah, 5 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1983). 2:151. 
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in Ragib’s mind that God could use the same rhetorical figures to communicate as effectively as 
poets had before and after the coming of Islam: 
If someone were to ask how the two comparisons in Quran 2:17 (‘they are like one who 
lights a fire…[but God leaves them in darkness]’) and Quran 2:19 (‘or like the 
rainstorm…[that they fear]’) are adjoined to each other (kayfa wa hu -l-ʿaṭf) when the 
second is not an appropriate way to follow the first, then one could answer in one of two 
ways. First, that “or like the people of the rain” was intended [making the comparison 
between a person who lights a fire and a person who is rained upon, rather than between a 
person and a rainstorm]. Alternatively one could say that the coordination is on the level of 
the idea, because comparison (tašbīh) sometimes occurs on the basis of a correspondence 
on the level of expressions, and sometimes on the basis of a correspondence of ideas not 
reflected in the expressions [i.e. the comparisons are really between the fear of being in 
darkness and the fear of the rainstorm, rather than between lighting a fire and being rained 
upon]. Another example of this is Quran 3:117: ‘that which they spend in this worldly life 
is like a cold wind that strikes a harvest of a people who have wronged themselves’. The 
idea of this verse is ‘like the harvest of a people who have wronged themselves, which was 
struck by a wind’ [i.e. the comparison is really between wasteful spending and a ruined 
harvest, rather than between spending and wind]. This reading is derived on the basis of 
ideas, not on the basis of expressions. Another example is the poet’s: 
The daughter of Ḥi  ān b. ʿAwf left many campsites / like a scribe adorns a parchment with 
the title.572 
The grammatical reconstruction (taqdīr) of this verse is ‘like the title that the scribe has 
written’ [i.e. the comparison is really between the campsites and the titles, rather than 
                                                 
572 Al-Aḫnas b. Šihāb aṯ- aġlibī (pre-Islamic / “long before Islam”). Lyall’s (free) translation reads: “The daughter 
of Ḥi  ān son of ʿAwf left her dwellings plain / like lines drawn by skilled hands fair on a volume’s opening page”, 
and the  amāsah has naqqama for raqqaša. al-Mufaḍḍal b. Muḥammad b. Yaʿlā aḍ-Ḍabbī, The Mufaḍḍalīyāt: an 
anthology of ancient Arabian odes, ed. Charles James Lyall and A. A. Bevan, 3 vols. (Oxford / London: Oxford 
University Press / Brill, 1921-1924). 1:410, 2:149; al-Marzūqī and Abū Tammām, Šarḥ al- amāsah, 1:721.  
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between the campsites and the scribal act of writing]. This type of comparison is called 
‘enfolded comparison’ (at-tašbīh al-mulaffaf).573  
Ragib deals with enfolded comparison, a relatively rare rhetorical figure,
574
 in his poetics 
manual. He explains that it is a matter of two targets (mušabbahayn) being together compared to 
a single source (mušabbah bihī), and then each source being comparable to one of the targets. In 
the line quoted above, the multiple campsites are the target, and they are compared to the single 
source of the book title. The book title is then efectively multiplied, and the image becomes one 
of multiple book titles compared to multiple campsites. The campsites are, in effect, folded into 
the book title. In one of the lines of poetry Ragib uses as examples of enfolded comparison in his 
manual of poetics, the fore and hind-legs of a horse are folded into a single pair of legs that 
moves as one: 
As if the two forelegs and the two hind legs were fleeing and trying to move as one.575  
Poetics is a matter of exegesis as well as poetry, and the tools of literary criticism can be used on 
both the words of divine revelation and the words with which pre-Islamic poets lusted after their 
beloveds. 
Figurative Readings 
                                                 
573 See Appendix for Arabic text. Ragib. Carullah 84. f.24a; ———. Ayasofya 212. Cf. ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 
814. 
574 Al-Marzūqī (Abū ʿAlī Aḥmad b. Muḥammad, d. 421/1030) was a contemporary of Ragib’s, and also from 
Isfahan. In his commentary on the  amāsah, he writes that comparing campsite remains to the act of writing is 
“enfolded, according to their methodologies” (malfūfun fī ṭarāʾiqihim). The “they” could well be a reference to 
poetics circles in Isfahan of which Ragib knew, or with which he was connected. al-Marzūqī and Abū Tammām, 
Šarḥ al- amāsah, 1:721. 
575 ka-annamā –r-ri lāni wa-l-yadāni  / ṭālibatā watrin wa-hāribāni. Ragib also quotes this line in his Quranic 
Glossary and Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, in the latter giving the name of the poet as Bakr b. al-Na  āḥ (fl. ca. 174/790). 
ibid., 2:1285; Ragib, Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, 4:642; ———, Quranic Glossary, 163; ———. Innovative Figures of 
Speech. f.8a. 
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In the example of poetics in exegesis quoted above, Ragib makes a hermeneutical 
distinction between reading on the level of expressions and reading on the level of ideas. He was 
quite happy to think about what God meant, and by extension what Ragib believed through the 
exercise of his reason God to have meant, and then to allow his conclusions to override the 
divine text. We already know that this was a substantial area of debate across mediaeval 
Islamicate intellectual culture, and one that was usually couched in terms of human reason versus 
divine revelation. Schools of thought such as the Muʿtazilah believed that the divine word could 
be evaluated, and if necessary overriden or explained away by human reason whereas everyone 
else, from the Ašāʿirah to the Ḥanābilah and beyond, believed that such a Muʿtazilī position was 
dangerous and heretical overreach. How could humans, created and controlled by God, be able to 
decide for themselves what God should or should not have meant? Ragib was taking a Muʿtazilī 
position here, despite as we have seen regarding himself as an opponent of theirs, and holding 
fast to the text of divine revelation and its precedent in all doctrinal matters. 
It was Ragib’s focus on language that enabled him to square this circle. I would argue that 
it was because he saw language as composed of both expressions and ideas that he could choose 
to either follow God’s ideas or God’s expressions while remaining faithful at all times to God’s 
language. His theory of meaning therefore enabled him to make the bold claim that God’s literal 
word should be understood as analogy rather than fact. Taking it as analogy did not make it less 
divine, and reading it as a figure of speech did not privilege human reason above God’s wisdom. 
Unsurprisingly, Ragib explained this position of his in terms of the pairing of expression and 
idea. 
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At the very end of The Path to the Nobilities, Ragib concluded a discussion about the 
different ways in which an action can be read (God as the first cause, humans as the immediate 
cause, etc.
576
) with the following remark: 
This is a subject in which one cannot establish ideas according to their equivalent 
expressions. One cannot, therefore, look at the idea through the expression. One must 
rather look at the expression through the idea.577 
Ragib made exactly the same epistemological claim in the methodological introduction to his 
Exegesis: 
The third area of disagreement and doubt is a difference of perspective.578 Should one look 
at the idea through the expression, or at the expression through the idea? Al- a  ābī [Ḥamd 
b. Muḥammad, d. ca. 386/996], for example, looked through the expression when he 
established the essences of things.579 The wise (al-ḥukamā’), on the other hand, looked 
through the essences of things and then to the expressions. 
This difference is exemplified by the debate about the divine attributes. Those who look 
through the expression are confronted with a grave doubt by, for example, Quran 5:64 
‘rather his two hands are outstretched’, Quran 54:14 (al-Qamar) “proceeding under our 
eye”, and other verses like them. 
                                                 
576 See note 478. 
577 wa-hādā faṣlun man taṣawarrahū lam yaʿtamid fī ta bīti –l-maʿānī ʿalā mi lihā min –l-alfāẓi fa-yanẓura min –l-
lafẓi ilā –l-maʿnā bal yanẓuru fī naḥwi hāḏā min –l-maʿnā ilā –l-lafẓ. Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 298. 
578 The first two areas are: homonymous expressions, and differing intents behind expressions (for the latter, see note 
482). 
579 Aḥmad Ḥasan Farḥāt, the editor, persuasively interprets this as a reference to al- a  ābī’s position on the 
attributes in his al-Ġunyah ʿan al-Kalām wa-Ahlihī (Dispensing with Theology and Theologians), as quoted by Ibn 
Taymīyah. There, al- a  ābī maintains that the attributes describe God’s essence (ḏāt) rather than his abilities or 
actions, and therefore that the Quranic expression “hand” means that God’s essence has a hand, albeit not a hand like 
other hands, and that “we cannot say [as Ragib does] that the idea behind ‘hand’ is strength and blessing” (wa-lisnā 
an naqūla inna maʿnā –l-yadi –l-quwwatu wa-n-niʿmah). Abū al-ʿAbbāṣ Aḥmad Ibn Taymīyah, al-Fatwā -l-
 amwīyah al-Kubrā, ed. Ḥamad b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin at-Tawayǧirī (Riyad: Dār aṣ-Ṣamīʿī, 2004). 361-365, 364; 
Ragib, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 40 (note 5). Cf. Frank, "Elements`," 165-166. 
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[However,] when specialists in the realities of things (ahl al-ḥaqāʾiq) demonstrate with 
proofs that God is one and unblemished by multiplicity (and consequently cannot have 
limbs or organs), they establish the expressions based on that [principle]. They therefore 
understand these expressions as non-literal language and idiom, and by doing so are 
protected from the doubt that confronted the group discussed above.580  
Verses that describe God were a source of doubt for non-specialists, and in On Creeds Ragib told 
his readers to “beware of thinking that there is a physical reality behind these expressions!” in 
the context of his discussion of God’s throne.581 Taking these verses to be analogy or figures of 
speech was not a rejection of God’s language, it was an accurate reading of that divine text. 
This position of Ragib’s was not a rejection of language in favour of ontology. He was not 
saying that we should bypass words and instead focus on concepts, but rather that when faced 
with the combination of expression and idea that constitutes language we should be prepared to 
work on the level of the ideas rather than the expressions, if the hermeneutical situation requires. 
Nevertheless, the conclusions that this strategy led him to make, such as the claim that the 
Quranic expressions “God’s hands” meant “God’s blessing” put him directly at odds with the 
Sunni majority.
582
 He was conscious of this, as we saw from his citation of al- a  ābī in the 
quotation above, and as we can see from the following discussion in the Quranic Glossary. 
                                                 
580 wa- - āli u – tilāfu naẓari –n-nāẓirīna min –l-lafẓi ilā –l-maʿnā aw min –l-maʿnā ilā –l-lafẓi wa-ḏālika ka-naẓari 
–l-Ḫaṭṭābī ilā –l-lafẓi fī i bāti ḏawāti –l-ašyāʾi wa-naẓari –l-ḥukamāʾi min ḏawāti –l-ašyāʾi ilā –l-alfāẓi wa-ḏālika 
naḥwu –l-kalāmi fī ṣifāti –l-bārī ʿa  a wa- alla fa-inna –n-nāẓira min –l-lafẓi waqaʿa [sic.] ʿalayhi –š-šubhatu –l-
ʿaẓīmatu fī naḥwi qawlihī taʿālā bal yadāhu mabsūṭāni wa-qawlihī ta rī bi-aʿyuninā wa-mā ya rī ma rāhu wa-ahlu 
–l-ḥaqāʾiqi lamma tabayyanū bi-l-barāhīna anna –llāha taʿālā wāḥidun muna  ahun ʿan –t-taka  uri fa-kayfa ʿan –
l- awāriḥi banū –l-alfāẓa ʿalā ḏālika wa-ḥamalū ʿalā ma ā i –l-luġati wa-mašāʿa –l-alfāẓi fa-ṣīnū ʿammā waqaʿa 
fīhi –l-firqatu –l-awwal. Ragib, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 87-88; ———, Methodological 
Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 40-41. Cf. Key, "al-Rāghib," 303-304. See note 501 on ahl al-ḥaqāʾiq. 
581 iyyāka an tataṣawwara bi-hāḏihi –l-alfāẓi šayʾan min –l-maḥsūsāt. Ragib, On Creeds, 105. 
582 See notes 276f. 
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Ragib writes that some say God is called al- abbār in the Quran because he is powerful 
and makes people do things and that lexicographers agree, deriving al- abbār from the factitive 
verb a bara. An alternative position denied that derivation and suggested an etymology from 
 abr in the phrase “neither compulsion ( abr) nor free will”. The Muʿtazilah disagreed with this 
alternative position on the basis that it implied God needs to compel people, an implication that 
denigrates God. Ragib then described this Muʿtazilī position as “not objectionable”,583 
characterizing them as thinking “with regard to the idea” (min ḥay u –l-maʿnā) while the 
lexicographers thought “with regard to the expression” (min ḥay u –l-lafẓ).584  
However, when it came to proposing a solution to the problems caused by Quranic 
expressions, Ragib was ultimately more comfortable borrowing phraseology from Sufism than 
from the Muʿtazilah. In his discussion in the Exegesis of the Quranic description of God raising 
Jesus “to him”, Ragib wrote that “to him” was a reflection of elevated noble status, and in no 
way an indication of a physical upwards movement: “the real nature of this cannot be attained 
through the expression. Humans can only come to know it through God’s light”.585 Ragib 
                                                 
583 And it does after all fit with the first part of Ragib’s own belief that there is “neither compulsion nor free will”. 
See notes 473 and  484. 
584 God is described as  abbār in Quran 59:23 (al-Ḥašar). Ragib writes: 
fa-qad qīla summiya bi-ḏālika … liannahū yu biru –n-nāsa ay yaqharuhum ʿalā mā yurīduhū wa-dafaʿa 
baʿḍu ahli –l-luġati ḏālika min ḥay u –l-lafẓa … fa-u ība ʿanhu bi-anna ḏālika min lafẓi –l- abri –l-marwīyi 
fī qawlihī lā  abra wa-lā tafwīḍa lā min lafẓi –l-i bāri wa-ankara  amāʿatun min –l-muʿta ilati ḏālika min 
ḥay u –l-maʿnā fa-qālū yataʿālā –llāhu ʿan ḏālika wa-laysa ḏālika bi-munkar. 
Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 184. 
585 Ragib’s commentary on Quran 4:158 (“Rather God raised him [Jesus] to him” (bal rafaʿahū –llāhu ilayhi)): 
 wa-ḏakara qawlahū ilayhi tanbīhan ʿalā taʿẓīmi –l-marfūʿi lā ʿilā išāratin ilā ḥaddin maḥdūdin tanbīhan ilā 
annahū ḥaṣala lahū bihī aʿlā aš-šarafi … wa-lā yumkinu –l-kašfu ʿan ḥaqāʾiqihā bi-l-lafẓi wa-innamā 
yudrikuhū –l-insānu bi-ḥasabi mā  aʿalahū lahū min nūrihī  
———, Exegesis ed. Sardār, 222. 
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certainly saw God’s light as itself a metaphor for the reason with which he had endowed 
humanity, but he would not describe that human reason as trumping revelation.
586
  
What he was prepared to say is that when one considers the expressions and ideas that 
make up the language of revelation, one should ensure that the ideas stack up together, rather 
than focussing on the expressions alone. In effect, this position was an inevitable consequence of 
his assumptions about linguistic structure. If the majority of language is potentially ambiguous, 
made up of polysemous connections between finite expressions and infinite ideas, then it would 
be impossible to follow the expressions without first considering the ideas. One would have no 
way of knowing to which ideas, among the options provided by the lexicon, the expressions 
referred. Looking through the expressions at the ideas would only be possible with the proper 
name that is a sign for a single external physical referent. For everything else, and we have seen 
that everything else is the vast majority of language, an expression has the potential to mean 
more than one thing. There is nowhere to look for the solution other than among the ideas 
themselves. 
Concluding Remarks on Ragib’s Philosophy of Language 
 Having completed a review of Ragib’s philosophy in language both as a theory and in 
practice, I will now attempt to sum up some of the most important points of the previous two 
chapters. 
Ragib’s philosophy of language is one in which linguistic ambiguity is accepted, even 
welcomed, and then negotiated and managed with a combination of assumptions, models of 
linguistic structure, and religious faith. 
                                                 
586 Indeed, in his Analysis of the Two Creations, Ragib compares both human reason and divine revelation to God’s 
light. ———, Analysis of the Two Creations, 119 (chapter 18). 
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The model that underpins this philosophy of language is a theory of meaning in which 
expressions (alfāẓ) express (ʿibārah ʿan) ideas (maʿānī) according to the intent (qaṣd, murād) of 
the speaker. The ideas are ontologically real and shared between language users, but they are not 
external physical things. Expressions express either through a one-to-one correspondence; a 
proper noun (ʿalam) that is simply a sign for an external physical thing, or they express ideas, in 
which case they do so through polysemy (ištirāk). Polysemy is a situation in which the finite 
corpus of expressions interacts with the infinity of potential ideas. This infinity is proscribed in 
the lexicon (al-luġah), which was coined by God’s fiat (waḍʿ) and then expanded upon by 
generations of humanity. 
Literary innovation (badīʿ), be it in poetry or in prose, is the result of new connections 
being made between expressions and ideas. This creative process was undertaken by pre-Islamic 
poets, poets and literary figures throughout the Islamic period up to Ragib’s time, and had been 
practiced by God in the Quran. The process is recorded in the archive of literary transmission 
and criticism, and when new connections become sufficiently widespread, humans choose to 
include them in the lexicon. 
Ragib is able to exploit his theory of meaning and his assumptions about the ambiguity of 
language in order to solve theological problems such as that of God’s compulsion versus human 
free will, and of God’s attributes. In both these cases, he uses his theory of meaning to explain 
that although they use the same language, there is a massive ontological difference between God 
and his human creation. When faced with evidence in the form of language, a scholar must 
decide, with reference to the lexicon, on the intent that determines to which ideas the expressions 
refer. The nature of linguistic ambiguity is such that these expressions have the potential to refer 
to ideas as different as “God” and “human”. 
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The nature of linguistic ambiguity is also such that expressions can refer to multiple 
ontologically distinct ideas at the same time. For this to happen, the ideas must be connected to 
each other, but if they are, however loose the connection, a single expression can mean two 
things at once. This is how we can be both responsible for our own actions and believe that God 
is acting through us. 
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5. THE HISTORY OF THE ARABIC LANGUAGE TRADITION 
Universal Concepts 
When Ragib’s work, written in the late tenth/early eleventh-century Islamicate world, is 
read alongside the work of other scholars from different centuries and cultures it becomes clear 
that he was not the first to think as he did about language, and would not be the last. Many of the 
concepts discussed in the preceding chapters speak to fundamental human assumptions about 
language, mind, and reality that reoccur at all times and in all contexts.  
Historical accounts of the philosophy of language usually begin with the Stoic logic of 
ancient Greece, where a theory of meaning developed that distinguished between expression, 
idea, and external physical referent, and viewed language and its ambiguities as an integral part 
of philosophy.587 Some Stoic concepts are enticingly close to those found in the Arabic Language 
Tradition, just as they are close to concepts developed in twentieth-century Europe. However, the 
temptation to suggest that each civilization’s scholars directly influenced the next should be 
resisted. The Stoic λεκτόν may perform an analogous function to the Arabic maʿnā,588 and indeed 
an analogous function to Frege’s Sinn and Carnap’s Intension,589 but in the absence of 
                                                 
587 The major Stoic figure is Zeno (born in Rhodes, fl. ca. 35—260 BC). It should be noted that our knowledge of 
Stoic logic is dependent on scattered and fragmentary data found in sources that are usually hostile to the Stoic 
ideals. Benson Mates, Stoic Logic, vol. 26, University of California Publications in Philosophy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1953). 1, 6, 8, 11; Versteegh, Greek Elements, 178f. For a discussion of how Stoic 
logic included syntax, poetics, verbal ambiguities, and parts of speech under its purview, see: Kwame Gyekye, 
Arabic Logic: Ibn al- ayyib's Commentary on Porphyry's Eisagoge  (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1979). 7. 
588 Mates translates λεκτόν as “the significate”. Both Sch ck and Versteegh address attempts to draw connection 
between Stoic logic and Arabic theories of meaning. Mates, Stoic Logic, 16; Sch ck, Koranexegese, 386, 432; 
Versteegh, Greek Elements, 184. 
589 Mates makes a tabular comparison between the terminology of the Stoics, Frege, and Carnap that equates λεκτόν, 
Sinn, and Intension. Mates, Stoic Logic, 20. 
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intertextual proof it is safer to assume that these concepts represent fundamental human 
assumptions that any scholar could have developed from first principles.  
The value of considering the Arabic Language Tradition alongside the variety of other 
linguistic models proposed throughout the ages is that doing so highlights the resilience and the 
civilization-wide breadth of penetration that the pairing of expression and idea achieved in 
Arabic. Neither the Stoic σημαῖνον and σημαινόμενον, Frege’s Sinn, Carnap’s intension, nor even 
Saussure’s signifiant and signifi  achieved the degree of acceptance within their cultural contexts 
that the pairing of lafẓ and maʿnā did across Arabic scholarship from the eighth-century 
onwards.590 The struggle, already documented in this dissertation, to find an appropriate English 
translation for lafẓ and maʿnā further confirms that English lacks equally omnipresent 
terminology for the two basic building blocks of so many theories of meaning. 
I will demonstrate in what follows that the pairing of expression and idea was an 
assumption about linguistic structure that everybody working in Arabic shared and used without 
quibble or question. In this chapter, I will focus on those scholars who used the pairing of 
expression and idea to manage polysemy, and whose philosophy of language accepted and 
managed linguistic ambiguity. These scholars constitute what I am calling the Arabic Language 
Tradition. Ragib was a part of this tradition, and an exemplar of it. In the conclusion that follows 
this chapter I will show how scholars working in the Classical Language Tradition also used the 
pairing of expression and idea as the foundation for a theory of meaning, but then chose, 
influenced by an established Aristotelian philosophy of language, not to embrace the role that 
                                                 
590 Respectively: sign/indicator and significate/indicated, sense, intension, signifier and signified. All of these terms 
do, of course, have their own defined roles in the theories of meaning in which they were situated. This is not the 
appropriate place for a detailed analysis of those theories. Sch ck, Koranexegese, 386; Versteegh, Greek Elements, 
179. See also note 346 and page 199 in addition to Speaks, Theories of Meaning. 
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polysemy and ambiguity could play. The Arabic Language Tradition and the Classical Language 
Tradition therefore shared an assumption about linguistic structure but disagreed on the nature of 
the relationship between language, mind, and reality. Expression and idea were omnipresent in 
Arabic-language scholarship, but only the Arabic Language Tradition exploited their potential to 
manage ambiguity. 
Early Analyses of Linguistic Ambiguity 
Our story begins in the two great garrison towns of southern Iraq, Basra and Kufa. 
Together, they were the dual hub of intellectual production for the nascent Islamic civilization 
that had founded them as army camps around the year 17/638. The first scholars whose work is 
available to us were born some sixty years later, and by the time Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū al-Ḥasan 
Muqātil b. Sulaymān died in 150/767 the Abbasid dynasty had not only brought the caliphate 
back to Iraq from Syria in 132/749, but also founded a third city in 146/763. That city, Baghdad, 
would overshadow everything else for the next few centuries.  
We cannot know, in the absence of manuscript evidence, what scholars were saying and 
writing in the century before Abū Ḥanīfah became head of his Kufan study circle in 120/737,591 
but it must have been an incredible period in which to work. We know from reports in later 
sources that the Quranic text was being discussed and fixed, and that arguments were starting 
                                                 
591 Yanagihashi, Abū  anīfa. When it comes to our knowledge of the region’s already-developed intellectual 
traditions, it should be noted that we: 
[H]ave no evidence of handbooks or technical treatises of rhetoric in Syriac from the pre-Islamic period … 
[t]he fifth and sixth centuries marked the beginning of the intensive Syriac work of translation and 
commentary on the Organon … for evidence of a technical treatise in Syriac … we have to wait until the 
Islamic period. 
Furthermore, “the bulk of the technical theory of late antiquity is devoted to judicial and deliberative rhetoric”. John 
W. Watt, "Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in Syriac," in Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in the Greek  
Roman  Syriac and Arabic Worlds, ed. Fr d rique Woerther (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2009), 144, 149. 
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about the central issues of theology. Arguments about politics had of course already been the 
cause of two civil wars. 
Abū Ḥanīfah and Muqātil are the very first Arabic-language scholars whose work is extant. 
This is particularly important in the context of this dissertation because the nature of an 
investigation into linguistic structures is such that the words and phrases that scholars used are of 
primary importance. If the scholars in question are reporting the scholarship of their 
predecessors, then regardless of their doctrinal or conceptual accuracy, it would be negligent to 
place weight on the linguistic terminology reported to have been used by the earlier generation. 
The assumptions about language that I am attempting to draw out are exactly the sort of 
methodological and conceptual tools that would slip unnoticed into a scholar’s transmission of 
earlier work. With at least one of Abū Ḥanīfah’s theological treatises we are on relatively certain 
ground when it comes to its authenticity,592 although in the absence of a codex dating from his 
lifetime nothing can be certain. With Muqātil we are on firmer ground, for a papyrus fragment 
dating from around the time of its author’s life has been studied by Nabia Abbott and established 
as his study of Quranic polysemy.593 
We can tell from Abū Ḥanīfah’s works that theological arguments were already raging 
during his lifetime, and that language itself was under consideration. In a letter written to the 
                                                 
592 Hiroyuki Yanagihashi writes that the Risālah ilā ʿU mān al-Battī (discussed in note 52) is regarded as the only 
authentic text from Abū Ḥanīfah’s pen, and that the other text that I make use of (al-ʿ lim wa-l-Mutaʿallim), is a 
valid record of discussions between Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū Muqātil b. Sulaymān (Ḥafs b. Salm, d. 208/823), 
recorded by the latter. U. F. ʿAbd-Allāh, "Abū Ḥanīfa," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New York: 
Iranicaonline Website, 2011); Nuʿmān b.  ābit Abū Ḥanīfah, al-ʿ lim wa-l-Mutaʿallim Riwāyat Abī Muqātil     wa-
yalīhi Risālat Abī  anīfah ilā ʿU mān al-Battī  umma al-Fiqh al-Absaṭ, ed. M. Zāhid al-Kawṯarī (Cairo: al- ānǧī, 
1949). 3; Yanagihashi, Abū  anīfa. 
593 The text of this fragment is in accordance with the printed edition to which I refer in what follows. Nabia Abbott, 
Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri II: Qurʾānic Commentary and Tradition  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1957). 92f; Muqātil b. Sulaymān, al-Wu ūh wa-n-Naẓāʾir fī-l-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, ed. Ḥātim Ṣāliḥ aḍ-Ḍāmin (Dubai: 
Markaz  umʿat al-Māǧid, 2006). John Wansbrough refuses to date Muqātil’s work earlier than “the beginning of the 
third/ninth century”. Wansborough, Quranic Studies, 209. 
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Basran jurist ʿUṯmān al-Battī (d. 143/760), Abū Ḥanīfah defends himself against accusations of 
Murǧiʾī tendencies as follows:594  
As for your use of the name Murǧiʾah, what would be the sin of a group of people who 
spoke about justice and were then called ‘the people of justice’ by heretics,595 when they 
were in fact the people of justice, and Sunni? It is just a name that odious people applied to 
them. By my life, that which is disparaged as justice, were you to encourage people to call 
it odious, and were people to follow you and indeed call it odious, then the name ‘justice’ 
would become heresy. How, as long as you had adopted it from the just, could it be so 
disparaged?596 
In a culture of oral argument what people said mattered, and the fact of their saying it raised the 
question of language. Quarrels about naming and what people were called by other people lay at 
the heart of early Muslim theology. Elsewhere, Abū Ḥanīfah makes the same distinction between 
a person being something and being called something,597 and asks “how many a word is first 
                                                 
594 The Murǧiʾah were a movement that believed judgements on the status of believers in the hereafter should be 
postponed (mur aʾ). See note 52. 
595 It would appear that Abū Ḥanīfah is referring to the still nascent Muʿtazilah (who called themselves the adherents 
of God’s justice and unity, ahl al-ʿadl wa-t-tawḥīd), and that the justice he refers to is God’s divine justice.  
596 The syntax here is not entirely clear: 
wa-ammā mā ḏakarta min –smi –l-mur iʾati fa-mā ḏanbu qawmin takallamū bi-ʿadlin wa-sammāhum ahlu –
l-bidʿi bi-hāḏā –l-ismi wa-lākinnahum ahlu –l-ʿadli wa-ahlu –s-sunnati wa-innamā hāḏā –smun sammāhum 
bihī ahlu šanaʾānin wa-laʿamrī mā yuha  anu ʿadlan law daʿawta ilayhi –n-nāsa fa-wāfaqūka ʿalayhi an 
sammaytahum ahla šanaʾānin –l-battata fa-law faʿalū ḏālika kāna hāḏā –l-ismu bidʿatan fa-hal yuha  anu 
ḏālika mā a aḏta bihī min ahli –l-ʿadl. 
Abū Ḥanīfah, "Risālah ilā ʿUṯmān," 37-38. This letter is also cited by Madelung. Wilferd Madelung, "Early Sunnī 
Doctrine concerning Faith as Reflected in the "Kitāb al-Īmān" of Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām (d. 224/839)," 
Studia Islamica 32(1970): 236. 
597 As part of his argument that belief is not the same as good works Abū Ḥanīfah writes: 
How many people do good works for another, but do not have a place among God’s servants as a result, nor 
does the name ‘placed among God’s servants’ apply to them. Others may have a place among God’s servants 
and not do good works, and the name ‘placed among God’s servants’ will nevertheless not leave them (wa-
ḏāka annahū kam min insānin yaʿmalu li-ā irin wa-lā yakūnu bi-ḏālika maqarran lahū bi-l-ʿubūdīyati wa-lā 
yaqaʿu ʿalayhi –smu –l-iqrāri bi-l-ʿubūdīyati wa-ā irun qad yakūnu muqarran bi-l-ʿubūdīyati wa-lā yaʿmalu 
fa-lā yaḏhabu ʿanhu –smu iqrārihī bi-l-ʿubūdiyah). 
Abū Ḥanīfah, "ʿĀlim wa-Mutaʿallim," 13. 
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heard and despised, and then accepted when it is explained?”598  He also describes both 
homonymy (ism  āmiʿ) and synonymy, without using the pairing of expression and idea.599 
Questions about linguistic ambiguity were being asked, but the terminology had not been 
firmly established. This conclusion is reinforced by the work of Muqātil on the Quran. In some 
of the very earliest extant exegetical passages to which we have access, Muqātil uses idea 
(maʿnā) on one occasion in his Exegesis and writes an entire book on Quranic polysemy. He uses 
maʿnā to mean the idea behind a Quranic verse: with regard to the movement of the angels as 
they take souls up to heaven, “this is the idea of [the Quranic verse] ‘by the angels 
hastening’”.600  
Muqātil starts his al-Wu ūh wa-n-Naẓāʾir fī-l-Qurʾān al-Karīm (Aspects and Equivalences 
in the Noble Quran) with a Hadith that he ascribes to the Prophet: “a man is not completely 
                                                 
598 fa-rubba kalimatin yasmaʿuhā –l-insānu fa-yakrahahū fa-iḏā u bira bi-tafsīrihā raḍiya bihī. Ibid. 
599 Homonymy: 
worship is a name that gathers within it obediance, desire, and fixedness in the divine (ismu –l-ʿibādati –smun 
 āmiʿun ya tamiʿu fīhi -ṭ-ṭāʿatu wa-r-raġbatu wa-l-iqrāru bi-r-rubūbīyah). Ibid., 28. 
Synonymy: 
These are different words [assent, knowledge, placed, Islam, certainty] that have the same single idea, which 
is ‘belief’ (hāḏihī asmāʾu muḥtalifatu [at-taṣdīq, al-maʿrifah, al-iqrār, al-islām, al-yaqīn] wa-maʿnāhā 
wāḥidun huwa –l-īmān.  Ibid., 14. 
600 hāḏā maʿnā fa-s-sābiqāti sabqan. Quran 79:4 (an-Nāziʿāt). I have used Pickthall’s translation here. It must be 
noted that this single instance of maʿnā in Muqātil’s Exegesis should not be wholly relied upon. Maʿnā appears 
elsewhere in the current printed edition, but it tends to do so only in the quotations from later scholars such as al-
Farrāʾ (Abū Zakarīyāʾ Yaḥyā b. Ziyād, d. 207/822) and  aʿlab (Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā, d. 291/904) that 
have been interpolated into the text during the transmission process. Muqātil b. Sulaymān, Tafsīr, ed. ʿAbdallāh 
Maḥmūd Šiḥātah, 5 vols. (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Miṣrīyah al-ʿĀmmah li-l-Kitāb, 1979-1989). 4:574; Kees Versteegh, 
"Grammar and Exegesis: The Origins of Kufan Grammar and the Tafsīr Muqātil," Der Islam 67(1990): 220-224, 
233; Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 19. Examples are the gloss of the idea behind the word “base” as being 
"marked out like a sheep with a notched ear” in Quran 68:13 (al-Qalam) (maʿnā  anīm…) and the grammatical idea 
of futureness behind the perfect (al-māḍī) tense (al-maʿnā mustqabal) in Quran 7:50. Muqātil b. Sulaymān, Tafsīr, 
1:520, 4:404; C. H. M. Versteegh, Arabic Grammar and Qur'anic Exegesis in Early Islam  (Leiden: Brill, 1993). 96-
99; Versteegh, "Grammar and Exegesis," 233. 
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knowledgable until he realises that the Quran has many aspects”.601 He then provides analysis of 
176 Quranic words that each have between two and seventeen different aspects, which he 
enumerates and explains with examples from Quranic verses. For example, the word al- abbār 
has four different aspects (ʿalā arbaʿati aw uhin): God overpowering his creation or telling the 
Prophet that only God can overpower his creation;
602
 unjust oppression by humans in the sense 
of unlawful killing;
603
 arrogant neglect of the worship of God;
604
 and the great extent of 
power.
605
 There is no evidence of the sort of detailed theological engagement with the 
justification of God’s oppression versus his justice that we saw in Ragib’s analysis of the same 
word nearly 300 years later,
606
 but Muqātil is clearly aware of, and intent on communicating, the 
fact that God used a single word to mean four different things in four different contexts. 
Kufa and Basra were cities with tens of thousands of inhabitants at the time of Muqātil and 
Abū Ḥanīfah, yet we only have three or four of those inhabitants’ books. On the one hand, this 
vacuum may lead us to assume incorrectly that our next scholar, Sībawayh, changed the face of 
Arabic intellectual history with a series of grammatical theories that made systematic and heavy 
use of the pairing of expression and idea. On the other, he may well have done so. He was 
                                                 
601 lā yakūnu –r-ra ulu faqīhan kulla –l-fiqhi ḥattā yarā li-l-qurʾāni wu ūhan ka īrah. Muqātil b. Sulaymān, al-
Wu ūh wa-n-Naẓāʾir, 19. See also: Andrew Rippin, "Lexicographical texts and the Qurʾan," in The Qur'an and its 
Interpretative Tradition (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2001), 167f; Wansborough, Quranic Studies, 208f. 
602 Quran 59:23 (al-Ḥašr): al-ʿa ī u –l- abbār and Quran 50:45 (Qāf): mā anta ʿalayhim bi- abbār.  
603 Quran 26:130 (aš-Šuʿarāʾ), in which the prophet Hūd asks his people whether they fight as oppressors, Quran 
28:19 (al-Qaṣaṣ), in which Moses is asked whether he plans to become an oppressor, and Quran 40:35 (Ġāfir), in 
which God promises to seal the hearts of oppressors. 
604 Quran 19:14 (Maryam), in which John is not arrogant towards his parents, and Quran 19:32, in which Jesus says 
that he is not arrogant. 
605 Quran 5:22, in which Moses’ people say that there is already a people of great strength in the Holy Land that he 
wants them to enter. 
606 See note 584. 
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certainly cited, commented upon, and exploited by the generations who followed him.
607
 The 
opening lines of his al-Kitāb (The Book) lay out the grammatical structure of the Arabic 
language: 
words are either a noun, a verb, or a particle that conveys an idea while being neither noun 
nor verb. Examples of the noun are ‘man’ and ‘horse’. Instances of the verb are taken from 
the expression of the events [that happen to] nouns…608 
Sībawayh assumes that his readers are familiar with two levels of language: the level of ideas, in 
which a particle such as ‘and’ (wa) can convey the idea of connection;609 and the level of 
expressions, upon which events that happen to nouns such as ‘went’ are expressed. Shortly after, 
he describes how homonymy and synonymy are structured according to these two levels in a 
                                                 
607 If one is writing a history of Arabic grammar, then the problem is that: 
…we really only have the Kitāb to go on: evidence of previous scientific interest in Arabic is scanty, and in 
the end the most detailed information we have about grammar before Sībawayhi comes from his own book. 
Michael Carter, Sibawayhi  (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004). 2-3. Cf. Rafael Talmon, "Naḥwiyyūn in Sībawayhi’s 
Kitāb," Zeitschrift f r arabische Linguistik 8(1982). However, if one’s concern is the history of the Arabic language 
itself, then Sībawayh’s status is clearer. He was building on the pre-existing traditions of poetic transmission and the 
variant readings of the Quran: 
Sibawayh inherited a linguistic tradition from a group of scholars already interested in the analysis of a pre-
defined kind of Arabic. This nascent tradition obviously lacked the sophistication and robustness that would  
characterize it following Sibawayh; however, one cannot emphasize the matter strongly enough: Sibawayh 
did not begin from scratch. What he and the other early grammarians did was build around an already-
established register of Arabic a sophisticated theoretical model of analysis. 
Ahmad Al-Jallad, "Ancient Levantine Arabic: a reconstruction based on the earliest sources and the modern 
dialects" (Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 2012), 44. 
608 My emphasis. Abū Bišr ʿAmr b. ʿUṯmān  Sībawayh, Kitāb, ed. ʿAbd as-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, 5 vols. (Cairo: 
Dār al-Qalam, 1966; repr., Beirut: Dār al- īl, 2000). 1:12 (1:2). References to the 1898-1900 Bulāq edition are 
given in brackets. According to the grammatical tradition of commentaries on Sībawayh, the phrase “events of 
nouns” (aḥdā  al-asmāʾ) refers to the verbal noun (al-maṣdar). See: Frank, "Meanings " 281. 
609 Such an ‘idea’ of connection has often been explained in the secondary literature as maʿnā referring to 
grammatical function, rather than to lexical meaning, or underlying sense or purpose. For example: Carter, 
Sibawayhi, 69-72; Versteegh, "The Arabic Tradition," 241-244. My position, as laid out in the Introduction 
(especially at note 13), is that the different aspects of maʿnā in Sībawayh’s work represent different functions 
performed by the same concept (that of “idea” understood in opposition to “expression”), rather than 
different/separate concepts.  
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section titled “The Relationship of the Expression to the Idea” (Bāb al-Lafẓ li-l-Maʿnā) ,which is 
translated here in its entirety: 
Know that their speech contains the variation of two expressions according to the variation 
of two ideas, the variation of two expressions while there is a single idea, and the 
agreement of two expressions while the two ideas differ. You will see this in what follows, 
God willing. Examples of the variation of two expressions according to the variation of two 
ideas are ‘he sat’ and ‘he went’. Examples of the variation of two expressions while there is 
a single idea are ‘he went’ and ‘he left’. Examples of the agreement of two expressions 
while the ideas differ are wa adta ʿalayhi (‘you were angry with him’) with regard to anger 
and wa adta (‘you found’) if you intended the finding of a lost sheep. There are many 
examples of this.610 
“They” in the phrase “their speech” are Bedouin Arabs, whose use of Arabic Sībawayh, a native 
speaker of Persian, was engaged in recording and analysing. At the beginning of his 
comprehensive work on their language he addressed the existence of homonymy and synonymy 
in their vocabulary, and did so by using the pairing of expression and idea.
611
 It was an analytical 
division of langauge into two spheres that would continue to function throughout the next 
millenium of Arabic-language scholarship, just as we have seen it at work in the opening lines of 
al-Kitāb quoted above.  
                                                 
610 Sībawayh, Kitāb, 1:24 (1:7-8).  
611 It should be noted that this passage (chapter four) is part of the seven-chapter introductory Risālah that comes at 
the start of al-Kitāb. The connection of this section to the rest of the Kitāb has been the subject of discussion. In a 
recent article, Noy has shown that at least one part of the Risālah (the sixth chapter on muḥāl) is inconsistent with 
the rest of the Kitāb, lending weight to the argument that the Risālah may represent the ideas that were established 
before Sībawayh, rather than his own analyses. In either case, for my purposes here the important thing is that lafẓ 
and maʿnā were used to analyse polysemy at a very early stage. Carter, Sibawayhi, 65-69; M. G. Carter, "The 
Origins of Arabic Grammar," in The Early Islamic Grammatical Tradition, ed. Ramzi Baalbakki (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2006), 7-9, 26; Avigail S. Noy, "Don’t be absurd: the term muḥāl in Sībawayhi’s Kitāb," in Sībawayhi and 
Early Arabic Grammatical Theory, ed. Amal Elesha Marog (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming); Gregor Schoeler, The Oral 
and the Written in Early Islam, ed. James Montgomery (New York: Routledge, 2006). 20, 49; Talmon, 
"Naḥwiyyūn," 18 (note 20); Versteegh, Greek Elements, 17 (note 78). 
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Sībawayh also deals with semantic extension and brevity in terms of expression and idea. 
He devotes a section to Bedouin Arab use of verbal expressions that were out of kilter with their 
usual ideas, usually for the sake of concision.
612







 In all these cases, expressions that are intended to be understood are 
omitted, leaving a set of expressions that on its own does not convey the intent of the speaker. In 
order for the intent to be clear, and for the complete idea to be conveyed, the audience needs to 
know what is going on. The audience would know what was going on either because they were 
used to this Bedouin Arab speech practice and understood the full idea behind the limited 
expressions, or because they had read Sībawayh’s book in order to familiarise themselves with 
such idioms. As Sībawayh puts it, the idea can “come according to semantic extension and 
brevity because of the audience’s knowledge of the idea”.616  
Semantic extension is a situation in which the one-to-one correspondence between ideas 
and expression breaks down, and there is more going on at the level of the ideas than is directly 
represented on the level of the expressions.
617
 According to Qu rub (Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad b. al-
                                                 
612 The section title is “the use of the verb according to the expression rather than according to the idea, because of 
Bedouin Arab speech’s semantic extension, brevity, and abbreviation” (hādā bābu -stiʿmāli -l-fiʿli fī-l-lafẓi lā fī-l-
maʿnā li-ittisāʿihim fī-l-kalāmi wa-l-ī ā i wa-l-i tiṣār). Sībawayh, Kitāb, 1:211-216 (1:108-110). Cf. Kees 
Versteegh, "Freedom of the Speaker? The term ittisāʿ and related notions in Arabic Grammar," in Studies in the 
History of Arabic Grammar II, ed. Michael Carter and Kees Versteegh (Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 1990). 
613 For example, for the phrase “two days were hunted on his account” (ṣīda ʿalayhi yawmāni) “the idea is in fact 
‘the wild beast was hunted on his account for two days’ but the speaker has used semantic extension and 
abbreviated” (wa-innamā –l-maʿnā ṣīda ʿalayhi –l-waḥšu fī yawmayni). Sībawayh, Kitāb, 1:211 (1:108). 
614 For example, in Quran 12:82 (Yūsuf): “ask the village” (wa-sʾal –l-qaryata) God “really intended ‘the people of 
the village’ but he abbreviated…” (wa-innamā yurīdu ahla –l-qaryata fa- taṣara). Ibid., 1:212 (1:109).  
615 For example, a line by Sāʿidah b.  uʾayyah al-Huḏalī (seventh century)  includes the phrase “the fox kept close 
the path” by which “he intends ‘to the path’” (ʿasala -ṭ-ṭarīqa a - aʿlabu yurīdu fī-ṭ-ṭarīq). Ibid., 1:214 (1:109). 
616  āʾa ʿalā siʿati –l-kalāmi wa-l-ī ā i li-ʿilmi –l-mu āṭabi bi-l-maʿnā. Ibid., 1:212 (1:109). 
617 Versteegh is right to point out that it is comparable to the distinction between literal and non-literal language that 
we have discussed above, in which non-literal language (ma ā ) represents all and any deviations from strict one-to-
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Mustanīr, eighth century and likely a contemporary of Sībawayh in Basra), it was the motivation 
for Bedouin Arabs’ use of synonymy. Qu rub gives the same three-part presentation of separate 
words, synonyms, and homonyms as Sībawayh, with additional examples in each category. He 
says that Bedouin Arabs used synonyms “to expand their speech and their expressions, just as 
they would alter the metre of their poetry in order to expand its structure without having to 
adhere to a single scheme”.618 Qu rub evaluates semantic extension alongside the manipulation 
of metre as ways in which Bedouin Arabs would exploit the flexibility inherent in synonymy and 
metrics in order to make their language more eloquent. This is an early recognition that 
eloquence and creativity could be the result when the one-to-one correspondence between 
expression and idea broke down. 
Creativity apart, this was an intellectual culture still in its infancy, and a great deal of 
taxonomical work still needed to be done only two hundred years or so after the birth of the 
Islamic community. This taxonomical work is reflected in the composition of Qu rub’s from 
which I have just quoted. It is a collection of 207 Arabic words in which the expression can refer 
to two opposite meanings (aḍdād, enantiosemy), a subsection of homonymy. They vary from 
commonplace dialectical variations such as  ib meaning “sit” in Ḥimyaritic and “jump” in 
                                                                                                                                                             
one correspondence. However, Sībawayh was describing the language that he found in Basra, not theorising about 
the origin of all human language. As we saw above, the distinction between literal and non-literal is made on the 
basis of the coinage of the language by divine fiat, and no such consideration is at play in Sībawayh’s grammar. 
Versteegh, "Freedom of the Speaker?," 283f. 
618 wa-ka-annahum innamā arādū bi- tilāfi –l-lafẓayni wa-in kāna wāḥidan mu rīyan [Ḥaddād has ma  īyan (sic.)] 
an yūsiʿū [Ḥaddād has yuwassiʿū] fī-kalāmihim wa-alfāẓihim ka-mā  āḥafū fī ašʿārihim li-yatawassaʿū fī abniyatihā 
wa-lā yal amū amran wāḥidan. Hans Kofler, "Das Kitāb al-Aḍdād von Abū ʿAlī Qu rub ibn al-Mustanīr. 
Herausgegeben von Hans Kofler," Islamica 5, no. 3 (1931-1932): 243-244; Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad b. al-Mustanīr 
Qu rub, Kitāb al-Aḍdād, ed. Ḥannā Ḥaddād (Riyad: Dār al-ʿUlūm, 1984). 69-70. Cf. Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-
Qāsim Ibn al-Anbārī, Kitāb al-Aḍdād, ed. Muḥammmad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm (Kuwait: Dāʾirat al-Ma būʿāt wa-n-
Našr fī-l-Kuwait, 1960). 8. See also: Kees Versteegh, "The Linguistic Introduction to Rāzī's Tafsīr," in Studies in 
Near Eastern Languages and Literatures: Memorial Volume of Karel Petráček, ed. Petr Zemánek (Prague: Academy 




 to discussions of meaning that have explicit theological implications. For example, 
Qu rub writes that the verb ẓanna (“to think”) can refer to either certainty or doubt. When God 
uses the verb ẓanna in the Quran for the words of those who enter heaven on the day of 
judgement: “I thought that I would indeed meet my reckoning”, then “this is certainty, and were 
it to be doubt, then the idea would be impermissable and would constitute unbelief. But it is 
certainty”.620 
Therefore, in the very first book on words with two or more opposite meanings the pattern 
is established. The polysemy inherent in language offers a hermeneutical opportunity that 
enables scholars to deal with theological difficulties. There would be many more works of this 
nature written in the decades to come. 
The Great Men of the Arabic Tradition621 
With the major figures of aš-Šāfiʿī and al- āḥiẓ our story emerges into a world of more 
established texts, better-understood contexts, and more secondary literature. The recent work of 
Joseph Lowry, James Montgomery, David Vishanoff, Ahmed El-Shamsy,
622
 and others gives us 
                                                 
619 Kofler, "Das Kitāb al-Aḍdād," 264; Qu rub, Kitāb al-Aḍdād, 118. See note 365 for Ibn Fāris and as-Suyū ī’s 
repetition of this report. 
620 Quran 69:20 (al-Ḥāqqah): innī ẓanantu annī mulāqin ḥisābīyah. Qu rub writes: fa-hāḏā yaqīnun wa-law kāna 
ḏālika šakkan lam ya u  fī-hāḏā –l-maʿnā wa-kāna kufran wa-lākinnahū yaqīn. Kofler, "Das Kitāb al-Aḍdād," 244; 
Qu rub, Kitāb al-Aḍdād, 71. 
621 With tongue in cheek, pace Thomas Carlyle (“[t]he history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at 
bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here”). Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes  Hero-Worship  and the 
Heroic in History  (London: Chapman and Hall, 1840). 3. 
622 For example: El Shamsy, "Tradition to Law."; Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory; James E. Montgomery, "Al-
Jāḥiẓ's Kitāb al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn," in Writing and Representation in Medieval Islam : Muslim hori ons, ed. Julia 
Bray (New York: Routledge, 2006); ———, "Speech and Nature 1."; ———, "Speech and Nature: al-Jāhiẓ, Kitāb 
al-Bayān wa-l-Tabyīn, 2.175-207, Part 2," Middle Eastern Literatures 12, no. 1 (2008); ———, "Speech and 
Nature: al-Jāhiẓ, Kitāb al-Bayān wa-l-Tabyīn, 2.175-207, Part 3," Middle Eastern Literatures 12, no. 2 (2008); ——
—, "Speech and Nature: al-Jāhiẓ, Kitāb al-Bayān wa-l-Tabyīn, 2.175-207, Part 4," Middle Eastern Literatures 12, 
no. 3 (2009); Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics. 
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a relatively clear picture of the intellectual culture at the turn of the eighth and ninth centuries, 
whereas the intellectual context from which Sībawayh had produced al-Kitāb remains shrouded 
in relative mystery. 
Aš-Šāfiʿī is a foundational figure of Islamic law, standing close to the very beginning of 
legal history in Arabic.
623
 He wrote that: 
God addressed the Arabs with his book in their language. He did so because the Arabs 
knew the ideas behind their language.624 They knew that the language had semantic breadth 
(ittisāʿ), and that it was in God’s nature to address them in the Quran with explicit language 
of general application (ʿāmman ẓāhiran) while intending that language to be indeed 
explicit, unrestricted, and independent of the words around it, or alternatively intending the 
explicit and unrestricted language to contain specificity (al-ḥāṣṣ) that rested on the 
surrounding words, or intending the explicit and unrestricted language to be in fact specific, 
or intending explicit language to be non-explicit, this being known from its context.  
The Arabs begin their speech with expressions that clarify what follows, and they begin 
speech with expressions that need to be clarified by what follows.  
The Arabs say something and they make the idea behind it understood without this being 
manifest in the expression.625 This is comparable to the way that they indicate something 
with a physical gesture. They consider this way of speaking to be the most elevated, 
because only those who know it can do it and those who are ignorant of it cannot. 
The Arabs call a single thing many names, and they call many ideas with a single name.626 
                                                 
623 See Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 2. 
624 innamā  āṭaba –llāhu bi-kitābihī –l-ʿaraba bi-lisānihā ʿalā mā taʿrifu min maʿānīhā.  
625 wa-takallamu bi-š-šayʾi tuʿarrifuhū bi-l-maʿnā dūna –l-īḍāḥi bi-l-lafẓ.  
626 wa-tusammā –š-šayʿa –l-wāḥida bi-l-asmāʾi –l-ka īrati wa-tusammā bi-l-ismi –l-wāḥidi –l-maʿānī –l-ka īrah. aš-
Šāfiʿī, ar-Risālah, 51-52 (#s173-176). This passage is translated and analysed by El-Shamsy, Lowry, Montgomery, 
and Vishanoff, and I have profited from their efforts. El Shamsy, "Tradition to Law," 58-59; Lowry, Early Islamic 
Legal Theory, 253; Montgomery, "al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn," 105-106; aš-Šāfiʿī, ar-Risālah, 51-52 (#173f); Vishanoff, 
Islamic Hermeneutics, 46. 
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A civilizationally-specific programme is in operation. Aš-Šāfiʿī describes how God spoke 
ambiguously to his chosen people the Arabs in his revelation, confident in the knowledge that 
they would be able to understand the Quran because they were already talking to each other in 
allusions and ellipses. Polysemy was a fact of Arabic, and aš-Šāfiʿī, as a member of the Arabic-
language community, was confident in his ability to negotiate the apparent ambiguity that it 
caused.
627
 Arabic language “carries multiple potential ideas” (muḥtamilan li-l-maʿānī),628 and 
key terms can be homonymous: the word bayān (clear, clarity) is a “noun comprising several 
convergent basic ideas which are, however, divergent in their details”.629 This description of 
homonymy as a noun that comprises (ismun  āmiʿun) ideas had already appeared in the work of 
Abū Ḥanīfah.630 
Montgomery and Lowry agree that al- āḥiẓ, whose discussions of expression and idea we 
have already encountered, was aware of and engaged with aš-Šāfiʿī’s ar-Risālah.631 Al- āḥiẓ 
repeats aš-Šāfiʿī’s definition of bayān, albeit in somewhat more evocative language: “bayān is a 
noun that comprises everything that throws open to you the veil of the idea”.632 This comes in a 
section that started with the statement that ideas “subsist in the hearts of people, conceived in 
                                                 
627 Vishanoff argues productively that ambiguity is “the central theme” of aš-Šāfiʿī’s Risālah  ———, Islamic 
Hermeneutics, 15-65, 51, 238. 
628 aš-Šāfiʿī, ar-Risālah, 222 (#613). Cf. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 253.  
629 wa-l-bayānu ismun  āmiʿun li-maʿānin mu tamiʿati –l-uṣūli mutašaʿʿiti –l-furūʿ. The translation is Lowry’s, with 
“ideas” substituted for his “meanings”. ———, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 25; aš-Šāfiʿī, ar-Risālah, 21 (#53).,  
630 See note 599. Another term of aš-Šāfiʿī’s,  umlah, is more central to the Risālah’s discussion of ambiguity. It is 
opposed to naṣṣ (unambiguous and self-sufficient) and means language that in itself gathers together ( amala) 
multiple interpretative options. It has been analysed by Vishanoff as an aspect of polysemy, but Lowry’s suggestion 
that it refers to the need to gather the text together with the other texts required to understand it is persuasive. Lowry, 
Early Islamic Legal Theory, 104f (note 80); Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 55f. 
631 See note 528. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 51f; Montgomery, "al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn," 102f. 
632 wa-l-bayānu –smun  āmiʿun li-kulli šayʾin kašafa laka qināʿa –l-maʿnā. al- āhiẓ, al-Bayān wa-t-Tabyīn, 1:76; 
Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 52. 
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their minds”,633 and he then says that there are five ways in which these ideas are indicated, of 
which the expression (al-lafẓ) is only one. The other four are the physical gesture (al-išārah), 
counting with numbers (al-ʿaqd), writing (al- aṭṭ), and context (al-ḥālu –llatī tusammā 
niṣbatan).634 Elsewhere, in the context of God teaching language to Adam, al- āḥiẓ writes that a 
name (ism) must consist of the combination of an expression and an idea for it to be 
meaningful.
635
 The implication is exactly that laid out by Ragib centuries later: language is the 
combination of expressions and ideas.
636
  
The difference between aš-Šāfiʿī and al- āḥiẓ, as Montgomery and Lowry are aware,637 is 
that the former is working on a hermeneutic for the interpretation of divine revelation while the 
latter is putting forward a theory of communication that applies to both humans and God. 
Montgomery attributes this difference to al- āḥiẓ’s greater regard for the role of human reason, 
but I would rather place weight on their respective genres. Adab works inevitably pull in 
quotations and ideas from a broad range of disciplines, but more importantly it is the very ideal 
                                                 
633 al-maʿānī –l-qāʿimatu fī ṣudūri –n-nāsi –l-mutaṣawwaratu fī aḏhānihim. al- āhiẓ, al-Bayān wa-t-Tabyīn, 1:75. 
634 Ibid., 1:76. 
635 wa-l-smu bi-lā maʿnan laġwun … wa-lā yakūnu –l-lafẓu -sman illā wa-huwa muḍammanun bi-maʿnan wa-qad 
yakūnu –l-maʿnā wa-lā –sma lahū wa-lā yakūnu –smun illā wa-lahū maʿnan. ———, "Risālah fī-l- idd wa-l-Hazl," 
in Rasā’il al-Ǧāḥiẓ, ed. ʿAbd as-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn (Cairo: Maktabat al- ānǧī, 1965). Cf. Behzadi, Sprache 
und Verstehen, 110-111. I believe that Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd misreads al- āḥiẓ here, writing that if the ism must 
contain a maʿnā then “we can infer that al- āḥiẓ uses maʿnā to refer to the relationship between the ism and the 
musammā” (my emphasis). However, as al- āḥiẓ has already said (see note 633), ideas are in people’s minds. It is 
intent that makes the connections between ideas and external physical reality. Abū Zayd, al-Itti āh al-ʿAqlī fī-t-
Tafsīr, 84-85; Larkin, The Theology of Meaning, 33.  
636 My discussion of Ragib’s position on the composition of language started at page 109, and my translation of his 
discussion of God teaching language to Adam at page 123. 
637 Lowry writes that “[t]he relationship between Jāḥiẓ’s discussion of the bayān and that of Shāfiʿī remains 
puzzling, however, since Shāfiʿī focuses on revealed texts, and Jāḥiẓ on … a general theory of communication”. 
Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 54. Montgomery describes the difference as being between aš-Šāfiʿī’s 
“salvationist deontology” (thereby focusing on the purpose of his hermeneutic) and al- āḥiẓ’s “axiology – a theory 
of ultimate values – in which man’s reasoning intellect dominates: man has to decide how he should live”. 
Montgomery, "al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn," 103. 
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of language excellence and language performance that lies at the heart of adab itself: to be an 
adīb is to not just know things, but to say them and say them well. This concern forces al- āḥiẓ, 
and Ragib over a century later, to deal with language as something that is produced as well as 
something that is interpreted. Aš-Šāfiʿī had no such motivation, but hermeneutics was difficult 
enough on its own. 
Whatever the divisions of genre and scope, everyone agreed that language could be 
ambiguous and that polysemy was an inevitable part of that ambiguity. A consensus was also 
starting to develop that the primary epistemological tool for dealing with the resultant problems 
was the pairing of expression and idea. Sībawayh used lafẓ and maʿnā to explain homonymy and 
synonymy, but as we can see from Abū Ḥanīfah, Muqātil, aš-Šāfiʿī, and others, this terminology 
was not uniform. Abū Ḥanīfah and aš-Šāfiʿī discussed homonymy by pairing “idea” (maʿnā) 
with “word” (ism). Aš-Šāfiʿī used the pairing of expression (lafẓ) and idea when he was dealing 
with Hadith: the transmission of reports of what the Prophet said can be accurate right down to 
the expressions themselves (lafẓ), or just accurate with regard to the ideas behind the expressions 
(maʿnā).638 
The pairing of expression and idea that Sībawayh used to describe single words and their 
polysemy therefore works for Hadith just as well as it works for poetry. And aš-Šāfiʿī used 
expression and idea to deal with both.
639
 This means that by the first few decades of the ninth 
century, the core of the Arabic Language Tradition had been established and was in wide 
                                                 
638 Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 110, 127, 254; aš-Šāfiʿī, ar-Risālah, 267-272 (#s737-748). 
639 For example, when explaining that šaṭr (direction) in Quran 2:150 means  ihah (the same) he cites four lines of 
poetry containing the word šaṭr from early and pre-Islamic poets and notes that šaṭr,  ihah, and tilqāʾ “are all a 
single idea albeit expressed by different expressions” (wa-inna kullahā maʿnan wāḥidan wa-in kānat bi-alfāẓin 
mu talifah). ———, ar-Risālah, 34f (#105f). Cf. Montgomery’s argument that this constituted a challenge to the 
“antiquarian study by philologists and grammarians of the poetry of the desert Arabs”. Montgomery, "al-Bayān wa 
al-Tabyīn," 104. 
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circulation. Language was assumed to be ambiguous, and its ambiguity was conceived of 
through the duality of expressions and ideas. This was true whether one was writing literature or 
law. Our next two figures, Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Qutaybah, show what scholars started to 
do with these concepts.  
Ibn Ḥanbal, like aš-Šāfiʿī, used the pairing of expression and idea for the wording of a 
Hadith and the idea behind it: “this is the exact wording of ʿAbdallāh b. Ṣandal’s Hadith, and the 
idea behind both these expressions and his is the same”.640 When it came to theology, and his 
famous interrogation by the political authorities about the created or uncreated status of the 
Quran: 
Ibn Ḥanbal’s polemic strategy was to demonstrate that his opponents quoted problematic 
verses which had multiple meanings and therefore could not be used as proof … Thus, he 
sought to expose the multiple meanings or lack of clarity of these verses.641 
Nimrod Hurvitz put this well. Ibn Ḥanbal assumed, and exploited, linguistic ambiguity. As we 
have seen, by the mid-ninth century the intellectual culture in which he was working was used to 
doing the same. The Muʿtazilī interrogators of Ibn Ḥanbal assumed that words were not 
ambiguous: they cited Quran 43:3 (az-Zuḫruf) “we made it a Quran” and asked “isn’t everything 
                                                 
640 hāḏā lafẓu ḥadī i ʿAbdallāh b   andal wa-maʿnāhumā wāḥid. Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad 1895, 1:148; ———, Musnad, 
ed. Šuʿayb al-Arna’ū  and ʿĀdil Muršid, 50 vols. (Beirut: Muʾassasat ar-Risālah, 2001). 2:413. Also, for example: 
maʿnā ḥadī  so-and-so (the idea behind so-and-so’s Hadith). ———, Musnad 1895, 1:76, 1:42, 1:60; ———, 
Musnad 2001, 1:204, 1:388, 1:485. Or lafẓ so-and-so (the exact wording of so-and-so’s transmission of this Hadith). 
———, Musnad 1895, 1:133, 1:135; ———, Musnad 2001, 2:344, 2:353.  
641 Hurvitz, The Formation of  anbalism, 141. The work in question (Ibn Ḥanbal, "ar-Radd," 69-72.) was written by 
Ibn Ḥanbal’s son, ʿAbdallāh b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ḥanbal (Abū ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān, d. 290/903). Livnat 
Holtzman’s citation of both aḏ- āḥabī’s statement that it was incorrectly attributed (mawḍūʿ) to Ibn Ḥanbal and aḏ-
 āhabī’s editor Šuʿayb al-Arna’ū ’s agreement with that judgement implies a greater risk of unreliability than is in 
fact the case. Aḏ- āhabī himself does not equivocate in the slightest in his attribution of it to ʿAbdallāh, who like his 
father was an eighth-century scholar. ad- ahabī, Siyar, 11:287, 13:523; Livnat Holtzman, "Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal," in 
Encyclopaedia of Islam  THREE, ed. Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill 
Online: Brill, 2011); Hurvitz, The Formation of  anbalism, 4. For an example of what may be switches in voice 
between father and son (qāla –l-imāmu Aḥmad … fa-kāna mimmā balaġanā …), see: Ibn Ḥanbal, "ar-Radd," 64-65. 
 216 
that is made created?” Ibn Ḥanbal cited Quran 21:58 “we made them into fragments” and Quran 
105:5 (al-Fīl) “he made them into dry eaten leaves of corn” and asked “did he create them? Is 
every made thing a created thing? How can the Quran be created when [we know from ‘we made 
it a Quran’ that] it was made beforehand?” The interrogator, a judge who believed the Quran to 
be created, was silent in the face of this exploitation of polysemy.
642
 
Ibn Qutaybah is a tremendously important figure.
643
 His is the first ouevre we have seen in 
this chapter that combines grammar, lexicography, theology, exegesis, law, adab, Hadith, and 
poetics. It is a range of intellectual interests that (with the exception of Hadith) mirrors Ragib’s, 
and the two scholars, separated by over a century, share a certain orientation within the 
disciplines in which they worked. Ibn Qutaybah, like Ragib, saw himself as subscribing to a 
traditional way of thinking that had started with Ibn Ḥanbal, rejected theology as both needlessly 
innovative and incoherent, nevertheless was prepared to engage in theological reasoning, and 




                                                 
642 a-fa- alaqahum a-fa-kullu magʿūlin ma lūqun kayfa yakūnu ma lūqan wa-qad kāna qabla an yu laqa –l- aʿlu 
fa-amsak. Ḥanbal b. Isḥāq, Ḏikr Miḥnat al-Imām Aḥmad b   anbal, ed. Muḥammad Naġaš (Cairo: Dār Našr aṯ-
 aqāfah, 1983). 53-54. The judge was Šuʿayb b. Sahl. This passage is discussed at: Hurvitz, The Formation of 
 anbalism, 125-126, 138-139. Pace Frank, who accuses the Ḥanābilah traditionalists of having scarcely “any 
formal analysis at all”. Frank, "Elements`," 173. 
643 G. Lecomte, "Ibn Ḳutayba, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh b. Muslim al-Dīnawarī," in Encyclopaedia of Islam  
Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs (Brill Online: 
Brill, 2012); ———, Ibn Qutayba  L'homme  son oeuvre  ses id es  (Damascus: Institut Francais de Damas, 1965); 
Joseph E. Lowry, "The Legal Hermeneutics of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba: A Reconsideration," Islamic Law and 
Society 11, no. 1 (2004). 
644 In his al-I tilāf fī-l-Lafẓ wa-r-Radd ʿalā al-Ǧahmīyah wa-l-Mušabbihah (The Disagreement about the Expression 
[of the Quran] and the Rebuttal of the Followers of Ǧahm and the Anthropomorphists) Ibn Qutaybah praises the ahl 
al-ḥadī , notes that despite their good qualities they remain divided over the status of human expressions of the 
Quran, both apologises for and stresses the need for the subsequent theological discussion, states that predestination 
is God’s secret, and stresses that the justice that applies between humans cannot be applied to God. Abū Muḥammad 
ʿAbdallāh Ibn Qutaybah, "al-Iḫtilāf fī-l-Lafẓ wa-r-Radd ʿalā al- ahmīyah wa-l-Mušabbihah," in ʿAqā’id as-Salaf, 
ed. ʿAlī Sāmī an-Naššār and ʿAmmār a -Ṭālibī (Alexandria: al-Maʿārif, 1971), 224-226. As we have seen above, 
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Ibn Qutaybah uses polysemy, and an assumed theory of meaning in which intent links 
expression and idea, to solve certain hermeneutical problems. The question of whether or not 
human expressions (i.e. vocalizations, alfāẓ) of the words of the Quran are created is solved as 
follows: 
The mean position with regard to the disagreement about the recitation and the expression 
of the Quran is that ‘recitation’ is a single expression comprising two ideas. One idea is the 
action of reciting, and the other idea is ‘Quran’ … the Quran subsists in the action of 
recitation and that action is the movement of the tongue and the mouth with the Quran, an 
action that is created. The thing that is being recited is the Quran, and it is uncreated.645 
Ibn Qutaybah continues with an analogy in which two men take their quarrel over whether a hot 
coal is a “fire” or “a substance” to a jurist who says to each one of them in turn: “you are correct, 
but the thing that you mention has two ideas and you have only used one of them”. Ibn Qutaybah 
concludes that “the ‘hot coal’ is like the ‘recitation’ because it is a name that gathers together 
two meanings”.646 The argument is therefore a lexicographical one: there are words that mean 
more than one thing, and we have identified them. Sure enough, in his manual on language usage 
for the scribal class, Adab al-Kātib, Ibn Qutaybah has a section on the aḍdād (“calling two 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ragib makes many of the same points. For example, that predestination is God’s secret: note 334. 
645 My emphasis.  
wa-ʿadlu –l-qawli fīmā – talafū fīhi min –l-qirāʾati wa-l-lafẓi bi-l-qurʾāni anna –l-qirāʾata lafẓun wāḥidun 
yaštamilu ʿalā maʿnīyayni aḥaduhumā ʿamalun wa-l-ā iru qurʾānun … wa-huwa bi-l-ʿamali fī-l-qirāʾati 
qāʾimun wa-l-ʿamalu taḥrīku –l-lisāni wa-l-lahawāti (a more exact translation of which is “the uvulas”) bi-l-
qurʾāni wa-huwa ma lūqun wa-l-maqrūʾu qurʾānun wa-huwa ġayru ma lūq   
Ibid., 248. The arguments over lafẓ al-qurʾān were indeed an internal Ḥanbalī dispute, evocatively described by 
Hurvitz as an internal purge following their victory over the Muʿtazilah. Hurvitz, The Formation of  anbalism, 152-
157. 
646 …ṣadaqta walākin ḏakarta šayʾan ḏā maʿnīyayni bi-aḥadi maʿnīyayhi fa-l- amratu ma alun li-l-qirāʾati li-
annahā –smun wāḥidun ya maʿu maʿnīyayni –l- ismu wa-n-nār. Ibn Qutaybah, "al-Iḫtilāf fī-l-Lafẓ," 249. 
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However, Ibn Qutaybah does not use the pairing of expression and idea to describe the 
aḍdād, and the theory of meaning constituted by that pairing does not dominate his 
hermeneutical work. This is despite the fact that his two books Taʾwīl Mu talif al- adī  and 
Taʾwīl Muškil al-Qurʾān, on the interpretation of controversial Hadith and difficult Quran 
respectively, explicitly aim to manage and negotiate linguistic ambiguity. Although in the work 
on Hadith he uses maʿnā for the idea behind a Quranic verse or Hadith, and explains the intensity 
of friendship referred to in a phrase as: “he did not intend, with this speech act [x] … but rather 
he intended [y] …”,648 the theory of meaning therein is by no means central to his hermeneutic 
and the terms lafẓ and maʿnā never appear together.649 The same is true of his work on the 
Quran, where maʿnā is the idea behind a speech act, a Quranic verse, or the grammatical 
function of a word and the term lafẓ appears sporadically in the same contexts.650  
The potential of the pairing of expression and idea is only realised in Ibn Qutaybah’s adab 
and his poetics. Specifically, it is realised in contexts where Ibn Qutaybah lays out the structure 
of a field of enquiry. In the section of his adab manual devoted to correcting linguistic error he 
explains near-synonymy, near-homonymy, and the relationships of grammatical functions to 
                                                 
647 ———, Adab al-Kātib, ed. Max Grünert (Leiden: Brill, 1900; repr., Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1967). 230-233. 
648 …lā yurīdu bi-hādā –l-qawli maʿnā ṣuḥbati aṣḥābihī … wa-innamā yurīdu annahū… ———, Taʾwīl Mu talif al-
 adī , 92. Cf. Ibid., 116, 168. 
649 This observation is borne out by Lowry, "Legal Hermeneutics." 
650 For example: “people would err with regard to both the expression[s] of that line of poetry, and the idea behind 
it” (an-nāsu yaġlaṭūna fī-lafẓi hāḏā –l-bayti wa-maʿnāhu). Ibn Qutaybah, Taʾwīl Muškil al-Qurʾān, 96. Cf. Ibid., 
280f. 
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morphology by tracking variations on the level of expressions, and then on the level of ideas.
651
 
In the critical introduction to his poetic anthology he divides poetry into four, according to the 
quality of the expressions and the quality of the ideas. Poets achieve success in both expression 
and idea, or they fail because either their expressions are beautiful while the ideas behind them 
are vapid, or their ideas are powerful but the expressions fail to do them justice, or finally both 
their expressions and ideas are defective.
652
  
This use of the pairing of expression and idea is significant. It is the first time in this 
narrative that we have seen the binary used as a way to structure one’s thoughts and to explain 
the way that mind and language interact. The pairing is moving from being a terminological 
assumption used in thinking about grammar, or a conceptual assumption about polysemy that 
assists with hermeneutics, to being a theory of meaning in the full sense of the word “theory”: 
“[a] conception or mental scheme of something to be done”.653 My reading here is confirmed by 
the way that Ibn Qutaybah introduced his division of poetry: “I have contemplated poetry and 
subsequently found it to be of four types”.654  
The Theorists 
Sībawayh’s fully-formed theory of syntax and morphology simply assumed that the pairing 
of expression and idea was the appropriate way to understand the difference between the word on 
                                                 
651 Near synonymy is when both the expressions and their ideas are similar and there is potential for confusion, and 
near-homonymy is when the expressions are similar but the ideas are different. ———, Adab al-Kātib, 333f. 
652 ḍarbun minhu ḥasuna lafẓuhū wa- āda maʿnāhu … wa-ḍarbun minhu ḥasuna lafẓuhū wa-ḥalā fa-iḏā anta 
fattaštahū lam ta id hunāka fāʾidatan fī-l-maʿnā … wa-ḍarbun minhu  āda maʿnāhu wa-qaṣṣarat alfāẓuhū ʿanhu … 
wa-ḍarbun minhu taʾa  ara maʿnāhu wa-taʾā  ara lafẓuhū. ———, aš-Šiʿr wa-š-Šuʿarāʾ, 2 in 1 vols. (Beirut: Dār 
aṯ- aqāfah, 1964). 12-15.  
653 "Theory, n.1,"  in OED Online (Oxford University Press, June 2011). 
654 My emphasis. tadabbartu –š-šiʿra fa-wa adtuhū arbaʿata aḍrub. ———, aš-Šiʿr wa-š-Šuʿarāʾ, 12. 
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page or lips, and the grammatical function it performed. His contemporaries working on 
theology and scripture assumed that the exploitation of linguistic ambiguity was a legitimate 
hermeneutic. Poetry was ever-present in grammar, theology, and exegesis throughout the first 
centuries of Islamicate intellectual endeavour, both as a source of linguistic precedent, and as a 
catalyst for thinking about language and imagery. For example, Abū al-ʿAmayṯal (ʿAbdallāh b. 
 ulayd, d. 240/854) was both a successful poet and, at the same time, the author of a work on 
homonymy that enumerated the different meanings of over three hundred words with poetic 
examples. It is not hard to imagine that this work of lexicography was designed to facilitate the 
imagination and wordplay of poets, including himself.655 
Sībawayh’s fully-formed theory of grammar, containing a theory of meaning based on 
expression and idea, appears to have come out of a vacuum. In the absence of further manuscript 
discoveries, or sources that will allow us to identify the shadowy “grammarians” he mentioned in 
al-Kitāb, all we know with relative certainty is that the culture the Islamic conquests brought out 
of the Arabian desert and into the new garrison towns of Kufa and Basra was a literary one, with 
a well-developed tradition of poetry at its political and artistic core. Little more than a century 
after those two towns were founded, that literary culture was engaged in the production of 
theory.  
In subsequent centuries, when theories began to be constructed outside the discipline of 
grammar, they were naturally influenced by the language-obsessed culture in which they grew. 
For example, aš-Šāfiʿī took the oratory and poetry of the Bedouin Arabs as proof of a linguistic 
                                                 
655 "Abu'l-ʿAmaythal, ʿAbd Allāh b. Khulayd b. Saʿd,"  in Encyclopaedia of Islam  Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, 
Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs (Brill Online: Brill, 2012); Abū al-ʿAmayṯal al-
Aʿrābī, Kitāb al-Maʾ ūr min al-Luġah (mā ittafaq lafẓuhū wa- talaf maʿnāhu), ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir 
Aḥmad (Cairo: Maktabat an-Naḥḍah al-Miṣrīyah, 1988); Reinhard Weipert, "Abū l-ʿAmaythal," in Encyclopaedia of 
Islam  THREE, ed. Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill Online: Brill, 2012). 
Cf. Ragib, Litt rateurs’ Ripostes, 1:629-630, 1:646. 
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ambiguity that he made into the central claim, and the primary recourse, of his legal hermeneutic.  
In Ibn Qutaybah’s theory of poetic quality we have one of the first attempts to bring taxonomical 
and methodological coherence to poetry in the same way that aš-Šāfiʿī had brought it to the 
derivation of the law. A new stage of intellectual production was beginning, and theories were 
becoming more popular. Instead of the reactive hermeneutics of early theologians such as Abū 
Ḥanīfah and the exegetical and Hadith work of even Ibn Qutaybah, and in place of the free-
wheeling associative adab with its hidden and subtle structures of al- āḥiẓ, we have organised 
conscious reflection on disciplines, their contents, and the theories necessary to make sense of 
them.656  
In the works of the scholars of the tenth century there are arguments about which theories 
of language are best. Take, for example, Ibn Durustawayh (Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh, 258/871-
346/957): 
In his Commentary on ‘The Eloquent Man’, in which the different ideas behind the 
expression ‘he found’ are discussed, Ibn Durustawayh said:  
‘This expression (‘he found’) is one of the strongest proofs adduced by those who claim 
that the Bedouin Arab language contains homonyms. Sībawayh discussed homonymy at the 
start of his al-Kitāb and made it one of his initial principles.  
Those who fail to contemplate the level of ideas, and fail to investigate the actual 
connections between expressions and ideas, suppose that it is a single expression that has 
come to have multiple different ideas behind it. However, the ideas behind this expression 
are in fact all the same: the idea of attaining something whether for good or bad’. 657 
                                                 
656 This dynamic has been noted and analysed by more than one scholar. See, for example: Wolfhart Heinrichs, "The 
Classification of the Sciences and the Consolidation of Philology in Classical Islam," in Centres of Learning: 
Learning and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East, ed. Jan Willem Drijvers and A A MacDonald 
(Leiden / New York: Brill, 1995).  
657 Ibn Durustawayh’s commentary (Šarḥ al-Faṣīḥ) on The Eloquent Man (al-Faṣīḥ) by  aʿlab is lost, and this 
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Ibn Durustawayh is engaged in a polemical modification of the concept of homonymy. He 
chooses the same example (the word wa ada, “he found”) that Sībawayh used to explain 
homonymy at the start of al-Kitāb,658 and uses it to argue that this is not a matter of a single 
expression denoting multiple ideas but rather of an expression denoting a single idea that can 
itself be used in different ways. This contradicts the more usual understanding of the polysemous 
lexicon as being one in which the multiple and independent ideas behind expressions are 
enumerated. Enantiosemy (aḍdād), in which these multiple ideas actually contradict each other, 
is therefore the most extreme type of homonymy. If Ibn Durustawayh denied homonymy he must 
have also denied enantiosemy, and we know from his reference to a work of his (now lost) titled 
On the Invalidity of Enantiosemy that this was indeed the case.
659
 
The question of whether aḍdād did indeed exist in Arabic was a live issue among the tenth-
century theorists. Ibn al-Anbārī (Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim, d. 328/940) wrote in the introduction 
to his Kitāb al-Aḍdād that expressions with two opposite meanings were a characteristic of 
                                                                                                                                                             
quotation is preserved in as-Suyū ī, al-Mu hir, 1:384. Cf. Kanazi, Studies, 204-205 (note 5); as-Suyū ī, Buġyat al-
Wuʿāh, 2:36. We learn from as-Suyū ī’s Buġyah that Ibn Durustawayh was thought to have been a companion of al-
Mubarrad (for whom see note 364) and to have met Ibn Qutaybah. The text translated above reads: 
qāla –bnu Durustawayhi fī-Šarḥi –l-Faṣīḥi wa-qad ḏukira lafẓatu wa ada wa- tilāfi maʿānīhā hāḏihī –l-
lafẓatu min aqwā ḥu a i man ya ʿamu anna min kalāmi –l-ʿarabi mā yattafiqu lafẓuhū wa-ya talifu maʿnāhu 
li-anna Sībawayhi ḏakarahū fī awwali kitābihī wa- aʿalahū min –l-uṣūli –l-mutaqaddamati fa-ẓanna man 
lam yata’mmal –l-ma‛ānī wa-lam yataḥaqqaq –l-ḥaqāʾiqa anna hāḏā lafẓun wāḥidun qad  ā‛a li-ma‛ānin 
mu talifatin wa-innamā hāḏihī –l-ma‛ānī kulluhā šay’un wāḥidun wa-huwa iṣābatu –š-šay’i  ayran kāna aw 
šarran  
Ibn Durustawayh goes on to explain that lexicographers have been confused by the variant verbal nouns (maṣādir) 
that exist for a particular root (w- -d has at least seven: wa d,  idah, wu d, wu ūd, wi dān, i dān, and maw idah), 
have incorrectly associated them with different objects of the verb in reality, and have failed to comprehend the 
complex subtleties of their morphological derivations. Sure enough, this is exactly what Sībawayh’s teacher and the 
first extant lexicographer, al- alīl b. Aḥmad al-Farāhīdī (d. 175/791), did in his Kitāb al-ʿAyn: wa d is connected to 
sorrow, maw idah is connected to anger, and wi dān and  idah are connected to attaining something. Ibn Aḥmad al-
Farāhīdī al- alīl, Kitāb al-ʿAyn, ed. Mahdī Maḫzūmī and Ibrāhīm Sāmarrā’ī, 8 in 4 vols. (Baghdad: Wizārat aṯ-
 aqāfah wa-l-Iʿlām, 1980). 6:169; as-Suyū ī, al-Mu hir, 1:384. Cf. Ragib, for whom w- -d is an opportunity to draw 
another dividing line between a word’s application to God and its application to humans: Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 
854. 
658 See page 207. 
659 …fī-kitābinā fī ibṭāli –l-aḍdād. as-Suyū ī, al-Mu hir, 1:396. 
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Arabic as spoken by the Bedouin Arabs, that they were a subset of homonymy,
660
 and that their 
linguistic context (the other words surrounding them) would always enable the correct meaning 
to be understood.
661
 He also refers to unnamed “others” who maintained, as did Ibn 
Durustawayh, that words referring to two contradictory ideas should in fact be understood as 
referring to a single principle idea within the semantic breadth of which the two different 
variants could then interact with each other.
662
 
The best known exponent of this theory, that the multifarious meanings of almost every 
root in Arabic can be traced back to a single principle, is Ibn Fāris (Abū al-Ḥusayn Aḥmad, d. 
395/1004). His dictionary, Muʿ am Maqāyīs al-Luġah (Dictionary of the Gauges of the 
Lexicon), states these principles for every single root it includes. Ibn Fāris is clearly motivated by 
the desire to minimize the number of principles per root, and in the great majority of cases does 
indeed confine each root’s range of meanings to a single principle. In the case of the root w- -d 
dealt with by Sībawayh and Ibn Durustawayh, he writes that these three letters in this order 
“indicate a single principle – finding something”.663 
Ibn al-Anbārī also commented on the controversy over whether synonyms really existed in 
Arabic, or whether in fact each apparent synonym actually had a subtley different meaning. He 
quotes Qu rub as saying that the Bedouin Arabs’ use of synonyms was a rhetorical flourish 
designed to show the semantic breadth of their language. Some fifty years later, Ragib’s 
                                                 
660 wa-ma rā ḥurūfi –l-aḍdādi ma rā –l-ḥurūfi –llatī taqaʿu ʿalā –l-maʿānī –l-mu talifati wa-in lam yakun 
mutaḍāddah. Ibn al-Anbārī, Kitāb al-Aḍdād, 3-4.  
661 Ibid., 1-4. 
662 wa-qāla ā irūna iḏā waqaʿa –l-ḥurūfu ʿalā maʿnīyayni mutaḍāddayni fa-l-aṣlu li-maʿnan wāḥidin  umma 
tadā ala –l-i nāni ʿalā  ihati –l-ittisāʿ. Ibid., 8. 
663 al-wāw wa-l- īm wa-d-dāl yadillu ʿalā aṣlin wāḥidin wa-huwa –š-šayʾu yulfīhi. Ibn Fāris, Muʿ am Maqāyīs al-
Luġah, 6:86. 
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contemporary Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbdallāh, d. ca. 1010) would write a book 
explicitly designed to show the subtle inflections in meaning that enabled him to deny the 
existence of any synonyms.
664
  
In all these lexical discussions, there was also often a latent political angle: what was the 
status of the intellectual inheritance from the desert Bedouin Arabs? Were they to be praised for 
their poetry and facility with language, or condescended to for a damaging inexactness in 
expression? Ibn al-Anbārī is clear: the Bedouin Arabs manipulated context so skillfully that the 
multi-faceted words they used never in fact resulted in ambiguity.
665
  
In the quotation above, Ibn Durustawayh complained about the failure of scholars to 
“contemplate the level of ideas”.666 This concept, in which the pairing of expression and idea is 
used to make a distinction between two different strategies for thinking, is something that we 
have already seen in Ragib.
667
 For Ragib, thinking of language as composed of both expressions 
and ideas was useful in exegesis and theology because one can then choose to either follow 
God’s ideas or God’s expressions while remaining faithful at all times to God’s language. For 
Ibn Durustawayh it was useful in lexicography. For the major theorist Ibn  innī (Abū al-Fatḥ 
ʿUṯmān, d. 392/1002) it enabled him to distinguish the different ways in which Sībawayh had 
constructed his grammatical theory. The pairing of expression and idea performs the same 
                                                 
664 al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbdallāh Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, al-Furūq al-Luġawīyah  (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2006). 
665 Ibn al-Anbārī, Kitāb al-Aḍdād, 1-2. This cultural and political argument over the status of the new civilization’s 
Bedouin Arab heritage vis-à-vis its contacts with more established Persianate cultures was widespread in the eighth 
and ninth centuries. It is usually referred to as the Šuʿūbīyah controversy. See: C. E. Bosworth, "Shuʿūbiyya," in 
Encyclopedia of Arabic literature, ed. Julie Scott Meisami and Paul Starkey (London / New York: Routledge, 1998). 
666 man lam yata’mmal –l-ma‛ānī. See page 221. 
667 See the section “Metaphorical Readings” on page 191. 
 225 
function in lexicography, theology, exegesis, and grammar; it facilitates the distinction between 
form and content. 
Language, for Ibn  innī, was “every expression that is self-sufficient in its communication 
of the idea behind it”.668 He explained that the chapter on homonyms in his al-Ḫaṣāʾiṣ (The 
Properties [of Arabic]) does not deal with divergent ideas behind single expressions in the way 
that discussions about, for example, the different ways that wa ada can be used “appear a great 
deal in the books of the lexicographers”.669 Instead, he was dealing with “the level behind that .. 
[which is] formulated in the souls of the words”.670 This referred to the grammatical idea or 
function behind each morphological component (the vowels and letters) of a word.  
Ibn  innī made the following statement about the way Sībawayh thought in a particular 
case: “explanation according to the idea, not according to the expression”.671 According to Ibn 
 innī, Sībawayh was not looking at morphological rules and patterns when he put forward the 
proposal in question but rather at the mental associations made by language users. Sībawayh had 
explained that the kasrah (“i”) vowel at the end of the word fa āri (a proper name: “Vice”) was 
                                                 
668 ammā –l-kalāmu fa-kullu lafẓin mustaqillin bi-nafsihī mufīdin li-maʿnāhu. Ibn  innī, al- aṣāʾiṣ, 1:17. He was 
talking about language, or more exactly about meaningful speech: that which made sense on its own; a sentence or 
clause. 
669 ġaraḍunā min hāḏā –l-bābi laysa mā  āʾa bihī –n-nāsu fī kutubihim naḥwu wa adtu fī-l-ḥu ni wa-wa ādtu fī-l-
ġaḍabi … fa-inna hāḏā -ḍ-ḍarbu min –l-kalāmi … ka īrun fī kutub –l-ʿulamāʾi. Ibid., 2:93. 
670 wa-innamā ġaraḍunā hunā mā warāʾuhū … al-maṣūġatu fī anfusi –l-kalim. Ibid. 
671 tafsīrun ʿalā ṭarīqi –l-maʿnā lā ʿalā ṭarīqi –l-lafẓ. Ibid., 2:198-199. Ibn  innī was not the first to make this sort of 
judgement in the field of grammar. Ibn as-Sarrāǧ (Muḥammad b. Sahl, d. 316/928) made the same statement about 
Quran 7:59 and 11:50 (Hūd): mā lakum min ilāhin ġayruhū (or ġayrihī in the variant readings of Abū Jaʿfar Yazīd b. 
al-Qaʿqāʿ (d. 130/747) and ʿAlī b. Ḥamza al-Kisāʾī (d. 189/804)). Ibn as-Sarrāǧ wrote that the reading ġayruhū was 
according to the maʿnā and the reading ġayriḥī was according to the lafẓ. Versteegh notes that “maʿnā is identical 
with the underlying level” and that this usage may well follow the use of maʿnā to paraphrase or reconstruct the 
intention of a Quranic verse. This example was also used by Frank. Frank, "Meanings " 312; Muḥammad b. Sahl Ibn 
as-Sarrāǧ, al-Uṣūl fī-n-Naḥw, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn al-Fatlī, 4 vols. (Beirut: Muʾassasat ar-Risālah, 1996). 1:94; Royal 
Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, "Altafsir.com,"  http://www.altafsir.com/Recitations.asp; Versteegh, "The 
Arabic Tradition," 245.  
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the result of the Bedouin Arabs’ association of what is actually a noun with the ending of a 
hypothetical verb in the feminine.
672
  
Ibn  innī also engaged in a more exact description of the level of ideas. He made a 
distinction between two types of functions that occur behind expressions, one of which was 
strictly grammatical, and the other of which he identified as idea (maʿnā). He distinguished 
between the level of grammatical reconstruction and supplementation needed to explain the 
declension of an expression (taqdīr al-iʿrāb) and the level of reconstruction that explains the 
idea, context, and intent behind an expression (tafsīr al-maʿnā). In the former, the elided word 
that is re-supplied fits into the case structure of the sentence, whereas in the latter, the 
reconstruction does not reproduce the case structure that motivated it in the first place. The 
exegesis of the idea behind an expression is a mental reconstruction, whereas simple 
grammatical reconstruction reconfigures the text (and its expressions).
673
  
                                                 
672 In the chapter in question (bāb mā  āʾa maʿdūlan ʿan ḥaddihī min –l-muʾanna ) Sībawayh is describing how 
masculine proper names (diptotes that do not fully decline) can be derived, against their own grammatical principles 
(maʿdūlun ʿan wa hihī wa-aṣlihī), as feminine on the pattern faʿāli. In some cases, the final kasrah comes from the 
yāʾ found on the feminine singular imperative (ifʿalī) and in other cases Sībawayh argues that it should be traced 
back to the feminine gender of the verbal noun. The example that Ibn  innī picks up on, fa āri, is according to 
Sībawayh derived from the feminine verbal noun al-fa rah. The proof texts are, of course, poetry. Sībawayh, Kitāb, 
3:270-274, 274 (2:36-38, 38). 
673 An example of taqdīr al-iʿrāb is the phrase ahlaka wa-l-layla (“your people and the night!”), the grammatical 
reconstruction of which is ilḥak ahlaka wa-sābiq –l-layla (“find your people and outstrip the night! i.e. get to them 
before nightfall). The addition of the two transitive verbs both explains and fits the accusative case in which the two 
objects in the original sentence were placed. Ibn  innī, al- aṣāʾiṣ, 1:279. An example of tafsīr al-maʿnā is the 
phrase ḍarabtu  aydan sawṭan (*“I struck Zayd a stick!”) the idea behind which is ḍarabtuhū ḍarbatan bi-sawṭin (“I 
struck him a blow with a stick”). This idea makes sense, but according to Ibn  innī it does not represent an accurate 
taqdīr al-iʿrāb, which would be ḍarabtahū ḍarbata sawṭin (*“I struck him a blow of stick”) because the taqdīr al-
iʿrāb reconstruction strategy requires in this case that the word which governs the case in sawṭan must be the word 
that had been elided and is to be supplied (ḥaḏf al-muḍāf as opposed to ḥaḏf ḥarf al- arr (“elision of the preposition 
governing the genitive”) which is less favoured). Therefore, the taqdīr al-iʿrāb of ḍarabtu  aydan sawṭan is 
ḍarabtahū ḍarbata sawṭin but the more meaningful tafsīr al-maʿnā of the same phrase is ḍarabtuhū ḍarbatan bi-
sawṭin. Ibid., 1:284. Cf. al- urǧānī’s maʿānī an-naḥw: Larkin, The Theology of Meaning, 54. Al- urǧānī also 
discusses this exact example in his Asrār, concluding that the grammarians’ reconstruction is “the original [level of] 
language that may be forgotten and copied over (…mā kāna ʿalayhi –l-kalāmu fī aṣlihī wa-anna ḏālika qad nusiya 
wa-nusi a)”. al- urǧānī, Asrār al-Balāġah, 330. 
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This is important evidence of critical thinking about the pairing of expression and idea, and 
about the different functions that the idea had come to discharge both in grammar, and in broader 
accounts of language. It is a distinction that also appears in the work of Ibn  innī’s predecessor 
az-Zaǧǧāǧī (Abū al-Qāsim ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān, d. ca. 337/948), albeit with less terminological 
precision. Az-Zaǧǧāǧī wrote that Sībawayh’s use of expressions and ideas to analyse polysemy 
at the start of al-Kitāb should be read as a referring to both the ideas behind expressions of case 
inflection and the ideas behind expressions of whole words.
674 Ibn  innī would then say that the 
first type of ideas were accessed by taqdīr al-iʿrāb, and the second type by tafsīr al-maʿnā. 
Finally, in a division that parallels the one Ragib would later make between language that 
indicates things with proper nouns and language that indicates ideas through polysemy,
675 Ibn 
 innī writes: 
If you were to ask why proper names seldom refer to ideas and more often refer to external 
physical things such as Zayd,  aʿfar, and all individuals that have a name, then the answer 
would be that external physical things are more easily sensed and more clearly witnessed. 
They are more amenable to naming than that which can neither be seen nor sensed, but 
rather must be contemplated and deduced without the knowledge that inevitably comes 
from direct witness.676 
                                                 
674 Therefore, just as “he went” and “he sat” are two different expressions with two different ideas behind them, the 
visible difference in the case of “your brother” in akramanī a ūka (“your brother honoured me”) and akramtu a āka 
(“I honoured your brother”) constitutes two different expressions with two different ideas behind them. Abū al-
Qāsim az-Zaǧǧāǧī, al-Īḍāḥ fī ʿIlal an-Naḥw, ed. Māzin al-Mubārak (Cairo: Dār al-ʿArūbah, 1959). 137-138. 
675 See page 166. 
676 The text reads: 
fa-in qulta wa-li-ma qallat –l-iʿlāmu fī-l-maʿānī wa-ka urat fī-l-aʿyāni naḥwu Zaydin wa-Ǧaʿfara wa- amīʿu 
mā ʿallaqa ʿalayhi ʿalamun wa-huwa ša sun qīla li-anna –l-aʿyāna aẓharu li-l-ḥāssati wa-abdā ilā –l-
mušāhadati fa-kānat ašbaha bi-l-ʿalamīyati mimmā lā yurā wa-lā yušahadu ḥissan wa-innamā yuʿlamu 
taʾammulan wa-stidlālan wa-laysat ka-maʿlūmi -ḍ-ḍurūrati li-l-mušāhadah   
Ibn  innī, al- aṣāʾiṣ, 2:200. 
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Ibn  innī now appears to us both as a member of the generation of theorists that took a basic 
theory of meaning, and assumptions about the management of linguistic ambiguity, to a whole 
new level of sophistication, and as someone whose ideas about language may have been 
influential on Ragib. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, Ragib translated the 
grammatical theory of scholars like Ibn  innī into a philosophy of language and a theory of 
meaning that could work across the genres of exegesis, theology, and poetics. 
There is neither time nor space here for us to review the vast swathe of theories and 
disputes about language that took place among Ragib’s predecessors and contemporaries in the 
tenth and eleventh centuries. The major figures dealt with above provide sufficient evidence that 
the turn towards theory had taken place, and that the pairing of expression and idea was at the 
centre of all the discussions of language in the Arabic Language Tradition. It was accompanied 
by the iterative process of negotiating linguistic ambiguity. To conclude this section I will now 
refer in brief to three scholars who had particularly notable theories in poetics and legal theory, 
and one man who came after Ragib but cast such a great shadow that he cannot be ommitted 
from any historical review of the philosophy of language in Arabic. 
In the tenth and eleventh-centuries legal theory was developing into an independent 
discipline, one that would achieve its full potential in the madrasa from the twelfth century 
onwards. In the two hundred years after aš-Šāfiʿī’s death, however, legal theory had both a 
distinct identity and a particular approach to language. Ragib’s slightly younger contemporary, 
the Muʿtazilī Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (Muḥammad b. ʿAlī, d. 436/1044), clarified this self-
conscious identity. He argued that legal theory needed to be separated from extraneous detailed 
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discourses about the nature and classification of knowledge,
677
 and stated that the subject matter 
of legal theory was divinely revealed judgements (aḥkām šarʿīyah). 
Legal theory was therefore the process of establishing the hermeneutical principles that 
would enable jurists to read divine revelation and determine its judgements. The theories of 
language that it contained did not speak to any concerns broader than the extraction of actionable 
legal information from text and speech. However, even that limited goal did catalyse sustained 
theorizing on language, and we can see this in the work of the tenth-century legal theorist al-
 aṣṣāṣ. Every hermeneutical device and division is described in terms of the relationship 
between expression and idea, from general versus specific reference (ʿāmm and  āṣṣ), to the 
literal and non-literal (ḥaqīqah and ma ā ),678 and of course polysemy. An expression can 
encompass two ideas, one of which is literal and the other non-literal, or one of which is 
unequivocal (ṣarīḥ) and the other allusive (kināyah).679  
Intent was critical in determining what the speaker meant. Al- aṣṣāṣ reports his teacher, 
Abū al-Ḥasan al-Karḫī (ʿUbaydallāh b. al-Ḥusayn, d. 340/952), as proving a point by saying: 
“when he intended one of the two meanings of a homonym then it was as if he had spoken 
                                                 
677 Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī had written a commentary on al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār’s Kitāb al-ʿUmad (Book of the 
Core Issues), and while writing this commentary he had felt that it included subjects that were not strictly concerned 
with legal theory (lā talīqu bi-uṣūli -l-fiqhi min daqīqi -l-kalāmi naḥwi –l-qawli fī aqsāmi -l-ʿulūmi wa-ḥaddi -ḍ-
ḍarūrīyi minhā wa-l-muktasab   ). He therefore made sure to exclude these matters from his influential Kitāb al-
Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh (That Which Can Be Relied Upon in Legal Theory). Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, Kitāb al-
Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, ed. Aḥmad Bakīr and Ḥasan Ḥanafī, 2 vols. (Damascus: Institut Francais de Damas, 
1965). 1:7-8; Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 252 (note 439). For the distinction between theological and legal 
theories, see also: M. A. S. Abdel Haleem and Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak, "Early Islamic 
Theological and Juristic Terminology: "Kitāb al-Ḥudūd fi 'l-uṣūl," by Ibn Fūrak," Bulletin of the School of Oriental 
and African Studies 54, no. 1 (1991): 15. 
678 Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, for whom ḥaqīqah and ma ā  were necessary and inevitable aspects of language, saw 
homonymy as primarily a matter of an expression being connected to one idea literally, and to another idea non-
literally. Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 1:22-23. For a review of al- āṣṣāṣ’ understanding of ma ā , see: 
Heinrichs, "Contacts," 258f. And on al- aṣṣāṣ’ legal scholarship more broadly: Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 
219-220 (and index). 
679 al- aṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 1:46, 1:48. 
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unequivocally and named it exactly, and therefore not included the other meaning [in his 
speech]”.680 Al-Karḫī needed to give a linguistically ambiguous speech act the status of an 
unambiguous one, and so he used the speaker’s posited intent to read ambiguity as clarity. 
In all these cases what matters is the judgement, the legal value (al-ḥukm). It dominates al-
 aṣṣāṣ’ thinking to the extent that his eighty-ninth chapter reproduces the traditional explanation 
of the structure of homonymy and synonymy, but the expressions in this new structure are 
replaced by the judgements (aḥkām).681 This tells us both that the judgement is what is primarily 
at stake, and that al- aṣṣāṣ has internalised the use of the pairing of expression and idea to 
conceive of polysemy to such an extent that he reproduces it for a different purpose. This kind of 
taxonomical theorizing is typical of the work produced after the twelfth century in the madrasa, 
and the fact that it can be found in tenth-century legal theory shows how much influence the 
discipline of legal theory had on the later development of intellectual endeavour. 
Linguistic ambiguity is therefore a fact of Arabic, but one that has to be conquered in order 
to derive the law, whether from a divine revelation in Arabic, or for a community that speaks in 
Arabic. These hermeneutical principles, which in the work of al- aṣṣāṣ go hand in hand with 
confidence in the scholar’s ability to determine the intent behind linguistic ambiguity, are the 
                                                 
680 wa-yaḥta  u fīhi bi-annahū matā arāda aḥada –l-maʿanīyayni fa-ka-annahū qad ṣaraḥa bihī wa-sammāhu bi-
ʿaynihī fa-lā yatanāwalu –l-maʿnā –l-ā ar. Ibid., 1:77. 
681 The chapter title is: “on the judgements being different while the idea is the same, and the judgements being the 
same while the ideas are different” (fī – tilāfi –l-aḥkāmi maʿa –ttifāqi –l-maʿnā wa-ttifāqihā maʿa – tilāfi –l-
maʿānī). The actual argument that al- aṣṣāṣ made in this chapter was relatively simple. A single idea can produce 
rulings on a number of different subject. For example, the idea or hermeneutical concept of sexual intercourse 
produces a ruling requiring expiatory extra fasting if sex occurs during the Ramadan fast, as well as a ruling 
requiring sacrifice of an animal as atonement if sex occurs while the person is in a state of ritual purity for 
pilgrimage (ya ū u an yataʿallaqa bi-l-maʿnā –l-wāḥidi aḥkāmun muḥtalifatun ka-taʿalluqi ī ābi kaffārati 
ramaḍāna wa-dammi –l-iḥrāmi bi-l- imāʿ). Al- aṣṣāṣ then says that this maʿnā-aḥkām dynamic is the same as the 
dynamic when a single name (ism) is a sign (ʿalam) for different rulings. Conversely, a single ruling can be derived 
from different ideas, or on the basis of different rationales (wa- āʾi un ayḍan –ttifāqu –l-aḥkāmi li-ʿilalin 
mu talifah). Ibid., 4:175-176.  
 231 
same in legal theory and in exegesis.
682
 It is only when literature is involved that theories of 
meaning come to address the creation of language as well as its interpretation. 
That was the case with Ragib, and it was also the case with Qudāmah, with whose work 
Ragib was, as we have already seen, familiar. Qudāmah, like Ragib, structured his poetics 
according to the dynamics of the connections made between expressions and ideas.
683
 Poetics 
was the genre in which fully fledged theories of meaning that were more than just hermeneutics 
could emerge. After Qudāmah, and Ragib, it is therefore unsurprising that the scholar who would 
come to dominate the analysis of language from the eleventh centry onwards worked in both the 
hermeneutical discipline of Quranic exegesis, and in poetics. Al- urǧānī, dying as he did in 
471/1078, falls outside the chronological scope of this dissertation, which does not consider 
those who could not have been Ragib’s predecessors or contemporaries. 
Nevertheless, al- urǧānī’s impact was so substantial that it behoves us to use him, and 
Ragib, to conclude this historical review of the Arabic Language Tradition. We should also note 
the form in which he wrote: his two books on language, Asrār al-Balāġah and Dalāʾil al-Iʿ ā , 
are substantial monographs on literary eloquence and Quranic inimitability respectively. This 
self-conscious foregrounding of language results in clear statements about his intellectual 
endeavour that tally with what we have already seen in more scattered remarks across a variety 
of genres in this and the preceding chapters. Al- urǧānī writes in the introduction to his Dalāʾil 
that the best discipline of knowledge in any language is the study of clear communication (ʿilm 
                                                 
682 Schwarb discusses the relationship between exegesis, legal theory, and poetics with similar conclusions at: 
Schwarb, "Capturing the Meanings," 133f. 
683 See page 185. Ragib may also have been aware of another notable work of tenth-century language theory that 
showed some Aristotelian influence, that of Ibn Wahb, for which see notes 285 and 426, and Geert Jan Van Gelder, 
"Ibn Wahb," in Encyclopedia of Arabic literature, ed. Julie Scott Meisami and Paul Starkey (London / New York: 
Routledge, 1998). 
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al-bayān), that knowledge of language is a subtle and reasoned process at the summit of which is 




The theoretical advance of al- urǧānī’s that is most important for the discussions in this 
dissertation is his decision to subdivide the level of ideas. Ragib’s analysis of how complex 
metaphors functioned had gone some way in this direction, but al- urǧānī made the theoretical 
distinction between an initial idea (maʿnā) and a subsequent idea about that idea (maʿnā al-
maʿnā). Ragib understood complex metaphors with two models that went beyond the simple 
concept of an attribute borrowed from a source and given to a target. In the rhetorical figure of 
allusive borrowing (istiʿārat al-kināyah) he broadened the understanding of the source to include 
ongoing actions and states as well as attributes. When “the reins of the morning were in the hand 
of the northwind”, the northwind (target) is compared to a leader engaged in the act of leading 
(source), with the clouds as the sheep that he is leading.
685
 
 Ragib’s other theory of complex metaphor includes the combined comparison (tašbīh 
mu mal), in which “the target and the source are mentioned, but the aspect that they share is not 
clarified, in which case the compared idea is reasoned either intuitively or deductively [by the 
                                                 
684 ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān al- urǧānī, Dalā’il al-Iʿ ā   (Damascus: Maktabat Saʿd ad-Dīn, 1983; repr., 
1987). 59-61; ———, Dalā’il ed  Šinqīṭī, 4-6; ———, Dalā’il al-Iʿ ā , ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Šākir (Cairo: Dār 
al-Madanī, 1992; repr., 1987). 5-7. 
685 iḏ aṣbaḥat bi-yadi –šamāli  imāmuhā qaṣada ilā tašbīha –š-šamāli bi-qāʾyidin [sic.] wa-s-saḥāba bi-baʿīrin 
maqūd. Ragib therefore does “justice to the underlying tamthīl [analogy]”, answering Heinrich’s complaint that the 
notion of istiʿārah in other theorists’ work usually fails to do so (they read this line as the borrowing of the hand for 
the northwind, and the borrowing of the rein for the morning). The poet is Labīd (Abū ʿAqīl b. Rabīʿah, d. ca. 
40/660). Heinrichs, The Hand of the Northwind, 9; al-Huḏayliyīn and  uwaylid b.  ālid Abū  uʾayb, Diwān al-
Huḏayliyīn, ed. Aḥmad az-Zayn and Maḥmūd Abū al-Wafā, 3 in 1 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīyah, 1945-
1950). 1:3; Key, "Language and Literature," 58; Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. f.12b. 
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audience]”.686 The dynamic in this single rhetorical figure heralds one of al- urǧānī’s theoretical 
statements about language as a whole: 
Language is divided into two types. In one, you grasp the intended aim with the indication 
of the expression alone (bi-dalālati –l-lafẓ waḥdahū), for example if you intended to inform 
[someone] about Zayd’s literal departure, you would say ‘Zayd left’. In the other type of 
language you do not grasp the intended aim with the indication of the expression alone, but 
rather the expression indicates its idea, the lexical context of which it necessitates, to you, 
and then you find that this idea contains a second indication that leads you to the intended 
aim. This type of language relies on allusion, istiʿārah, and analogy.687 
As in Ragib, the theory of meaning is twofold. Language is either simple indication, or complex 
reference. For al- urǧānī, complex reference is defined not by the polysemic situation in which 
it occurs, but by the second level of mental effort on the part of the audience that goes into 
deciphering it. He is aware that this is an explicit theoretical claim, and he creates a new 
terminology for it: 
If you have understood all of the above, then here is an abbreviated way to express it. You 
can just say ‘the idea’ and ‘the idea of the idea’. By ‘the idea’ you will mean the idea 
directly understood from the expression itself (ẓāhir al-lafẓ) without an intermediary. By 
‘the idea of the idea’ you will mean that you reason an idea from the expression and then 
that idea leads you to another idea…688  
                                                 
686 wa-l-mu malu an yuḏkara –l-mušabbahu wa-l-mušabbahu bihī wa-lam yubayyan –l-wa hu –llaḏī tašābahā wa-
ḏālika iḏ kāna maʿnā –t-tašbīhi maʿqūlan immā bi-badīhati –l-ʿaqli aw bi-baʿḍi –l-istidlālāt. His example is taken 
from the Muʿallaqah of Zuhayr (b.  anāb, fl. sixth century):  
they rose early and set out at dawn, for they and the valley of ar-Rass were like the hand to the mouth 
(bakarna bukūran wa-staḥarna bi-suḥratin / fa-hunna wa-wādī –r-rassi ka-l-yadi li-l-fami)  
Ahlwardt, Divans, 94; Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. f.8a. 
687 al- urǧānī, Dalā’il ed  Šinqīṭī, 202; ———, Dalā’il ed  Šākir, 262. Also translated and edited by: Larkin, The 
Theology of Meaning, 74, 184-185. 
688 al- urǧānī, Dalā’il ed  Šinqīṭī, 203; ———, Dalā’il ed  Šākir, 263. Also translated by: Abu Deeb, Al-Jurjānī's 
Theory, 75f. Cf. (mis-referenced to the Asrār): ʿAbbās, Tārī  an-Naqd, 429. 
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Like Ragib, al- urǧānī was concerned with the theological status of words as well as their poetic 




Concluding Remarks on the Arabic Language Tradition 
The notion that the interaction between language and mind could be divided into two core 
concepts that referred to the form of words and their content was by no means unique to Arabic. 
Scholars writing and talking in Arabic settled on the pairing of expression and idea very early on, 
as those of other times and places had and would settle on their own names for this binary. 
However, the theory of meaning that developed in the Arabic-speaking intellectual world of the 
seventh to eleventh centuries was remarkable in its resilience, widespread usage, and not 
coincidentally, its interpretative power and the autonomy it gave to scholars to make their own 
decisions about what language had meant and should mean. In the Arabic Language Tradition, as 
we have been reading in this chapter, the theory of meaning based on expressions and ideas was 
paired with an assumption that linguistic ambiguity was ubiquitous, surmountable, and could be 
emancipatory. 
                                                 
689 Al- urǧānī denied that the word “hand” can simply be conceived of as lexically equivalent to the word 
“blessing”, and attempted to demonstrate that the two words are not interchangeable. For example, they are not 
interchangeable in translation into other languages (al- urǧānī, Asrār al-Balāġah, 327; Larkin, The Theology of 
Meaning, 89f.). Ragib had espoused just that equivalence in his Exegesis, and qualified the relationship between the 
two words as one of istiʿārah in his Quranic Glossary (“‘Hand’ was borrowed [and given to] ‘blessing’”. Ragib, 
Quranic Glossary. See discussions and translations above at notes 276, 463, 579, and 580). Al- urǧānī’s solution 
was more complex. The semantic connection between “hand” and “blessing” is weaker, when reasoned with 
examples, than the semantic connection between “hand” and “ability (qudrah)”. “Ability” is therefore a more 
acceptable exegetical response to the word “hand” in the Quran. The relationship between “hand” and “ability” is an 
“allusion by way of analogy” (talwīḥ bi-l-ma al), and this is appropriate for an attribute of God. In fact, al- urǧānī 
concludes, the hermeneutical equivalence between “hand” and “blessing” or “power” was originally motivated by a 
laudable theological belief in the impossibility of anthropomorphism combined with an insufficient theory of 
meaning (al- urǧānī, Asrār al-Balāġah, 332; Larkin, The Theology of Meaning, 90-91. Al- urǧānī references al-
Mubarrad as an early adopter of such exegetical equivalences. Al-Mubarrad had equated God’s right hand (yamīn) in 
Quran 39:67 (az-Zumar) with “power”. Ragib had agreed that the relationship between “right hand” should be read 
according to the hermeneutic for “hand”. al-Mubarrad, al-Kāmil, 1:75; Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 893.). 
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The story began in the first cultural capitals of Islamic intellectual society, Kufa and Basra. 
There, scholars started to standardize terminology that would enable them both to argue about 
what to call each other, and to negotiate the revelation that Islam had brought from the other side 
of the Arabian desert. Two key principles were established: language was potentially ambiguous, 
and a popular solution was homonymy. The most systematic theory was done in grammar, which 
is also where we find the first presentation of polysemy explained with the pairing of expression 
and idea. 
The work of the next generations of scholars laid down theories that could stand alongside 
Sībawayh's magnum opus in grammar. By now, the pairing of expression and idea was 
terminologically established, and another key assumption had started to become apparent and 
self-conscious. In the Arabic language that had always been understood as linguistically 
ambiguous, the main site of that ambiguity, and the source that scholars could always refer back 
to for precedents, was poetry. The Bedouin Arabs had been poets, and the intellectual culture that 
was now over two centuries old was becoming a culture of literary critics. 
Later, as we get closer to Ragib's contemporaries, the central issues of linguistic ambiguity 
and polysemy had begun to be debated, and deconstructed. Scholars were arguing, and writing, 
about the way that polysemy occured in Arabic, and the best way to describe it. They were also 
engaged in criticism of the theories of their predecessors. The level of sophistication and 
abstraction in the work of intellectuals such as Ibn  innī matches anything that theorists of 
language are producing in the twenty-first century in European languages. As theorists became 
more numerous, the particular strand of thought that was legal theory came to develop its own 
account of language, which lay at the heart of the jurisprudential hermeneutic being developing. 
The analysis of polysemy was a central concern of a genre that sought to extract firm rules from 
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the linguistically ambiguous corpus of revelation, and to impose these rules on the equally 
ambiguous world of human speech. 
The legal theorists tended to neglect poetry and poetics, or at least to relegate them to the 
role of a stale resource of linguistic precedent, a treasure trove of past usage that could be mined 
but not expanded. However, other scholars were working in that very discipline, and were taking 
insights about language developed in exegesis, grammar, and indeed legal theory itself and 
developing them into new theories about eloquence and rhetorical innovation. It is therefore not 
suprising that the most complete accounts of language, where the theory of meaning based on 
expression and idea, and the negotiations of linguistic ambiguity, are most fully developed, are 
those that come from scholars who worked in both hermeneutical and poetic disciplines. Ragib, 
whose theory has in previous chapters been extracted from across the range of genres in which 











6. A CONCLUDING COMPARISON TO A CLASSICAL LANGUAGE TRADITION  
In order to bring the Arabic Language Tradition discussed in the preceding chapters into 
focus, we need to examine it alongside the Classical Language Tradition. The difference between 
the two philosophical approaches to language that these two traditions embodied has not gone 
unnoticed in the European-language academy. In his article on metaphor, Jacques Derrida wrote 
that “the genius of oriental languages" is to be "lively and figurative",690 and that metaphor has 
been understood by philosophy as being defined by “a provisional loss of meaning”, which 
destroys the connections necessary for conceptual thought. According to Derrida, this destruction 
is what Aristotle recognised and decried as sophistry.
691
  
Both Derrida and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whom he was quoting, used this comparison to 
dramatize the contrast between an Orient suffused in metaphor, and the cold rational North that 
was Europe. It is my argument, however, that this opposition between two rival philosophical 
approaches to language can be profitably used to describe the situation in the Arabic-speaking 
mediaeval world. The Arabic Language Tradition embodied a philosophy of language in which 
the language itself, with its potential for ambiguity, stood front and centre. The Classical 
Language Tradition embodied an entirely different philosophical approach, one that believed 
language was a distraction, and that assumed language needed to be sidelined in order for 
philosophy to deal directly with both thoughts and things.  
                                                 
690 “Et ‘le g nie des langues orientales’ c’est d’etre ‘vives et figur es’”. Jacques Derrida, "La mythologie blanche," 
Poetique 5(1971): 51; Jacques Derrida and F. C. T. Moore, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," 
New Literary History 6, no. 1 (1974): 72. Derrida was quoting Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Essai sur l'origine des 
langues  (Paris: Belin, 1817; repr., Paris: A. Braik, 1983). 5. NB: g nie is mistranslated as “genesis” in Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and John H. Moran, "On the Origin of Language," in On the Origin of Language (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1966), 11. 
691 Derrida, "La mythologie blanche," 51-52; Derrida and Moore, "White Mythology," 73-74. 
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The idea that language could ever be separated from mind and reality never occurred to 
scholars working in the Arabic Language Tradition. Could this have been the consequence of 
genre and discipline? Scholars like Ragib worked in poetics, literary criticism, exegesis, and 
literary compilation, all of which required a focus on language. The work of scholars in the 
Classical Language Tradition, on the other hand, often centered on the Organon, a collection of 
works with logic at its core. Perhaps only the question of the divine brought the two traditions 
together: the beliefs about the nature of the one and the spheres laid out in Book Lambada of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Ragib’s discussions of God’s unity and attributes are both 
conversations about the divine. However, Aristotle and the generations of Greek, Syriac, and 
Arabic commentators on him, did not talk about divinity in terms of language. Ragib, and the 
thousands of Arabic-language scholars whose assumptions he shared, could scarcely mention 
God without confronting the issue of the language used to describe him. 
This opposition mirrors a culture clash. Mediaeval Islamicate scholars argued about 
whether their intellectual culture should turn to the inheritance passed down to them from the 
Greeks through late antiquity, or whether that heritage in fact represented an undesirable foreign 
influence inseperable from metaphysical claims incompatible with Islam. There was a persistent 
division, before the twelfth century, between Arabist scholars working in exegetical and poetic 
disciplines, and philhellenic scholars working on the Greek inheritance from late antiquity, and 
in particular, on the transmission and reception of Aristotle’s Organon. The paradigmatic text 
that highlights this divide is Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī’s (d. 414/1023) report of a debate between 
the grammarian Abū Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī (d. 368/979) and the logician Abū Bišr Mattā (d. 328/ 
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940).692 This was a debate, albeit set in a court that expected Arabic to win, and reported by a 
follower of the victorious participant, in which Arabic culture chose Arabic grammar as its 
weapon in the defeat of a foreign Hellenistic logic that made false claims of universality. This 
summary reflects Abū Ḥayyān’s partisan reportage, but the text tells us how conscious tenth-
century scholars were of the culture clash.693  
Nevertheless, scholars such as Ragib remind us that the intellectual borders of 
philhellenism and anti-hellenism were porous. It was not simply the case that scholars who 
                                                 
692 D. S. Margoliouth, "The Discussion Between Abū Bishr Mattā And Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī On The Merits of Logic 
and Grammar," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. January (1905): 79-129; Abū 
Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī, Kitāb al-Imtāʿ wa-l-Muʾānasah, ed. Aḥmad Amīn and Aḥmad az-Zayn, 3 in 1 vols. (Beirut: Dār 
Maktabat al-Ḥayāh, 1965). 1:104f. For commentary on the debate, see also: Muhsin Mahdi, "Language and Logic in 
Classical Islam," in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, ed. Gustave E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: O. 
Harrassowitz, 1970); Zimmermann, Commentary and Short Treatise, cxxiif. For later Arabic consciousness of the 
issue, see the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ’s statement that anyone who wants to study philosophical logic (al-manṭiq al-falsafī) 
must first know grammar. Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, Rasāʾil  Beirut, 1:415. The idea that intellectual output was either 
indigenous or philhellenic, and that the standard bearers of these alternatives were grammar and logic respectively, 
is reflected by the Christian falyasūf Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī (d. 363/974), who described the difference between grammar and 
logic, and indeed in the division of all intellectual disciplines into either Arabic (including grammar) or foreign 
(including logic) in the Mafātīḥ al-ʿUlūm (The Keys of the Intellectual Disciplines) of al- uwārizmī (Abū ʿAbdallāh 
Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, fl. 366/976-387/997). Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī defined logic as “a craft that is concerned with 
expressions that refer to universals in order to combine those expressions in structures that reflect reality” (ṣināʿatun 
tuʿnā bi-l-alfāẓi –d-dāllati ʿalā –l-umūri –l-kullīyati li-tuʾallifahā taʾlīfan muwāfiqan limā ʿalayhi –l-umūru –llatī 
hiya dāllatun ʿalayhā). Grammar, on the other hand, was concerned with the inflection of expressions according to 
Bedouin Arab precedent. Al- uwārizmī wrote that he was dividing his survey of the disciplinary landscape into “the 
disciplines of the [Islamic] revelation and those Arabic disciplines associated with it” (li-ʿulūmi -š-šarīʿati wa-mā 
yaqtarinu bihā min –l-ʿulūmi –l-ʿarabīyah) and “the foreign disciplines from the Greeks and other nations” (li-
ʿulūmi –l-ʿa ami min –l-yūnānīyīna wa-ġayrihim min –l-umam). Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Yusūf al-
 uwārizmī, Mafātīḥ al-ʿUlūm, ed. G Van Vloten (Leiden: Brill, 1895; repr., Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-ʿĀmmah li-Quṣūr 
aṯ- aqāfah, 2004. Edited by Muḥammad Ḥusayn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz). 5; Kees Versteegh, Landmarks in Linguistic 
Thought III: The Arabic Linguistic Tradition  (London: Routledge, 1997). 255-256; Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, Maqālāt Yaḥyā b  
ʻAdī al-Falsafīyah, ed. Saḥbān  ulayfāt (Amman: Manšūrāt al- āmiʻah al-Urdunīyah, 1988). 414-424, 423.  
693 Fritz Zimmermann wrote:  
The clash between Hellenists and anti-Hellenists in the controversy over logic and grammar, by bringing 
pride and prejudice to the fore, further inhibited dispassionate discussion. At the same time, however, this 
clash is evidence of intense contact between the two subjects … pointed silences may have played an 
important part in the debate and … each side may have paid far more attention to the other than it cared to 
acknowledge. 
In this context, Zimmermann discusses “significant agreements” between al-Fārābī and his grammarian 
contemporary Ibn as-Sarrāǧ (Abū Bakr Muḥammad, d. 316/929). Zimmermann, Commentary and Short Treatise, 
cxix-cxxi, cxxxviii. Further evidence of al-Fārābī’s sensitivity to these dynamics can be extracted from his apparent 
avoidance of Arabic grammar as a source for the consideration of indefinite nouns in Aristotle’s logical works. For 
details of the avoidance, see: Black, "Aristotle's 'Peri hermeneias'," 64-65, 68. 
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preferred Arabic grammar to Greek philosophy, and who subscribed to the Arabic rather than the 
Classical Language Tradition, were anti-hellenic. Ragib, whose approach to language as 
polysemic and ambiguous puts him squarely in the Arabic Language Tradition, chose the 
Neoplatonic inheritance of late antiquity as the source for the vast majority of his ethical work. 
Ragib was culturally prepared to quote Aristotle in his ethics, and equally certain that Aristotle 
should not be part of his Quranic exegesis. Ragib was able to compartmentalize based on genre 
or discipline. 
The boundaries between genres and disciplines, and their interactions with the culture clash 
described above, also explain the failure of Aristotle’s works on language and poetry to influence 
scholars like Ragib. As Black and others have shown,694 Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics came 
into the Arabic-speaking world as an integral part of an Organon centered on logic. They were 
therefore studied by those Arabic scholars who were working in the Organon tradition, and 
ignored by those working outside it.695 This was in contrast to Aristotelian and Neoplatonic 
ethics, the transmission of which was much less tightly attached to the Organon and its logic. 
Furthermore, one can imagine that had a scholar like Ragib come into contact with the approach 
to language and its use embodied in Aristotle’s Rhetoric in particular, he would have thought it 
more applicable to his ethics and adab than his hermeneutic, theological, and poetic 
                                                 
694 ———, Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics. 
695 For example, a note on the manuscript of the Rhetoric edited by M. C. Lyons reads: “not many of those who read 
in the craft of logic (qurrāʾ ṣināʿati –l-manṭiq) have come to study this book”. The thrust of this note is that students 
of logic are the book’s natural readership, but because the book is little known and poorly transmitted, they have 
failed to make use of it. Aristotle, Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica  The Arabic Version, ed. M. C. Lyons, 2 vols. 
(Cambridge: Pembroke Arabic Texts, 1982). 1:ii, xxvi. The author of the note appears to have been Ibn as-Samḥ 
(Abū ʿAlī, Christian and pupil of Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, d. 418/1027), but for uncertainty on this attribution, see: ibid., iv-vi. 
Heinrichs, albeit addressing a later period than that of Ragib, remarks that “[l]ogical poetics (and rhetoric) and 
indigenous poetics and literary theory did not often rub shoulders. Most practicioners of the latter ignored what the 
logicians had to say…”. Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Takhyīl: Make-Believe and Image Creation in Arabic Literary 
Theory," in Takhyīl: the Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics, ed. G. J. H. van Gelder and Marl  Hammond 
(Cambridge: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2008), 9. 
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considerations of language, mind, and reality. The questions that Aristotle asks in his Rhetoric 
about how language persuades, and about the tropes of pleasure, youth, and old age, are the same 
questions that are addressed in Ragib’s literary compendia and ethics.696 
Making the distinction between the Arabic and the Classical Languages Traditions 
therefore has a number of advantages. It highlights a persistent philosophical difference between 
conceiving of language as a solution and conceiving of language as a problem. It reminds us that 
mediaeval Islamicate intellectual culture was engaged in an argument about which intellectual 
heritage was best. Finally, it helps explain the otherwise puzzling fact that a scholar like Ragib 
could have been ethically philhellenic but linguistically Arabic. 
Expressions, Ideas, Logic, and Homonymy in the Classical Language 
Tradition 
Al-Kindī (Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb b. Isḥāq, d. ca. 252/866) was perhaps the most substantial 
early Arabic philosopher to work on the Organon tradition,697 and the trope of Arabic as a 
language notable for its polysemy can be found in his works just as it can in the theory of his 
contemporary aš-Šāfiʿī. He wrote that while the mutual resemblance of words and their 
derivations was a feature of all languages, this was particularly frequent in Arabic to the extent 
                                                 
696 Cf. Aristotle, On Rhetoric  A theory of civil discourse, ed. George A. Kennedy, trans. George A. Kennedy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 16. The divisions sketched out here would, of course, change after Ragib’s 
death, due in part to the efforts of Avicenna to come to terms with Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics through a more 
resolutely Arabic vocabulary than al-Fārābī had used. Avicenna’s analysis of the role of imagination (ta yīl) may 
then have impacted later Arabic poetics, most notably those of al- urǧānī. This process can be mapped through the 
volume of collected texts and studies edited by van Gelder and Marl  Hammond, and introduced by Heinrichs. 
Black, Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics, 180-209; G. J. H. van Gelder and Marl  Hammond, Takhyīl: the 
Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics  (Cambridge: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2008). 2 (and passim). 
697 Although it should be noted that Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ had already produced an analytical synopsis of the Organon (or 
more exactly: Porphyry’s Eisagoge and Aristotle’s Categories, On Interpretation, and Analytics) in the mid-eighth 
century. He began with the observation that Porphyry had been concerned with the status of logical terminology (al-
asmāʾ in al-manṭiq) and the need for both the words (al-asmāʾ) and the process by which they were named (at-
tasmīyah) to be explained. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, "al-Man iq," 1. 
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that a single name could be used for two opposites.698 Elsewhere, as part of his explanation that 
Hellenistic philosophy (al-falsafah) is the study of universals rather than particulars, he uses the 
pairing of expression and idea: “we say that every expression must either have an idea behind it, 
or not” and only those expressions that have ideas matter in philosophy.699 The vocabulary that 
constituted Ragib’s theory of meaning, and Sībawayh’s account of polysemy, was therefore 
equally familiar to a scholar working on the Organon like al-Kindī.  
The pairing of expression and idea was just as present in the work of Ragib’s contemporary 
Avicenna, nearly two centuries later. Avicenna explains Aristotle’s inclusion of composite 
negative nouns such as “not human” or “not seeing” alongside simple nouns like “human” in the 
same way that Ragib might explain a polysemic problem of interpretation: “the expression ‘not’ 
and the expression ‘seeing’ both indicate an idea, and the combination of their two ideas is the 
idea of the ‘not human’ whole”.700 Avicenna’s explanation also relies on the concept of 
composite ideas. The multiple ideas of animal, living, speaking, and dying can be substituted for 
with a single expression “human”.701  
                                                 
698 ištibāha –l-asmāʾi … wa-t-taṣrīfa wa-l-ištiqāqāti … wa-in kānat ka īratan fī-l-luġati –l-ʿarabīyati fa-innahā 
ʿāmmatun li-kulli luġatin fa-inna fī-l-luġati –l-ʿarabīyati anwāʿan ka īran min tašābuhi –l-asmāʾi ḥattā inna –l-isma 
–l-wāḥidi la-yūḍaʿu ʿalā ḍiddayni  amīʿan. This remark comes at the beginning of al-Kindī’s letter to his pupil (the 
son of the caliph, Aḥmad b. al-Muʿtaṣim) On the Clarification that the Highest Sphere Bows Down to and Obeys 
God (fī–l-ibānati ʿan su ūd –l- armi –l-aqṣā wa-ṭāʿatihī li-llāhi ʿa  a wa- all). Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb al-Kindī, 
Oeuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al-Kindī, ed. Roshdi Rashed and Jean Jolivet (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997). 
699 fa-naqūlu inna kulla lafẓin fa-lā ya lū min an yakūna ḏā maʿnan aw ġayra ḏī maʿnā fa-mā lā maʿnā lahū fa-lā 
maṭlūba fīhi wa-l-falsafatu innamā taʿtamidu mā kāna fīhi maṭlūb. From al-Kindī’s On the First Philosophy (fī-l-
falsafati –l-ūlā). Ibid., 43. 
700 wa-lafẓatu –l-lā wa-lafẓatu –l-baṣīri yadillāni ʿalā maʿnan wa-yataʾallafu min maʿnayhimā maʿnā –l-kull. 
Aristotle, "On Interpretation," 16a.30; Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), "aš-Šifāʾ: al-Man iq III (al-
ʿIbārah)," in aš-Šifāʾ, ed. Ibrāhīm Madkūr (Cairo: Dār al-Kātib al-ʿArabī, 1970; reprint, Qum: Ẕovī el-Qurbā, 2007), 
12. Cf. Black, "Aristotle's 'Peri hermeneias'," 67. 
701 Avicenna writes: 
The composition may be … composed of two ideas … for which a single expression can be substituted. For 
example ‘Zayd is a speaking, dying, animal’. The part of this phrase ‘speaking, dying, animal’ is a 
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The motivation behind Avicenna’s explanation is Aristotle’s text, and therefore by 
extension, the need to establish the types of words that can be used to construct syllogisms and 
the relationship between their single or composite natures. The model was constructed for a very 
different purpose that that of Ragib’s, where the motivation was the need to give both a 
hermeneutical account of linguistic ambiguity and a poetic account of metaphor and imagery. 
Nevertheless, the result of the two processes is analogous. Both models use the pairing of 
expression and idea to represent the interaction of language and mind, and both models describe 
a situation in which a single expression denotes multiple ideas. Ragib would have included this 
phenomenon under the category of prolixity (basṭ), and Avicenna called it a composition of ideas 
(tarkīb bayna maʿnīyayn) being exchanged for a single expression (badlahū lafẓun mufrad), but 
the concepts are closely related. This raises the intriguing possibility that Avicenna did not 
influence subsequent work in poetics of scholars such as al- urǧānī so much through his work 
on Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics as through his work on logic and Aristotle’s On 
Interpretation.  
Avicenna, of course, wrote more than just extended Organon commentary. He made more 
use of the indigenous Arabic pairing of expression and idea in his Išārāt wa-Tanbīhāt (Pointers 
and Reminders), where he wrote that “there is a certain relationship between the expression and 
the idea”, the nature of the ideas can be affected by the nature of the expression, and the logician 
must therefore take heed of actual expressions in the languages in which they are couched.702 
                                                                                                                                                             
composition that acts in this way, and a single expression like ‘human’ can be substituted for it. (kāna –t-
tarkību … bayna maʿnīyayni fīhimā tarkībun … wa-yumkinu an yakūna badlahū mufradun ka-qawlinā 
Zaydun ḥayawānun nāṭiqun māʾitun fa-inna tarkība –l- u ʾi minhu wa-huwa qawlunā ḥayawānun nāṭiqun 
māʾitun tarkībun bi-hāḏihī -ṣ-ṣifati wa-yaqūmu badlahū lafẓun mufrad). 
Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), "al-ʿIbārah," 32-33. Cf. Black, "Aristotle's 'Peri hermeneias'," 67. 
702 bayna –l-lafẓi wa-l-maʿnā ʿalāqatun mā wa-rubbamā a ārat aḥwālun fī-l-lafẓi fī aḥwāli –l-maʿnā fa-li-ḏālika 
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The requirements of the logician reappear shortly afterwards, when Avicenna lays out a theory of 
meaning designed to meet syllogistic, rather than poetic, requirements. Therein, expressions can 
indicate ideas through congruence (muṭābaqah), in which each expression stands opposite its 
idea (the relationship between the idea of a three sided shape to the expression “triangle”), or 
through implication (taḍammun; the relationship between the expression “shape” and the idea of 
a triangle), or concomitance (al-istibtāʿ wa-l-ilti ām) in which one idea requires that another 
follow it (the relationship between the expression “ceiling” and the idea of a wall supporting 
it).703 Congruence is analogous to Ragib’s understanding of a literal relationship between 
expression and idea according to fiat coinage. Avicenna’s implication is necessary for the logical 
accomodation of the relationships between universals, such as that between a species and the 
genus in which it is included. There is no foregrounding of mechanisms that accommodate 
linguistic ambiguity therein, but the third category of concomitance is potentially analogous to 
Ragib’s analysis of how one idea can lead to another in poetic metaphor, and indeed to al-
 urǧānī’s ideas that are subsequent to other ideas (maʿnā al-maʿnā). 
In between al-Kindī and Avicenna, and equally firmly in the Classical Language Tradition, 
al-Fārābī eschewed the indigenous vocabulary of expression and idea in favour of expressions 
and intelligibles (maʿqūlāt) at several points in his works. It is in al-Fārābī that we get the 
statement that logic is the grammar of the mind and that the grammatical rules of syntax are 
analogous to the logical rules of thought.704 Al-Fārābī also argued that expressions reliably 
                                                                                                                                                             
yul amu –l-manṭiqīyu ayḍan an yurāʿī  āniba –l-lafẓi –l-muṭlaqi min ḥay u ḏālika ġayru muqayyadin bi-luġati 
qawmin dūna qawm. Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) and Naṣīr ad-Dīn a -Ṭūsī, al-Išārāt wa-t-Tanbīhāṭ, ed. 
Sulaymān Dunyā, Third Edition ed., 4 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1983-1994). 1:131. 
703 Ibid., 1:139. The translations are taken from W.P. Heinrichs, "Naḳd," in Encyclopaedia of Islam  Second Edition, 
ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs (Brill Online: Brill, 2012). 
704 Black, "Aristotle's 'Peri hermeneias'," 49; Abū Naṣr Muḥammad al-Fārābī, Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm, ʿUṯmān Amīn (Cairo: 
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imitate intelligibles, and that Aristotle (on whose On Interpretation al-Fārābī was commenting) 
was able to explain the composition of intelligibles by substituting expressions for them exactly 
because the two sides corresponded with each other.705  
Language, in fact, could be used in two different ways. Al-Fārābī distinguished between the 
investigation of expressions in linguistic contexts, which had the potential to cause confusion and 
error, and the investigation of expressions in so far as they were simply a convenient substitute 
for intelligibles. The first type of investigation was that found in Aristotle’s Sophistical 
Refutations (in which he combated language manipulated in order to deceive), Rhetoric, and 
Poetics (in which language was manipulated for literary effect).706 The second type of 
investigation was that found in logic, and these two ways of approaching language are 
themselves the two separate philosophical approaches that I have sought to capture with the 
labels of the Arabic and the Classical Language Traditions. When laid out by a logician, 
however, they make a very clear argument, which is that logic is concerned with linguistic 
expressions for only two reasons. Expressions either matter because their ambiguity needs to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1949). 54. 
705 In the background of al-Fārābī’s discussion of whether Aristotle, in On Interpretation, was talking about 
expressions as used in language or about intelligibles in people’s minds was the long-established debate about the 
subject matter of both On Interpretation and Categories. Throughout late antiquity, the commentary tradition has 
struggled with the question of whether the discussions of names that appear in these two parts of the Organon 
should be understood as discussions of words, or as discussions of things and ideas. The underlying concern was 
whether or not language was part of logic. Perhaps the most influential compromise position (and certainly one 
influential on al-Fārābī) was that of Porphyry (d. ca. 305), who wrote that Aristotle’s Categories was about “words 
in so far as they signify things”. Later, Simplicius (fl. 529) would put more stress on the signification than the things, 
arguing that Categories was concerned with “the words … that signify … [beings] qua significant”. Centuries later, 
Avicenna would quote and reject Porphyry, arguing that the Categories were things that just happened (and indeed 
needed) to have fixed names (wa-ʿalayhā taqaʿu –l-alfāẓu –l-mufradatu -ʿtiqādan mawḍūʿan musallaman). The 
consensus among modern commentators is with Avicenna, that Aristotle was discussing things: “Aristotle relies 
greatly on linguistic facts and tests, but his aim is to discover truths about non-linguistic things” (J. L. Ackrill). 
Aristotle and Ackrill, Categories, 71; Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), "al-Maqūlāt," 6-7; Black, "Aristotle's 'Peri hermeneias'," 
59; Sabra, "Avicenna," 762; Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators  200 - 600 AD: a Sourcebook  
Vol  3: Logic and Metaphysics   (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 61f, 69.  
706 Black, "Aristotle's 'Peri hermeneias'," 59; al-Fārābī, Šarḥ al-ʿIbārah, 25; Zimmermann, Commentary and Short 
Treatise, 13. 
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erased, or (and indeed subsequently) expressions matter as inevitable yet substantively 
unimportant substitutes for concepts and things. 
By pairing expressions with intelligibles (maʿqūlāt) and not with ideas (maʿānī), al-Fārābī 
makes it clear that he is not working with the theory of meaning that dominated the Arabic 
Language Tradition.707 But al-Fārābī did use the term maʿnā to talk about language. He wrote 
that Aristotle’s discussion at the end of the first chapter of On Interpretation is a statement that 
expressions and intelligibles resemble each other with regard to truth and falsity.708 
Combinations (i.e. predications) of expressions can be true or false, and commensurately 
combinations of intelligibles can be true or false. A single expression or a single intelligible, 
however, cannot be true or false. “Man” or “whiteness” on its own cannot be true or false, 
“except that every single expression indicates the idea that it was intended to explicate”.709 The 
idea that is indicated by an expression can then either be an imaginary conception in the soul 
( ayāl fī-n-nafs), or an intellectible in the mind (maʿqūl) that itself relies on something in 
external physical reality (tastanidu ilā maw ūdin min  āri ). If we were to say “goat-stag”, then 
our speech would “indicate an idea conceived in our heart, of an animal half of which is the body 
of a goat and half of which is the body of a stag”. This idea could then not be true or false.710 
                                                 
707 The “linguistic Hellenism” that Zimmermann identified as an aspect of al-Fārābī’s thought is relevant here: “[al-
Fārābī’s] show of deference to Greek grammar makes sense only as a gesture designed to hurt the pride of Muslim 
Arab scholarship”. Cf. note 693. ———, Commentary and Short Treatise, cxxxiv, cxxxvii. 
708 This is an accurate paraphrase. Aristotle, "On Interpretation," 16a.9; al-Fārābī, Šarḥ al-ʿIbārah, 26; Zimmermann, 
Commentary and Short Treatise, 14. It should be noted here that Zimmermann corrects Kutsch and Marrow’s 
ordering of the folios. Ibid., cxliii-cxliv, 12 (note 1). 
709 illā anna kulla wāḥidin min || –l-alfāẓi –l-mufradati dāllun ʿalā –l-maʿnā –llaḏī quṣida –l-ibānatu ʿanhu bihī. al-
Fārābī, Šarḥ al-ʿIbārah, 27, 28; Zimmermann, Commentary and Short Treatise, 14-15. The notation || represents the 
point where the folios are incorrectly ordered in Kutsch and Marrow. 
710 fa-inna qawlanā ʿan āyyilu qad yadillu ʿalā maʿnan mutaṣawwarin fī-ḍ-ḍamīri wa-huwa ḥayawānun naṣfuhū 
badnu ayyilin wa-naṣfuhū badnu ʿan . al-Fārābī, Šarḥ al-ʿIbārah, 28; Zimmermann, Commentary and Short 
Treatise, 15. The imaginary “goat-stag” appeared in Aristotle’s On Interpretation. Aristotle, "On Interpretation," 
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 I would like to read al-Fārābī’s switch between intelligible and idea in this passage as 
follows. Ideas are linguistic; they are that to which the expressions refer, and they cannot be 
conceived of apart from the expressions. Intelligibles, on the other hand, are a subdivision of 
ideas and they are concepts in the mind that can exist devoid of linguistic expression.711 Scholars 
in the Arabic Language Tradition such as Ragib dealt only in ideas because they assumed no 
potential for a sphere of conception or understanding that was unconnected to language. A 
scholar in the Classical Language Tradition such as al-Fārābī wanted both to distinguish himself 
from the Arabic Language Tradition, and to focus on a logical mentality wholly separated from, 
and indeed superior to, language. He associated intelligibles with logic and ideas with language, 
associations that would also be reflected in the work of Ragib’s contemporary Miskawayh.712 Al-
Fārābī was committed to the paradigmatic attitude of the Classical Language Tradition: we do 
not need linguistic expression in order to think, just to express our thoughts.713 A century later, 
                                                                                                                                                             
16a.15f. See also note 425. 
711 Elsewhere, al-Fārābī uses three terms: alfāẓ (expressions), maʿānī (ideas linked to expressions), and maʿānī 
maʿqūlah (ideas not linked to expressions). Abū Naṣr Muḥammad al-Fārābī, al-Alfāẓ al-Mustʿamalah fī-l-Manṭiq, 
ed. Muhsin Mahdi (Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq, 1968; repr., Alexandria: 2002). 100.  
712 In a review of Aristotle’s Organon, Miskawayh wrote that: “syllogisms are composed of expressions and ideas” 
(al-qiyāsu fa-iḏā huwa murakkabun min alfāẓin wa-maʿānin), and that while a minimum of two expressions are 
required for a premise, “the smallest number of syllogistic ideas that are required is two intelligibles [in one 
premise] and two intelligibles [in the other]” (My emphasis) (wa-aqallu –l-maʿānī –l-qiyāsīyati mā kāna min 
maʿqūlayni maʿqūlayn). Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Miskawayh, Kitāb as-Saʿādah li-Ibn Miskawayh fī Falsafat al-
A lāq, ed. ʿAlī a -Ṭūbǧī as-Suyū ī (Cairo: al-Madrasah aḍ-Ḍāʿīyah al-Ilāhīyah, 1917). 66. On this work of 
Miskawayh’s see: Dimitri Gutas, "Paul the Persian on the classification of the parts of Aristotle's philosophy: a 
milestone between Alexandria and Bagdad," Der Islam 60(1983): 231, 234. 
713 Al-Fārābī makes this argument in al-Alfāẓ al-Mustʿamalah fī-l-Manṭiq (The Expressions Used in Logic) and in 
doing so quotes Aristotle’s statement in On Interpretation that apodeictic proof comes from “internal speech” rather 
than “external speech” (an-nuṭq aḏ-ḏā il (Badawī has al-bāṭin) as opposed to an-nuṭq al- āri ). Aristotle, Organon 
Aristotelis, 340; ———, "Posterior Analytics," in Loeb Classical Library: Aristotle II (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1960; reprint, 1997), 76b.25; al-Fārābī, al-Alfāẓ, 102. 
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Avicenna agreed: “speaking about the expressions that correspond to their ideas is equivalent to 
speaking about the ideas, although the use of expressions is more practical”.714 
For al-Fārābī, “goat-stag” is both an expression and an idea, but not an intelligible. It is not 
founded on any external physical reality, but instead represents a person’s internal subjective 
imagination. As such, it has little value in logic. Intelligibles, on the other hand, can be 
predicated with other intelligibles to form the premises of a syllogism or other logical 
construction. For scholars in the Arabic Language Tradition like Ragib, in the absence of a need 
to construct statements in correct logical form there is no such firm distinction between 
predicable objective ideas and imaginary subjective ideas. Ideas are just ideas, and expressions 
refer to them. Ideas in the Arabic Language Tradition are also not understood as subjective. For 
ideas to work in poetry, for example, they must be accessible to all language users and therefore 
part of an objective reality, albeit neither external nor physical. The “goat-stag” in poetics is 
therefore an objective entity in the mind, just like “the hand of the northwind”. 
That the attitude to homonymy constitutes a major difference between the Arabic and the 
Classical Language Traditions is clear. For scholars like Ragib it is a hermeneutical and poetic 
opportunity while for Aristotle and his followers in the logical tradition it is a difficulty to 
overcome before logic can start to work. However, the Classical Language Tradition is broader 
than just philhellenic scholars working on the Organon. It included scholars working in theology, 
and scholars whose cited lists of authorities did not include Aristotle. One such scholar, the 
Muʿtazilī al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, thought that homonymy was a problem, and a threat. 
                                                 
714 fa-inna -l-kalāma ʿalā –l-alfāẓi –l-muṭābaqati li-maʿānīhā ka-l-kalāmi ʿalā maʿānīhā illā anna waḍʿa –l-alfāẓi 
aḥsanu ʿamalan. For Avicenna, the subject matter of logic is single ideas (maʿnā wāḥid mufrad) and combined ideas 
(maʿānin muʾallafah), and only the latter can create decisive logical assent to a proposition (taṣdīq) while the former 
creates only the initial conception of an idea (taṣawwur). Expressions are not necessary for logic qua logic, but they 
are necessary for its communication. Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), "al-Madḫal," 21, 22 (lines 13f), 23 (lines 3-4); Black, 
"Aristotle's 'Peri hermeneias'," 54-55; Sabra, "Avicenna," 752.  
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ʿAbd al- abbār was a contemporary of Ragib’s, a representative of the Muʿtazilī school of 
theology with which we have seen Ragib engage so closely,715 and he shared Ragib’s acceptance 
of the potential language had for ambiguity. Thereafter, however, the two scholar’s attitudes, 
approaches, and models diverged completely. Ragib exemplified the Arabic Language Tradition 
while ʿAbd al- abbār shared the Classical Language Tradition’s prejudice against language as a 
means of conveying the truth. And while for those working on the Organon that truth could be 
derived from the predicated logical statements of humanity, for ʿAbd al- abbār the truth in play 
was the divine monotheistic justice of God. We have moved from a difference in philosophy of 
language between logicians on the one hand and litt rateurs, theologians and grammarians on the 
other, to differences in philosophy of language between theologians themselves. 
ʿAbd al- abbār’s theory of meaning was one in which intent was everything.716 Language 
was therefore understood when the context in which it was uttered was known and analysed.717 
He used a concept that originated in legal theory, and maybe even in logic, to describe the 
                                                 
715 Margaretha Heemskerk, "ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamaḏānī," in Encyclopaedia of Islam  THREE, ed. 
Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill Online: Brill, 2009); Wilferd Madelung, 
"ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New York: Iranicaonline Website, 
1982); Peters, God's created speech; Reynolds, "Rise and Fall." 
716 Intent was a reflection of human will (irādah), a central concept in ʿAbd al- abbār’s theology. It is the will (not 
the ability, qudrah) that specifies whether an expression (lafẓ) is a predicate ( abar) or imperative (amr). Without 
intent (qaṣd) language has no meaning. With intent, we can make “Zayd” mean any number of Zayds we want. al-
Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, al-Muġnī, 6.2:8-12, 17-19. My thanks to Philip Pilkington for this reference. Cf. Larkin, The 
Theology of Meaning, 32-38; Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 116f, 134-135. 
717 “Context” (ḥāl al-mutakallim) was one of two things required for speech to have meaning. The other was 
muwāḍaʿah, the lexicon in communicative human usage. al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, al-Muġnī, 16:347. Muwāḍaʿah 
was translated by Sch ck as Festset ung (“fixing”), by Vasalou as “convention”, and described by Peters as “man 
comes to a convention and in this way makes a language”. Larkin, The Theology of Meaning, 37-38; Peters, God's 
created speech, 387; Sch ck, Koranexegese, 382; Sophia Vasalou, ""Their Intention Was Shown By Their Bodily 
Movements": The Basran Muʿtazilies on the Institution of Language " Journal of the History of Philosophy 47, no. 2 
(2009): 212.  
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additional evidence (qarīnah) that had to be brought to bear on each speech act.718 The door 
would seem to be open for a consideration of linguistic ambiguity, but in fact ʿAbd al- abbār 
slammed it shut with an explicit commitment to resist and refute polysemy. The concept of 
enantiosemy (aḍdāḍ) that we have seen so lovingly enumerated in the Arabic Language 
Tradition, was for ʿAbd al- abbār an epistemological threat to hermeneutics, and consequently a 
threat to religion. Polysemy leads us to “lose faith in the true meanings of words”.719 
My reading of ʿAbd al- abbār’s position is that it was in all likelihood influenced by the 
discipline of logic, and the study of the Organon, that was so well-developed by his time. He 
described the possibility that a word could mean two things at once as anathema to reason, and 
                                                 
718 The idea that the status of some linguistic acts was ambiguous until a piece of supplementary evidence (qarīnah) 
had been provided, often from context, was developed in legal theory. Wael B. Hallaq, "Notes on the Term qarīna in 
Islamic Legal Discourse," Journal of the American Oriental Society 108, no. 3 (1988); Schwarb, "Capturing the 
Meanings," 130 (note 82). Sch ck draws a persuasive conceptual parallel between qarīnah and the term sūr in the 
logical tradition. Sch ck, Koranexegese, 383. The Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ for example, use sūr to describe the extra things 
that people need to say in order to ensure that their speech is accurately understood. Speech without such a 
quantifier is indeterminate (muhmal). Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, Rasāʾil  Beirut, 1:416. Their analysis in turn can be traced by 
to al-Fārābī’s use of the term sūr, which Zimmermann then connects to what may have been early Syriac logic 
influencing Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. Zimmermann, "Some Observations," 517, 529-531.  
719 ʿAbd al- abbār wrote that ideas (maʿānī) need to be establishable by human reason, whether that reason is 
intuitive/necessary (iḍtirār) or learnt/acquired (iktisāb). Then: 
it is not possible for us to believe that the rationale (ʿillah) that we cite as productive of a judgement is 
accompanied by another different idea that produces a different judgement, and that with that idea is a third 
idea, and so on for infinity or until the [erroneous] idea is found to be present. This also applies to the 
discussion of enantiosemy, that which is both praiseworthy and blameworthy at the same time, and those 
ideas that connect to contrary ideas. Such discourses [about language] invalidate the proofs, and should such 
doubt be accepted with regard to proofs then it would be even more acceptable with regard to matters of 
religion. Such discourses also lead us to lose faith in the true meanings of words, and to make claims about 
words without any indicators. Such practices lead to mutual ignorance about both words and ideas, and 
anything with that result must be condemned as corrupt. 
(ya ibu allā nuʾmina anna maʿa –l-ʿillati –llatī naddaʿī annahā mū ibatun li-l-ḥukmi maʿnā siwāhā huwa –l-
mū ibu li-l-ḥukmi dūnahā wa-maʿa ḏālika –l-maʿnā maʿnā  āli an ḥattā lā nantahī ilā ḥaddin illā wa-
yumkiny ḏālika fīhi wa-ka-ḏālika –l-qawlu fī taḍāddi –l-ḍiddayni wa-mā yastaḥiqqu bihī –ḏ-ḏammu wa-l-
madḥu wa-mā yataʿallaqu min –l-maʿānī bi-ġayrihī wa-fī ḏālika ibṭalu uṣūli –l-adillati wa-matā  ā at hāḏihī 
–š-šubhatu fīhā fa-fī –l-ʿibādāti a wa u wa-hāḏihī yuʾaddī ilā allā na iqu bi-ḥaqāʾiqi –l-asmāʾi wa-an 
yuddʿā fīhā mā lā dalīla ʿalayhi wa-fī ḏālika irtikābu –t-ta āhuli fī-l-asmāʾi wa-l-maʿānī  amīʿan wa-mā 
addʿā ilā ḏālika wu iba –l-ḥukmu bi-fasādihī). 
 al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, al-Muġnī, 7:14. Peters does not focus on this passage in his summary of this chapter. 
Peters, God's created speech, 308f. 
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destructive of our ability to draw conclusions from evidence. This position is analogous to 
Aristotle’s desire to address polysemy at the start of On Interpretation in order to prevent it from 
undermining his teaching on logic, and to expose sophistical manipulations of polysemy in 
Sophistical Refutations. ʿAbd al- abbār agreed: homonymy was intended to cause deception.720 
A word therefore cannot be, or mean, two things at once. This is the ontological and 
epistemological assumption behind ʿAbd al- abbār’s argument that language (al-kalām) is only 
physical sound.721 Language cannot be, as it was for Ragib, both the expressions and the ideas 
behind them. ʿAbd al- abbār believed that the ideas (maʿānī) in people’s minds were only 
subjective, and that there was no connection between them and expressions that could be 
analysed.722 Larkin persuasively attributes his motivation for this separation of expressions and 
ideas to his theological commitments, which include a refusal to contemplate the prospect of 
                                                 
720 ʿAbd al- abbār wrote that “the purpose of speech is to communicate and remove polysemy” (anna mawḍūʿa –l-
kalāmi huwa –l-ifādau wa-i ālatu –š-širkah). Furthermore “people use homonymous expressions in order to 
deceive” (wa-innamā waḍaʿū –l-lafẓa –l-muštaraka li-īhāmin). al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, al-Muġnī, 16:351-352; 
Sch ck, Koranexegese, 382f. Compare this to Aristotle’s analysis of the six sophistical fallacies that are rooted in 
language: homonymy, ambiguity, synthesis, diaeresis, pronunciation, grammatical form. Aristotle, "On Sophistical 
Refutations," in Loeb Classical Library: Aristotle III (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955; reprint, 2000), 
165b.23f. 
721 Larkin, The Theology of Meaning, 29-31, 68; Peters, God's created speech, 308-312; al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, al-
Muġnī, 7:14f. 
722 ʿAbd al- abbār’s hypothetical interlocutor in this passage challenges him: “I know for sure that there is an idea 
in my heart that corresponds to these letters” (innī aʿlamu bi-ḍtirārin fī qalbī maʿnan yuṭābiqu hāḏihī –l-ḥurūf). 
ʿAbd al- abbār responds that his interlocutor does not know this, but only wishes it. Rather, this hidden speech 
(kalām  afī) is unknowable. “This hidden speech may then be mixed up with thought made up of the letters of [real] 
speech as a result of the soul’s conversations [with itself]” (wa-rubbamā yaltabisu ʿalayhi –l-fikru fī ḥurūfi –l-kalāmi 
bi-ḥadī i –n-nafs). ʿAbd al- abbār is, on the one hand, clearly struggling to disentangle himself from linguistic 
metaphors, but more importantly he is also clearly trying to establish that the ideas in people’s minds, which they 
think are connected to their expressions, are not actually connected to the expressions. Rather than the ideas 
(maʿānī) being objective and shared, as they are for Ragib, the ideas in people’s minds are for ʿAbd al- abbār 
wholly subjective. ———, al-Muġnī, 7:15-16. It must however be remembered that ʿAbd al- abbār did not deny 
any connection between expressions and ideas, he just denied that “language” was composed of both. Elsewhere, he 
wrote that meaningful speech, including of course the Quran, was made up of expressions used to refer to ideas 
(alfāẓ wuḍiʿat li-maʿānī). Speech was meaningful when it indicated an idea, and indication (dalālah) occurred in 
three ways: by the expression, by a qarīnah (see note 718), or by reason (ʿaql). ibid., 16:349; Sch ck, Koranexegese, 
382-383. 
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God having ideas that might co-exist with him or need to be known by humans.723 I would like to 
suggest an additional dimension for ʿAbd al- abbār’s rejection of the notion that language could 
be both ideas and expressions: he tended to assume that a single word or thing could only mean 
one thing. In the case of language (al-kalām), that thing could only be the physical expressions of 
words by humans. Language could never have both a physical level and a mental level. It could 
never be both divine and profane. Ragib, of course, had expressed impatience with this refusal to 
contemplate polysemy.724  
Larkin, Vishanoff, and I do all agree, however, on the importance of theological conviction 
in shaping ʿAbd al- abbār’s positions.725 He is at all times committed to separating God from 
humanity, and in the face of the Quranic revelation and the obsession with language that 
characterised the intellectual culture in which he lived, this led him to downplay and de-stress 
language in a way that is very reminiscent of the attitude of those working in the Organon 
tradition. Just as Avicenna was prepared to examine linguistic concerns only because they were 
an unavoidable necessity for the communication of ideas that the mind composed and 
connected,726 so ʿAbd al- abbār wrote that the Quran was in effect an irrelevant linguistic 
byproduct of a divine message.727 God’s justice and unity made sense on their own in human 
                                                 
723 Larkin, The Theology of Meaning, 38. In the preceding pages, Larkin explains how it is intent behind speech 
(qaṣd) that is knowable, rather than the ideas behind it (maʿānī). The theological implication is clear: it is 
permissable for us to know what God intended, but not what he was actually thinking.  
724 Ragib implied in his discussion of the word “Quran” that the Muʿtazilah were na ve and essentialist in their 
refusal to conceive of the Quran as being in multiple places at once, both divine and human. See note 429. 
725 Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 133. 
726 See note 714. 
727 He wrote that while humans can compel their audience to understand their intent through either speech or 
physical gesture, God’s speech is different. Human speech (al- iṭāb) is knowable (mudrak) whereas divine speech is 
unknowable (lā yudrak) because God is unknowable. For example (the example is mine), while one can know Zayd 
(ʿalimtu Zaydan) one cannot know God (ʿalimtu –llāha), a point with which Ragib agreed. Furthermore, ʿAbd al-
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reasoning, and language, with its reliance on knowledge of context, could support that message 
but also corrupt it. Reason was paramount for both the philhellenic philosophers and Muʿtazilī 
theologians like ʿAbd al- abbār. 
ʿAbd al- abbār’s theological argumentation was also, of course, directed at the Ašāʿirah. It 
was their doctrine of speech on the lips versus speech in the soul (kalām lafẓī / nafsī) to which he 
was responding. That doctrine, which posited a nafsī Quran with God and a lafẓī Quran among 
humans, was designed with the same primary motivation as ʿAbd al- abbār’s theology: to 
maintain the distance between the divine and humanity.728 The Ašāʿirah set up two separate 
ontological categories of Quran (and by extension of “language”), but they often shared the 
Muʿtazilī prejudice in favour of words meaning just one thing that could then be argued about.729 
It was only scholars like Ragib, obsessed with language and more often than not directly engaged 
with literature as authors or critics, who went in a different direction. For while Ragib struggled 
throughout his theological writings to maintain and explain a complete separation between God 
and humanity, often doing so through the creative use of polysemic hermeneutics, he was 
completely comfortable with the equation of God’s language with that of poets. In Ragib’s 
intellectual worldview the divine and the human shared the same language with all its potential 
for ambiguity and eloquence. This is in direct contrast to the logicians of the Organon tradition, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 abbār wrote that with regard to the core theological priciples of God’s unity and justice: “it is the reason that 
indicates this matter, and we know that God sent down that speech (i.e. the Quran) because it was in some way 
beneficial” (inna –l-ʿaqla huwa –llaḏī yadillu ʿalā ḏālika –l-amri wa-naʿlamu annahū taʿālā an ala ḏālika –l-
kalāma li-ḍarbin min –l-maṣlaḥah). al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al- abbār, al-Muġnī, 16:354, 17:12; Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 
560; Sch ck, Koranexegese, 383-387. 
728 Al-Bāqillānī wrote that humans cannot say they “speak God’s language” (lā ya ū u an yaqūla aḥadun innī 
atakallamu bi-kalāmi –llāh) when, for example, they recite the Quran. This was because God’s speech needed to be 
entirely separate from that of humans, a point also made by Vasalou. Al-Bāqillānī also wrote that “the real language 
is the idea that exists in the soul” (al-kalāmu –l-ḥaqīqīyu huwa –l-maʿnā –l-maw ūdu fī-n-nafs). See also note 431. 
al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, 101; Vasalou, "Institution of Language," 221. 
729 See, for example, the Ašʿarī analysis of the divine attributes, which is addressed above in chapter four (page 
159f). 
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for whom language was an inconvenient obstacle, and to the Muʿtazilī theology of ʿAbd al-
 abbār, for whom language was mired in the human because it could not be two things at once. 
For the Classical Language Tradition therefore, human reason was the source of the human 
connection to the divine and the truth, whereas for the Arabic Language Tradition that 
connection lay in language itself. 
Epilogue 
The story about language told in this dissertation has ended in the eleventh century. Ragib 
dies around the year 1020, ʿAbd al- abbār in 1024, Avicenna in 1037, and al- urǧānī in 1078. 
The madrasa in its classical institutional form was born in 1067. It is tempting to make that latter 
date into a defining turning point for Islamicate intellectual culture, and while the reality is 
hardly likely to be as simple or convenient, it is true that the nature of the scholarship that was 
produced in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries was very different from what had gone 
before. In the works of Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī and al-Ġazālī in particular, the relationship between 
language, mind, and reality is sliced up in a very different way to that found in Ragib or his 
predecessors in the Arabic Language Tradition.  
The new consensus that would come to dominate madrasa scholarship in the subsequent 
centuries can perhaps best be described as a synthesis of the Arabic and Classical Language 
Traditions. This synthesis relied on the achievement of Avicenna, whose thoroughgoing analysis 
of the Organon tradition was written in an Arabic that was accessible, and that minimalized the 
self-conscious neologisms that had characterised al-Fārābī’s previous bold attempt at synthesis. 
The new synthesis also relied on the achievement of al- urǧānī, whose analysis of exegetical 
and profane poetics built on a tradition of Arabic literary criticism that was approximately half a 
millenium old by the eleventh century. 
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Was Ragib as significant for the centuries to come as these great names? It seems unlikely. 
His role in this dissertation has been as a perfect example of a tradition that would never be the 
same again after the eleventh century. In Ragib’s works we can see an eclecticism and pluralism 
that allowed him to maintain Ibn Ḥanbal as an influence and authority while writing ethical 
guidance for the Muslim community that was based on the Neoplatonic ethics attributed to 
Aristotle and Plato. This synthesis would be the same as that attempted by al-Ġazālī, whom we 
of course know was an avid consumer of Ragib’s ethical works. Ragib’s poetics also made some 
strides in the typology and analysis of complex metaphor that may have contributed to al-
 urǧānī’s theory. However, it is just as likely that al- ūrǧanī was building on the work of other 
literary scholars, or indeed on ideas contained in the logical works of Avicenna. 
The Arabic Language Tradition as understood in this dissertation therefore died in the 
eleventh century, to be replaced by a new synthesis with the Classical Language Tradition that 
had been its rival. However, the obsessions with language that it embodied would continue to 
play a substantial role in defining the intellectual culture of the subsequent centuries, in which 
the consumption and creation of literature in the forms of both poetry and adab would become 
no less important. The obsession with language would also find a home in the taxonomies of 
coinage developed in the discipline of ʿilm al-waḍʿ studied by Bernard Weiss.  
The Arabic Language Tradition, with its focus on linguistic ambiguity and its obsessive 
engagement with the pairings of expressions and ideas, has not been fully appreciated in 
scholarship before this dissertation. More work remains to be done on its central early figures, 
although the success of that work may depend on the potential for further manuscript discoveries 
from those first centuries of intellectual endeavour. More work also remains to be done outside 
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the discipline of legal theory, a sub-field in which Vishanoff has recently made persuasive 
arguments about rival approaches to language and the law. 
Perhaps the most important lacuna is the need to address the great figures of the eleventh 
century in terms of their attitudes to language, with sensitivity to the linguistically obsessed 
culture in which even philhellenic philosophers like Avicenna were working. Frank Griffel’s 
recent work on al-Ġazālī has taken steps in this direction,730 but all too often scholars like 
Avicenna and even al-Fārābī are considered solely in the context of their dominant influence (the 
Organon tradition) and without sufficient reference to the rigorous and complex attitudes to 
language that can be found in Arabic, and that are unconnnected to the Organon. Those rigorous 
and complex attitudes have been the subject of this dissertation.  
 
  
                                                 
730 Frank Griffel, Al-Gha ālī's Philosophical Theology  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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APPENDIX ONE: MANUSCRIPTS 
Description of the London Quranic Glossary 
Library of Muhammad Lu fī al- a īb, Private Collection, London. Title piece on f.1a in 
Abbasid Bookhand script:
731
 Mufradāt Ġarīb al-Qurʿān al-Karīm | li-Abī -l-Qāsim al- usayn b  
Muḥammad b  | al-Mufaḍḍal al-maʿrūf bi-r-Rāġib al-Iṣfānī [sic ] | adāma -llāh ʿulāhu wa-aṭāla 
-llāh fī-l-ʿi   wa-n-niʿam baqāhu [sic.]. Author’s name in incipit: fa-yaqūl al-faqīr  usayn b  
Muḥammad b  al-Mufaḍḍal al-Maʿrūf bi-r-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī ballaġahū allāh al-amānī. Thick 
white Arabic paper, low pulp quality with high interference and visible fibres, little to no 
burnishing, faint and irregular chain lines approx. 50mm apart, thick laid lines with irregularities 
between 27 and 34mm apart (vertical to spine in f.1 and f.2, horizontal to spine in remainder of 
text block),  reed or grass laid mould. Page 200x170mm, written area 160x110mm, 21 lines per 
page, no rulings. No foliation. 40 II/III (222). The quire at ff.192-195 is upside down. Textblock 
in angular scholar’s nas  bookhand fully pointed and unvocalised. No catchwords. Chapter 
headings (the letters of the alphabet) shaded in red, rubricated entry titles. Type III pasteboard 
binding, leather covering, central lozenge almond shape floral stamp (mandorla) cf. D roche 
Type Osh8
732
 on upper and lower covers together with embossed chain frame. Chevron endbands 
in blue and yellow appear relatively new, textblock is bound too tightly resulting in loss of some 
marginalia close to spine. Frequent marginal commentary in several hands in some cases marked 
with rubricated “ḥāšiyah”, frequent collation marks (usually minor textual variations or scribal 
                                                 
731 See Gacek, Vademecum, 1-2. 
732 François D roche, Annie Berthier, M I Waley, and Al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation, Islamic Codicology: 
an introduction to the study of manuscripts in Arabic script  (London: Al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation, 
2006). 303. 
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omissions, errors, and illegibilities) with   [nus ah u rā] and ṣḥ [ṣaḥḥa]. Anonymous marginal 
note with bibliographical assertions on f.51a in recent hand.
733
 Purchase and reading notes on 
f.1a as discussed in chapter two above. Colophon dated Muḥarram 409 / May-June 1018. 
Multiple impressions of seal dated 976/1568 with which Esmehan Sultan, daughter of the 
Ottoman Sultan Selim II (reg. 974/1566-982/1574), endows the manuscript to her madrasa in the 
Eyüp quarter of Istanbul (waqf ismīhān sulṭān bint salīm  ān madrasatahā fī abī ayūb al-anṣārī 
976).
734
 After the colophon (ff.206b-218a) Ragib’s methodological introduction to the Exegesis 
has been copied out in full in a different hand (rounded scholar’s nas  bookhand), starting just 
after the introduction with: bi-ḥaqqin ṣāra –l-kalāmu  alā ata aqsām…735 Three folios of this 
text have become detached from the codex at f.207a. The detached folios start with: wa-ḏālika 
bi-ḥasabi -ʿtibāri –l-mu āṭib…736 and end with: …fa-qṭaʿ lubānata man taʿarraḍa waṣluhū.737 
This witness to the methodological introduction is undated, and has an anonymous quotation 
after it on f.218a. The last two folios of the detached section also contain undated Hadith 
(scholar’s taʿlīq bookhand) and invocations.  
The change in orientation of the laid lines in the first two folios as opposed to the rest of the 
text block and an apparent slight change in hand between f.2b and f.3a (from more rounded to 
more angular hand, and from thicker to thinner calamus) both point to the replacement of the 
                                                 
733 al- awharǧī, "Ra’y fī Taḥdīd," 199-200. 
734 I am grateful to Betsy Omidvaran for her help with this seal. 
735 Ragib, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 28. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. 
Nāhī," 80. 
736 ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 38. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. 
Nāhī," 86. 
737 ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 46. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. 
Nāhī," 91. 
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first two folios at an early stage, certainly before 420/1029 when the first note on f.1a was 
written. The overtight binding and apparently recent chevron endbands point to later repairs, 
which may have taken place in the Al-Assad National Library in Damascus. The manuscript’s 
owner, Muḥammad Lu fī al- a īb, tells of taking it to this library for scanning and then 
removing it when the library staff began to cut the binding to facilitate the scanning and he 
suspected theft. The resulting confusion may have been what led al- āwharǧī, who saw the 
manuscript when it was in the National Library, to confuse the plates in his article. He provides 
accurate images of f.51a and f.206a (the colophon) but inaccurate images of the title page and a 
folio with Hadith notes.
738
 The anonymous note on f.51a discussed by al- awharǧī may also date 
from this period of confusion, and could have been written by a Damascus library staff member 
attempting to remove and substitute the title page. 
 
Description of Ragib on Innovative Figures of Speech (Kitāb min Kalām ar-
Rāġib fī-l-Badīʿ / Afānīn al-Balāġah) 
Title on f.1a in textblock hand: Kitāb min Kalām ar-Rāġib fī-l-Badīʿ. Title on upper 
doublure with question mark: Afānīn al-Balāġah (The Diversity of Eloquence). Title in 
catalogue: [Afānīn al-Balāġah], “title supplied by Dr. Landberg”.739 Incipit f.1b: al-ḥamdu li-
llāhi muʿṭī –l-insāna faḍīlata –l-lisāni taqwiyatan li-iʿ ā i –l-qurʾāni ¶ | wa-ṣallā –llāhu ʿalā 
nabīyihī –l-mu tāri muḥammadin wa-ālihī –l-a yāri ¶ | saʾaltum adāma –llāhu –l-imtāʿa bi-kum 
                                                 
738 al- awharǧī, "Ra’y fī Taḥdīd," 197-200. Al- awharǧī’s article is reproduced with the incorrect plates in as-
Sārīsī, Fī-d-Difāʾ, 49-56.  
739 Leon Nemoy, Arabic Manuscripts in the Yale University Library, Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of 
Arts and Sciences (New Haven: Yale University Library, 1956). 41. 
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an umliya mā yu ʿalu amāratan fī naqdi | -l-ašʿāri… Explicit f.39b: wa-n-naqli | wa-l-qalbi wa-
t-tabdīli wa-huwa a ḏu -ṭ-ṭarīqati wa-tanāwulu –l-lafẓi. The text breaks off in the chapter on 
types of literary plagarism (Fī Anwāʿ as-Sariqāt), which is the last chapter according to the table 
of contents on f.3a-b. Good quality thick Arabic paper, brown biscuit colour, slight burnishing, 
clumping in pulp, fine fleck intrusions, opaque. Hard to discern laid lines vertical to spine with 
occasional irregularities (slants eg. f.17a) at approx. 7 per 10mm. Thick (1.5mm) and vague 
chain lines 26-30mm apart very rarely discernable (eg. f.16a) with horizontal slant from left to 
right. Grass (?) laid mould. Page 165x130mm, written area 135x95mm, 13-15 lines per page, no 
rulings, English foliation every five folios at top left in pencil. V-½(39), 3V(30). Quire 
signatures at f.10a, f.20a, f.30a. No catchwords. Clear bold scholar’s nas  bookhand fully 
pointed and partially vocalised in places. Chapter titles in larger (double/triple size) nas  with 
consistent head serifs to right on alif. Type III thin pasteboard binding covered in patterned red 
and green leaf design. Closed volume 10mm thick with dark red paper spine. Good preservation 
with occasional worm holes. Repaired and trimmed probably at time of binding with loss of 
some marginalia. Some smudges and repairs cover text. Collation marks throughought, both ṣḥ 
[ṣaḥḥa] (eg. f.17b) and ṭ [ma ṭūṭah u rā]. Some marginalia marked as “ḥāšiyah” eg. f.2a, f.8b. 
Title page has calculations and prices for foodstuffs. Lower cover doublure has unvowelled note 
in different hand partially obscured by doublure hinges: [---] ḥay u qāla –l-muṣannifu raḥimahū 
–llāhu maʿa[---] | [---] an-nufūsu –n-nāṭiqatu iḏā ẓahara la-hā min ṣānih[---] | [---] –l-ḥaqāʿiqu 
taksibu –l-ma hūla min –l-muṭṭah[---] |.  
 
Description of Chester Beatty AR 5277 (On Creeds)  
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Title on f.1a (scholars nas  bookhand ≠ textblock): Kitāb aš-Šay  Abū al-Qāsim al- usayn 
b  Muḥammad b  al-Mufaḍḍal ar-Rāġib fī-l-ʿAqāyid [sic]. Author’s name in incipit: aš-Šay  Abū 
al-Qāsim al- usayn b  Muḥammad b  al-Mufaḍḍal ar-Rāġib. Medium-good quality Arabic 
paper, light brown, light burnishing, rare and slight interference, regular (?) but hard to discern 
straight chain lines horizontal to spine 20-30mm apart, regular and distinct laid lines with some 
variations vertical to spine at 7 per 10mm and 0.5mm (?) wide, reed or grass laid mould. Page 
165x125mm, written area 130x90mm (+/-0.5mm), 18 (occ. 17) lines per page, no visible rulings. 
Irregular Latin foliation in pencil top left, Arabic pagination up to f.57. 12 IV (96), V-2 (104). 
Textblock in rounded scholar’s nas  bookhand fully pointed and unvocalised, catchwords ≠ 
textblock hand, red overlines for qāla etc, some red shading in early pages, all rubrication 
decreases towards end, black triangular shading between ṣād and lām of faṣl in chapter headings 
throughout. Type III pasteboard binding (appears to be original), leather covering, central 
lozenge almond shape floral stamp (mandorla) on upper and lower covers (Ottoman?) cf. 
D roche type OAi.740 Sparse collations marks, both ṣ [ṣaḥḥa] (eg. f17b) and ṭ [ma ṭūṭah u rā] 
(eg. f.28a), editing marks and suggestions in Western (?) hand in first 57 folios. Prayers and 
poetry on upper cover doublure and title page, one couplet on lower cover doublure, aphorisms 
(ḥikam) and poetry, prayers, Hadith on ff.103b-104a. Poem of 96 lines in nastaʿlīq hand ff.102b-
103b as noted on title page titled: Nafaḥāt Manā il as-Sāʾirīn wa-Rašaḥāt Mutaʾahhil al-ʿ rifīn. 




                                                 
740 D roche, Berthier, Waley, and Foundation, Islamic Codicology, 306. 
741 Cf. al-ʿAǧalī, who appears to take the phrase “…into the ownership of its [i.e. this note’s] scribe…” to mean 
“…into the ownership of its [i.e. this work’s] scribe…” (…ilā mulki kātibih…). The purchase note is in a thick 
Mamluk nas  scholar’s bookhand ≠ the textblock. Ragib, On Creeds, 11. 
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Annotated list of Ragib’s Work in Manuscript Catalogues around the 
World (a work in progress) 
Notes and Observations 
The manuscripts that I have been able to consult in Istanbul and elsewhere have their 
references in bold type. Those listings not in bold are taken from the sources referenced.
742
 I 
have also included (in italics), in those cases where I have been able to verify them, the false 
attributions and cataloguing errors that inevitably abound. 
The Quranic Glossary has the largest number of recorded copies at over eighty worldwide, 
Litt rateurs Replies comes in at around two thirds of that number, The Path to the Nobilities and 
Analysis of the Two Creations at less than half, and then the ten or so copies of the Exegesis. The 
documentation of dating is patchy, but these approximate numbers appear to be evidence that 
Ragib’s exegetical, ethical and adab works were all popular across the centuries, albeit with 
nothing approaching the popularity of the Quranic Glossary. In light of the number of false 
attributions identified in copies of the Exegesis, the caveat remains that many of the witnesses in 
the subsequent lists are probably false. For example, al-Iskāfī’s Durrat at-Taʾwīl wa Ġurrat at-
Tan īl (see above) has often been catalogued as the Exegesis.  
The oldest manuscript is the London Quranic Glossary, dated in or around Ragib’s 
lifetime. We then have The Confluence of Eloquence (Ahmed III 2390 dated 521/1127), 
                                                 
742 The long list in al-Fihris aš-Šāmil (FS) collects the references to Ragib’s tafsīr manuscripts. Royal Academy for 
Islamic Civilization Research, al-Fihris aš-Šāmil li-l-Turā  al-ʿArabī al-Islāmī al-Ma ṭūṭ: ʿulūm al-qurʾān ma ṭūṭāt 
at-tafsīr wa-ʿulūmuh, 2 vols. (Amman: Manšūrāt al-Maǧmaʿ al-Malakī li-Buḥūṯ al-Ḥaḍārah al-Islāmīyah, 1986). 
1:125-126. Karabulut’s Arabic-language union catalogue (K) collates the catalogues and handlists of the Turkish 
collections themselves, although he is forced to admit, for example: …“and there are many copies in Istanbul 
libraries..” even after his long list of Quranic Glossary witnesses. Karabulut, Muʿ am al-Ma ṭūṭāt, 1:470-472. 
Brockelmann’s references (GAL, GALS) are understandably incomplete. Brockelmann, GAL, 1:289. ———, GALS, 
1:505. 
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Litt rateurs’ Ripostes (British Museum ADD 18529 dated 523/1129), The Path to the Nobilities 
(Laleli 1744 dated 545/1150), Abridgement of ‘The Reform of Speech’ (at-Taymūrīyah 137 
Luġah reported as dated 552/1157), and Analysis of the Two Creations (Yahuda 3555 dated 
584/1188) all from around a century or more after his death. The oldest manuscript of On Creeds 
comes a good century later (Āstān-e Quds-e Ra āvī 56 dated 679/1280), and everything else is 
even later still, or undated. This reaffirms the importance of the London Quranic Glossary, and 
throws into sharp contrast our dependence on the indigenous manuscript tradition. 
The dominance of Istanbul, and indeed the libraries of Turkey in general, is, as noted 
above, testament to the power of the Ottoman empire and the efforts it made to collect cultural 
capital in manuscript form. The worldwide spread of the remainder of the witnesses is testament 
to the difficulties faced by both their cataloguers and those who want to read them. It is also a 
reaffirmation of the fact that a bad printed edition is better for scholarship than no edition at all. 
Exegesis of the Quran (Tafsīr)743 
Atıf  Efendi 180 ≠ Ragib  Anonymous and undated commentary on the Anwār at-Tan īl of al-
Bayḍāwī, incorrectly ascribed to Ragib on endpaper preceding textblock.  
Atıf  Efendi 362-002 (methodological introduction - Quran 2:126). Süleymaniye. Istanbul. 
Attributed to Ragib in incipit. 
Ayasofya 212 (methodological introduction - Quran 2:223). Süleymaniye. Istanbul. Attributed to 
Ragib in incipit. 
Carullah 84 (Quran 1:1-5:120). Süleymaniye. Istanbul. (Carullah is usually Walī ad-Dīn Ǧār 
Allāh in Arabic-language catalogues). Section from Quran 3:89 (f.228b) to Quran 4:63 
                                                 
743 See also the note describing a quotation from the Exegesis on f.1a of Carullah 2080. Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge 
triumphant: the concept of knowledge in medieval Islam  (Leiden: Brill, 1970). 39 note 2. 
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(f.273b) missing and replaced with whiter paper and more rounded scholar’s nas  
bookhand. Catalogued incorrectly as Tafsīr al-Iṣfahānī by Maḥmūd b. Abī al-Qāsim b. 
Aḥmad Šams ad-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī (674/1275-749/1349).744 Anonymous and undated. 
Carullah 85 ≠ Ragib (Quran 1:1-18:100)  S leymaniye  Istanbul  Attributed to “Iṣfahānī” on 
title page and undated.  
Carullah 86 ≠ Ragib (Quran 12:1-33:73)  S leymaniye  Istanbul  Attributed to Šams ad-Dīn al-
Iṣfahānī in colophon at Quran 12:111 745 and in title page note recording copying from 
autograph of Šams ad-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī’s Anwār al- aqāʾiq dated 746/1345. Cf. the Anwār 
al- aqāʾiq autograph in the S leymaniye (Laleli 138). 
Emanet Hazine 1616 (methodological introduction – Quran 2:6). Titled an-Nukat al-Qurʾānīyah. 
Topkapı Palace. Istanbul. Attributed to Ragib in incipit.746  
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 100 ≠ Ragib. Anonymous and dated 734/1334. The text on Quranic 
inimitability at the start of this manuscript is close  but not identical  to that of the ninth-
century Zaydī exegeses collected by ʿAbdallāh aš-Šarafī (d. 1652).747  
Feyzullah Efendi 2141-001 ≠ Ragib (Quran 1:1). Anonymous and dated 1091/1690. 
Fey ullah Efendi 62  63 ≠ Ragib  Millet K t phanesi 748  
                                                 
744 Although Šams ad-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī wrote his own name as reproduced here (see his autograph on Carullah 86 and 
Laleli 138), it tends to be given in the biographical tradition as Šams ad-Dīn sAbū aṯ- anāʾ Maḥmūd b. ʿAbd ar-
Raḥmān b. Aḥmad al-Iṣfahānī. Kaḥḥālah, Muʿ am al-Mu’allifīn, 3:814. 
745 Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 393. 
746 ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 22 (with plates). ———, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 
391-392 (with plates). 
747 ʿAbdallāh b. Aḥmad aš-Šarafī, al-Maṣābīḥ as-Sāṭiʿah al-Anwār: tafsīr ahl al-bayt: al-Imām al-Qāsim b  Ibrāhīm  
al-Imām Muḥammad b  al-Qāsim  al-Imām Yaḥyā b  al- usayn, ed. Muḥammad Qāsim al-Hašamī (Sa'dah: 
Maktabat at-Turāṯ al-Islamī, 1998). 87-89. 
748 Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 395. 
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Feyzullah Efendi 2141  S leymaniye  Istanbul, Turkey. Title page (f 1a) attributes Tafsīr al-
Fātiḥah to Ragib  but the text (ff 1b-16b) is not Ragib’s Exegesis  Dated 1091/1680.  
Raza Library II 47/97. Rampur, India. GALS. 
Sana’a al-Ǧāmiʿ al-Kabīr ≠ Ragib? (Mu taṣār at-Tafsīr)  Sana’a, Yemen. The text provided by 
the cataloguer does not tally with any of Ragib’s works and Dāwūdī was unsure of the 
attribution on consultation of the manuscript.
750
  
03 Gedik 17308/1 ≠ Exegesis  Afyon Gedik Ahmet Paşa İl Halk K t phanesi  Milli K t phane-
Ankara (Qarah  iṣār in Arabic-language catalogues). Incorrectly titled Taḥqīq al-Bayān  
this is a copy of Ragib’s The Path to the Nobilities dated 1015/1605.751 
Laleli 171 (methodological introduction – Quran 2:6). Süleymaniye. Istanbul. Attributed to 
Ragib in incipit. 
London Quranic Glossary (methodological introduction). Undated. See Appendix. 
Maktabat al-Qādirīyah 60 ≠ Ragib (Ǧāmiʿ at-Tafsīr) (Quran 23f)  Baghdad  Aš-Šidī reports on 
the basis of an undated Ph D  thesis by  Muḥammad Iqbāl Farḥāt (a -Zaytūnah University, 
Tunis) that the Ragib manuscripts catalogued as being in Baghdad are either not by Ragib 
or are no longer there.
752
  
                                                 
749 Ibid., 390-391. 
750 ———, Quranic Glossary, 9. Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd ar-Razzāq Ruqayḥī, ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad Ḥibšī, and ʿAlī 
Wahhāb Ānisī, Fihrist Ma ṭūṭāt Maktabat al-Ǧāmiʿ al-Kabīr  anʿāʾ, 4 vols. (Sana'a: al-Jumhūrīyah al-ʿArabīyah al-
Yamanīyah / Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-al-Iršād, 1984). 1:211. 
751 Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "Turkey Manuscripts Online Database,"  http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/. 
752 ʿImād ʿAbd as-Salām Raʿūf, al-  ār al-Ḫaṭṭīyah fī al-Maktabah al-Qādirīyah fī Ǧāmiʿ aš-Šay  ʿAbd al-Qādir al-
Kīlānī bi-Baġdād  (Baghdad: Ma baʿat al-Iršād, 1974). 86. Ragib, Exegesis ed  aš-Šidī, 394. 
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At-Taymūrīyah 361 (methodological introduction). Cairo, Egypt. Farḥāt.753 
32 Yalvaç 178 (Tafsīr). Bölge Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi. Konya, Turkey.754 
Yusuf Aga 19 ≠ Ragib  Konya (accessible through S leymaniye, Istanbul). Anonymous  titled 
Tafsīr al-Kitāb al-ʿA ī   catalogued as Anwār al- aqāʾiq by Šams ad-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī  and 
dated 685/1286. 
 
Quranic Glossary (Mufradāt Ġarīb al-Qurʿān al-Karīm) 
ʿAbd al-Ḥasan al-Asadī 3. Al-Kāẓimīyah, Iraq. FS. Mīr Lawḥī.755 
Adab 27. Alexandria, Egypt. “Fragment”. GAL. 
Amasya Beyazıt İl Halk Kütüphanesi 05 Ba 1433. Istanbul, Turkey. Yazmalar.756   
ʿĀrif  Ḥikmet 68. Medina, Saudi Arabia. FS. K. Dāwūdī .757 
ʿĀrif  Ḥikmet 69. Medina, Saudi Arabia. FS. Dāwūdī.758 
Asir Efendi 1120. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey.759  
Āstān-e Quds-e Ra āvī 3/219. Mashhad, Iran. FS. Handlist. Mīr Lawḥī. GALS.760  
                                                 
753 ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed  Farḥāt, 22. I have been unable to find reference to this 
manuscript in the published catalogues of the Taymūrīyah. 
754 Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/". 
755 Manuscripts with “FS” are from Royal Academy for Islamic Civilization Research, al-Fihris aš-Šāmil, 1:125-
126. Volume II contains a key to the manuscript libraries and catalogues cited. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 229. 
756 Catalogued at: Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/". 
757 Cf. ʻUmar Riḍā Kaḥḥālah, al-Munta ab min Ma ṭūṭāt al-Madīnah al-Munawwarah  (Damascus: Majmaʿ al-
Luġah al-ʿArabīyah bi-Dimašq, 1973). 6, 122. Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 39. 
758 ———, Quranic Glossary, 39. 
759 Kütüphane-i Asir Efendi, "Kütüphane-i Asir Efendi," in Nuruosmaniye K t phanesinde mahfu  k t b-  
mevcudenin defteri (Istanbul: Dersaadet, 1888), 7. 
760 Cf. Sayyed ʿAlī Ardalān-e  avān, Fehrest-e Kutub-e Ḫaṭṭī-ye Ketāb ānah-ye Marka ī-ye  stān-e Quds-e Rażāvī, 
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Āstān-e Quds-e Ra āvī 1554. Mashhad, Iran. FS. Handlist. Mīr Lawḥī.761 
 Atıf  Efendi 278. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K. 
Atıf  Efendi 362. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. Cf. GALS. 
Atıf  Efendi 378. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. 
Al-Awqāf 1076. Baghdad, Iraq. FS.  
Ayasofya 432. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, K, GALS. 
Berlin Staatsbibliothek 675/966. Germany. Dated 1265/1849. FS. Ahlwardt. GAL.
762
 
Bešir Aga 77. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, K, GALS. 
Carullah 445. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K. 
Carullah 446. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K. 
Carullah 2048. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. 
Damad Ibrahim 312. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K. 
Damad Ibrahim 313. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K. 
Esad Efendi 3279. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K, GALS. 
Fatih 5272. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K. 
Feyzullah Efendi 365. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K. 
Feyzullah Efendi 2107. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, K, cf. GALS. 
Feyzullah Efendi 2108. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. K.763 
                                                                                                                                                             
25 vols. (Mashhad: Ketābḫānah-ye Markazī-ye Āstān-e Quds-e Ra avī, 1986). 1:582.  Cf. Muḥammad Āṣef Fekrat 
and Muḥammad Vafādār Murādī, Fehrest-e Alefbā’ī-ye Kutub-e Ḫaṭṭī-ye Ketāb ānah-ye Marka ī-ye  stān-e Quds-e 
Rażāvī  (Mashhad: Kitābḫānah-ye Markazī-ye Āstān-e Quds-e Ra avī, 1990). 543. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 228. 
761 Īraǧ Afšār, Muḥammad Taqī Dānišpažūh, Muḥammad Bāqir Ḥuǧǧatī, and Aḥmad Munzavī, Fehrest-e Kitābhā-ye 
Ḫaṭṭī-ye Ketāb ānehā-ye Millī-ye Malik vābastah bi- stān-e Quds-e Rażāvī, 13 vols. (Tehran: Kitābḫānehā-ye 
Millī-ye Malik, 1973). 1:718. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 228. 
762 Cf. Ahlwardt, Ver eichnis, 1:268.  
763 Karabulut, Muʿ am al-Ma ṭūṭāt, 1:471.  
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Feyzullah Efendi 2141. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. ff.81a-252b. Dated 1092/1681. FS. 
 āmiʿat Baṣrah 348. Basra. Iraq. Dated 1061/1651. FS. 
Hadāʾī 114. Selim A a Kütüphanesi, Üsküdar, Istanbul, Turkey. K. 
Halet Efendi 28. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. K. 
Hamidiye 190. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. K. 
Hamidiye 191. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. K. 
Al-Ḥaram 137. Mecca, Saudi Arabia. FS. 
Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīyah. Dated 732/1091. Cairo, Egypt. Fihrist. Cf. GAL, GALS. 764  
Kiliç Ali 176. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, GALS, K. 
Kiliç Ali 177. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, GALS, K. 
Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Library 1484. Patna, Bihar, India. Dated 1088/1677. FS. GALS. Cf. 
GAL 
K prülü 1577. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. Dated 722/1322. FS. Şeşen. GAL.765 
Laleli 3632. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, K, GALS. 
London Quranic Glossary. United Kingdom. Dated 409/1018. See above. 
Al-Maḥmūdīyah 138/218/228. Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Dated 1054/1644. FS, Kaḥḥālah, 
Dāwūdī.766 
Al-Maḥmūdīyah 2019. Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Dāwūdī.767 
Maktabat al-Qādirīyah 99. Baghdad, Iraq. Acephalous. Note at end: 
                                                 
764 Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīyah, Fihrist al-Kutub al-ʿArabīyah al-Maḥfūẓah bi-l-Kutubkhānah al-Khidīwīyah, 7 in 8 
vols. (Cairo: Ma baʻat ʻUṯmān ʻAbd ar-Razzāq, 1888-1893). 1:216.  
765 Şeşen, Fihris Kūprīlū, 2:98.  
766 Kaḥḥālah, al-Munta ab, 122. Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 39. 
767 ———, Quranic Glossary, 39. 
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this book has been rescued from the River Tigris after it was thrown there by the Tatars, 
may God curse them, in the year 656 of the Prophet’s hiǧrah, and I am al-faqīr ilā-llāh 
ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad b.ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Makkī. 
FS. Mīr Lawḥī. Raʿūf.768 




Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesi 45 Hk 2080. Manisa, Turkey. Dated 714/1314. Yazmalar.770  
Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesi 45 Hk 4383. Manisa, Turkey. Dated 1168/1753. Yazmalar.771 
Michigan University Library Sulaiman Purchase Collection. [al-Mufradāt fī gharīb al-
Qurʼān, 19th century?] Former shelfmark: Mich. Isl. Ms. temp. no. 179. United States.772  
Mingana 44/1248. Selly Oak Colleges Library, Birmingham, United Kingdom. Dated 
1190/1776. FS.  
Muhammad Yakun [?] Paşa. Milli Kütüphane. Ankara, Turkey. FS. 
Murad Molla 313. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, K. 




Nuruosmaniye 599. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. K. 
Nuruosmaniye 600. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. K. 
                                                 
768 Raʿūf, al-  ār al-Ḫaṭṭīyah, 125. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 229. 
769 Scanned images viewed at:Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/". 
770 Scanned images viewed at: ibid. 
771 Catalogued at: ibid. 
772 Available online at: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015079132174.  
773 Rudolf Mach and Eric L. Ormsby, Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts (New Series) in the Princeton University 
Library  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 174. 
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Nuruosmaniye 601. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. K. 
Ragıb Paşa 1448. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K. 
Rashed Efendi 1424. Istanbul, Turkey. Dated 998/1590. FS. Cf. K. 
Reşit Efendi 1424. Istanbul, Turkey. Dated 1167/1754. FS. 
Reşit Efendi 117. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. 
Raza Library 620. Rampur, India. FS. GALS. 
Raza Library 621. Rampur, India. FS. 
Ṣanʿāʿ al- āmiʿah al-Kabīr 203. Sana’a, Yemen. Dated 819/1306. FS. Ruqayḥī.774 
Ṣanʿāʿ al- āmiʿah al-Kabīr 219. Sana’a, Yemen. Dated 1306/1889. FS. Ruqayḥī.775 
Selim A a 145. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. Dated 1160/1747. FS, K. 
Selim A a 146. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. Dated 1172/1759. FS, K, GALS. 
Tehran University 553. Tehran, Iran. Mīr Lawḥī.776 
Tokat İl Halk Kütüphanesi 60 Hk 181. Ankara, Turkey. Yazmalar.777 
Topkapı Palace 1747. Istanbul, Turkey. 1167/1754. FS. 
ʿUmūmī. Kitābḫāne-ye ʿUmūmī Ḥa rat-e Naǧafī Marʿašī. Qum, Iran. Dated 701/1302. Purchase 
note dated 735/1335. Marʿašī and Ḥusaynī.778 Cf. Mīr Lawḥī.779     
ʿUmūmī. Kitābḫāne-ye ʿUmūmī Ḥa rat-e Naǧafī Marʿašī 7863. Qum, Iran. Mīr Lawḥī.780  
                                                 
774 Ruqayḥī, Ḥibšī, and Ānisī, Fihrist, 1:219-220. 
775 Ibid. 
776 Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 228. 
777 Scanned images viewed at: Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/". 
778 Maḥmūd Marʿašī and Aḥmad Ḥusaynī, Fehrest-e Nus ehā-ye  aṭṭī Kitāb āne-ye ʿUmūmī  ażrat-e Ayāt Allāḥ 
al-ʿUẓmā Na afī Marʿašī, 40 vols. (Qum: Ṣadrā, 1975). 12:291. 
779 Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 224-227. 
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Umumiya 278/558. Bayezıd. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. K. 
Veliyuddin 445. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. GALS. 
Veliyuddin 446. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. GALS. 
Veliyuddin 447. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. GALS. 
Veliyuddin 448. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. GALS. 
Vehid Paşa 394. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K. 
Yaʿqūb Sarkīs 104. Baghdad University, Iraq. FS. 
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ʿAǧalī’s edition). The section on the knowledge of God (maʿrifat allāh) that al-ʿAǧalī 
places at the end of chapter two (pp.39-63) comes at the end of the manuscript, after 
chapter eight. This fact is alluded to in an internal colophon f.75a, following which is an 
text on the investigation of the word “one” (taḥqīq al-wāḥid, ff.75b-76b), at the end of 
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at the end of the book” (kāna fī ā iri –l-kitābi hāḏā) and its content is very close to, and in 
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786
 and the second of which is Risālah fī-l-Iʿtiqād by ʿAlāʾ ad-Dīn al-Buḫārī 
(completed on 14 Ṣafar 961 / 18 January 1554).787 Both of these works appear to be 
unpublished. On Creeds starts on f. 17b and ends on f.52b. The section on the knowledge 
of God (maʿrifat allāh) that Āstān-e Quds-e Ra āvī 56 places after chapter eight is omitted, 
as is a small section on God’s attributes (pp.74-79 missing at f.22b), and the manuscript 
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finishes early at the end of chapter seven (… fa-mā qāla lī fī šayʾin  ālafata murādahū lima 
faʿalta. p.290).788 
Chester Beatty AR 5277. The Chester Beatty Library. Dublin, Ireland. See description above. 
Undated. The section on the knowledge of God (maʿrifat allāh) that Āstān-e Quds-e Ra āvī 
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section on God’s attributes ommited in Şehid Ali 382 (al-ʿAǧalī pp.74-79) is present 
(ff.14a-15b). A subsequent section on the attributes also appears in a different place (Şehid 
Ali 382’s f.23a (pp.79-82 al-ʿAǧalī) is swopped with Şehid Ali 382’s ff.25b-26a (pp.98-
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section on the knowledge of God, the ordering of the section on the attributes (Şehid Ali 
382’s f.23a), and the early conclusion, but the small section on the attributes omitted by 
Şehid Ali 382 is present in accordance with Chester Beatty AR 5277 (ff.43a-43b). 
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Nuruosmaniye 2383. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K. 
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801 ʿAbd al-Sattār ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq Ḥalwaǧī, Arabic manuscripts in the Egyptian National Library (Dār al-Kutub al-
Miṣriyyah): collections (ma āmīʿ)  (London: Al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation, 2008). 96-97. 
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803 Mach, Yahuda, 169. 
804 Ibid. 
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copying from manuscript dated 591/1195. Stocks and Baker, Murād, Riedel, GAL.833 
British Museum ADD 18529. London, United Kingdom. Dated 14 Ṣafar 523 / 5 February 1129. 
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Tehran Maǧlis 308. Tehran, Iran.Undated, Persian abridged translation. Riedel.857 
Tehran ʿUmūmī 144. Tehran, Iran. Dated 1285/1868. Riedel.858 
Tehran University 1884. Tehran, Iran. Incomplete. Dated 27 Šawwāl 1068 / 28 July 1658. Mīr 
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 198ِكتاٌب ِمْن َكلاِم الرَّاِغِب في الَبديع 
   َتقاِسيُم الَكلام ]b3.f[
ضَا ْ ٌب يُِفيُد ِا  بان اةا هْما ُل لا حاجا ةا ا  لى ِذْكرِِه وا الُس ْ تاْعما ُل على ضَا ْ ب اِين ل ُ االكَلا ُم ضَا ب اِين ُمهْما ٌل وا ُمس ْ تاْعما ٌل فا 
شارا ِة ] عاٍين ِمن عاٍين ما قام ٍ
ِ
بان اةا عاٍين وا تاُقوُم ما قاما الا
ِ
[ كذا ] ما قاما الا شارِة [خ: ضَا ْ ٌب يُِفيُد ا
298
وٰذِلِا  
اِد دض ْالأ َوا  فاِت ل ِتا خ ْاَلأْعلاُم وضَا ْ ٌب ُوِضعا ِلُيِفيدا على طا رِيِق اِلاْشِتِاِك وا ٰذِلِا ِقْسما ِين ِقْسٌم ي اقاُع على ال ُ 
ُصوصًا كافاْرٍس وا ِحماٍر في ٌم ي ات اناوا ُل ما خ ْعاِل فاعا لا وا صا ناعا وِقْس فْ ماِء ل اْوٌن وا جا ْوها ٌر وا في الأ َس ْكاقوِلِا في الأ َ
 عالفْ ماءا وا خا را جا وا ضَا ا با في الأ َس ْالأ َ
ا ن ْم ِوا  تاِلفاين ُِمخ ْ نِياين ِع ْما ا ما ُوِضعا ل ِن ْم ِوا  ه ِص  ٍ ب ًِنى واِحٍد ُمختا ع ْما ا ما ُوِضعا ل ِن ٍْب م ُِة على َأْضَ ُِفيدا ال ُ  اُظ لفالأ َوا  
 تالاُفوا ِفي اخ ْوا   لُ َاتاين ِيَا ُوُز ِفي  ن َّه ُأ َضًا اِلُث لا ِخلافا َأيْ الث َّ انيُّ وا الث َّ وا  يه ُِل لا ِخلافا ف ِوَّ الأ َفا  ما ُوِضعا ِلِضدَّ ين ِ
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  192
 ص جا واِزِه [
ِ
] ذا كان: ا
398
 ]a4.f[ وا ْجْان ِ ظٍ ِمن ٰذِلِا ف ْل ا  تاطا ل َّبا ِلك  ِ ما ن أ بَا جا وازا ٰذِلِا اِحدا ٍة وا وا  لُ َاٍة ِفي  
هاِء الُفقا باِء وا دا ٌير ِمن الأأ ثِ كا  ِلفاِن فاأ بَا ٰذِلِا تا نِياِن ُمخ ْظِ الواِحِد ما ع ْف ْللا ْن يُرادا ِبا اْختالاُفوا ها ل يُصا حُّ أ َ ُثَّ 
 يحح ِالصَّ  وا ه ُم وا جا وَّ زا ُه ب اْعُضهُوا 
 راع ُِل الشَّ و ْقا  ٰذِلِا على وا 
 ِاع ُس ِ  جا واِن ِ ِه ال تاعا قَّما ِفي   ر ٍاٍء أ ِجٍن الجامَّ اِت قاف ْما وا   
ِة قاْفٌر ِمن ِصفا ِة الاِء وا نَّ الأ ِجنا ِمن ِصفا ِلأ َ  ال ِات  ِكانُُه ِفي ما وا  وا أأِريدا ه ُ د ْقا كاِنِه وا لاُق على ما يُط ْ د ْالاُء قا وا 
 جا واِنِب ِتفاُر ِفي تِقاُم اِلاح ْبحاش ية: اِلاع ْ [ يهصاِء ف ِتِق ْْس ِضُع الا ِٰهذا ما و ْ سا ل اتْ وا  فاين ُِوِصفا بالوا ْص  د ْقا كاِن وا ال ا 
  ] صا  الأ َ وا ه ُدُّ ُد وا التَِّ ا  وا يُقاُل ه ُ] وا  كذا  [ِِير ال ِ
 
 [ ُاُلمساَوه]
الُساوا ُه وا ُهوا َأْن ياكونا اللافظُ ُمساِويّ  ً لِلما عنىا لا زاِيدا [كذا]  عليه  وا ِمن هذا الِاِب [باُب الاس تِعارِة]
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  292
 ولا ناِقصا عنه كاما قال بعُضهم في وا ْصِف ب اِليغ ٍكان ا ِْ َألفاُظُه قاواِلُب لعِنيها ونَا و
 د ْوي اأْتِْيكا ِباَلأْخباِر ما ن ل ام تُزا و  ِ  سا تُْبِدي لِا ا اَلأيُّم ما ُكْن ِا جاِهلا ً  
 ونَا و
 وا َأوَّ ُل را اٍض س ُ نًَّة ما ن ي اِسْيرُ ها  
 وكاقوِل ُزها ير
س ُ ِيْم ُِ [كذا]  
498
 ثاماِنينا عاامًا لا َأبا لِا ا ي اْسأَم ِ  تاكاِليفا الحياِة وما ن ي اِعْش  
ْذ قاْد ُذِكرا َأن َُّه س ُ ِئِا تاكاِليفا الحياِة لا 
ِ
ْذ كان ا ِْ الحياُة لا تُملُّ فا  نَّ الُعلاما اُء ارتاضا وُه وا اس ْ تاْحس ا ُنوُه ا
ِ
الحياِة ا
 وا فُض ِ لا على ب اتْ ِ ل ا ِ يٍد حا ْيُث ي اقول ُ
  وا ُسؤاِل ٰهذا الناِس كاْيفا ل ا ِ ْيُد   وا ل اقاْد س ُ ئِْم ُِ ِمن الحياِة وا ُطول اها  
 
                                                 
 واُب س ُ ِئْم ُِ والصَّ  498 
  392
 الَبسُط





ِكُِّ وال ِاِطيُء الفاهِما َأْو كان اللافظُ ُمشتِا ِكا ًب اين ما عنِياين حا ِقيقاتاين َأْو حا ِقيقاٍة وما 
جااٍز َأْو القارِيُب وال ِاِعيُد والذَّ
لى الا ش ْ ِاع
ِ
 عاٍم وخاص  ٍ َأْو ِلِصْدِق الِعنايِة بموِرِد الخابَا ِ فاياحتاُج ا
 
 698ُير الرَّاِغبَتْفِس
 ]a42.f :48 halluraC[
ن ْ
ِ
 قادا نارًا وا لا ي اِليُق أ ن ْو ْوا قاْد قالا ِفي الأ وَّ ِل ما ث الُكُُ كَا اثاِل الذَّ ِ ي اس ْ تا  ِلِا ِقيلا كايفا وا ْجُه العا ْطِف ِفي ذ ٰ فاا
 لِ ِبأَن َُّه أأِريدا َأْو كَا َْهِل ِصتٍب ِمْن السَّ ماِء وا ِقيلا ب اعدا ُه كاِصتٍب ِقيلا قاْد أأِجيبا عا ْن ذ ٰ يُقالا 
ِ
ِلِا عاْطٌف نَّ ذ ٰا
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  492
ِلِا أ  نَّ الت َّْشِبيها تارا ًة يُْؤتا نىا وا ذ ٰعالىا ال اع ْ
798
ِفي اللاْفظِ وا تارا ًة يُْؤتا  ب اقًا للُمش ا َِّه ِاِبِه ُمط 
898
ِبِه عالىا ما ي اْقتاِضيِه  
 صاب ا ِْ ِذِه الحايوِة كَا اثاِل ِرٍيح ِفيها صَا ٌّ أ َما ث اُل ما ي اْنِفُقونا ِفي ه ٰ ۝ِلِا قاوُلَُ تاعالىا  ذ ٰنىا ُدونا اللاْفظِ عالىا ال اع ْ
ُموا أ نُْفسا هُْم َأصاب اْتُه ِريحٌ فاْرِعيٌّ  وا ما ْعناُه كاحا ْرِث قاْوم ٍ ۝حا ْرِث قاْوٍم ظا لاُموا أ نُْفسا هُْم 
ظا لا
998
ُدونا  ِفيِه ال اْعنىا  
 ِلِا قاْوُل الشَّ اِعر ِوا عالىا ذ ٰاللاْفظِ 
 الُعْنوانا ِفي الر  ِق  ِ كاتُِب  كاما را قَّشا   ما ناِزل ٌ ِن عاْوٍف طانا ب ْفاِلابْناِة ح ِ  
 ذا النَّْوُع ِمْن الت َّْشِبيِه يُقاُل لَا ُ الت َّشِبيُه الُل افَُّف وا ه ٰ وا تاْقِديُرُه كاُعْنواٍن را قَّش  ُه الكاتُِب 
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لىا َأنَّ َأواِيِلها 
ِ
نَّ النَّاسا اْختالاُفوا ِفي اللَُاِت فاذا ها با ب اْعُض الُتاكا ِ ِمينا ا
ِ
اْصِطلاٌح [كذا] وا ِباِلله التَّْوِفيِق ا
لاَّ ِباِلخطاِب وا لا ِلِا ِبأَن َُّه لا سا ِبيوا الِاِقِ يُصا حُّ َأْن ياُكونا تاْوِقيفًا وا اس ْ تادا لَّ عالىا ذ ٰ
ِ
لىا ما ْعرِفاِة ُمراِد ِالله ا
ِ
لا ا
 ِبُمراِدِه ُضَُ ورا ًة يُصا حُّ َأْن تاْعلاما ُه ُضَُ ورا ًة ِلأَنَّ الِعْلْا ِبُمراِدِه فاْرٌع عالىا الِعْلِْ ِبذاتِِه فالا يُصا حُّ َأْن ياُكونا الِعلْ ُْ
لىا َأْن ياُكوِن الِعْلُْ ِلِا يُؤا وا الِعْلُْ ِبذاتِِه ُمْكت اس ِ ًِا ِلأَنَّ ذ ٰ
ِ
 وا الجاِلُِّ ُمْكت اس ِ ًِا ِوذ ٰ الخاِفي  ِد ِ ي ا
ِلِا فااِسٌد ُضَُ وِريَّّ ً
ل ايِه الجُْمهُوُر َأن َُّه تاْوِقيٌف ه ٰ
ِ
ْن شاءا ُالله ما ذا ها با ا
ِ
ذا ما قالَا ُ وا الصَّ ِحيُح ا
109
وا قاْبلا الدَّ لالَا ِ عالىا ال اس ْ ئالَا ِ ن ُ ِاين ِ ُ  
س ْ ئالَا ِ وا القاولا ِفي ذ ِٰالله تاعالىا ِعِادا ُه عالىا َأي ِ وا ْجٍه ياُكوُن فاذ َٰأنَّ تاْعِليما 
ِلِا َأنَّ اللها ِلِا يُسا ه ُِل الكَلا ما ِفي ال ا
لىا ذ ٰ
ِ
لاَّ  اللَّّ  ُ يُكا ِ ما ه ُ َأن ْ ِلباشا  ٍ كاا نا  وا ما ا۝ِلِا ِبقاوِلَِ تاعالىا قاْد َأشارا ا
ِ
 يُْرِسلا  َأو ْ ٍب ِحجاا ا وا را اء ِ ِمن ْ َأو ْ وا ْحيًا ا
ْذِنه ِ فاُيوِحا  را ُسوًلا 
ِ
۝ي اشا اء ُ ما ا ِبا
 209
كارا َأنَّ ُمكال اما تاُه تاعالىا الباشا ا عالىا َأحا ِد ه ٰ
ِذِه اَلأْوُجِه الث َّلاثاِة َأْشَا فُها فاذا
كانا با  لقاِء  ما كانا ِبا  ْرساِل را ُسوٍل يارا ى ذاتاُه وا ي اْسما ُع كَلا ما ُه كاحاِل النَِّب ِ ما عا ِجْبَِيلا عالايِه السَّ لاُم وا الث َّانيُّ ما
ابْتِداِء الر  ِسالَا ِ وا الث َّاِلُث ما كانا يُْوِح  كَلا ٍم ِفي السَّ ْمع ِِمْن غاْيرِ ُرْؤي اٍة كاحاِل ُمْوسَا عالايِه السَّ لاُم ِفي 
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لْهاُم وا الت َّْسِخُير وا ال اناماُت فاتاْعِلُيم ِالله تاعالىا أ دا ما 
ِ
اَلأْسماءا وا الوا ْحُ هاُهنا ما ْخُصوٌص بالا  لقاِء ِفي الرُّ ْوع ِوا الا
نَّ الاْصِطلاحا ِذِه الُوُجوُه وا ُمحاٌل َأْن ياُكونا الاْصِطلاُح عالىا عالىا َأحا ِد ه ٰ
ِ
 اَلألْفاِظ ُمتاقادَّ مًا عالىا التَّْعِلِيم فاا
ْن ِقيلا فاما عالايِه وا ذ ٰ [كذا]لا بُدَّ لَا ُ ِمْن كَلا ٍم ي اتاواُطونا 
ِ
ِلِا يُؤا د ِ ي ِا  لىا َأنَّ لا ياُكوُن اْصِطلاٌح وا لا لُ َاٌة فاا
نَّ ا
ِ
شاراٌت وا تاْصِوي ٌِ فاا
ِ
ِلِا وا لَا ُ ما خاِرُج الحُُروِف ي اْقِدُر عالىا ذ ٰ ]b62.f[َلأْخرا ُس تاْنكاُرونا َأْن تُواِضُعوا ا
شاراُت يُْفهاُم عا ْنا ِبالا ِ
ِ
س ْ تِْدلاِل كاساِيِر ِلأَناَّ نَا ِ ُد الذَّ ِ ينا لا ي اتاكا َُّمونا ي اْفهاُمونا وا يُْفهاُمونا وا لا لُ َاةا ل اُهم ِقيلا الا
لاَّ اِلاس ْ تِْدلال فاقا ْ اِلاس ْ تِْدلالاِت ال َِّتِ لاْو تاوا هَّّ ْ [كذا]
ِ
نا الكَلا ما ُمْرتافاعًا لاصا حَّ ُحُصوُلَُ وا لاتسا ِل َ ْخرا ِس ا
ن َّما صا وتُُه كاصا وِت الط ِ ْفِل الذَّ ِ ي ل اْم ي اتالاقَّن اَلألْفاظا وا اللُ َا 
ِ
ن َّما ياُكوُن لُ َاٌة وا لا قُْدرا ةا لَا ُ عالىا َألْفاِظ تُؤا ل ُِفها وا ا
ِ
ُة ا
لىا ذ ِٰبحُُصوِل تار ْ
ِ
كانا ِمن شَا ْ ِط ال ُِْكُِ َأْن ِكيِب الُْفرا داِت الث َّلاِث وا ل اْو كاِن ا
ِلِا سا ِبيٌل ِمن غاْيرِ تاْعِلِيم لا
ن َّما عَا ا زا عا ْن الكَلا ِم ِلعا ْجزِِه عا ْن التَّ 
ِ
ع ِفاث ا ِا ِا لاُقِن ِبالسَّ م ْي اتاواضا عوا ِفيما ب اتْنا ُم كَلا مًا ِلأَنَّ أ فاُة ال ُِْكُِ ِمن السَّ ْمع ِفاا
لاَّ ِمْن ُمعا لْ ِ ِ وا ذ ٰ
ِ
ْن َأنَّ ابْتِداءا تاْعِلِيم الكَلا ِم لا ياُكوُن ا
ِ
ِلِا قاْد كانا ِمْن ِالله تاعالىا ِلأ دا ما ِبأَْخِد الُوُجوِه الُتاقاد  ِ ما ِة ا
لاَّ وا 
ِ
مَّ ا ِقيلا كاْيفا عال َّما ُه اَلأساِمي ُكَُّها وا قاْد عاِلْمنا َأن َُّه ما ِمْن زا ما ٍن ا
ِ
ب اُنوها ي اِصُفوِن َأساِمي ِلما عاٍن وا َأْعياٍن ا
نَّ ُكَُّ ذ ٰ
ِ
لايها عا ْن غاْيرِها ِقيلا قاْد قالا ب اْعُض النَّاِس ا
ِ
مَّ ا ما نُْقولَا ً ا
ِ
عال َّما ها ُالله أ دا ما  ]كذا[ِلِا ِبُِ ِزيِّتِا ُمْختِا ا عاًة وا ا
ْن أأْظهِرا ِفي ب اْعِض اَلأْزِمناِة ِمْن ب اْعِض َأه ْ
ِ




فارا ِس وا القاواِنينا الُش ْ تاِملَا ِ عالىا الُفُروع ِوا ال اعاِني الُكِ يَِّة الُْنطا ِوي َِّة عالىا اَلأْجزاِء كَا اْعرِفاِة جا ْوها ِر الا
يقاُة الشََّّ ِء كَا أُصوِل الضََّّ ْ ِب ِفي اِلحساِب وا َأْحواِل اَلأبْعاِد وا ال اقاِديِر وا الهاْندا سا ة ِال َِّتِ تُْعرا ُف ِبِا حا ق ِ
309
 
 ]كذا[الكاِثْيرا ُة ِفي الِفْقِه وا الكَلا ِم وا النَّْحِو فاأَمَّ ا ما ْعرِفاُة الجُِزيِّت  ]كذا[عالايها الساِيُل   ]كذا[وا الأأُصوِل ال ا ِْ ِن ِ 
عا ْن الأأُصوِل فالاتْسا ِبِعْلٍْ وا لا يُقاُل العاِرُف  ُمتاعا ر  ِي َّة ً
409




ِبِا عاِلٌم عالىا الا
ذا كانا كاذ ٰ
ِ
ْعلاُمُه القاواِنينا وا الأأُصولا الُش ْ تاِملَا ا ُمحاكاةا ال ِا ِْ َاِء ِل َ لْفاِظ وا ا
ِ
ِلِا فاتاْعِلُيم ِالله أ دا ما اَلأْسماءا ُكَُّها ا
ل ٰ ]كذا[عالىا الجُِزيِّت 
ِ
هِيَِّة ِمْن وا الُفُروع ِوا قاْد عُِلْا َأنَّ تاْعِليما الُكِ يَّاتا َأْعظا ُم ِفي اَلأْعَُ وب اِة وا َأش ْ ِاُه ِبالأأُموِر الا
ا وا حا قاِيقاها الصَّ ِب ِ الحاْرفا ب اْعدا الحاْرفا وا قاوُلَُ اَلأْسماءا ُكَُّها َأرادا ِبِه اَلألْفاظا وا ال اعاِني ُمْفرا داتِا ا وا ُمرا كَِّ اتِا  تاْعِليمِنا
سا ِب الوا ْضع ِِلِا َأنَّ اِلاْسْا يُس ْ تاْعما ُل عالىا ضَا ْ ب اِين َأحا ُدُهما ِبحا وا ذا واتا اَلأش ْ ياءا ِفي َأنُْفِسها وا ب اياُن ذ ٰ ]كذا[
ا ِباِلاْسِْ ِلِا يُقاُل ِل َ نْواع ِالث َّلاثاِة ال َِّتِ ِهِا الُْخبَا ُ عا ْنُه وا الخابَا ُ وا الرَّ اِب ُ ب اتْنا ُما وا ِهِا الُْعتابَا ُ عان ْاَلأوَّ ِل وا ذ ٰ
ن َُّه تاعالىا ل اْم يارِْد ِبقاووا الِفْعِل وا الحاْرِف وا ه ٰ
ِ
ِلَِ وا عالَّْ ا أ دا ما اَلأْسماءا ُكَُّها تاْعِليم اُه را ُجًلا وا فارا سًا ذا ُهوا الُراُد هاُهنا فاا
ذا ُعرِضا عالايِه  ]a72.f[ُدونا ذا ها با وا خا را جا 
ِ
نْساُن اِلاْسْا فاياُكونا عاِرفًا ُمسا مَّ اُه ا
ِ
وا ِمْن وا عا ْن وا لا ي اْعرُِف الا
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ساِمي ِبلُ َاٍة ما ْح ُِولَا ٍي اْعرُِف الُسا مَّ ى َألا تارا ى َأنَّ لاْو عاِلْمنا أ َ 
609
وا ل اْم ن اْعرِْف ُصورا ةا ما لَا ُ تِْلْا اَلأْسماِء  
ذا شاها دناها وا ُكنَّا عاِرِفينا ِبأَْصواٍت ُمجا رَّ دا ٍة فاث ا ِا ِا َأنَّ ما ْعرِِفةا اِلاْسِْ لا ُيُْ صا 
ِ
لاَّ ِبما ْعرِفاِة ل اْم ناُكْن عاِرفًا ِبِا ا
ِ
ُل ا
ُصوِل ما ْعرِفاِتِه ِفي الضَّ ِمِير ُثَّ ال اْعلُوماُت قاْد ياُكوُن جا واِهرا وا َأْعراضًا ِمْن كَا ِيَّاٍت الُسا مَّ ى ِفي ن اْفِسِه وا ح ُ
ضافاٍت وا ساِيِر 
ِ
ِذِه ِلِا ِمْن اَلأْعراِض وا ُيَْ عا ُل لِلشََّّ ِء الواِحِد َأساِمي ِبحاسا ِب ه ٰذ ٰ ]كذا[وا كايِفيَّاٍت وا ا
نْساُن عاِرفًا بِ ِٰ النَّظا راِت فالا بُدَّ َأْن ياُكون ِ
ِ
ِذِه ال اعاِني ُمْجتاِمعا ًة وا ُمْفتِا ِقاًة حا تََّّ ياُكوُن عاِرفًا ِباَلأْسماِء ال َِّتِ الا
ُتُْ عا ُل ل اها
709
ن َُّه يُقاُل لِلشَّ ْخِص الواِحِد فُلاٌن اْعتِِارًا ِبلاقاِبِه وا را ُجٌل اْعتِِارًا ِبابْنِِه وا َأٌخ ِبحاس ا ِبِا ِمثاُل ذ ٰ 
ِ
ِلِا ا
 وا  ه ُضا َّ  ن ْما ب ِ  ِارا ًتِ اع ِْبابْنِِه وا َأٌخ  ِارا ًتِ اع ْ
ِ
با سا ن ا  ه ُيَّّ ا
809
اِنيٌّ بِا ْص أ َوا  ِشٌّ را قُ وا  
909
  ه ِلا  ِب ا وا  ه ِتِ يلا ب ِقا ب ِ ِارا ًتِ اع ْ 
ِ
 ْير ْغا  لىا ا
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 212 ayfosayA :ما كّ ِ ٌّ  909
  019
ِ
 فا  هاداد ُعا تا  ُث ُك ْيا  ِتِ الَّ  ماء ِس ْالأ َ ن ْم ِ ِلِا ذ ٰ ْير ِغا  لىا ا
ِ
  مال ِ ة ٌنا م  ِضا تا م ُ اُكَُّه ءا ْسماالأ َ أ دا ما  وا عالَّْ ا  ِلَ ِو ْقا  ة ُيقا ق ِحا  ا ًذا
 212 ayfosayA : ناه ُر ْكا ذا
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